Celia A. Harvey, Jonah Busch and Muhammad Farid, Jakarta | Thu, 11/11/2010 10:05 AM | Opinion
A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
The international community is currently tackling two urgent global problems: the rapid increase in climate change and the ongoing loss of biodiversity. Two weeks ago, delegates from around the world gathered in Nagoya, Japan to discuss the failure of countries to meet their 2010 biodiversity targets and to propose new targets for reducing further biodiversity loss. And, at the end of this month, country delegates will convene in Cancun, Mexico, to continue the ongoing climate negotiations and seek solutions to the climate crisis.
One topic that is critical is how to deal with deforestation and degradation of the world’s tropical forests.
Each year, roughly 13 million hectares of forests are cleared globally, resulting in the emission of around 4.4 billion tons of CO2, or roughly 15 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change.
This deforestation also leads to the loss of hundreds — or perhaps even thousands — of plant and animal species, and negatively impacts local and indigenous communities who depend on these forests for their livelihoods.
In Indonesia alone, it is estimated that roughly 1 million hectares of forests are lost each year, resulting in the annual emission of more than a billion tons of CO2, and negatively impacting Indonesia’s biodiversity. Indonesia has a very rich biodiversity, including at least 58 amphibian species, 182 bird species and 141 mammal species that are endemic to its forests and are found nowhere else on earth.
REDD+ offers an opportunity to tackle both of these problems simultaneously. REDD+ is an international policy mechanism in which developed countries provide incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, and to enhance carbon sequestration through forest conservation, carbon stock enhancement and sustainable management.
For Indonesia, REDD+ is an unprecedented opportunity to conserve its remaining forests, significantly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and earn revenue in support of sustainable development. It is also a unique opportunity to conserve forest habitat for the country’s remarkable biodiversity.
Although the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) mechanism is designed primarily to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest sector, there are several reasons why it is also likely to provide unprecedented benefits for biodiversity.
First, for REDD+ to be successful, policy-makers will need to find ways to address the many drivers of deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Most of these drivers of deforestation are also the key threats to biodiversity conservation.
Second, the approaches that policy makers will use to conserve and sustainably manage forests will likely build on approaches already developed and implemented by the conservation community. These key approaches include payments to local communities and jurisdictions that conserve forest, the expansion of the protected area system, the improved management of existing protected areas, recognition of indigenous communities and community-managed areas, prevention of fires, as well as the use of agroforestry systems and agricultural intensification on degraded land to reduce pressure on remaining forests.
Third, both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation are dependent on good governance. Under REDD+, governments will need to strengthen their forest governance, enhance their capacity to monitor forest cover and illegal logging, and develop clear legal and financial frameworks and law enforcement to protect remaining forests.
In addition, they will need to clarify land tenure issues and carbon rights. All of the steps towards improving forest governance will not only help ensure that REDD+ conserves forests and reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but also benefit the biodiversity that relies upon these forests.
Finally, the success of both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation efforts will depend on active participation and support of local stakeholders. If local communities and stakeholders are well-informed and supportive of efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation and actively involved in decision-making and implementation of REDD+, it is more likely that forests will be conserved over the long term, providing both mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Of course, REDD+ on its own is not enough to solve either the climate change or biodiversity crisis. In order to tackle climate change, additional mitigation activities such as reducing fossil fuel use, using renewable energy and promoting energy efficiency through development of a low carbon development strategy are needed.
To achieve biodiversity conservation, additional conservation measures will be needed in non-forest ecosystems and in areas that may have little mitigation potential but are of important conservation value.
However, if REDD+ is well-designed and appropriately implemented, it would be a giant and historic step forward towards solving both the climate and biodiversity crises. With its vast (but rapidly disappearing) forests and extraordinary biodiversity, Indonesia is a unique position to provide global leadership in ensuring REDD+ delivers both climate mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Dr. Celia Harvey is vice president of Global Change and Ecosystem
Services at Conservation International. Dr. Jonah Busch is a climate and forest economist at Conservation International. Muhammad Farid, MSc. is a climate change
specialist for Conservation International Indonesia Program.
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Climate change, biodiversity and REDD+-Klipping Jakarta Post
Celia A. Harvey, Jonah Busch and Muhammad Farid, Jakarta | Thu, 11/11/2010 10:05 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
The international community is currently tackling two urgent global problems: the rapid increase in climate change and the ongoing loss of biodiversity. Two weeks ago, delegates from around the world gathered in Nagoya, Japan to discuss the failure of countries to meet their 2010 biodiversity targets and to propose new targets for reducing further biodiversity loss. And, at the end of this month, country delegates will convene in Cancun, Mexico, to continue the ongoing climate negotiations and seek solutions to the climate crisis.
One topic that is critical is how to deal with deforestation and degradation of the world’s tropical forests.
Each year, roughly 13 million hectares of forests are cleared globally, resulting in the emission of around 4.4 billion tons of CO2, or roughly 15 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change.
This deforestation also leads to the loss of hundreds — or perhaps even thousands — of plant and animal species, and negatively impacts local and indigenous communities who depend on these forests for their livelihoods.
In Indonesia alone, it is estimated that roughly 1 million hectares of forests are lost each year, resulting in the annual emission of more than a billion tons of CO2, and negatively impacting Indonesia’s biodiversity. Indonesia has a very rich biodiversity, including at least 58 amphibian species, 182 bird species and 141 mammal species that are endemic to its forests and are found nowhere else on earth.
REDD+ offers an opportunity to tackle both of these problems simultaneously. REDD+ is an international policy mechanism in which developed countries provide incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, and to enhance carbon sequestration through forest conservation, carbon stock enhancement and sustainable management.
For Indonesia, REDD+ is an unprecedented opportunity to conserve its remaining forests, significantly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and earn revenue in support of sustainable development. It is also a unique opportunity to conserve forest habitat for the country’s remarkable biodiversity.
Although the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) mechanism is designed primarily to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest sector, there are several reasons why it is also likely to provide unprecedented benefits for biodiversity.
First, for REDD+ to be successful, policy-makers will need to find ways to address the many drivers of deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Most of these drivers of deforestation are also the key threats to biodiversity conservation.
Second, the approaches that policy makers will use to conserve and sustainably manage forests will likely build on approaches already developed and implemented by the conservation community. These key approaches include payments to local communities and jurisdictions that conserve forest, the expansion of the protected area system, the improved management of existing protected areas, recognition of indigenous communities and community-managed areas, prevention of fires, as well as the use of agroforestry systems and agricultural intensification on degraded land to reduce pressure on remaining forests.
Third, both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation are dependent on good governance. Under REDD+, governments will need to strengthen their forest governance, enhance their capacity to monitor forest cover and illegal logging, and develop clear legal and financial frameworks and law enforcement to protect remaining forests.
In addition, they will need to clarify land tenure issues and carbon rights. All of the steps towards improving forest governance will not only help ensure that REDD+ conserves forests and reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but also benefit the biodiversity that relies upon these forests.
Finally, the success of both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation efforts will depend on active participation and support of local stakeholders. If local communities and stakeholders are well-informed and supportive of efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation and actively involved in decision-making and implementation of REDD+, it is more likely that forests will be conserved over the long term, providing both mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Of course, REDD+ on its own is not enough to solve either the climate change or biodiversity crisis. In order to tackle climate change, additional mitigation activities such as reducing fossil fuel use, using renewable energy and promoting energy efficiency through development of a low carbon development strategy are needed.
To achieve biodiversity conservation, additional conservation measures will be needed in non-forest ecosystems and in areas that may have little mitigation potential but are of important conservation value.
However, if REDD+ is well-designed and appropriately implemented, it would be a giant and historic step forward towards solving both the climate and biodiversity crises. With its vast (but rapidly disappearing) forests and extraordinary biodiversity, Indonesia is a unique position to provide global leadership in ensuring REDD+ delivers both climate mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Dr. Celia Harvey is vice president of Global Change and Ecosystem
Services at Conservation International. Dr. Jonah Busch is a climate and forest economist at Conservation International. Muhammad Farid, MSc. is a climate change
specialist for Conservation International Indonesia Program.
A | A | A |
The international community is currently tackling two urgent global problems: the rapid increase in climate change and the ongoing loss of biodiversity. Two weeks ago, delegates from around the world gathered in Nagoya, Japan to discuss the failure of countries to meet their 2010 biodiversity targets and to propose new targets for reducing further biodiversity loss. And, at the end of this month, country delegates will convene in Cancun, Mexico, to continue the ongoing climate negotiations and seek solutions to the climate crisis.
One topic that is critical is how to deal with deforestation and degradation of the world’s tropical forests.
Each year, roughly 13 million hectares of forests are cleared globally, resulting in the emission of around 4.4 billion tons of CO2, or roughly 15 percent of the greenhouse gas emissions responsible for climate change.
This deforestation also leads to the loss of hundreds — or perhaps even thousands — of plant and animal species, and negatively impacts local and indigenous communities who depend on these forests for their livelihoods.
In Indonesia alone, it is estimated that roughly 1 million hectares of forests are lost each year, resulting in the annual emission of more than a billion tons of CO2, and negatively impacting Indonesia’s biodiversity. Indonesia has a very rich biodiversity, including at least 58 amphibian species, 182 bird species and 141 mammal species that are endemic to its forests and are found nowhere else on earth.
REDD+ offers an opportunity to tackle both of these problems simultaneously. REDD+ is an international policy mechanism in which developed countries provide incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation, and to enhance carbon sequestration through forest conservation, carbon stock enhancement and sustainable management.
For Indonesia, REDD+ is an unprecedented opportunity to conserve its remaining forests, significantly reduce its greenhouse gas emissions and earn revenue in support of sustainable development. It is also a unique opportunity to conserve forest habitat for the country’s remarkable biodiversity.
Although the REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) mechanism is designed primarily to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the forest sector, there are several reasons why it is also likely to provide unprecedented benefits for biodiversity.
First, for REDD+ to be successful, policy-makers will need to find ways to address the many drivers of deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Most of these drivers of deforestation are also the key threats to biodiversity conservation.
Second, the approaches that policy makers will use to conserve and sustainably manage forests will likely build on approaches already developed and implemented by the conservation community. These key approaches include payments to local communities and jurisdictions that conserve forest, the expansion of the protected area system, the improved management of existing protected areas, recognition of indigenous communities and community-managed areas, prevention of fires, as well as the use of agroforestry systems and agricultural intensification on degraded land to reduce pressure on remaining forests.
Third, both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation are dependent on good governance. Under REDD+, governments will need to strengthen their forest governance, enhance their capacity to monitor forest cover and illegal logging, and develop clear legal and financial frameworks and law enforcement to protect remaining forests.
In addition, they will need to clarify land tenure issues and carbon rights. All of the steps towards improving forest governance will not only help ensure that REDD+ conserves forests and reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but also benefit the biodiversity that relies upon these forests.
Finally, the success of both REDD+ and biodiversity conservation efforts will depend on active participation and support of local stakeholders. If local communities and stakeholders are well-informed and supportive of efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation and actively involved in decision-making and implementation of REDD+, it is more likely that forests will be conserved over the long term, providing both mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Of course, REDD+ on its own is not enough to solve either the climate change or biodiversity crisis. In order to tackle climate change, additional mitigation activities such as reducing fossil fuel use, using renewable energy and promoting energy efficiency through development of a low carbon development strategy are needed.
To achieve biodiversity conservation, additional conservation measures will be needed in non-forest ecosystems and in areas that may have little mitigation potential but are of important conservation value.
However, if REDD+ is well-designed and appropriately implemented, it would be a giant and historic step forward towards solving both the climate and biodiversity crises. With its vast (but rapidly disappearing) forests and extraordinary biodiversity, Indonesia is a unique position to provide global leadership in ensuring REDD+ delivers both climate mitigation and biodiversity benefits.
Dr. Celia Harvey is vice president of Global Change and Ecosystem
Services at Conservation International. Dr. Jonah Busch is a climate and forest economist at Conservation International. Muhammad Farid, MSc. is a climate change
specialist for Conservation International Indonesia Program.
ASEAN eyeing investment in regional connectivity - Klipping Jakarta Post
Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 11/05/2010 10:20 AM | World
A | A | A |
ASEAN is inviting countries outside the region to invest in Southeast Asia, as ASEAN member states are working on numerous projects to connect with one another and integrate, creating a single market.
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan reaffirmed the importance of building intra-regional connectivity within ASEAN.
ASEAN connectivity will enhance trade, investment, tourism, infrastructure, people-to-people exchanges and development among member countries, which are the main goals of the people-oriented ASEAN Community by 2015, he said.
“Goods being shipped from Bangkok to Los Angeles are cheaper than goods shipped from Bangkok to a small port in the southern Philippines, because there is no connectivity,” Pitsuwan said Thursday in an address at the ASEAN secretariat before ambassadors to ASEAN and Indonesia.
ASEAN declared the adoption of the ASEAN Connectivity master plan on Oct. 28, during the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi.
With the association’s decision to promote connectivity, all are now looking at an opportunity to make (or improve) investment in the region, Pitsuwan said.
Japan had reaped ¥280 billion (US$3.45 billion) in profits each year from its investments in ASEAN, he said.
“This is just to show you that we’re productive and that ASEAN should not be considered only a boutique of collections,” he said.
According to Pitsuwan, last year’s total trade among ASEAN members stood at $1.5 trillion, $3.3 trillion among members of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea), $13.2 trillion among ASEAN+6 (plus India, Australia and New Zealand) and $28.5 trillion among ASEAN+8 (plus the US and Russia).
Pitsuwan said those trade figures would increase further if there was better connectivity.
Indonesian Ambassador to ASEAN Ngurah Swajaya, who also spoke at the ASEAN secretariat, said Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand had expressed an interest in improving connectivity in the region.
“In Indonesia alone there are at least 12 flagship projects to be offered to ASEAN’s partners in the form of [official development assistance], and [public private partnerships],” he said.
A | A | A |
ASEAN is inviting countries outside the region to invest in Southeast Asia, as ASEAN member states are working on numerous projects to connect with one another and integrate, creating a single market.
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan reaffirmed the importance of building intra-regional connectivity within ASEAN.
ASEAN connectivity will enhance trade, investment, tourism, infrastructure, people-to-people exchanges and development among member countries, which are the main goals of the people-oriented ASEAN Community by 2015, he said.
“Goods being shipped from Bangkok to Los Angeles are cheaper than goods shipped from Bangkok to a small port in the southern Philippines, because there is no connectivity,” Pitsuwan said Thursday in an address at the ASEAN secretariat before ambassadors to ASEAN and Indonesia.
ASEAN declared the adoption of the ASEAN Connectivity master plan on Oct. 28, during the 17th ASEAN Summit in Hanoi.
With the association’s decision to promote connectivity, all are now looking at an opportunity to make (or improve) investment in the region, Pitsuwan said.
Japan had reaped ¥280 billion (US$3.45 billion) in profits each year from its investments in ASEAN, he said.
“This is just to show you that we’re productive and that ASEAN should not be considered only a boutique of collections,” he said.
According to Pitsuwan, last year’s total trade among ASEAN members stood at $1.5 trillion, $3.3 trillion among members of ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea), $13.2 trillion among ASEAN+6 (plus India, Australia and New Zealand) and $28.5 trillion among ASEAN+8 (plus the US and Russia).
Pitsuwan said those trade figures would increase further if there was better connectivity.
Indonesian Ambassador to ASEAN Ngurah Swajaya, who also spoke at the ASEAN secretariat, said Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand had expressed an interest in improving connectivity in the region.
“In Indonesia alone there are at least 12 flagship projects to be offered to ASEAN’s partners in the form of [official development assistance], and [public private partnerships],” he said.
ASEAN to bring in US as counterbalance to China - Klipping Jakarta Post
Tini Tran, Associated Press, Hanoi, Vietnam | Fri, 10/29/2010 3:58 PM | World
A | A | A |
Southeast Asian nations are welcoming the United States into their club, a move seen as bringing a counterweight to China following a series of aggressive maritime moves by Beijing.
The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, will formally invite the U.S. and Russia to join their annual East Asian Summit on Saturday in the Vietnamese capital.
During a stop in Hawaii en route to Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed that the U.S. would remain a major power in the Asia-Pacific region and called on China to expand cooperation with the U.S.
"It is not in anyone's interest for the United States and China to see each other as adversaries," she said.
Southeast Asian nations have become increasingly rattled in recent months, accusing China of being a bully following a series of territorial spats on the high seas, including run-ins with Vietnam and a nasty row with Japan.
China has strongly pushed to keep territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea out of talks held by ASEAN, preferring instead to deal with clashes one on one. But the smaller countries have refused to back down.
"ASEAN should have one voice before we venture (into) talking to other claimants," Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said, adding that he and other Southeast Asian leaders' aired concerns during a dinner Thursday centered around maintaining peace and keeping busy shipping lanes open in the South China Sea.
At another meeting in Hanoi this summer, Clinton enraged China by announcing that the U.S. has a national interest in seeing territorial disputes in the South China Sea resolved, ensuring vital shipping lanes remain open and that navigation within international waters be free for everyone.
China has laid claim to strategically placed and potentially oil-rich islands in the South China Sea, but parts of the territory are also claimed by several Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.
Meanwhile, China and Japan met Friday in an attempt to repair soured relations over a maritime territorial dispute, with Japan also asking for the lifting of a block on rare earth exports crucial to its high-tech manufacturing.
Japanese companies have said those exports were frozen after the dispute flared up in late September, though the Beijing government denied that it has blocked the exports.
China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Japanese counterpart Seiji Maehara went into private talks on the sidelines of a regional Asian summit, hoping to lay the foundation for a meeting between Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
"The discussion took place in a good atmosphere. It was held calmly while both sides said what we should say. I believe it is likely that the leaders of China and Japan will hold a meeting here in Hanoi," Maehara told reporters after the hour-plus talks in the Vietnamese capital.
The two countries have sought to repair ties brought to a new low after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese patrol boats last month near disputed islands in the East China Sea. Tensions have remained high, despite Japan's release of the boat captain, with anti-Japanese protests flaring up in cities across China.
Japan also asked China to unblock the export of rare earths and reopen talks on the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea, Maehara said, adding that China responded that it would consider both requests. Beijing suspended the gas field talks during the spat.
A day earlier, Maehara met with Clinton in Hawaii where she said the restrictions served as a "wake-up call" for the global high-tech industry to diversify its suppliers. China currently produces 97 percent of the world's exotic metals, used in everything from laptops to cell phones.
China said Thursday it will not use the metals as a "bargaining tool."
Tokyo recently said it planned to mine rare earths in Vietnam as a way to reduce its dependence on China, which ships 60 percent of its metals to Japan.
Maehara also said that Japan "repeated its position firmly" regarding the territorial issue over the East China Sea islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Both countries claim the islands.
Anti-Japan sentiment has continued to flare in China with multiple protests across several cities, including one earlier this week where a Japanese flag was torched outside a consulate in southwestern China.
Japan on Tuesday said it was considering increasing the size of its navy submarine fleet amid growing concerns that China's maritime muscle is becoming too strong and could tip the balance of power in the Pacific, where the United States also maintains a strong presence.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is expected to meet with leaders from Japan and South Korea when in Vietnam.
----
Associated Press writer Jim Gomez contributed to this report
A | A | A |
Southeast Asian nations are welcoming the United States into their club, a move seen as bringing a counterweight to China following a series of aggressive maritime moves by Beijing.
The 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, will formally invite the U.S. and Russia to join their annual East Asian Summit on Saturday in the Vietnamese capital.
During a stop in Hawaii en route to Hanoi, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton stressed that the U.S. would remain a major power in the Asia-Pacific region and called on China to expand cooperation with the U.S.
"It is not in anyone's interest for the United States and China to see each other as adversaries," she said.
Southeast Asian nations have become increasingly rattled in recent months, accusing China of being a bully following a series of territorial spats on the high seas, including run-ins with Vietnam and a nasty row with Japan.
China has strongly pushed to keep territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea out of talks held by ASEAN, preferring instead to deal with clashes one on one. But the smaller countries have refused to back down.
"ASEAN should have one voice before we venture (into) talking to other claimants," Philippine President Benigno Aquino III said, adding that he and other Southeast Asian leaders' aired concerns during a dinner Thursday centered around maintaining peace and keeping busy shipping lanes open in the South China Sea.
At another meeting in Hanoi this summer, Clinton enraged China by announcing that the U.S. has a national interest in seeing territorial disputes in the South China Sea resolved, ensuring vital shipping lanes remain open and that navigation within international waters be free for everyone.
China has laid claim to strategically placed and potentially oil-rich islands in the South China Sea, but parts of the territory are also claimed by several Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam.
Meanwhile, China and Japan met Friday in an attempt to repair soured relations over a maritime territorial dispute, with Japan also asking for the lifting of a block on rare earth exports crucial to its high-tech manufacturing.
Japanese companies have said those exports were frozen after the dispute flared up in late September, though the Beijing government denied that it has blocked the exports.
China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Japanese counterpart Seiji Maehara went into private talks on the sidelines of a regional Asian summit, hoping to lay the foundation for a meeting between Premier Wen Jiabao and Prime Minister Naoto Kan.
"The discussion took place in a good atmosphere. It was held calmly while both sides said what we should say. I believe it is likely that the leaders of China and Japan will hold a meeting here in Hanoi," Maehara told reporters after the hour-plus talks in the Vietnamese capital.
The two countries have sought to repair ties brought to a new low after a Chinese fishing trawler collided with Japanese patrol boats last month near disputed islands in the East China Sea. Tensions have remained high, despite Japan's release of the boat captain, with anti-Japanese protests flaring up in cities across China.
Japan also asked China to unblock the export of rare earths and reopen talks on the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea, Maehara said, adding that China responded that it would consider both requests. Beijing suspended the gas field talks during the spat.
A day earlier, Maehara met with Clinton in Hawaii where she said the restrictions served as a "wake-up call" for the global high-tech industry to diversify its suppliers. China currently produces 97 percent of the world's exotic metals, used in everything from laptops to cell phones.
China said Thursday it will not use the metals as a "bargaining tool."
Tokyo recently said it planned to mine rare earths in Vietnam as a way to reduce its dependence on China, which ships 60 percent of its metals to Japan.
Maehara also said that Japan "repeated its position firmly" regarding the territorial issue over the East China Sea islands, known as Senkaku in Japanese and Diaoyu in Chinese. Both countries claim the islands.
Anti-Japan sentiment has continued to flare in China with multiple protests across several cities, including one earlier this week where a Japanese flag was torched outside a consulate in southwestern China.
Japan on Tuesday said it was considering increasing the size of its navy submarine fleet amid growing concerns that China's maritime muscle is becoming too strong and could tip the balance of power in the Pacific, where the United States also maintains a strong presence.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao is expected to meet with leaders from Japan and South Korea when in Vietnam.
----
Associated Press writer Jim Gomez contributed to this report
ASEAN gears up to challenge Asia’s giants - Klipping Jakarta Post
Abdul Khalik, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Mon, 10/25/2010 9:26 AM | Headlines
A | A | A |
The leaders of the 10 ASEAN member countries will convene this week to discuss a new master plan for enhancing ties and building new infrastructure that would allow the group to compete with rising economic giants China and India.
The 10 leaders will convene from Thursday to Saturday in Hanoi, Vietnam, to discuss the so-called Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, which would anchor the region’s long-term strategy to improve infrastructure and institutional and people-to-people relations, the ASEAN Secretariat said in Jakarta on Saturday.
“Enhancing intra-regional connectivity within ASEAN and its subregional grouping would benefit all ASEAN member states through enhanced trade, investment, tourism and development,” the draft of the master plan read.
“The deepening and widening of connectivity in the region would reinforce ASEAN’s position as the hub of the East Asia region and preserve its centrality.”
Experts have praised the plan as a necessary step to improve economic integration that would allow the region to compete with China, which has become a huge magnet for investors.
“ASEAN integration is becoming even more urgent as we prepare for the rise of China and India, as well as the possible normalization of Japan’s military role. As rivalry heightens, these major powers will use economic and military means to achieve their national goals,” Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, said.
By enhancing connectivity, investors would see the nation grouping of 560 million people as one united market rather than as separate countries, the expert said.
The master plan proposes strategies to boost road, rail, shipping, air and other networks between ASEAN members to reduce economic disparities in Southeast Asia and help ASEAN achieve its goal of becoming an economic community by 2015.
Indonesian Foreign Ministry secretary-general for ASEAN Djauhari Oratmangun said Indonesia was the coordinator for achieving maritime inter-connectivity in the region. ASEAN plans to build 42 new seaports in the region.
“We propose that the focus will be the eastern part of ASEAN, meaning also the eastern part of Indonesia. According to the plan, 16 ports will be built in the eastern part of Indonesia. This way, we can connect Indonesia’s isolated islands with ASEAN,” Djauhari said.
He said the master plan called for efforts to improve the region’s connectivity in three areas — physical connectivity such as transport and ICT infrastructure, institutional connectivity such as trade and investment liberalization, and people-to-people connectivity such as tourism and education.
The leaders will also likely discuss criticism of the group’s stance on Myanmar’s decision to bar foreign observers and journalists form entering the country during its elections, scheduled to take place on Nov. 8.
ASEAN will host the United States and Russia in the East Asian Summit, along with the six existing partners — China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.
Analysts say the US is likely to lobby ASEAN to question Myanmar’s approach to its elections, which have been criticized as non-transparent and unfair, given that democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition party has chosen to boycott the election.
A | A | A |
The leaders of the 10 ASEAN member countries will convene this week to discuss a new master plan for enhancing ties and building new infrastructure that would allow the group to compete with rising economic giants China and India.
The 10 leaders will convene from Thursday to Saturday in Hanoi, Vietnam, to discuss the so-called Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, which would anchor the region’s long-term strategy to improve infrastructure and institutional and people-to-people relations, the ASEAN Secretariat said in Jakarta on Saturday.
“Enhancing intra-regional connectivity within ASEAN and its subregional grouping would benefit all ASEAN member states through enhanced trade, investment, tourism and development,” the draft of the master plan read.
“The deepening and widening of connectivity in the region would reinforce ASEAN’s position as the hub of the East Asia region and preserve its centrality.”
Experts have praised the plan as a necessary step to improve economic integration that would allow the region to compete with China, which has become a huge magnet for investors.
“ASEAN integration is becoming even more urgent as we prepare for the rise of China and India, as well as the possible normalization of Japan’s military role. As rivalry heightens, these major powers will use economic and military means to achieve their national goals,” Rizal Sukma, executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta, said.
By enhancing connectivity, investors would see the nation grouping of 560 million people as one united market rather than as separate countries, the expert said.
The master plan proposes strategies to boost road, rail, shipping, air and other networks between ASEAN members to reduce economic disparities in Southeast Asia and help ASEAN achieve its goal of becoming an economic community by 2015.
Indonesian Foreign Ministry secretary-general for ASEAN Djauhari Oratmangun said Indonesia was the coordinator for achieving maritime inter-connectivity in the region. ASEAN plans to build 42 new seaports in the region.
“We propose that the focus will be the eastern part of ASEAN, meaning also the eastern part of Indonesia. According to the plan, 16 ports will be built in the eastern part of Indonesia. This way, we can connect Indonesia’s isolated islands with ASEAN,” Djauhari said.
He said the master plan called for efforts to improve the region’s connectivity in three areas — physical connectivity such as transport and ICT infrastructure, institutional connectivity such as trade and investment liberalization, and people-to-people connectivity such as tourism and education.
The leaders will also likely discuss criticism of the group’s stance on Myanmar’s decision to bar foreign observers and journalists form entering the country during its elections, scheduled to take place on Nov. 8.
ASEAN will host the United States and Russia in the East Asian Summit, along with the six existing partners — China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.
Analysts say the US is likely to lobby ASEAN to question Myanmar’s approach to its elections, which have been criticized as non-transparent and unfair, given that democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi’s opposition party has chosen to boycott the election.
Friday, November 5, 2010
APLEAS Bookshelf
- Southeast Asia in the New Century – An Asian Perspective, Edited by Samuel C.Y.Ku, Center For Southeast Asian Studies, National Sun Yat-Sen University, Singapore University Press, 2002.
- East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Sheldon W. Simon ( Editor ), Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1993.
- ASEAN – India – Australia : Toward Closer Engagement in a New Asia, Edited by William T. Tow and Chin Kin Wah, ISEAS, Singapore 2009.
- Korea’s Changing Roles in Southeast Asia – Expanding Influance and Relations, Edited by David I. Steinberg, ASEAN-Korea Center ( Seoul ) & ISEAS ( Singapore ), 2010.
- Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy and ASEAN, Jiro Okamoto, Ide Jetro, ISEAS, 2010.
- Economic Regionalism a la ASEAN, East Asia & APEC, Mohamed Ariff, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, 2008.
- Regional Political Economy of China Ascendant – Pivotal Issues and Critical Perspective, Emile Kok-Khen ( Editor ), Institute of China Studies University of Malaya, KL, 2009.
- Ensuring Interests : Dynamic of China-Taiwan Relations and Southeast Asia, Edited by Ho Khai Leong and Hou Kok Chung, Institute of China Studies University of Malay, KL, 2006.
- Different Societies, Shared Futures – Australia, Indonesia and the Region, Edited by John Monfries, Indonesia Update Series Research Schoool of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University, ISEAS, 2006.
- The International Relations of Northeast Asia, Edited by Samuel S. Kim, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford, 2004.
- If China Attacks Taiwan – Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, Edited by Steve Tsang, Routledge, London, New York, 2006.
- Regionalism and Multilateralism, Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, Amitav Acharya, Times Academic Press, 2002.
- India & Southeast Asia – Towards Security Convergence, Sudhir Devare, ISEAS, 2006.
- The United States and the Defense of the Pacific, Ronald D.McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, Westview Press & Kyungnam University Press, 1989
- Security and Southeast Asia – Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Allan Collins, Viva Books Private Limited, 2005.
- Major Powers at a Crossroads – Economic Interdependence and an Asia Pacific Security Community, Ming ZhangLynne Rienner Publisher, London, 1995.
- Challenges To India’s Foreign Policy in the New Era, Annpurna Nautiyal ( editor ), Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006.
- Singapore’s Foreign Policy – The Search for Regional Order, Amitav Acharya ( University of Bristol UK, World Scientific, Institute of Policy Studies, 2008.
- The Economics of the Enterprise For ASEAN Initiative, Seiji F.Naya & Michael G. Plummer, ISEAS 2005.
- Malaysia Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development, Karminder Singh Dhilon, Nus Press Singapore, 2009.
- Globalization Change in Asia, Edited by Dennis A.Rondinelli & John M. Heffron, Lynne Rienner, London, 2007.
- The East Asian Development Experience – The Miracle, The Crisis and The Future, Ha-Joon Chang, Zed Books-TWN Third World Network, 2006.
- China and Malaysia In A Globalizing World – Bilateral Relations, Regional Imperatives and Domestic Challenges, Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Hou Kon Chung, Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, 2006.
- ASEAN-China Economic Relations, Edited by Saw Swee-Hock, ISEAS, 2007.
- Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Edited by Robert Ayson and Desmond Bal, Allen & Unwin, 2006.
- The Southeast Asian Economic Miracle, Edited by Young C.Kim, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick ( London ) and London ( UK ), 1995.
- ASEAN Towards 2020 Strategic Goals and Future Directions, Edited by Stephen Leong, ISIS Malaysia, 1998.
- Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, Amitav Acharya, Routledge, London, New York, 2001.
- The European Union, United States and ASEAN – Challenges and Prospects For Cooperative Engagement in the 21st Century, Edited by K.S. Nathan, ASEAN Academic Press, 2002.
- Southeast Asia in Search of An ASEAN Community – Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo C. Severino, ISEAS, 2006.
- Asia-Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century, Edited by Suthiphand Chirathivat, Franz Knipping, Poul Henrik Lassen and Chia Siow Yue, Centre For European Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, ISEAS, 2001.
- Malaysia-Africa Relations – Searching For Common Goals, Hamidin Abd Hamid, Rhytm Publishing C.Sdn.Bhd, 2003.
- Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia, Edited by Vedi R. Hadiz, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, 2006.
- ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture – Origin, Development and Prospects, Jurgen Haacke, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.
- The China Threat : Perceptions, Myths and Reality, Edited by Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, Routledge Curzon, 2002.
- Historical Perspectives On Contemporary East Asia, Edited by Merle Goldman & Andrew Gordon, Harvard Univerty Press, 2000.
- Monarchy in Southeast Asia – the Faces of Tradition in Transition, Roger Kershaw, Routledge, 2001.
- China’s Megatrends – The 8 Pillars of a New Society, John & Doris Naisbitt, Herper Business, 2010.
- A History of Malaysia, Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y.Andaya, Palgrave, 1982.
- China’s New Great Leap Forward – An Emerging China and Its Impact on ASEAN, David N. Abdulai, MPH Publishing, 2007.
- Beyond Bilateralism : US – Japan Relations in The New Asia-Pacific, Edited by Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel, Standford University, 2004.
- North Korea – The Paranoid Peninsula – A Modern History, Paul French, Zed Books, 2005.
- ASEAN – China Relations – Realities and Prospects, Edited by Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah, ISEAS, 2005.
- India-ASEAN Economic Relations – Meeting the Challenges of Globalization, Nagesh Kumar, Rahul Sen & Mukul Asher ( Editor ), RIS & ISEAS, 2006.
- East Asian Security in the Post-Cold War Era, Sheldon W. Simon ( Editor ), Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data, 1993.
- ASEAN – India – Australia : Toward Closer Engagement in a New Asia, Edited by William T. Tow and Chin Kin Wah, ISEAS, Singapore 2009.
- Korea’s Changing Roles in Southeast Asia – Expanding Influance and Relations, Edited by David I. Steinberg, ASEAN-Korea Center ( Seoul ) & ISEAS ( Singapore ), 2010.
- Australia’s Foreign Economic Policy and ASEAN, Jiro Okamoto, Ide Jetro, ISEAS, 2010.
- Economic Regionalism a la ASEAN, East Asia & APEC, Mohamed Ariff, Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, 2008.
- Regional Political Economy of China Ascendant – Pivotal Issues and Critical Perspective, Emile Kok-Khen ( Editor ), Institute of China Studies University of Malaya, KL, 2009.
- Ensuring Interests : Dynamic of China-Taiwan Relations and Southeast Asia, Edited by Ho Khai Leong and Hou Kok Chung, Institute of China Studies University of Malay, KL, 2006.
- Different Societies, Shared Futures – Australia, Indonesia and the Region, Edited by John Monfries, Indonesia Update Series Research Schoool of Pacific and Asian Studies The Australian National University, ISEAS, 2006.
- The International Relations of Northeast Asia, Edited by Samuel S. Kim, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford, 2004.
- If China Attacks Taiwan – Military Strategy, Politics and Economics, Edited by Steve Tsang, Routledge, London, New York, 2006.
- Regionalism and Multilateralism, Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific, Amitav Acharya, Times Academic Press, 2002.
- India & Southeast Asia – Towards Security Convergence, Sudhir Devare, ISEAS, 2006.
- The United States and the Defense of the Pacific, Ronald D.McLaurin and Chung-in Moon, Westview Press & Kyungnam University Press, 1989
- Security and Southeast Asia – Domestic, Regional and Global Issues, Allan Collins, Viva Books Private Limited, 2005.
- Major Powers at a Crossroads – Economic Interdependence and an Asia Pacific Security Community, Ming ZhangLynne Rienner Publisher, London, 1995.
- Challenges To India’s Foreign Policy in the New Era, Annpurna Nautiyal ( editor ), Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2006.
- Singapore’s Foreign Policy – The Search for Regional Order, Amitav Acharya ( University of Bristol UK, World Scientific, Institute of Policy Studies, 2008.
- The Economics of the Enterprise For ASEAN Initiative, Seiji F.Naya & Michael G. Plummer, ISEAS 2005.
- Malaysia Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Era 1981-2003 – Dilemmas of Development, Karminder Singh Dhilon, Nus Press Singapore, 2009.
- Globalization Change in Asia, Edited by Dennis A.Rondinelli & John M. Heffron, Lynne Rienner, London, 2007.
- The East Asian Development Experience – The Miracle, The Crisis and The Future, Ha-Joon Chang, Zed Books-TWN Third World Network, 2006.
- China and Malaysia In A Globalizing World – Bilateral Relations, Regional Imperatives and Domestic Challenges, Emile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Hou Kon Chung, Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, 2006.
- ASEAN-China Economic Relations, Edited by Saw Swee-Hock, ISEAS, 2007.
- Strategy and Security in the Asia-Pacific, Edited by Robert Ayson and Desmond Bal, Allen & Unwin, 2006.
- The Southeast Asian Economic Miracle, Edited by Young C.Kim, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick ( London ) and London ( UK ), 1995.
- ASEAN Towards 2020 Strategic Goals and Future Directions, Edited by Stephen Leong, ISIS Malaysia, 1998.
- Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, Amitav Acharya, Routledge, London, New York, 2001.
- The European Union, United States and ASEAN – Challenges and Prospects For Cooperative Engagement in the 21st Century, Edited by K.S. Nathan, ASEAN Academic Press, 2002.
- Southeast Asia in Search of An ASEAN Community – Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary General, Rodolfo C. Severino, ISEAS, 2006.
- Asia-Europe on the Eve of the 21st Century, Edited by Suthiphand Chirathivat, Franz Knipping, Poul Henrik Lassen and Chia Siow Yue, Centre For European Studies at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, ISEAS, 2001.
- Malaysia-Africa Relations – Searching For Common Goals, Hamidin Abd Hamid, Rhytm Publishing C.Sdn.Bhd, 2003.
- Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia, Edited by Vedi R. Hadiz, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London & New York, 2006.
- ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture – Origin, Development and Prospects, Jurgen Haacke, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2005.
- The China Threat : Perceptions, Myths and Reality, Edited by Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, Routledge Curzon, 2002.
- Historical Perspectives On Contemporary East Asia, Edited by Merle Goldman & Andrew Gordon, Harvard Univerty Press, 2000.
- Monarchy in Southeast Asia – the Faces of Tradition in Transition, Roger Kershaw, Routledge, 2001.
- China’s Megatrends – The 8 Pillars of a New Society, John & Doris Naisbitt, Herper Business, 2010.
- A History of Malaysia, Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y.Andaya, Palgrave, 1982.
- China’s New Great Leap Forward – An Emerging China and Its Impact on ASEAN, David N. Abdulai, MPH Publishing, 2007.
- Beyond Bilateralism : US – Japan Relations in The New Asia-Pacific, Edited by Ellis S. Krauss and T.J. Pempel, Standford University, 2004.
- North Korea – The Paranoid Peninsula – A Modern History, Paul French, Zed Books, 2005.
- ASEAN – China Relations – Realities and Prospects, Edited by Saw Swee-Hock, Sheng Lijun, Chin Kin Wah, ISEAS, 2005.
- India-ASEAN Economic Relations – Meeting the Challenges of Globalization, Nagesh Kumar, Rahul Sen & Mukul Asher ( Editor ), RIS & ISEAS, 2006.
ASEAN’s legal personality - Klipping Jakarta Post
Hikmahanto Juwana and Sari Aziz, Jakarta | Thu, 08/26/2010 9:55 AM | Opinion
On Nov. 20, 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states adopted the ASEAN Charter. Currently, all 10 ASEAN member states have ratified the Charter.
One of the features of the Charter is the recognition of ASEAN’s legal personality. The legal personality of ASEAN is provided for under Article 3 of the Charter, which states that, “ASEAN, as an intergovernmental organization, is hereby conferred legal personality”. This article will discuss the significance of ASEAN having a legal personality.
A legal personality is endowed on an entity to make it a subject of law. With legal personality, a subject of law will have duties and obligations. In addition, it grants the subject legal capacity and the powers to act.
Most legal textbooks will define a legal subject as a natural person and an artificial person. However, this may be misleading, as the two are persons recognized under private law, not other branches of law.
In fact, depending on which areas of law, persons recognized by law are varied.
Under international law, a subject of law consists of states and non-state entities. The non-state entities include international organizations, the Holy See, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and belligerents and individuals committing international crimes.
An international organization, as a subject of international law, has a legal personality. The legal personality is derived from its constitution. The constitution of an international organization is in the form of a treaty agreed by states establishing such an organization.
The constitution will provide a provision conferring the organization with legal status. There are two terms frequently used, namely, legal or juridical personality, and legal capacity.
It should be noted that the two terms can be used interchangeably after the International Court of Justice rendered its advisory opinion in the renowned case dubbed the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.
The United Nations Charter, under Article 104, uses the term legal capacity, whereas the International Labor Organization (ILO) uses the term juridical personality under its Article 39.
However, the World Trade Organization uses both terms, legal personality and legal capacity, under its Article 8, Paragraph (1).
In discussing ASEAN’s legal personality, distinction has to be made before the Charter was adopted (pre-Charter) and after its adoption (post-Charter).
In the pre-Charter era, since its formation in 1967, ASEAN did not have a constitution. In addition, there were no documents that contained specific provisions on ASEAN as an institution, nor the Secretariat, having a legal personality.
For such reason, it may be questioned whether the founders of ASEAN have, from the beginning, conceived ASEAN to be an international organization or, as suggested by its name, only an “Association of States”.
Legally, there are distinctions between an international organization and an association of states. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), for example, is not an international organization. This is also true with respect to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Scholars had been debating whether ASEAN qualified as a proper international organization or only an association of states lacking legal personality.
Nevertheless, ASEAN state members in the pre-Charter era recognized and treated ASEAN politically as an entity having legal personality and legal capacity.
If examined closely, the legal personality and capacity of ASEAN in that era was not endowed on ASEAN, but was endowed on the ASEAN Secretariat.
This can be seen from the 1979 Privileges and Immunities Agreement between the government of Indonesia and ASEAN. The title of the agreement clearly states that privileges and immunities are rendered to the ASEAN Secretariat.
Furthermore, Article 2, Paragraph (2) made reference to the Secretariat having legal capacity, and not ASEAN.
This provision is different from, as an example, the ILO constitution. Under Article 39, reference is made to the ILO, not the Secretariat of the ILO, maintaining the legal capacity.
In the pre-Charter era, it may be argued the legal status of ASEAN was similar to APEC or NAM. These groupings, even though they are not international organizations, however, maintain the Secretariat.
In the post-Charter era, ASEAN becomes an international organization that is endowed with its members’ legal personality.
As an entity with legal personality, ASEAN is vested with rights and obligations under international law and domestic law.
The legal personality means that ASEAN has the legal capacity to enter into international agreements with other international organizations and states. In this context, ASEAN is acting in its public capacity (jure imperii).
However, it should be noted that ASEAN may not enter into certain international agreements on behalf of the member states of ASEAN. ASEAN does not act as a federal or central government among its members.
Another characteristic of ASEAN’s legal capacity is that it may enter into a private contract with domestic law’s private entities. In this context, ASEAN is treated as a private entity and as acting in its private capacity (jure gestionis).
Thus, it may acquire and dispose of assets and institute proceeding within the domestic jurisdiction under its own name. As a private law entity, it has to relinquish or waive its immunity.
In the post-Charter era, the Secretariat becomes one of the organs within ASEAN and does not maintain a legal personality of its own. The Secretariat, headed by the secretary-general, may represent ASEAN in its day-to-day interactions with third parties.
In the post-Charter era, the international community should regard ASEAN, not the Secretariat, as subject to international law and states’ domestic law.
As such, Indonesia, as the host government for ASEAN’s headquarters, must enter into various new agreements to reflect the post-Charter legal status of ASEAN, including amending the host and privileges and immunities agreements.
The agreements should be concluded between the government of Indonesia and ASEAN, and not with the Secretariat.
As to other member states of ASEAN, each member state should recognize and accord ASEAN with legal status under its domestic laws. In the pre-Charter era, it is not clear whether the ASEAN Secretariat had a legal personality under member states’ domestic laws.
It should be noted that in 2009, member states signed the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of ASEAN. Once the agreement enters into force, member states will have to recognize ASEAN as a legal entity in their domestic legal systems.
Unless protected by the laws on immunity, in cases where ASEAN, in its private law capacity, breaches domestic law, ASEAN can be held liable under the relevant domestic laws.
As to the non-member states of ASEAN, they are free to acknowledge or disregard the legal personality of ASEAN in their domestic laws.
There is progress being made for ASEAN to be recognized as an international organization having legal personality by non-member states. Currently, 39 non-member states of ASEAN have sent representative missions. These states should treat ASEAN as having legal personality under their domestic legal systems.
Hikmahanto Juwana is a professor of International Law at the University of Indonesia. Sari Aziz is a research associate at the Centre for International Law (CIL at the National University of Singapore (NUS).
The shows of South Korea, Japan and Indonesia
Kornelius Purba, Jakarta | Thu, 11/04/2010 9:59 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
Next week South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan separately will host two crucial multilateral summits. For President Lee this is a magnificent opportunity to demonstrate the achievements of the world’s 15th largest economy, while for PM Kan this is a good chance to lift a “demoralized” nation whose economy and global influence have been overpowered by China.
On Nov. 11-12 President Lee will preside over the summit of the world’s 20 largest economies (G20) in Seoul and over the following two days (Nov. 13-14) it will be the turn of PM Kan to chair the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Yokohama. The president is luckier than the prime minister because all members of G8 are also members of the G20, which means in terms of content, the Seoul meeting is much more attractive for the world media than Yokohama. APEC reached its glorious peak in the 1990s when Indonesia hosted the second summit in 1994.
The Seoul event is also an occasion to “tease” leaders of North Korea as the country continues to face economic hardships. For Kan, his top priority includes his bilateral meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in which he will aim to cool down tensions after a recent clash over a territorial dispute. A meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to discuss territorial disputes is also on the top list for domestic political consumption.
The G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, the US and the European Union. The group represents about 90 percent of the world’s GDP.
APEC includes all the ASEAN members (except Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos), the US, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Russia, Hong Kong and Canada.
President Lee recently expressed his nation’s pride at hosting the summit. “Korea is a country with first-hand experience in economic development that propeled a country out of poverty all within the living memory of a substantial fraction of its population. Korea has also experienced the devastating impact of a financial crisis and understands the efforts necessary to secure a robust economy. However Korea’s experience cannot always be translated directly into off-the-shelf solutions for other countries.”
According to President Lee, in Seoul the G20 leaders will make decisions on how to implement financial sector reform to strengthen bank capital and liquidity standards and to address systematically important financial institutions and resolution issues.
“The new rules will build a more resilient financial system that serves the needs of the world’s economies, reduces moral hazards, limits the build-up of systemic risk and supports stable economic growth,” the president said as quoted by Korean media.
Meanwhile on the APEC meeting, PM Kan remarked, “Japan would like to continue to contribute to the Asia-Pacific and global economy’s recovery and development by addressing issues in three areas in an integrated manner to revive the Japanese economy: “economic growth”, “sound fiscal policy” and “social security reform”.
As Indonesia will host the APEC meeting in 2013 and one day will get have its turn to chair the bi-annual G20 meeting, we need to set clear and achievable goals starting now. It is natural that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will require Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to ensure that he will host the G20 summit before ending his second presidential term in September 2014. He wants to leave a long-standing legacy for the nation.
Hopefully when Indonesia has its turn to chair the two groups, our situation will be closer to South Korea’s current condition where the economy is booming and not Japan’s. No one is expecting the worse, where our leaders will use the all available means just to accumulate their political power at the cost of millions of Indonesians.
On Wednesday, The Jakarta Post quoted Columbia University’s Prof. Xavier Sala-i-Martin as saying that the G20 has no relevance in improving the welfare of the people of its member states. “You may think the way to resolve issues is through the G20. But at the end of the day, nothing binding happens. The policies that will help Indonesia come from Indonesia. Indonesia is on its own,” the professor told a Jakarta economic forum.
The professor is completely right because both APEC and the G20 are non-binding multilateral forums.
The co-founder of the Global Competitiveness Report also pointed out that Indonesia should prioritize boosting its per capita income.
But we also need to remember that the G20 represents major political and economic capital in the international community. Many Indonesians do not realize or do not see the significance of our membership in the club. One of the reasons is probably because many Indonesians do not see the direct and concrete impacts of the G20 in their daily lives. For many it is just a waste of money and energy.
When President Yudhoyono shakes hands with President Lee in Seoul on Nov. 11, we hope he can say, “When Indonesia hosts the next G20 summit, my country’s situation will be much more prosperous than South Korea’s”.
And to PM Kan, the President may say, “We will never be as big as Japan, but we will have better relations with our neighbors”.
Anyway, Yudhoyono may have great hope but the two hosts have very concrete achievements.
The writer is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.
On Nov. 20, 2007, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states adopted the ASEAN Charter. Currently, all 10 ASEAN member states have ratified the Charter.
One of the features of the Charter is the recognition of ASEAN’s legal personality. The legal personality of ASEAN is provided for under Article 3 of the Charter, which states that, “ASEAN, as an intergovernmental organization, is hereby conferred legal personality”. This article will discuss the significance of ASEAN having a legal personality.
A legal personality is endowed on an entity to make it a subject of law. With legal personality, a subject of law will have duties and obligations. In addition, it grants the subject legal capacity and the powers to act.
Most legal textbooks will define a legal subject as a natural person and an artificial person. However, this may be misleading, as the two are persons recognized under private law, not other branches of law.
In fact, depending on which areas of law, persons recognized by law are varied.
Under international law, a subject of law consists of states and non-state entities. The non-state entities include international organizations, the Holy See, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and belligerents and individuals committing international crimes.
An international organization, as a subject of international law, has a legal personality. The legal personality is derived from its constitution. The constitution of an international organization is in the form of a treaty agreed by states establishing such an organization.
The constitution will provide a provision conferring the organization with legal status. There are two terms frequently used, namely, legal or juridical personality, and legal capacity.
It should be noted that the two terms can be used interchangeably after the International Court of Justice rendered its advisory opinion in the renowned case dubbed the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.
The United Nations Charter, under Article 104, uses the term legal capacity, whereas the International Labor Organization (ILO) uses the term juridical personality under its Article 39.
However, the World Trade Organization uses both terms, legal personality and legal capacity, under its Article 8, Paragraph (1).
In discussing ASEAN’s legal personality, distinction has to be made before the Charter was adopted (pre-Charter) and after its adoption (post-Charter).
In the pre-Charter era, since its formation in 1967, ASEAN did not have a constitution. In addition, there were no documents that contained specific provisions on ASEAN as an institution, nor the Secretariat, having a legal personality.
For such reason, it may be questioned whether the founders of ASEAN have, from the beginning, conceived ASEAN to be an international organization or, as suggested by its name, only an “Association of States”.
Legally, there are distinctions between an international organization and an association of states. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), for example, is not an international organization. This is also true with respect to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
Scholars had been debating whether ASEAN qualified as a proper international organization or only an association of states lacking legal personality.
Nevertheless, ASEAN state members in the pre-Charter era recognized and treated ASEAN politically as an entity having legal personality and legal capacity.
If examined closely, the legal personality and capacity of ASEAN in that era was not endowed on ASEAN, but was endowed on the ASEAN Secretariat.
This can be seen from the 1979 Privileges and Immunities Agreement between the government of Indonesia and ASEAN. The title of the agreement clearly states that privileges and immunities are rendered to the ASEAN Secretariat.
Furthermore, Article 2, Paragraph (2) made reference to the Secretariat having legal capacity, and not ASEAN.
This provision is different from, as an example, the ILO constitution. Under Article 39, reference is made to the ILO, not the Secretariat of the ILO, maintaining the legal capacity.
In the pre-Charter era, it may be argued the legal status of ASEAN was similar to APEC or NAM. These groupings, even though they are not international organizations, however, maintain the Secretariat.
In the post-Charter era, ASEAN becomes an international organization that is endowed with its members’ legal personality.
As an entity with legal personality, ASEAN is vested with rights and obligations under international law and domestic law.
The legal personality means that ASEAN has the legal capacity to enter into international agreements with other international organizations and states. In this context, ASEAN is acting in its public capacity (jure imperii).
However, it should be noted that ASEAN may not enter into certain international agreements on behalf of the member states of ASEAN. ASEAN does not act as a federal or central government among its members.
Another characteristic of ASEAN’s legal capacity is that it may enter into a private contract with domestic law’s private entities. In this context, ASEAN is treated as a private entity and as acting in its private capacity (jure gestionis).
Thus, it may acquire and dispose of assets and institute proceeding within the domestic jurisdiction under its own name. As a private law entity, it has to relinquish or waive its immunity.
In the post-Charter era, the Secretariat becomes one of the organs within ASEAN and does not maintain a legal personality of its own. The Secretariat, headed by the secretary-general, may represent ASEAN in its day-to-day interactions with third parties.
In the post-Charter era, the international community should regard ASEAN, not the Secretariat, as subject to international law and states’ domestic law.
As such, Indonesia, as the host government for ASEAN’s headquarters, must enter into various new agreements to reflect the post-Charter legal status of ASEAN, including amending the host and privileges and immunities agreements.
The agreements should be concluded between the government of Indonesia and ASEAN, and not with the Secretariat.
As to other member states of ASEAN, each member state should recognize and accord ASEAN with legal status under its domestic laws. In the pre-Charter era, it is not clear whether the ASEAN Secretariat had a legal personality under member states’ domestic laws.
It should be noted that in 2009, member states signed the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of ASEAN. Once the agreement enters into force, member states will have to recognize ASEAN as a legal entity in their domestic legal systems.
Unless protected by the laws on immunity, in cases where ASEAN, in its private law capacity, breaches domestic law, ASEAN can be held liable under the relevant domestic laws.
As to the non-member states of ASEAN, they are free to acknowledge or disregard the legal personality of ASEAN in their domestic laws.
There is progress being made for ASEAN to be recognized as an international organization having legal personality by non-member states. Currently, 39 non-member states of ASEAN have sent representative missions. These states should treat ASEAN as having legal personality under their domestic legal systems.
Hikmahanto Juwana is a professor of International Law at the University of Indonesia. Sari Aziz is a research associate at the Centre for International Law (CIL at the National University of Singapore (NUS).
The shows of South Korea, Japan and Indonesia
Kornelius Purba, Jakarta | Thu, 11/04/2010 9:59 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
Next week South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan separately will host two crucial multilateral summits. For President Lee this is a magnificent opportunity to demonstrate the achievements of the world’s 15th largest economy, while for PM Kan this is a good chance to lift a “demoralized” nation whose economy and global influence have been overpowered by China.
On Nov. 11-12 President Lee will preside over the summit of the world’s 20 largest economies (G20) in Seoul and over the following two days (Nov. 13-14) it will be the turn of PM Kan to chair the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Yokohama. The president is luckier than the prime minister because all members of G8 are also members of the G20, which means in terms of content, the Seoul meeting is much more attractive for the world media than Yokohama. APEC reached its glorious peak in the 1990s when Indonesia hosted the second summit in 1994.
The Seoul event is also an occasion to “tease” leaders of North Korea as the country continues to face economic hardships. For Kan, his top priority includes his bilateral meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in which he will aim to cool down tensions after a recent clash over a territorial dispute. A meeting with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to discuss territorial disputes is also on the top list for domestic political consumption.
The G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, the US and the European Union. The group represents about 90 percent of the world’s GDP.
APEC includes all the ASEAN members (except Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos), the US, Australia, China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Taiwan, Russia, Hong Kong and Canada.
President Lee recently expressed his nation’s pride at hosting the summit. “Korea is a country with first-hand experience in economic development that propeled a country out of poverty all within the living memory of a substantial fraction of its population. Korea has also experienced the devastating impact of a financial crisis and understands the efforts necessary to secure a robust economy. However Korea’s experience cannot always be translated directly into off-the-shelf solutions for other countries.”
According to President Lee, in Seoul the G20 leaders will make decisions on how to implement financial sector reform to strengthen bank capital and liquidity standards and to address systematically important financial institutions and resolution issues.
“The new rules will build a more resilient financial system that serves the needs of the world’s economies, reduces moral hazards, limits the build-up of systemic risk and supports stable economic growth,” the president said as quoted by Korean media.
Meanwhile on the APEC meeting, PM Kan remarked, “Japan would like to continue to contribute to the Asia-Pacific and global economy’s recovery and development by addressing issues in three areas in an integrated manner to revive the Japanese economy: “economic growth”, “sound fiscal policy” and “social security reform”.
As Indonesia will host the APEC meeting in 2013 and one day will get have its turn to chair the bi-annual G20 meeting, we need to set clear and achievable goals starting now. It is natural that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will require Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to ensure that he will host the G20 summit before ending his second presidential term in September 2014. He wants to leave a long-standing legacy for the nation.
Hopefully when Indonesia has its turn to chair the two groups, our situation will be closer to South Korea’s current condition where the economy is booming and not Japan’s. No one is expecting the worse, where our leaders will use the all available means just to accumulate their political power at the cost of millions of Indonesians.
On Wednesday, The Jakarta Post quoted Columbia University’s Prof. Xavier Sala-i-Martin as saying that the G20 has no relevance in improving the welfare of the people of its member states. “You may think the way to resolve issues is through the G20. But at the end of the day, nothing binding happens. The policies that will help Indonesia come from Indonesia. Indonesia is on its own,” the professor told a Jakarta economic forum.
The professor is completely right because both APEC and the G20 are non-binding multilateral forums.
The co-founder of the Global Competitiveness Report also pointed out that Indonesia should prioritize boosting its per capita income.
But we also need to remember that the G20 represents major political and economic capital in the international community. Many Indonesians do not realize or do not see the significance of our membership in the club. One of the reasons is probably because many Indonesians do not see the direct and concrete impacts of the G20 in their daily lives. For many it is just a waste of money and energy.
When President Yudhoyono shakes hands with President Lee in Seoul on Nov. 11, we hope he can say, “When Indonesia hosts the next G20 summit, my country’s situation will be much more prosperous than South Korea’s”.
And to PM Kan, the President may say, “We will never be as big as Japan, but we will have better relations with our neighbors”.
Anyway, Yudhoyono may have great hope but the two hosts have very concrete achievements.
The writer is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS - Klipping Jakarta Post
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Klipping Jakarta Post
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Klipping Jakarta Post : Asian regionalism and RI’s comparative advantage Kiki Verico, Tokyo | Thu, 08/19/2010 10:08 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
Undeniably, we’re heading towards the globalization of world trade. At the same time countries face challenges other than globalization: regionalism and bilateralism. Indonesia simultaneously faces different levels of trade liberalization, whether at the global (World Trade Organization or WTO), regional (ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA) or bilateral level (such as with Australia).
The existence of these trade agreements makes world trade relations more complicated. This phenomenon is known as the “spaghetti bowl effect”. There is still hope in dealing with this kind of complexity.
Regional trade agreements such as AFTA allow “discriminative trade liberalization” between members and non-members of ASEAN. However, AFTA also recognizes the “open regionalism principle” that independently allows members to establish trade agreement with non-members.
Theoretically, bilateral trade agreements (BTA) between regional members and non-members will stimulate a “domino effect” to other member countries as no member country wants to be left behind. This is why after Singapore and Thailand effectively negotiated BTAs with non-ASEAN members such as the US and Japan. Other ASEAN members followed suit. This action followed the logic of the “prisoner’s dilemma”.
In the end, competitive trade liberalization forces regional member to negotiate BTAs with non-members. Increasing BTAs in Southeast Asia will drive the original “discriminative principle” out of the region. It means BTAs are indirectly transforming regionalism to be the complement to globalism.
BTAs are not fit for all members. In this case, some regional members must deal with the “hub and spokes” problem. Non-members with advanced economies will gain benefit more than members that are less advanced.
The more advanced a member’s economy, the easier it is to achieve a “win-win solution” with advanced non-member economies. Most ASEAN members are not in a feasible position to create direct BTAs with non-members unless it is done under ASEAN’s umbrella, such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and so on. It is why ASEAN’s open regionalism is a crystal-clear advantage.
Prior to that, Indonesia needs to identify its trade competitiveness by identifying comparative trade advantages. This can be done by combining net export (NX) of the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The most competitive products are those with positive of G-L index (export value higher than its import value) and higher than one for the RCA index.
Based on my calculations using WTO statistics, Indonesia’s greatest comparative advantage is in primary products (agriculture and mining) and labor-intensive industries (such as textiles). Yet RI still has a comparative advantage in medium-high technology industries such as telecommunication equipment production.
Indonesia still has opportunities in electronic data processing, office equipment, and integrated circuit and electronics component production. However, the country faces a negative G-L index & less than of RCA index in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery and transport equipment production.
There are some products where Indonesia competes with other Asian countries. We compete in agricultural products including food with Thailand, Vietnam and India. For textiles, we compete with Thailand, China, Korea and India while for clothing; the competitors are Vietnam and the Philippines. For manufactured products (telecommunication equipment), we compete with Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan and Korea.
On the other hand, we rely on Japan and India to fulfill our domestic market demand for iron and steel products. As for pharmaceuticals, we depend on India, and for machinery and transport equipment Indonesia relies on Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Japan and Korea. Indonesia’s automotive product demand is fulfilled by Japan and Korea. As for chemical products, empirically, most of Asian domestic market including Indonesia still depends on external markets outside of Asian region.
In sum, mapping the comparative trade advantages of different products in different countries will help Indonesia to plan its best strategy to cope with the world’s manufactures competition that can be started from the Asian region.
Since market mechanism works naturally, ruled by “natural law” (Francois Quesnay, 1758) and driven by the “invisible hand” (Adam Smith, 1776), it is the role of the government to map out Indonesia’s comparative advantages in more detail. Such a public good is naturally provided by the government, private sector will not develop this kind of information.
Trade comparative advantage mapping will significantly help Indonesia develop its best strategy to take part in future global and regional trade architectures, together with Brazil, Russia, India and China. Let the government plays this important role. We need to be optimistic and think positively for our own bright future.
The writer is a doctoral student at Waseda University, Tokyo and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia.
The existence of these trade agreements makes world trade relations more complicated. This phenomenon is known as the “spaghetti bowl effect”. There is still hope in dealing with this kind of complexity.
Regional trade agreements such as AFTA allow “discriminative trade liberalization” between members and non-members of ASEAN. However, AFTA also recognizes the “open regionalism principle” that independently allows members to establish trade agreement with non-members.
Theoretically, bilateral trade agreements (BTA) between regional members and non-members will stimulate a “domino effect” to other member countries as no member country wants to be left behind. This is why after Singapore and Thailand effectively negotiated BTAs with non-ASEAN members such as the US and Japan. Other ASEAN members followed suit. This action followed the logic of the “prisoner’s dilemma”.
In the end, competitive trade liberalization forces regional member to negotiate BTAs with non-members. Increasing BTAs in Southeast Asia will drive the original “discriminative principle” out of the region. It means BTAs are indirectly transforming regionalism to be the complement to globalism.
BTAs are not fit for all members. In this case, some regional members must deal with the “hub and spokes” problem. Non-members with advanced economies will gain benefit more than members that are less advanced.
The more advanced a member’s economy, the easier it is to achieve a “win-win solution” with advanced non-member economies. Most ASEAN members are not in a feasible position to create direct BTAs with non-members unless it is done under ASEAN’s umbrella, such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and so on. It is why ASEAN’s open regionalism is a crystal-clear advantage.
Prior to that, Indonesia needs to identify its trade competitiveness by identifying comparative trade advantages. This can be done by combining net export (NX) of the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The most competitive products are those with positive of G-L index (export value higher than its import value) and higher than one for the RCA index.
Based on my calculations using WTO statistics, Indonesia’s greatest comparative advantage is in primary products (agriculture and mining) and labor-intensive industries (such as textiles). Yet RI still has a comparative advantage in medium-high technology industries such as telecommunication equipment production.
Indonesia still has opportunities in electronic data processing, office equipment, and integrated circuit and electronics component production. However, the country faces a negative G-L index & less than of RCA index in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery and transport equipment production.
There are some products where Indonesia competes with other Asian countries. We compete in agricultural products including food with Thailand, Vietnam and India. For textiles, we compete with Thailand, China, Korea and India while for clothing; the competitors are Vietnam and the Philippines. For manufactured products (telecommunication equipment), we compete with Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan and Korea.
On the other hand, we rely on Japan and India to fulfill our domestic market demand for iron and steel products. As for pharmaceuticals, we depend on India, and for machinery and transport equipment Indonesia relies on Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Japan and Korea. Indonesia’s automotive product demand is fulfilled by Japan and Korea. As for chemical products, empirically, most of Asian domestic market including Indonesia still depends on external markets outside of Asian region.
In sum, mapping the comparative trade advantages of different products in different countries will help Indonesia to plan its best strategy to cope with the world’s manufactures competition that can be started from the Asian region.
Since market mechanism works naturally, ruled by “natural law” (Francois Quesnay, 1758) and driven by the “invisible hand” (Adam Smith, 1776), it is the role of the government to map out Indonesia’s comparative advantages in more detail. Such a public good is naturally provided by the government, private sector will not develop this kind of information.
Trade comparative advantage mapping will significantly help Indonesia develop its best strategy to take part in future global and regional trade architectures, together with Brazil, Russia, India and China. Let the government plays this important role. We need to be optimistic and think positively for our own bright future.
The writer is a doctoral student at Waseda University, Tokyo and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia.
Klipping Jakarta Post : Russia, E. Asia geopolitics and ASEAN factor Victor Sumsky, Moscow | Sat, 10/30/2010 11:06 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
The Russia-ASEAN summit caused mixed feelings both in Moscow and in the capitals of the Ten. Indubitably, our relations are not stagnating. Yet it is obvious that both the Russian Federation and the countries of the Association currently profit more by working with other partners.
Some people may hasten to recall that neither Russia nor ASEAN countries are up to competing with China in terms of global economy and ability to fascinate the world with its achievements. It is for this reason that both we and the people of ASEAN look up to it more often than we do with regard to each other.
After all, both Russia and ASEAN members live side by side with a country that is now assuming the role of the 21st century’s most influential power. Isn’t this reason enough for us to “compare notes”, collate our impressions, and think of what can be done jointly, especially in the areas of production and technology, to cut a dignified figure against the stature of the regional and world leader?
As Russia adopted the modernization agenda, the debate was revived as to which external partnerships might best help us implement that policy. Again we hear that the West, and the West alone, commands the mysteries of high-tech and will share those secrets with us if we but play on its side in the game of geopolitics. We’ve been through all that in the 1990s, and past experiences, just as the present crisis leaves no room for illusions.
The more so that it is no longer possible to ignore the alternative of proactive cooperation with East Asia, which is currently achieving obvious success in modernization. The position of this country’s top leadership is a perfectly unequivocal testimony to that. In July this year at the conference on socioeconomic issues that President Dmitry Medvedev chaired in Khabarovsk the problems of Russia’s modernization, development of its Far Eastern areas and consolidation of partnership relations with neighboring Asian countries were considered as a single cluster.
But our “eternal Westernizers” remain undaunted. They will respond to the above arguments by reminding us that virtually all East Asian countries and territories where rapid modernization occurred in the second half of the 20th century were at the very least members of political, and often also of military, alliances with the United States.
Those alliances were open (as in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) or informal (as in the case of Indonesia and China), but they invariably involved trade and economic preferences without which the Asian “miracles” could hardly have happened. This point can be accepted, but with three reservations.
First, all of that happened in Cold War conditions, which are certain never to return.
Second, even then it was vital to do everything in moderation: Not one of the ASEAN founder states had so close a relationship with the US as did the Philippines. But it was precisely in the Philippines that modernization was, and still is, far from smooth.
Third, no one is saying that relations with the West should be scrapped. All that is being suggested is following the example of the West in what it has always been good at — in being realistic in estimates and actions. And this attitude requires taking stock of all available opportunities and options of cooperation with the outer world.
More than that, it requires a certain kind of circumspection precisely in the East Asian sector, where we had better lose no more time in making our presence felt.
At this point one feels like making a pause to hear out a remark from oneself, for a change. Obviously, an alarmist mood is not desirable, but there is definitely food for thought there, especially if one views modernization not in a rectilinear technocratic way, but as a controversial process in which new achievements always entail new problems. That was the way Samuel Huntington viewed it.
While pointing out that it took a minimum of political controllability to “kick-start” modernization programs and the end goal of such programs was stability characteristic of developed modern society, he emphasized that modernization per se was a most destabilizing thing. And the danger of destabilization was the more real, the higher the rate of transformations.
These ideas have lost none of their explanatory force, if seen, say, in light of the last few years’ events in Thailand, a country going through a crisis not because of chronic backwardness, but as the result of accelerated development.
Painful in themselves, such crises are even more dangerous when occurring in areas still suffering from the Cold War legacy (Korea, the Taiwan Straits) where tensions in relations between neighboring countries, protracted territorial disputes, or the so-called new threats to security, like cross-border crime, are plentiful.
But perhaps the most disquieting thing is that we observe the start of rivalry over regional and global domination between the United States and China. The picture is made even more complicated by old resentments along the China-India, and also China-Japan lines, and by simultaneous attempts by the chief rivals to win over both ASEAN as a whole and its individual members.
Are the leaders of East Asia aware of that? Do their advisers ponder all this, do they discuss these matters among themselves? They are and they do. Otherwise the search for a “new regional architecture” of cooperation and security would not have acquired the paramount importance in that part of the world that it now has.
The readiness of the East Asia Summit participants to admit Russia to their circle is a sign that Russia is expected to make a more significant contribution to the search.
What shape might that contribution take? Nothing could be better than defense of one’s own national interests, for as regards East Asia, they virtually coincide with the region’s collective interest. The objective of our Far Eastern territories developing in conjunction with the neighboring political and economic areas, basically formulated in Khabarovsk, will have its rationale if East Asia preserves economic dynamism. And it can only do so if escalation of the current regional contradictions, let alone their degenerating into a conflict phase, is avoided.
Peace in East Asia is something the overwhelming majority of participants in regional developments need, and all of them, ourselves included, will have to fight for it. After all, passivity is a synonym of lack of preparedness for trials, and if one imagines such a contingency, Russia with its vast open spaces and resources will be drawn into a confrontation we need like a hole in the head.
Assuming that this argumentation is not altogether groundless, we will see that ASEAN is as good as a natural ally to us. Like Russia, the Association and its members are mere losers in the context of growing contradictions between the US and China.
It would appear that neither we nor our ASEAN friends have yet realized in full measure our strategic need for each other. Let us hope that the process of its realization will give us extra incentives for economic exchanges, while the latter in turn will consolidate the basis for political partnership.
The writer is director of the ASEAN Centre of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO-U) and chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS.
The article first appeared in the Special Issue of International Affairs Magazine (Russia ).
Some people may hasten to recall that neither Russia nor ASEAN countries are up to competing with China in terms of global economy and ability to fascinate the world with its achievements. It is for this reason that both we and the people of ASEAN look up to it more often than we do with regard to each other.
After all, both Russia and ASEAN members live side by side with a country that is now assuming the role of the 21st century’s most influential power. Isn’t this reason enough for us to “compare notes”, collate our impressions, and think of what can be done jointly, especially in the areas of production and technology, to cut a dignified figure against the stature of the regional and world leader?
As Russia adopted the modernization agenda, the debate was revived as to which external partnerships might best help us implement that policy. Again we hear that the West, and the West alone, commands the mysteries of high-tech and will share those secrets with us if we but play on its side in the game of geopolitics. We’ve been through all that in the 1990s, and past experiences, just as the present crisis leaves no room for illusions.
The more so that it is no longer possible to ignore the alternative of proactive cooperation with East Asia, which is currently achieving obvious success in modernization. The position of this country’s top leadership is a perfectly unequivocal testimony to that. In July this year at the conference on socioeconomic issues that President Dmitry Medvedev chaired in Khabarovsk the problems of Russia’s modernization, development of its Far Eastern areas and consolidation of partnership relations with neighboring Asian countries were considered as a single cluster.
But our “eternal Westernizers” remain undaunted. They will respond to the above arguments by reminding us that virtually all East Asian countries and territories where rapid modernization occurred in the second half of the 20th century were at the very least members of political, and often also of military, alliances with the United States.
Those alliances were open (as in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) or informal (as in the case of Indonesia and China), but they invariably involved trade and economic preferences without which the Asian “miracles” could hardly have happened. This point can be accepted, but with three reservations.
First, all of that happened in Cold War conditions, which are certain never to return.
Second, even then it was vital to do everything in moderation: Not one of the ASEAN founder states had so close a relationship with the US as did the Philippines. But it was precisely in the Philippines that modernization was, and still is, far from smooth.
Third, no one is saying that relations with the West should be scrapped. All that is being suggested is following the example of the West in what it has always been good at — in being realistic in estimates and actions. And this attitude requires taking stock of all available opportunities and options of cooperation with the outer world.
More than that, it requires a certain kind of circumspection precisely in the East Asian sector, where we had better lose no more time in making our presence felt.
At this point one feels like making a pause to hear out a remark from oneself, for a change. Obviously, an alarmist mood is not desirable, but there is definitely food for thought there, especially if one views modernization not in a rectilinear technocratic way, but as a controversial process in which new achievements always entail new problems. That was the way Samuel Huntington viewed it.
While pointing out that it took a minimum of political controllability to “kick-start” modernization programs and the end goal of such programs was stability characteristic of developed modern society, he emphasized that modernization per se was a most destabilizing thing. And the danger of destabilization was the more real, the higher the rate of transformations.
These ideas have lost none of their explanatory force, if seen, say, in light of the last few years’ events in Thailand, a country going through a crisis not because of chronic backwardness, but as the result of accelerated development.
Painful in themselves, such crises are even more dangerous when occurring in areas still suffering from the Cold War legacy (Korea, the Taiwan Straits) where tensions in relations between neighboring countries, protracted territorial disputes, or the so-called new threats to security, like cross-border crime, are plentiful.
But perhaps the most disquieting thing is that we observe the start of rivalry over regional and global domination between the United States and China. The picture is made even more complicated by old resentments along the China-India, and also China-Japan lines, and by simultaneous attempts by the chief rivals to win over both ASEAN as a whole and its individual members.
Are the leaders of East Asia aware of that? Do their advisers ponder all this, do they discuss these matters among themselves? They are and they do. Otherwise the search for a “new regional architecture” of cooperation and security would not have acquired the paramount importance in that part of the world that it now has.
The readiness of the East Asia Summit participants to admit Russia to their circle is a sign that Russia is expected to make a more significant contribution to the search.
What shape might that contribution take? Nothing could be better than defense of one’s own national interests, for as regards East Asia, they virtually coincide with the region’s collective interest. The objective of our Far Eastern territories developing in conjunction with the neighboring political and economic areas, basically formulated in Khabarovsk, will have its rationale if East Asia preserves economic dynamism. And it can only do so if escalation of the current regional contradictions, let alone their degenerating into a conflict phase, is avoided.
Peace in East Asia is something the overwhelming majority of participants in regional developments need, and all of them, ourselves included, will have to fight for it. After all, passivity is a synonym of lack of preparedness for trials, and if one imagines such a contingency, Russia with its vast open spaces and resources will be drawn into a confrontation we need like a hole in the head.
Assuming that this argumentation is not altogether groundless, we will see that ASEAN is as good as a natural ally to us. Like Russia, the Association and its members are mere losers in the context of growing contradictions between the US and China.
It would appear that neither we nor our ASEAN friends have yet realized in full measure our strategic need for each other. Let us hope that the process of its realization will give us extra incentives for economic exchanges, while the latter in turn will consolidate the basis for political partnership.
The writer is director of the ASEAN Centre of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO-U) and chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS.
The article first appeared in the Special Issue of International Affairs Magazine (Russia ).
Klipping Jakarta Post : Assessing SBY’s foreign policy Yayan GH Mulyana, Bogor | Mon, 11/01/2010 9:32 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
In the past year, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s foreign policy has been characterized primarily by the increasing use of economic diplomacy. The choice of economic diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument is timely and realistic because since 2008/2009 Indonesia has been working hard to consolidate its resilience against the remaining repercussions caused by the global financial crisis.
Indonesia has used this economic diplomacy not only to keep the country economically resilient, but also to create a new architecture of global financial systems through a joint effort of the G20 forum. Being an active member of the forum, Indonesia consistently pronounces the urgency of a balanced, fair, transparent and credible global financial system.
And in the G20 Summit this month in Seoul, Indonesia will not only continue to advocate such a pronouncement, but also will emphasize the issue of development, including financial inclusion, which is of paramount importance to developing countries.
Indonesia’s strong commitment to environment diplomacy continued in the past year. As an ardent advocate for the efforts to address climate change, Indonesia spares no effort to ensure that the implementation of the 2007 Bali Plan of Action on climate change stays the course. Indonesia’s continued environment diplomacy will remain needed to assure, in collaboration with other countries, the successful outcome of the forthcoming Cancun Conference.
In the political and security realm, Indonesia’s diplomacy has been dedicated to the development of a regional security architecture marked by a dynamic equilibrium among its parties. Indonesia has done its utmost to ensure the role of ASEAN as the driving force in the regional architecture building process; to ensure the centrality of ASEAN in the “plus one” and “plus three” processes as well as the ARF, EAS, APEC and ASEM.
On the Middle East issue, Indonesia has been firm and steadfast in its support for a comprehensive just, and lasting peace in the region. On the Israeli-Palestinian track, last month on the sidelines of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, Indonesia hosted the Four Country Initiative on Palestine. This is an important step in Indonesia’s contribution to the efforts in resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
The Indonesian government has also continued to use peacekeeping operations as a foreign policy instrument, especially in fulfilling the constitutional mandate to keep international peace and order.
Indonesia has large contingents in UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIS (Sudan) and MONUC (Congo). In April 2010, Indonesia deployed a sigma class corvette “KRI Frans Kasiepo – 368” as part of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. The presence of an Indonesian navy vessel in Lebanese waters has been very much appreciated by the international community, and marked a new chapter in the history of Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
On the bilateral level, despite specific challenges that emerged to confront relations between Indonesia and Malaysia as well as between Indonesia and The Netherlands, Indonesia has generally gained a lot for its national development from various bilateral initiatives.
The President’s visit to several countries in the past year has resulted not only strengthened bilateral relations but also produced pledges of increased investment from the governments and private sectors of those partner countries.
Foreign policy establishment in Indonesia has developed in a positive direction in the past year. On foreign relations issues, the government has always listened to the people’s voices attentively while exerting firm and reasonable positions. The role of parliament in foreign policy has been respected, and the traditionally limited role of the vice president in foreign relations has been expanded by his participation in the US-initiated Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, and in the recent US-ASEAN Summit in New York last month.
In the years ahead, there will be more room for Indonesia’s foreign policy activism. The chairmanship of Indonesia in ASEAN in 2011 will provide Indonesia with the opportunity to lead and to strive for the realization of the ASEAN Community. Indonesia came up with the idea five years ago, and now it is a chance through stewardship to ensure its realization for the common good of ASEAN as well as the global family of nations.
Some glitches over the year in Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Netherlands relations have taught us one very important lesson: There is no fit-for-all strategy in bilateral diplomacy. A strategy for bilateral diplomacy with Scandinavian countries would be different from that with Malaysia, Australia, The Netherlands and Timor Leste.
With the Netherlands, unless resolved once and for all, “history” will continue to affect Indonesia’s bilateral relations. Thus, in strategizing, bilateral diplomacy must be recalibrated. In its implementation, it will require consideration for the particularities of each partner country while maintaining long standing conventional practices.
Another important lesson is the need for greater foreign relations literacy among the Indonesian populace. There is a need for educational in Indonesian foreign policy to bridge the gap between the public’s expectations, which have often been seen to be influenced by emotion, such as in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and the government’s policies, which have been rational and abide by the principles of peacefully settling disputes.
An informed public will offer reasonable and constructive input, free from mockery and cynicism. It is a shared responsibility to educate the public — it is the responsibility of the government, the media, politicians, parliamentarians, foreign affairs experts, analysts and academicians.
It is also pertinent to recalibrate Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, which has been serving as a legal basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy. New realities have emerged at home and abroad since the Law took effect on Sept. 14, 1999. In the future, Indonesia’s foreign policy will need a legal basis that reflects those new developments.
A greater consideration should also be given to the dynamism in the Indian Ocean Rim and the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Ocean’s strategic and historical value warrants serious thought on what role Indonesia can play in the sub-region. On the Non-Aligned Movement, the need for its revitalization remains strong. As one of the founding states, it is natural that Indonesia would be expected to play a leading role in rejuvenating the movement. In the future, with 118 member states, the movement will need a diverse leadership.
On the doctrinal level, the principle of bebas aktif (active but not aligned) has been consistently heeded, and I believe that it will remain so in the coming years.
The writer is an Indonesian diplomat. The opinions expressed are his personal thoughts.
Indonesia has used this economic diplomacy not only to keep the country economically resilient, but also to create a new architecture of global financial systems through a joint effort of the G20 forum. Being an active member of the forum, Indonesia consistently pronounces the urgency of a balanced, fair, transparent and credible global financial system.
And in the G20 Summit this month in Seoul, Indonesia will not only continue to advocate such a pronouncement, but also will emphasize the issue of development, including financial inclusion, which is of paramount importance to developing countries.
Indonesia’s strong commitment to environment diplomacy continued in the past year. As an ardent advocate for the efforts to address climate change, Indonesia spares no effort to ensure that the implementation of the 2007 Bali Plan of Action on climate change stays the course. Indonesia’s continued environment diplomacy will remain needed to assure, in collaboration with other countries, the successful outcome of the forthcoming Cancun Conference.
In the political and security realm, Indonesia’s diplomacy has been dedicated to the development of a regional security architecture marked by a dynamic equilibrium among its parties. Indonesia has done its utmost to ensure the role of ASEAN as the driving force in the regional architecture building process; to ensure the centrality of ASEAN in the “plus one” and “plus three” processes as well as the ARF, EAS, APEC and ASEM.
On the Middle East issue, Indonesia has been firm and steadfast in its support for a comprehensive just, and lasting peace in the region. On the Israeli-Palestinian track, last month on the sidelines of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, Indonesia hosted the Four Country Initiative on Palestine. This is an important step in Indonesia’s contribution to the efforts in resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
The Indonesian government has also continued to use peacekeeping operations as a foreign policy instrument, especially in fulfilling the constitutional mandate to keep international peace and order.
Indonesia has large contingents in UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIS (Sudan) and MONUC (Congo). In April 2010, Indonesia deployed a sigma class corvette “KRI Frans Kasiepo – 368” as part of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. The presence of an Indonesian navy vessel in Lebanese waters has been very much appreciated by the international community, and marked a new chapter in the history of Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
On the bilateral level, despite specific challenges that emerged to confront relations between Indonesia and Malaysia as well as between Indonesia and The Netherlands, Indonesia has generally gained a lot for its national development from various bilateral initiatives.
The President’s visit to several countries in the past year has resulted not only strengthened bilateral relations but also produced pledges of increased investment from the governments and private sectors of those partner countries.
Foreign policy establishment in Indonesia has developed in a positive direction in the past year. On foreign relations issues, the government has always listened to the people’s voices attentively while exerting firm and reasonable positions. The role of parliament in foreign policy has been respected, and the traditionally limited role of the vice president in foreign relations has been expanded by his participation in the US-initiated Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, and in the recent US-ASEAN Summit in New York last month.
In the years ahead, there will be more room for Indonesia’s foreign policy activism. The chairmanship of Indonesia in ASEAN in 2011 will provide Indonesia with the opportunity to lead and to strive for the realization of the ASEAN Community. Indonesia came up with the idea five years ago, and now it is a chance through stewardship to ensure its realization for the common good of ASEAN as well as the global family of nations.
Some glitches over the year in Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Netherlands relations have taught us one very important lesson: There is no fit-for-all strategy in bilateral diplomacy. A strategy for bilateral diplomacy with Scandinavian countries would be different from that with Malaysia, Australia, The Netherlands and Timor Leste.
With the Netherlands, unless resolved once and for all, “history” will continue to affect Indonesia’s bilateral relations. Thus, in strategizing, bilateral diplomacy must be recalibrated. In its implementation, it will require consideration for the particularities of each partner country while maintaining long standing conventional practices.
Another important lesson is the need for greater foreign relations literacy among the Indonesian populace. There is a need for educational in Indonesian foreign policy to bridge the gap between the public’s expectations, which have often been seen to be influenced by emotion, such as in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and the government’s policies, which have been rational and abide by the principles of peacefully settling disputes.
An informed public will offer reasonable and constructive input, free from mockery and cynicism. It is a shared responsibility to educate the public — it is the responsibility of the government, the media, politicians, parliamentarians, foreign affairs experts, analysts and academicians.
It is also pertinent to recalibrate Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, which has been serving as a legal basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy. New realities have emerged at home and abroad since the Law took effect on Sept. 14, 1999. In the future, Indonesia’s foreign policy will need a legal basis that reflects those new developments.
A greater consideration should also be given to the dynamism in the Indian Ocean Rim and the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Ocean’s strategic and historical value warrants serious thought on what role Indonesia can play in the sub-region. On the Non-Aligned Movement, the need for its revitalization remains strong. As one of the founding states, it is natural that Indonesia would be expected to play a leading role in rejuvenating the movement. In the future, with 118 member states, the movement will need a diverse leadership.
On the doctrinal level, the principle of bebas aktif (active but not aligned) has been consistently heeded, and I believe that it will remain so in the coming years.
The writer is an Indonesian diplomat. The opinions expressed are his personal thoughts.
ASEAN and contemporary US diplomacy in East Asia
Evi Fitriani, Jakarta | Fri, 08/13/2010 9:09 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Despite US President Barack Obama twice postponing his visit to Indonesia, there has been a marked increase in high-ranked US officials reaching out to Southeast Asia.
The most prominent being the visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Jakarta to discuss the future of US-Indonesian military cooperation and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s presence at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi last month.
China’s economic growth and its ability to capitalize its economic strength to political-strategic influence in the region and global diplomacy has irritated the US. The world’s sole superpower now depends on Chinese investment to secure its economy.
The US does not only suffer continuous trade deficits against China, but also has to finance its budget on government bonds, much of which have been bought by China.
Clinton flew to China soon after the collapse of American financial market in 2009 to assure the Chinese government that China’s capital is safe in US hands. There is a global shift in power. The US may still be the strongest military power in the world but it needs strong economic support.
In contrast, with high economic growth and around US$2.45 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the biggest in the world, China can afford to build a very modern military, including a blue-ocean navy that may project its leverage in the Pacific and beyond.
On top of this hard power, China’s business interests have expanded into Africa and Latin America. With a very close link between politics and business in China and the centralized political system controlled by the Chinese authority, economic tools can be used to pursue political-strategic interests, and vice versa.
China has used its economic strength as a powerful tool in international relations which, in turn, may threaten US interests in Asia and around the globe.
In short, China’s economic strength and political-strategic influence have made the US more vulnerable domestically and abroad.
The US’ current outreach to countries in Southeast Asia is to balance China’s influence and mitigate its vulnerability.
America’s traditional ally in Asia, Japan, seems unable to play a significant role in balancing China in Asia due to its domestic political and economic problems.
Japan’s continuing struggle to reform its economic and political systems have taken a toll in the country’s diplomacy and limited its foreign policy. The US can’t rely on Japan to secure US interests in Asia.
Consequently, the US has actively approached ASEAN countries and insisted on joining the East Asian Summit (EAS). While the intensity may be different, all of the 10 members of the ASEAN have had their own historical engagements with the US.
The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 has been widely perceived as one part of the US’ strategy to contain communism in the region during 1960s.
Perhaps, ASEAN is the only realistic choice for the US to pursue its interests in Asia. While it has been criticized for being too weak institutionally and too compromising politically, ASEAN is the world’s longest running geo-political organization after the EU.
ASEAN countries have not only maintained the longevity of their regional institution beyond the Cold War, but expanded the institution’s membership to include almost all countries in Southeast Asia.
In addition, despite the emergence of various regional institutions in the region, ASEAN has developed as the core of Asian regional architecture since 1990s.
While there are frequent questions about ASEAN’s institutional capability to handle regional affairs and crises, ASEAN countries seem to occupy the driver’s seat in Asian regional forums.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s important position in the regional architecture means the organization’s leaders should not overlook challenges in regard to the US’ revitalized presence in Asia and its accession to the EAS.
History teaches us that the reasons behind the absence of solid Asian regionalism and identity derive not only from domestic problems and inter-state distrust among Asian countries, but also from the presence of external powers like the US in the region.
While traditional US strategy in East Asia is to oppose any single notion of domination, ASEAN should not let the Americans re-establish their own domination in the region.
ASEAN should be able to become the host in Asia and determine the course of Asian regional architecture based on reciprocal respect and mutual benefits between countries and external actors.
Despite the need to use acceptable diplomatic language, ASEAN countries have to be able to safeguard the region’s interests vis-à-vis external actors.
ASEAN countries need to balance China’s influence in the region too. The strategy looks to be to include Japan and Australia in the EAS. With the accession of the US, ASEAN should have more room to maneuver in dealing with China.
The revitalization of US presence in the region can be used to increase Southeast Asian countries’ bargaining power against China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. At the ASEAN Regional Forum last week, we saw antagonism between the US and China in handling the Spratly Islands conflict.
Nevertheless, ASEAN should not become the victim of the US – China competition in the region.
ASEAN countries should increase their institutional capability and build inter-state trust in order to become a smart mediator that can deal with external actors without sacrificing their own interests.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the International relations Department, University of Indonesia (Jakarta), and a PhD candidate in the Australian National University (Australia).
A | A | A |
Despite US President Barack Obama twice postponing his visit to Indonesia, there has been a marked increase in high-ranked US officials reaching out to Southeast Asia.
The most prominent being the visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Jakarta to discuss the future of US-Indonesian military cooperation and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s presence at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi last month.
China’s economic growth and its ability to capitalize its economic strength to political-strategic influence in the region and global diplomacy has irritated the US. The world’s sole superpower now depends on Chinese investment to secure its economy.
The US does not only suffer continuous trade deficits against China, but also has to finance its budget on government bonds, much of which have been bought by China.
Clinton flew to China soon after the collapse of American financial market in 2009 to assure the Chinese government that China’s capital is safe in US hands. There is a global shift in power. The US may still be the strongest military power in the world but it needs strong economic support.
In contrast, with high economic growth and around US$2.45 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the biggest in the world, China can afford to build a very modern military, including a blue-ocean navy that may project its leverage in the Pacific and beyond.
On top of this hard power, China’s business interests have expanded into Africa and Latin America. With a very close link between politics and business in China and the centralized political system controlled by the Chinese authority, economic tools can be used to pursue political-strategic interests, and vice versa.
China has used its economic strength as a powerful tool in international relations which, in turn, may threaten US interests in Asia and around the globe.
In short, China’s economic strength and political-strategic influence have made the US more vulnerable domestically and abroad.
The US’ current outreach to countries in Southeast Asia is to balance China’s influence and mitigate its vulnerability.
America’s traditional ally in Asia, Japan, seems unable to play a significant role in balancing China in Asia due to its domestic political and economic problems.
Japan’s continuing struggle to reform its economic and political systems have taken a toll in the country’s diplomacy and limited its foreign policy. The US can’t rely on Japan to secure US interests in Asia.
Consequently, the US has actively approached ASEAN countries and insisted on joining the East Asian Summit (EAS). While the intensity may be different, all of the 10 members of the ASEAN have had their own historical engagements with the US.
The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 has been widely perceived as one part of the US’ strategy to contain communism in the region during 1960s.
Perhaps, ASEAN is the only realistic choice for the US to pursue its interests in Asia. While it has been criticized for being too weak institutionally and too compromising politically, ASEAN is the world’s longest running geo-political organization after the EU.
ASEAN countries have not only maintained the longevity of their regional institution beyond the Cold War, but expanded the institution’s membership to include almost all countries in Southeast Asia.
In addition, despite the emergence of various regional institutions in the region, ASEAN has developed as the core of Asian regional architecture since 1990s.
While there are frequent questions about ASEAN’s institutional capability to handle regional affairs and crises, ASEAN countries seem to occupy the driver’s seat in Asian regional forums.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s important position in the regional architecture means the organization’s leaders should not overlook challenges in regard to the US’ revitalized presence in Asia and its accession to the EAS.
History teaches us that the reasons behind the absence of solid Asian regionalism and identity derive not only from domestic problems and inter-state distrust among Asian countries, but also from the presence of external powers like the US in the region.
While traditional US strategy in East Asia is to oppose any single notion of domination, ASEAN should not let the Americans re-establish their own domination in the region.
ASEAN should be able to become the host in Asia and determine the course of Asian regional architecture based on reciprocal respect and mutual benefits between countries and external actors.
Despite the need to use acceptable diplomatic language, ASEAN countries have to be able to safeguard the region’s interests vis-à-vis external actors.
ASEAN countries need to balance China’s influence in the region too. The strategy looks to be to include Japan and Australia in the EAS. With the accession of the US, ASEAN should have more room to maneuver in dealing with China.
The revitalization of US presence in the region can be used to increase Southeast Asian countries’ bargaining power against China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. At the ASEAN Regional Forum last week, we saw antagonism between the US and China in handling the Spratly Islands conflict.
Nevertheless, ASEAN should not become the victim of the US – China competition in the region.
ASEAN countries should increase their institutional capability and build inter-state trust in order to become a smart mediator that can deal with external actors without sacrificing their own interests.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the International relations Department, University of Indonesia (Jakarta), and a PhD candidate in the Australian National University (Australia).
Klipping Jakarta Post
East Asia Summit: ASEAN’s centrality and the challenges ahead
Awidya Santikajaya, Washington, DC | Fri, 10/29/2010 10:36 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Asia Pacific leaders are meeting this week at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Together with ASEAN and APEC, the EAS is a key element of Asia Pacific regionalism. Current members of the EAS are ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Countering claims that it is ineffective, the EAS has made meaningful concrete achievements, including cooperation on disaster management and the establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Further, the coming EAS is crucial because it will officially invite the US and Russia to join, after the previous East Asia Ministerial Meeting last August made this recommendation.
Since its establishment in 2005, the EAS was intended to be an ASEAN-led block, and has been linked to ASEAN Summits. An important issue ASEAN faces in the recent development of the EAS is whether it is can maintain its “centrality” in the grouping.
ASEAN has been regarded as one of the most stable regional groupings in the developing world. With a population of around 600 million, Southeast Asia is emerging politically, economically and strategically, attracting external powers.
Donald E. Weatherbee explained that ASEAN has become a stage where great power rivalries and competition for influence are being played out.
Among these external powers, the US and China are the two most important countries. China’s dilating economic and military capacities have boosted its diplomatic assertiveness over its neighbors, including Southeast Asia. Early this year, ASEAN and China began implementing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
The US also now intends to regain its lost influence in the “forgotten region” to maintain its global domination.
The US orientation toward Southeast Asia could be seen when President Barack Obama missed the US-EU Summit in Madrid last May, but hosted the ASEAN-US Summit in September, and plans to attend the EAS in Indonesia next year.
In this development, the political gravitation of China and the US has seriously challenged “ASEAN’s Centrality”. Using the dependency theory, we may conclude that the relations between ASEAN, on the one hand, and the US and China on the other are unusual. Normally, the “center” is more powerful than the “periphery”, but in this case the US and China (peripheries) are far stronger than ASEAN (center).
“There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement it will be.”
Recently, the accretion of rivalry between the US and China has been coloring Asia Pacific international relations. At the second ASEAN-US Summit, in New York last September, for instance, the US insistently espoused the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The US also expressed its willingness to help craft a legally binding “code of conduct” to prevent armed hostilities among countries with territorial claims. Responding to this issue, Chinese Foreign Minister Jiang Yu stated that China opposed any internationalization and expansion of the South China Sea dispute because it would only make the issue more complicated.
So far, the ASEAN’s main position toward external powers’ involvement is to exploit those powers’ interests for regional benefit. And it is gaining ground, at least for some countries. Vietnam, for example, has gained tremendous advantages from the aggressive approaches of America and China to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, besides of course both countries’ own economic and strategic interests.
China has already invested around $1.6 billion in a large bauxite mining and alumina refining project in Vietnam. On the other hand, last March Vietnam and the US, two former rivals during the Cold War, launched talks on nuclear cooperation, including the possibility of allowing Hanoi the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium.
ASEAN has consistently worked to mitigate balances of power by maintaining peace, security and prosperity as the main principles of EAS. The gavel is now obviously on the ASEAN’s side because all external powers already praise the concept of ASEAN plus in the EAS, “thanks to” the disappearance of Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community ideas.
While ASEAN has already set the rules and time-keeping, it does not necessarily mean ASEAN has succeeded in leading all EAS members to follow the existing path designed by ASEAN. What made Asia Pacific countries let ASEAN drive the regionalization process was ASEAN’s integrity, neutrality and acceptability to all stakeholders.
However, ASEAN’s centrality to the EAS will be interrupted if ASEAN cannot address two important challenges: First, overcoming intra-ASEAN differences, and second, satisfying non-ASEAN countries’ needs to join the EAS.
Despite its success in minimizing inter-state conflicts and fostering economic cooperation, ASEAN’s precept of loose cooperation (the “ASEAN Way”) makes it difficult to have a truly integrated community.
ASEAN has already moved toward extraordinary achievements through the creation of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and other instruments.
In spite of its sophisticated institutionalization, ASEAN often faces distrust from its members. In the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict mid this year, for example, there were diplomatic maneuvers by both countries in determining whether the dispute should be settled through a bilateral mechanism or by regional cooperation. ASEAN did not do much, except to suggest that both parties assuage the situation.
In this sense, if Cambodia and Thailand believed in ASEAN, why did not they agree to use ASEAN to host a dispute-settlement mechanism?
The next question is if its members do not fully trust ASEAN will that make ASEAN cumbersome as a default chairman of the EAS?
ASEAN’s chairmanship also should have the wits to think about providing more opportunities for non-ASEAN members to utilize the EAS.
There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement will be.
While maintaining its flexibility, at least for the short-to-medium term, ASEAN should initiate the construction of EAS institutions, such as a secretariat, which is separate from, but located in ASEAN countries.
Non-ASEAN members also should become co-chairs of the EAS concurrently with the ASEAN chair, to put them into a more precise scheme.
The writer is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
Awidya Santikajaya, Washington, DC | Fri, 10/29/2010 10:36 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Asia Pacific leaders are meeting this week at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Together with ASEAN and APEC, the EAS is a key element of Asia Pacific regionalism. Current members of the EAS are ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Countering claims that it is ineffective, the EAS has made meaningful concrete achievements, including cooperation on disaster management and the establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Further, the coming EAS is crucial because it will officially invite the US and Russia to join, after the previous East Asia Ministerial Meeting last August made this recommendation.
Since its establishment in 2005, the EAS was intended to be an ASEAN-led block, and has been linked to ASEAN Summits. An important issue ASEAN faces in the recent development of the EAS is whether it is can maintain its “centrality” in the grouping.
ASEAN has been regarded as one of the most stable regional groupings in the developing world. With a population of around 600 million, Southeast Asia is emerging politically, economically and strategically, attracting external powers.
Donald E. Weatherbee explained that ASEAN has become a stage where great power rivalries and competition for influence are being played out.
Among these external powers, the US and China are the two most important countries. China’s dilating economic and military capacities have boosted its diplomatic assertiveness over its neighbors, including Southeast Asia. Early this year, ASEAN and China began implementing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
The US also now intends to regain its lost influence in the “forgotten region” to maintain its global domination.
The US orientation toward Southeast Asia could be seen when President Barack Obama missed the US-EU Summit in Madrid last May, but hosted the ASEAN-US Summit in September, and plans to attend the EAS in Indonesia next year.
In this development, the political gravitation of China and the US has seriously challenged “ASEAN’s Centrality”. Using the dependency theory, we may conclude that the relations between ASEAN, on the one hand, and the US and China on the other are unusual. Normally, the “center” is more powerful than the “periphery”, but in this case the US and China (peripheries) are far stronger than ASEAN (center).
“There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement it will be.”
Recently, the accretion of rivalry between the US and China has been coloring Asia Pacific international relations. At the second ASEAN-US Summit, in New York last September, for instance, the US insistently espoused the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The US also expressed its willingness to help craft a legally binding “code of conduct” to prevent armed hostilities among countries with territorial claims. Responding to this issue, Chinese Foreign Minister Jiang Yu stated that China opposed any internationalization and expansion of the South China Sea dispute because it would only make the issue more complicated.
So far, the ASEAN’s main position toward external powers’ involvement is to exploit those powers’ interests for regional benefit. And it is gaining ground, at least for some countries. Vietnam, for example, has gained tremendous advantages from the aggressive approaches of America and China to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, besides of course both countries’ own economic and strategic interests.
China has already invested around $1.6 billion in a large bauxite mining and alumina refining project in Vietnam. On the other hand, last March Vietnam and the US, two former rivals during the Cold War, launched talks on nuclear cooperation, including the possibility of allowing Hanoi the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium.
ASEAN has consistently worked to mitigate balances of power by maintaining peace, security and prosperity as the main principles of EAS. The gavel is now obviously on the ASEAN’s side because all external powers already praise the concept of ASEAN plus in the EAS, “thanks to” the disappearance of Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community ideas.
While ASEAN has already set the rules and time-keeping, it does not necessarily mean ASEAN has succeeded in leading all EAS members to follow the existing path designed by ASEAN. What made Asia Pacific countries let ASEAN drive the regionalization process was ASEAN’s integrity, neutrality and acceptability to all stakeholders.
However, ASEAN’s centrality to the EAS will be interrupted if ASEAN cannot address two important challenges: First, overcoming intra-ASEAN differences, and second, satisfying non-ASEAN countries’ needs to join the EAS.
Despite its success in minimizing inter-state conflicts and fostering economic cooperation, ASEAN’s precept of loose cooperation (the “ASEAN Way”) makes it difficult to have a truly integrated community.
ASEAN has already moved toward extraordinary achievements through the creation of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and other instruments.
In spite of its sophisticated institutionalization, ASEAN often faces distrust from its members. In the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict mid this year, for example, there were diplomatic maneuvers by both countries in determining whether the dispute should be settled through a bilateral mechanism or by regional cooperation. ASEAN did not do much, except to suggest that both parties assuage the situation.
In this sense, if Cambodia and Thailand believed in ASEAN, why did not they agree to use ASEAN to host a dispute-settlement mechanism?
The next question is if its members do not fully trust ASEAN will that make ASEAN cumbersome as a default chairman of the EAS?
ASEAN’s chairmanship also should have the wits to think about providing more opportunities for non-ASEAN members to utilize the EAS.
There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement will be.
While maintaining its flexibility, at least for the short-to-medium term, ASEAN should initiate the construction of EAS institutions, such as a secretariat, which is separate from, but located in ASEAN countries.
Non-ASEAN members also should become co-chairs of the EAS concurrently with the ASEAN chair, to put them into a more precise scheme.
The writer is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
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