Reinventing ASEAN

1. There is now widespread recognition that ASEAN needs to be revitalized. Government ministers and officials have increasingly acknowledged that they must act or risk irrelevance. This recognition of potential irrelevance contrasts sharply with the high reputation that ASEAN had previously enjoyed. The Asian crisis that began in mid-1977 has been a key trigger in this change in perception. The severe impact of the crisis threw ASEAN member state into disarray and exposed their limits of co-operation in dealing with the financial contagion. Although some ASEAN member states were buoyed by sharp, V-shaped economic recovery in 1999-2000, the overall reputation of ASEAN did not improve much.
2. Moreover, even as the crisis abated, some continued to experience political and social instability, with Indonesia, the centre of gravity of the grouping by size and history, the worst hit. The worldwide economic slowdown in 2001, led by the downturn in the US market, will not assist the region. Instead, it exposes the fragility of the economic development policies that ASEAN member states have adopted, especially when, in contrast, China seemingly continues to prosper.

Asia's New Regionalism

1. Something significant is pulsing through Asia. Not for centuries has that region been so fluid, so open, so cosmopolitan. Never has communication been so inexpensive and widely available, nor transport so rapid and efficient. Cross-border business-old and new, legal and illegal-flourishes. Newly laid roads connect megacities with spanking new suburbs and chockablock shanties. Integrated production networks span far-flung manufacturing hubs. Sleepy ports lined with tumbledown warehouse are waking up, and airlines offer a starburst of new routes. City and local governments are setting up new offices to handle record numbers of tourists and entrepreneurs. Environmental, health and human rights groups are forming information networks and patchy cross-border coalitions. Sensing new prey, transnational gangs have stepped up their activity.
2. Nowhere is this regional pulse more palpable than in what I call Maritime Asia, the vast sweep of coastline and water connecting central and southern India, Southeast Asia, China, the Korean Peninsula, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In maritime communities, integration is spontaneous and tangible. A visitor to Asia’s major ports and coastal communities is likely to jostle against people from all over the region: A Malaysian official, an Indian engineer, a Chinese tourist, a Japanese banker, a Filipino bar hostess, a Korean professor, and an Indonesian businessman, perhabs. Most of them carry cellular telephones equipped with the latest devices and talk on them frequently-often in English, the region’s lingua franca. The visitor’s day might include a dim sum lunch, a stroll along a waterfront packed with cargo ships, shopping trip to a mall packed with Asian products, a sushi dinner and a Bollywood film. Westerners, no longer stared at, are lost in the crowd.
3. This quickening to life is highly uneven. In Asia’s remote rice paddies and dry plains, in the highlands and hill country, in the more distant islands of the archipelagos, in countless villages and small towns, lies a slow-moving, more isolated less cosmopolitan Asia. Foreign visitors are rare. Nevertheless, in local markets one might find “ Hello Kitty “ dolls, American T-shirts made in China and pirated CDs featuring a Korean pop singer.
4. Meanwhile, Asian government officials are promoting a different version of integration. Motivated primarily by reasons of state, members of ASEAN 10 are the drivers of this new movement. They have spun a series of concentric organizational circles dedicated to closer integration and what they call “ community building “. This activity is the chief expression of Asia’s new regionalism.
5. The innermost circle is ASEAN itself. Founded in 1967 ASEAN was originally designed as an anticommunist organization. Since then it has transformed itself into a cooperative grouping with numerous committees and working groups. ASEAN leaders have pledged themselves to an ASEAN Community resting on three pillars : economic, security and sociocultural. The next circle is ASEAN +3-ASEAN plus Japan, China and South Korea. This grouping periodically heralds the formation of an East Asian Community as a long-term goal.

An APEC Trade Agenda ? The Political Economy of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific

The proposal for an Asia-Pacific-wide free trade agreement is one of the oldest ideas for promoting mutually beneficial regional cooperation dating back to the mid-1960s. In more recent times, the idea has found new support for two main reasons : as a plan B to the stumbling Doha Development Agenda ( DDA ) round of WTO negotiations, and as a solution to noodle bowl of bilateral agreement in the region.

Beyond Bilateralism : US-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific

1. For most of the period since the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, relations between Japan and the US were overwhelmingly characterized by bilateralism. Each country extended to the other special privileges that they did not extend to other countries. Moreover, the key economic, political, and security relationship between the two nations were primarily dyadic links between the two governments; little influances was allowed to non-governmental actors or other nations.
2. Starting in the mid-to late 1980s, however, and accelerating since then, these once unambiguously bilateral ties have become far more complex and consequently, ambiguous. Three forces account for the bulk of these changes :
(1) alterations in geopolitics,
(2) the enhanced role of private capital flows, and
(3) the rise in number and importance of multilateral organizations.
Bilateralism has by no means vanished completely, nor has it been replaced by some equally easy-to-label alternative. Nonetheless, relations between Japan and the US now manifest a panoply of new traits, directions and managerial complexity that have unquestionably reshaped the relationship.
3. Even where bilateral management continues to prevail – and we find this more in the security than in the economic or financial realms-elites from both countries must face more complicated choices and implications than their predecessors faced.

Regionalism in Southeast Asia - To Foster the Political Will

1. The definition of “ regionalism “ – and of correlatives like region, regionalist, regionalise and regionness – is not, however, uncontested, even if, in this case, it is less on account of political or ideological overtones or purposes and more on account varying approaches to comment and analysis. The concept are, however, increasingly being used or developed in the course of or as a basis of public action, not merely though primarily political and both practice and theory are increasingly place in the conflicted context of globalization.
2. A sense of region implies a sense of world. A region is part of the world. For some it may be the whole world. More usually, it is seen to be, as it is, part of the world, in which there are other regions variously conceived and constituted. Regions, regionalisation, and regional organizations are indeed both a product of and a reaction to world-wide changes, predominantly economic and political in character.
3. Regionalism and regionalisation emerge in Europe in part as a response to and defense against outside pressures but in part also as a means of modifying or mediating internal disequilibrium. Within a trans-state region one state is likely to be stronger than another. A regional structure both constrains it and gives it an opportunity. Its leadership may become more acceptable to others if its dominance is less apparent.
4. The political success of ASEAN began to contribute to its economic advance. Its activities-togther with those of the major powers – helped to change the perception of Southeast Asia : it was no longer a region of turmoil but one of development. In my view, S. Dhanabalan declared in 1983, the biggest contribution of ASEAN towards economic development has been the way we have presented to the rest of the world a picture of ASEAN cooperation and neighbourliness. That had created an image of ASEAN as an area of stability. None of the ASEAN countries would have developed economically if their political wrangling could not be resolved.

Towards PAX SINICA ? China's Rise and Transformation : Impacts and Implications

1. Succesful hosting of the 2008 Olympics and the first Spacewalk better heralded the return of China to the centre of the world. Yet other incidents during the same year-whether in the form of natural calamities, man-made food scares, or socio-political disturbances-have not failed to dampen the optimism that would have otherwise marked unequivocally the country’s year of success.Napoleon once suggested that China be allowed to sleep, “ for when she awakes, she will shake the world “ China has indeed shaken the world – not with her armies, but with her factories. Today the world’s most populous nation of 1.3 billion people is also the third largest economy in terms of GDP and a global investor with operations established in more than 60 countries, while absolute poverty has dropped to below 22 million, with incidence of poverty just around 2 pct.
2. The phenomena rise of China as an economic power as well as her heightened political and military clout that has been growing in tandem with this, inevitably brought forth both regionally and globally, increasing concern over whether she is posing a threat to regional stability and prosperity and if so, in what way. Despite also being viewed as a threat, China is more often regarded as an opportunity for her trade partners. Unlike the earlier economic “ miracles “ of East Asia, China has been following a liberal foreign investment regime in recent decades, opening its domestic markets and “ not building an export powerhouse behind a wall of protective tariffs “. The country’s rapid economic growth has generated great opportunities for large volumes of imports of both primary and manufactured goods from her regional partners.

ASEAN Connectivity

The idea of ASEAN Connectivity was first proposed bt Thai PM Abhisit Vejjajiva at the Opening Ceremony of the 42nd Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on July 2009 in Phuket. As the Chairman of ASEAN, PM Abhisit proposed that a “ Community of Connectivity “ should be one objectives of ASEAN Community 2015. It means that
- goods and peoples,
- investment and initiatives,
can travel obstacle-free throughout the region. A fully integrated ASEAN economy as a single market and production base must have such connectivity built into both its hardware and software. It is expected that through a well-connected Community, ASEAN can realize its full economic potentials as well as take maximum advantage of the strategic location linking the massive economies of South Asia on the West and Northeast Asia to the North.
This initiative was endorsed with the adoption of the ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on ASEAN Connectivity at the 15th ASEAN Summit held in Hua Hin on 24 Oct 2009. ASEAN Leaders mandated the creation of a High Level Task Force ( HLTF ) on ASEAN Connectivity to devise a Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity by the 17 ASEAN Summit 2010. The Master Plan is both a strategic document for achieving overall ASEAN Connectivity and a plan of action for immediate implementation for the period 2011-2015 to connect ASEAN through enhanced :
- physical infrastructure development ( physical connectivity ),
- effective institutional arrangement ( institutional connectivity ) and
- empowered people ( people-to-people connectivity ).
On 28 Oct 2010, ASEAN Leaders adopted the Ha Noi Declaration of the Adoption of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity. In this Declaration, the ASEAN Leaders recognized that the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity will
- promote economic growth,
- narrow development gaps,
- ASEAN Integration and Community building process,
- enhance competitiveness of ASEAN,
- promote deeper social and cultural understanding as well as
- greater people mobility and connect its member states within the region and with the rest of the world.
The leaders also gave a task to Ministers, the ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee and the National Coordinators, supported by the ASEAN Secretariat, to coordinate and oversee the implementation the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity and to report the ASEAN Leaders the progress of its implementation on a regular basis through the ASEAN Coordinating Council.
As such, “ connectivity “, according to the document of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity, refers to the physical, institutional and people-to-people linkages that comprise the foundamental support and facilitative means to achieve the political-security, economic and socio-cultural pillars towards realizing the vision of an integrated ASEAN Community.
According to the document, the key element of ASEAN Connectivity include :
(1) physical connectivity ( i.e transport, energy and information and communication technology ) ;
(2) institutional connectivity ( i.e trade liberalization and facilitation, investment and services liberalization and facilitation, mutual recognition agreements/arrangements, regional transport agreements, cross-border procedures, capacity building programs );
(3) people-to-people connectivity (i.e education and culture as well as tourism ).
Among the main issues, in the ASEAN Connectivity are discrepancy and disconnectivity. First, there is a discrepancy in the progress of connectivity between the Wesyern Part of ASEAN, which is landmass in nature and the Eastern Part of ASEAN which is archipelago. Second, as it concerns maritime transport, connectivity between the Western Part of ASEAN and the Eastern Part of ASEAN is poor ( thus, this represents an issue of disconnectivity ). Third, the Eastern Part of ASEAN, which largely consists of the Eastern Part of Indonesia, represents the weakest link in the overall ASEAN Connectivity. Forth, pull factors are needed to speed up the process of connectivity building. These four issues must be addressed accordingly by ASEAN.
(quoted from ASEAN Connectivity in Indonesia Context – A Preliminary Study on Geopolitics of Hydropower and Maritime Transport – Centre of Policy Analysis and Development For Asia Pacific and African Regions, Policy Analysis and Development Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011 ).

INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY
________________________________________
Indonesia’s foreign policy, like that of any other country, is shaped by various factors such as the nation’s history, its geographic conditions, its demography and its security and national interest. These factors prompted Indonesia to adopt a foreign policy that is independent and active, as espoused in 1948 by Mohammad Hatta, then Indonesia’s Vice President.
Indonesia’s Independent and Active Foreign Policy is not about being “neutral“ or taking “equidistant” positions on international issues, nor is it a policy of “neglecting” or “ignoring” developments in world affairs.
The word “independent” means that Indonesia alone will decide and determine its own position on world issues without external pressures or influence. The word “active” means that Indonesia is committed to participating in constructive efforts that help build and maintain a just and peaceful world. The philosophy behind this principle is the mandate enunciated in Indonesia’s 1945 Constitution. Moreover, having been subjugated by a colonial power for over 300 years, Indonesia inevitably adopted a foreign policy that is anti-colonialist.
In the conduct of its foreign policy, Indonesia also adheres to the following guidelines:
• The Pancasila, the state ideology
• The Wawasan Nusantara, (archipelagic sense)
• National Resilience
• The Broad Outline of State Policy
The adoption of these guidelines in Indonesian foreign policy was stipulated by provision of law, particularly Act No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations and Act No. 24/2000 on Treaties.
Under the State’s Guideline for 1999-2004, Indonesia aims to achieve a strong foreign policy and diplomacy; develop foreign economic cooperation; implement broad extradition agreements; and engage in bilateral, regional and global/multilateral cooperation.
To reach these goals, the Department of Foreign Affairs laid down the following objectives: Restore Indonesia’s international image; help boost the economy and public welfare; help strengthen national unity, stability and integrity, and preserve the nation’s sovereignty; develop bilateral relations, particularly with countries that can support Indonesia’s trade and investment and economic recovery; as well as promote international cooperation that helps build and maintain world peace.
To ensure that these goals are within reach, the Department of Foreign Affairs puts emphasis on diplomatic cooperation with countries that are within a series of concentric circles.
The first of such concentric circles, which Indonesia considers a major pillar of its foreign policy, is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Just beyond that first circle, Indonesia likewise puts importance to promoting relations with its eastern and southern neighbors, prompting Indonesia to be engaged with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), the Southwest Pacific Dialogue, and with the recently established Tripartite Consultation between Indonesia, Australia and Timor Leste.
Also within the second concentric circle is the ASEAN + 3 (the three being Japan, China and South Korea). Beyond that, Indonesia puts a premium on its relations with the United States and the European Union, both of which are major economic partners of Indonesia.
In compliance with the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia also gives importance to working with like-minded developing countries. That is why Indonesia is deeply involved with the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Group of 77 (G –77) and the Group of 15 (G-15). It is in this context that Indonesia remains supportive of the struggle of the people of Palestine toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian State within their own homeland.
Indonesia’s diplomacy also aims to solidify the collective effort of developing countries to bridge the gap between the developed and the developing countries. The forums that address this problem are the NAM, OIC, G-15, G-77 and D-8, in all of which Indonesia plays an active role.
At the global level, Indonesia hopes to strengthen multilateralism through the United Nations. From a political and security perspective, the end of the Cold War 13 years ago also revealed strong unipolar tendencies, characterized by the emergence of one single military power with global reach. The hope for a new world order based on multilateral processes has become slimmer as a result of this conspicuous unilateralism.
Indonesia has consistently emphasized the central role of the UN in resolving issues on international peace and security. In line with the UN Charter, the issue of peace and security is a collective responsibility of all member states through the mechanism entrusted to and a mandate vested in the Security Council. Accordingly, Indonesia rejects all unilateral decisions taken outside the framework of the UN.

EAST ASIA MIRACLES

3 WAVE OF GLOBALIZATION

• DEMOCRATIC VALUES – EARLY 1990s
• FINANCIAL – LATE OF 1990s
• SECURITY – 2001 UP TO NOW

EAST ASIAN MIRACLES

* JAPAN STARTED IN MODERN ECONOMIC GROWTH IN
1885
* NIEs ( HONGKONG, TAIWAN, KOREA & SINGAPORE ) BEGAN EXPORT-ORIENTED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1960s,
* ASEAN ( THAILAND, MALAYSIA,PHILIPINES & INDONESIA ) EMBARKED ON THE SAME PATH IN 1970s,
* IN THE EARLY 1980s CHINA INTRODUCED OPEN ECONOMIC POLICIES IN AN EFFORT TO TURN ITS PLANNED SOCIALISY ECONOMY INTO A MARKET-ORIENTED ECONOMY,
* CLMV IMPLEMENTED SIMILAR POLICIES IN THE 1990s
* IN THE DECADE FOLLOWING 1987, ALL OF THE EAST ASIAN ECONOMIES ENJOYED HIGH ECONOMIC GROWTH.

REGIONAL IDENTITY, stimulated by

• EXTERNAL POLITICAL/MILITARY THREATS
• A PRODUCT OF GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY
• RACIAL SIMILARITY
• HOMOGENOUS CIVILIZATION

THESE ELEMENTS REPRESENT INTERDEPENDENCE AND A SENSE OF UNITY AND PROVIDE A FOUNDATION FOR IMAGIZING AN EAST ASIA INTER’L SOCIETY.

US OBJECTIVE IN THE WORLD

• NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER WMDs,
• DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
• FREE TRADE,
• OBJECTIVE SOMETIMES CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER ( US-INDIA NUCLEAR DEAL )

US OBJECTIVE IN ASIA

• REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY,
• PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL POWERS,
• PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN MILITARY TIES WITH ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN THE REGION,
• ENSURE OPENNESS OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES OF TRANSIT AREAS.
• MAINTAIN COMMERCIAL ACCESS TO THE ECONOMIC OF THE REGION,
• US PERCEIVES ITSELF AS ASIAN PACIFIC POWER,
• US SEES ITSELF AS PRIMARY STABILIZING FORCE AND AS KEY BALANCE OF POWER IN REGION,
• US OBJECTIVE ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED SINCE END OF WW II.

US OBJECTIVE IN CHINA

• WITHIN CHINA, SPREAD OF DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
• INCOPORATION OF CHINA AS A RESPONSIBLE STAKE HOLDER IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD,
• BUSSINESS/COMMERCIAL INTEREST ARE VERY STRONG.

PELUANG TENAGA KERJA SEKTOR FORMAL DI WILAYAH KERJA KJRI PENANG

Oleh : Moenir Arisoenanda *)


I. PERKEMBANGAN INDUSTRI MANUFAKTUR DI PENANG

Pembekuan status Penang sebagai pelabuhan bebas ( free port status ) awal tahun 1970 berdampak melonjaknya tingkat pengangguran secara drastis di Penang mencapai 16,4 pct. Sebagian besar potensi angkatan kerja muda lulusan sekolah-sekolah tinggi eksodus ke luar negeri diantaranya ke Singapura dan Eropa untuk mencari peluang kerja yang lebih baik. Untuk mengatasi tingginya tingkat pengangguran, Ketua Menteri Penang pada waktu itu Lim Chong Eu berkonsultasi dengan institusi-institusi federal dan institusi-institusi di negara bagian untuk mengajukan usulan pembentukan Zona Perdagangan Bebas ( Free Trade Zone ) di Penang.

Pemerintah Negeri Penang pada waktu itu melihat adanya potensi industri elektronik sebagai industri yang sangat strategis yang dapat menyerap secara lebih besar tenaga kerja semi-skilled yang jumlahnya cukup banyak di Penang. Free Trade Zone Act pada akhirnya disahkan bulan April 1971 dan yang pada awalnya dititik beratkan pada sektor industri manufaktur elektik dan elektronik ( E & E ) yang dipandang sebagai “ labour-intensive industries “. Sebagai tindak lanjut dari Free Trade Zone Act 1971 tersebut dibangun 2 kawasan Free Trade Zone/FTZ yaitu :

1. FTZ di Seberang Prai ( mainland ) khusus untuk industri berat ( heavy industry ),
2. FTZ di Bayan Baru khusus untuk industry ringan ( cleaner industry ).

Diawali dengan masuknya investasi oleh perusahaan Jepang Matsushita tahun 1972, Penang berkembang sebagai pusat manufaktur dengan mengalirnya lebih banyak lagi perusahaan-perusaan besar / MNC lainnya tidak saja dari Jepang namun dari beberapa kawasan lain seperti Eropa dan Amerika.

Pada awalnya hanya terdapat kurang lebih 30 MNC Jepang yang beroperasi di Penang dengan 400 ekspatriat. Setelah tiga puluh tahun kemudian, berkembang menjadi 120 MNC dengan 1670 ekspatriat beroperasi di Penang Industrial Zone. Penang dengan jumlah penduduk kurang dari 2 juta atau 6 pct penduduk Malaysia, berkembang menjadi pusat

industri manufaktur high-technology & high value added products dan dikenal sebagai “ Silicon Valley of the East “. Keberhasilan ini tentunya tidak terlepas dari kebijakan Pemerintah Malaysia dibawah PM Mahathir Muhammad pada waktu itu dengan “ Look East Policy “ nya.

Total komulatif manufacturing investment dalam periode 10 tahun sampai 1999 mencapai RM 20 billion dan total investasi antara tahun 2000 s/d 2007 mencapai RM 30 billion. Tahun 2008 Penang telah berhasil mencapai puncak tertinggi dalam perolehan investasi bidang manufaktur diurutan ke-4 setelah Sarawak, Selangor dan Johor dengan jumlah RM 10,16 billion. Penang telah dijadikan sebagai platform eksport produk-produk MNC besar dan menjual produk-produk high-tech nya ke negara asal atau negara ketiga.

Diantara sepuluh besar investor asing di Penang untuk periode 2005 s/d 2007 menurut data dari Invest Penang berasal dari :

1. USA : RM 3.691.587.945
2. German : RM 2.064.345.284
3. Japan : RM 1.132.890.308
4. Taiwan : RM 300.017.036
5. Netherlands : RM 268.668.146
6. Singapore : RM 200.093.446
7. Bermuda : RM 81.713.945
8. Korea Selatan : RM 64.876.520
9. France : RM 51.354.568
10. Denmark : RM 28.113.000

Beberapa faktor-faktor yang menarik MNC beroperasi di Penang antara lain :

1. Tersedianya infrastruktur industri yang memadai yaitu 2 free trade zone ( Seberang Prai Industrial Zone dan Bayan Baru Industrian Zone ), 1 industrial park ( Kulim Industrial Park ) dan 1 komplek industri di Sungai Petani ( Kedah ).

2. Penang dapat menyediakan tenaga ahli dengan upah yang kompetitif.

3. Penang sebagai logistic hub dengan fasilitas pelabuhan laut dan pelabuhan udara yang bertaraf internasional,

4. Sarana transportasi yang memadai,

5. Penang telah menjadi tempat tujuan terfavorit di Asia Tenggara bagi para ekspatriat dari Eropa & Amerika,

6. Kelengkapan fasilitas penunjang disekitar FTZ seperti fasilitas perumahan/property yang memadai, pertokoan, sekolah, gudang, tempat ibadah dsb,

7. George Town sebagai kota internasional,

8. Fasilitas perbankan berstandar internasional,

9. Fasilitas hiburan / entertainment.

10. Fasilitas kesehatan

Perusahaan-perusahaan asing/MNC yang pertama beroperasi di Penang ( MNC Pioneers ) :

- AMD,
- Osram,
- Intel,
- Clarion,
- Agilent Technologies,
- Bosch,
- Fairchild,
- Renesas.

Perusahaan MNC besar lainnya :

- Mini Circuit,
- Flextronics,
- Dell,
- Avago,
- B Braun,
- Motorolla,
- Sony,
- Ase,
- Western Digital,
- IDT,
- Plexus,
- Toray,
- Stec,
- Matel,
- Linear,
- Banchmark,
- Spansion.



II. PELUANG TENAGA KERJA FORMAL DI SEKTOR MANUFAKTUR

Di Penang saat ini terdapat kurang lebih 160 MNC dan perusahaan-perusahaan manufaktur yang bergerak di bidang elektrik & elektronik ( E & E ) dan 20 diantaranya MNC bidang R & D produk E & E. Sektor manufaktur yang berkembang pesat di Penang telah menjadi “ engine of growth “ pertumbuhan ekonomi Penang. Sejak tahun 1990-an Penang telah dapat mencapai tingkatan pengangguran yang relatif sangat kecil kurang dari 1 pct dan bahkan berhasil mencapai “full employment”.

Mengingat jumlah penduduk Penang yang relatif kecil kurang dari 2 juta atau 6 pct dari jumlah penduduk Malaysia, maka untuk memenuhi kebutuhan tenaga kerja formal di sektor manufaktur, didatangkan dari negara-negara tetangga terdekat antara lain Indonesia, Bangladesh, India, Myanmmar, Vietnam, Nepal dan Philipina. Disamping itu, tenaga kerja tempatan pada tingkatan semi-skilled kurang berminat untuk bekerja di pabrik-pabrik, sehingga sebagian besar tenaga kerja di sektor ini diisi oleh tenaga kerja asing dan khususnya dari Indonesia.

Berikut MNC yang mempekerjakan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia sektor formal baik melalui mekanisme rekruitmen langsung maupun tidak langsung ( outsourcing ) – data 2008 - 2009 :

Direct Recruitment :

1. Sony : 1055
2. Renessas : 97
3. Minnebea : 210
4. Sanyo : 210
5. Ase : 50

Indirect Recruitment / Outsourcing :

1. Dell : 505
2. Osram : 360
3. Kontron : 419
4. Venture : 150
5. Sony : 150
6. Sharp : 380
7. Benchmark : 80
8. Flextronics : 300
9. Plexus : 550
10. Renessas : 50
11. Robert Bosch : 200
12. Fairchild : 80
13. Osram : 40

Para agen pengerah tenaga kerja di Penang pada awalnya lebih banyak melakukan rekruitmen secara langsung ke beberapa MNC baik di Penang, Kulim dan Sungai Petani, namun dalam perkembangannya lebih lanjut para agen-agen pengerah tenaga kerja beralih dan lebih favorable kepada rekruitmen secara tidak langsung/outsourcing. Hal ini sebagai akibat pengaruh krisis keuangan global awal tahun 2009, dimana sebagian besar MNC yang mengalami kelambanan dalam proses produksi sehubungan dengan berkurangnya pasar di Eropa dan Amerika, terpaksa memulangkan para tenaga kerjanya.

Berikut beberapa nama perusahaan pengerah tenaga kerja sektor formal yang selama ini melakukan kegiatan rekruitmen baik langsung maupun tidak langsung ke MNC di Penang antara lain:

Penang - based companies / agents :

1. IM Orientation Academy
2. IRC Global Search
3. Juta Mahamega
4. Magnificent Emblem
5. Neo Giant
6. Niat Murni
7. Agenda Ceria
11. Smart Work
12. Priston Consultancy
13. Teguh Sarjana Bumi

Non Penang based companies / agents :

1. Alpha Neptune - Selangor
2. Globustar & Globustar Partners - Putra Jaya
3. GMP Kaisar Services - KL
4. GPGC Resources - Perak
5. JR Joint Resources Holdings - KL
6. Locfor-Hr-Consultancy - Selangor
7. Midas Sejati - Melaka
8. Pancarona - KL
9. Right Pristine - KL
10. Sepang Nusa - KL
11. Seri Antanum -
12. Sumbawa Makmur - Selangor
13. Uniquip - KL
14. Wise Force - Selangor
15. Arshoba Corp - KL
16. Evergreen Reliance - Selangor
17. Foshwa - KL
18. Ganda Imeg -
19. Global Partners - KL
20. L & P Development - Perak
21. Menara Kekal -
22. My Empire - Sabah
23. Ten Nac - KL

Awal tahun 2009 Penang dan juga Malaysia pada umumnya mulai merasakan dampak daripada krisis keuangan global. Sampai bulan Juni 2009 jumlah investasi yang masuk hanya mencapai 22 pct dari jumlah keseluruhan investasi tahun 2008. Beberapa MNC bahkan mulai melakukan pengurangan jumlah tenaga kerja-nya sehubungan dengan menurunnya proses produksi dan permintaan pasar di Amerika dan Eropa.

Sebelum terjadinya krisis keuangan global, tahun 2008 tercatat jumlah tenaga kerja Indonesia yang bekerja di sektor manufaktur berkisar : 9865 orang dan setelah terjadinya krisis jumlah TKI Formal di sector manufaktur berkurang menjadi 7884 orang. Demikian halnya permohonan job order untuk tahun 2008 sebanyak 5844 TKI dan untuk tahun 2009 berkurang menjadi 2932 TKI.

Pada kwartal ketiga tahun 2009 beberapa perusahaan sudah mulai menunjukkan pemulihan proses produksinya dan mulai kembali melakukan rekruitmen tenaga kerja baik secara langsung maupun melalui perusahaan outsourcing. Terbukti dengan meningkatnya jumlah permintaan job order oleh perusahaan-perusahaan pengerah tenaga kerja untuk mendatangkan TKI formal dari Indonesia.

III. PELUANG KERJA SEKTOR NON MANUFAKTUR

Industri Garmen / Tekstil

Terdapat 3 perusahaan besar di wilayah kerja KJRI Penang yang mempekerjakan sejumlah besar TKI sektor formal, yaitu :

1. Pan Apparel - kurang lebih antara 600-700 TKI Formal
2. Pen Fabric, dan - kurang lebih antara 150-200 TKI Formal
3. Body Fashion di Kedah - kurang lebih antara 200-300 TKI Formal

Sebagian besar produk pakaian jadi dari ketiga perusahaan tersebut untuk tujuan ekspor, sehingga dengan terjadinya krisis keuangan global proses produksi juga mengalami penurunan. Menurut catatan job order yang diajukan ke KJRI Penang oleh ketiga perusahaan tersebut tahun 2009 hanya untuk penambahan beberapa tenaga kerja, yaitu : Pan Apparel ( 20 TKI ), Body Fashion ( 200 TKI ) dan Pen Fabric ( 20 TKI ).

Industri Sarung Tangan dan Plastik

Data yang ada di KJRI Penang mencatat 2 perusahaan di Penang yang bergerak di bidang industri sarung tangan dan plastik yang mempekerjakan tenaga kerja Indonesia yaitu :

1. Mapa Glove,
2. Guppy Plastic Industry.

Kedua perusahaan tersebut mempekerjakan tenaga kerja Indonesia kurang lebih 300 TKI.

Pariwisata/Perhotelan

Penang dan Langkawi sebagai tempat tujuan wisata terkemuka baik untuk turis domestik maupun mancanegara memerlukan tenaga kerja trampil di bidang perhotelah khususnya untuk food & beverage dan spa. Kurang lebih 20.000 wisatawan berkunjung ke Penang setiap harinya. Terdapat 40 hotel berbintang di Penang ( 25 hotel kota dan 15 hotel di pinggir pantai ) dengan kapasitas 14.000 kamar tersedia yang rata-rata memiliki tingkat okupansi antara 70-80 pct. Tenaga kerja Indonesia yang bekerja di hotel-hotel di wilayah akreditasi KJRI Penang tidak begitu banyak dan dalam tahun 2009 tercatat sejumlah 56 pekerja bekerja di beberapa hotel & resort antara lain :

1. Starcity, Kedah
2. Darul Aman Country Club, Kedah
3. Teluk Datai Resort, Langkawi
4. Tanjung Rhu Resort, Langkawi

Hotel-hotel berbintang di Penang setiap tahunnya kurang lebih 240 orang tenaga praktek kerja industri dari Sekolah Menengah Perhotelan di Indonesia melaksanakan kerja praktek/magang selama 3-6 bulan di beberapa hotel antara lain :

1. Hotel Golden Sands,
2. Shangri-la Rasa Sayang,
3. City Baview, Holiday Inn,
4. Park Royal.

Perkebunan

Saat ini terdapat kurang lebih 408 TKI formal bekerja pada sektor perkebunan dan ladang di Semenanjung Utara Malaysia. Perusahaan-perusahaan perkebunan yang mempekerjakan TKI antara lain :

1. Zue Heng Farming Sdn Bhd, Penang,
2. Agritech Enterprise,
3. Mutiara Sinar Plantation,
4. LKY Plantation Sdn Bhd, Kedah,
5. GRGV Enterprise, Kedah,
6. Kumpulan Ladang-Ladang Kedah,
7. Perkumpulan Ladang-Ladang Perlis.

Konstruksi

Tercatat sebanyak 4.433 TKI formal bekerja di sektor konstruksi di wilayah kerja KJRI Penang. Awal tahun 2010 ini ada beberapa perusahaan konstruksi di Penang yang mengajukan permohonan job order ke Fungsi Konsuler KJRI Penang yaitu :

1. Lean Yee Builder - 80 TKI
2. Champ Steel - 5 TKI
3. Pembinaan Perintis - 80 TKI

Industri Perkapalan

Penang Bousted Shipping Company mempekerjakan kurang lebih 20 tenaga ahli dari Indonesia yang sebagian besar direkruit dari para mantan pekerja PT PAL

Restauran

Penang telah sejak lama dikenal sebagai “ Malaysia’s Gastronomic Capital “ dengan para pedagang jalanan ( hawkers ). Beberapa makanan khas Penang yang sangat dikenal antara lain : char koay teow, nasi kandar, laksa dsb. Penang dipandang cukup menarik bagi para wisatawan yang ingin menikmati kuliner, sehingga Penang telah menjadi salah satu tujuan wisata kuliner ( a culinary destination ). Industri restauran di Penang berkembang seiring berkembangnya sektor pariwisata.

Restauran yang berkembang di Penang dan banyak memerlukan tenaga kerja, 20 – 40 pct diantaranya tenaga kerja asing adalah restaurant nasi kandar yang diperkirakan memiliki peluang kerja lebih dari 25.000 job vacancies. Beberapa restauran nasi kandar terkemuka di Penang yang mempekerjakan tenaga kerja Indonesia antara lain :

1. Nashmir - 35 TKI,
2. Zamrud - 20 TKI,
3. Pelita Samudera - 50 TKI.

IV. POTENSI KEBUTUHAN TENAGA KERJA FORMAL DI PENANG

Industri Manufaktur

Ketua Menteri Penang Lim Guan Eng bertekad untuk mempertahankan Penang sebagai salah satu destinasi di kawasan ASEAN untuk industri manufaktur E & E. Dengan demikian peluang kerja bagi tenaga kerja sektor formal di industri ini akan tetap diperlukan, mengingat keterbatasan Penang untuk men-supply sendiri tenaga kerja bidang manufaktur tersebut. Sampai 11 Maret 2010 sebanyak 98.916 pekerja asing masuk Malaysia dan jumal tertinggi sektor manufaktur E & E sebanyak 54.844 pekerja. Penang sejauh ini masih dipandang sebagai a low cost assembly centre untuk a high-tech, high value added design dan manufacturing hub. Para pekerja tempatan menurut pengamatan selama ini kurang tertarik untuk bekerja di pabrik-pabrik.

Diversifikasi Industri

Selain industri manufaktur E & E, belajar dari peristiwa krisis keuangan global, Pemerintah Penang mulai melakukan diversifikasi tidak saja terfokus pada sektor industri manufaktur, namun akan mentargetkan pada sektor-sektor antara lain : sektor industri ( display technology, halal food industry, biotechnology, software development, green technology), sektor jasa ( healthcare, international education, international procurement center, regional distribution center, hospitality, tourism, MICE, Malaysian My Second Home ( MM2H – UK, Jepang, Korea Selatan, Taiwn, India, China), logistics, proffessional services.

Dari sejumlah sektor tersebut diatas, dipastikan terdapat peluang tenaga kerja asing termasuk TKI formal untuk bekerja di sektor-sektor tersebut. Yang jelas untuk healthcare dan hospitality sampai sejauh ini masih tertutup untuk tenaga kerja dari negara lain.

Peluang Kerja versi MIDA

Berikut data dari MIDA ( Malaysian Industrial Development Authority ) beberapa proyek investasi di Penang yang telah berhasil menciptakan peluang kerja selama tahun 2009 walaupun dalam skala yang relatif kecil :

1. Medical devices - 339 lapangan kerja,
2. Light emitting diodes - 238 lapangan kerja
3. Integrated circuits - 275 lapangan kerja
4. Biopharmaceuticals - 131 lapangan kerja
5. Food & beverages - 267 lapangan kerja
6. Paper products - 181 lapangan kerja
7. Machine parts - 223 lapangan kerja
8. Electrical producs - 325 lapangan kerja
9. Equipment parts - 104 lapangan kerja
10. Ball pens - 35 lapangan kerja
11. Security system - 34 lapangan kerja
12. Furniture - 80 lapangan kerja
13. Polymers/plastics - 43 lapangan kerja
14. Cable parts - 28 lapangan kerja
15. Electronic toys - 161 lapangan kerja
16. Jewelry - 143 lapangan kerja
17. Industrial waste management - 13 lapangan kerja
18. Footwear - 77 lapangan kerja
19. Printed circuit boards - 74 lapangan kerja
20. Lenses/optics - 41 lapangan kerja
21. Chemical products - 18 lapangan kerja

MIDA tidak memerinci lebih jauh apakah peluang kerja diatas tersebut diisi seluruhnya oleh para pekerja tempatan ataukah juga terdapat pekerja asing ? Diperkirakan jika momentum pemulihan ekonomi tetap berlangsung dengan baik, maka peluang kerja untuk tenaga kerja asing termasuk TKI terbuka kemungkinannya.

Proyek-proyek Koridor Ekonomi Utara

Sejumlah RM 41,2 juta dana proyek untuk pembangunan Northern Corridor Economic Regions yang mencakup Perak, Penang, Kedah dan Perlis. Proyek-proyek tersebut akan mencakup bidang-bidang :

1. Pertanian,
2. Konstruksi,
3. Tourism,
4. Mekanik,
5. Engeeners,
6. Craft,
7. Spa Industry,
8. Juru Rawat.

Diprediksi proyek ini akan dapat menciptakan peluang tenaga kerja yang cukup besar ( kurang lebih 6 ribu peluang kerja ) tidak saja untuk pekerja dari dalam negeri Malaysia, namun kemungkinan juga bagi tenaga kerja formal dari negara tetangga termasuk dari Indonesia.


Penang, 7 April 2010

Reviving the spirit of ‘diplomasi perjuangan’

Yayan G.H. Mulyana, Jakarta | Mon, 08/22/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |- Klipping the Jakarta Post.

On August 17, Indonesia celebrated the 66th anniversary of its independence. Indonesians have always been proud of the fact that their independence was gained and defended by tears and blood, where the use of bambu runcing (sharpened bamboo) was renowned. The physical struggle has been remembered many years after the declaration of independence.

But history records that Indonesian independence has also been guarded by diplomacy.

On August 19, 1945, two days after the declaration of independence, President Sukarno appointed Mr. Achmad Soebardjo to lead a small-sized Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Its initial responsibility was to deal with the remaining Japanese civilian and military administration and the arrival of the British-led Allied forces in Indonesia to disarm the defeated Japanese troops.

Although a foreign policy doctrine was yet to be envisioned during this formative period, diplomacy turned out to be a critical instrument of Indonesia’s foreign policy then.

The newly established Foreign Ministry was anticipating a more demanding role in supporting the government in the later months.

The British-led Allied forces, which docked at Tanjung Priok in Jakarta on September 15, 1945 carried with them the Dutch military personnel and the workforce of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). While serving as part of the Allied forces to disarm the Japanese forces, the Dutch also had a goal to reclaim their colonial power over Indonesia.

The Indonesian government knew more and more that the Dutch were using the American military equipment in their actions. Protesting the use of the American equipment by the NICA, President Sukarno sent a cable to President Harry S. Truman on October 20, 1945.

Diplomacy was increasingly important when the Dutch became more assertive in realizing their reoccupation policy. One important step was the Hoge Voluwe negotiation that took place from April 14 to 24, 1946.

It concluded with no concrete results. Following the unsuccessful Hoge Voluwe negotiation, from November 11 to 13, 1946, Indonesia and met with Dutch representatives at Linggarjati, and both accepted the Linggarjati Agreement.

The Linggarjati Agreement was short-lived. On July 21, 1947, the Dutch carried out their first military action in major cities of Indonesia. This move was aimed to secure factories and plantations vital to their economic interests. It was in breach of the Linggarjati Agreement.

The UN Security Council responded to the situation. The council endorsed the US proposal of the establishment of the Three States Commission. Under the Commission’s facilitation, Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the Renville Agreement on Jan. 17, 1948. The Agreement comprised two documents; on a ceasefire and on the establishment of foundations for achieving political accord.

The year was a difficult time for Indonesian diplomacy. In the international arena, the Cold War was steadily evolving. This had several repercussions in the domestic politics of the newly independent country. Muso and his Front Demokrasi Rakjat staged a revolt in Madiun in September 1948, and the Soviet flag was fluttering in the city. A debate among nationalists on whether the republic should align with the Soviet Union-led bloc or with the United States-led bloc had been pressing the government. In response, in his bold and visionary speech before parliament on September 2, 1948, Vice President Hatta outlined the bebas (independent) and aktif (active) doctrine of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

A few months after the pronouncement of the doctrine, on December 19, 1948, the Netherlands executed its second police action. Yogyakarta was captured, and Sukarno and Hatta were placed in exile. President Sukarno ordered the establishment of an emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra, with Syafruddin Prawiranegara as president. He also tasked Dr. Sudarsono, L.N. Palar and A.A. Maramis who were then in India to found a government in exile if the plan to establish an emergency government in Sumatra did not succeed.

And once again, the UN Security Council responded to this aggression. After a long session, from March 10 to 23, 1949, the Council endorsed that a Round Table Conference was to be convened in The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949. A prelude to the Round Table Conference was the Roem-Roijen Agreement of May 1949. And the Round Table Conference turned out to be the last major effort of diplomasi perjuangan (diplomacy of struggle) during the formative period of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

But diplomasi perjuangan did not stop there. It continued to work in the following years. It worked in the Indonesia’s struggle for its sovereignty over West Irian, or Papua. It helped revive the Indonesian economy and its international stature in the era of President Soeharto. It was an important part of Indonesia’s struggle in securing the support of the international community for its sovereignty and territorial integrity during the rule of presidents Habibie, Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid.

And today, diplomasi perjuangan is as relevant as ever before. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the spirit of diplomasi perjuangan has been reflected, among other areas, in Indonesia’s efforts to realize an ASEAN Community, to build a regional architecture that generates peace, prosperity and stability, to build a just, balanced and sustainable global financial architecture, to address a gamut of non-traditional security challenges such as food and energy, and to eradicate poverty and elevate the people’s living conditions through the attainment of the MDGs.

As in the past, diplomasi perjuangan could be multi-pronged. In the formative period, it helped the government to tackle foreign aggression, and at the same time to respond to the bipolar pressure of the Cold War. One of the important factors of diplomasi perjuangan is unity in policy and national support. Domestic dissension will only corrode its effectiveness.

In future, diplomasi perjuangan will remain an essential instrument of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It is a foreign policy instrument with Indonesia’s character. And bebas aktif will continue to serve as its doctrinal vigor.

The writer is an assistant to the special staff to the President for International Relations. The opinions expressed are his own.

Ratification of Rome Statute would signal belief in justice

Song Sang-hyun | Mon, 05/04/2009 2:58 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Indonesia failed to fulfil its promise to ratify the Rome Statute, the founding treaty of the International Criminal Court (ICC), by the end of 2008, casting doubt over its commitment to deal with human rights violations. The Jakarta Post's Imanuddin Razak and Irawaty Wardany talked to ICC President Song Sang-hyun during his recent visit to Jakarta about the issue. The following is an excerpt.

What's the purpose of your visit to Indonesia and why now?

I've chosen Indonesia as my first destination since I became the president of the ICC because I think this country is the most important, the most influential one in the international community.

I am taking this opportunity to find out why you missed your target on ratifying the Rome Statute by the end of last year and to find out if there is anything we can do to perhaps help your government speed up the ratification of the Rome Statute.

The ICC is purely a traditional institution and it should remain a traditional institution-it cannot interfere with the national ratification process at all. After all, this is a decision of a sovereign state.

What would be the significance of Indonesia's ratification of the Rome Statute?

By ratifying Rome Statute, Indonesia would signal that it believes justice and accountability for the worst human rights violations are indeed central to the rule of law, as well as a stable and just system of government.

I'm sure it will send a clear signal to the international community of Indonesia's commitment to uphold the highest international human rights standard and highest moral commitment.

Once you've become a state party, I'm sure Indonesia can play a leading role in this newly introduced international criminal justice system and its operation. Also, it could perhaps open the pathway for more countries in Asia, especially in this Southeast Asia region.

We have to show the world that not only my country but also your country in this region wants to be part of the global fight against impunity. It is surprisingly to see Asia has only 14 state parties in the ICC, while the African region has 30. What's wrong with Asia?

Even though it has nothing to do with the ICC directly, but in every continent, every region, they have their own regional human rights court. Asia is the only region that doesn't have any regional human rights court.

Are there any sanctions for Indonesia for delaying the ratification?

No. Who would hand down sanctions to your country? As I said, it's ultimately the decision of a sovereign state. The ICC is a traditional institution created by an international treaty called the Rome Statute. So whether or not any country would ratify the treaty is entirely up to the country.

I do not know why your ratification process has been delayed. The government officials I met all indicated their strong commitment to ratifying the Rome Statute, yet there are some technical problems to be further considered by the government.

They all said it is not a matter of whether Indonesia will ratify it or not, but a matter of when Indonesia will ratify and how soon. I've gotten the impression that your government will eventually ratify the Rome Statute.

So there is no room for past human rights violators in Indonesia to be brought to the ICC?

Anything that happened before July 1, 2002 cannot be brought to the ICC at all, but anything that happened after July 1, 2002 can be brought to us depending upon your government's decision.

There is one more condition; normally it is the primary responsibility of your court, your prosecution, your police system, to start investigation or prosecution or indictment and conviction of all this human rights abuses.

Only if your court system does not work, your police system is paralyzed, your prosecution system is broken down and cannot do anything, only then ICC will step in.

So it is your national judicial system that is responsible for cleaning up human right messes that took place in this country. It is your responsibility, not ours. But in case your national legal system breaks down and cannot do anything then we can step in. We don't want to interfere with sovereignty of Indonesia.

How does the ICC determine when it is time to intervene?

Only if your system does not function or breaks down completely and cannot function; then we can jump in. So by ratifying Rome Statute your court system can learn a lot from the ICC or we can rely on your national court system for our work. So this is mutually beneficial.

Your domestic system sometimes runs into some problems then we can help you correct. There are many ways of cooperation between the ICC and your national system by exchanging people, sharing information and so on.

The necessity to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute

Muladi, Jakarta | Tue, 08/23/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Indonesia’s hesitation to ratify the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) tends to cast doubts over the country’s commitment to the root principles of democracy, particularly to the promotion and protection of human rights.

Surely its reluctance goes against the country’s billing as the third-largest democracy in the world.

On July 17, 1998, at the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in Rome, Italy, 120 states voted for the adoption of the Rome Statute of the ICC.

Equipped with two other interrelated legal documents, namely the Elements of Crimes document and the Rule of Procedure and Evidence document, the Rome Statute of the ICC “could well be the most important institutional innovation since the founding of the United Nations” (Johansen, 1997).

Former United Nations secretary-general Kofie Annan (1998) described the ICC as “a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march toward universal human rights and the rule of law”.

The Rome Statute is a treaty that established the permanent tribunal of the ICC and it came into force on July 1, 2002, the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the secretary-general of the United Nations. As of July 2011, 116 states are party to the statute. Indonesia has signed, but not yet ratified the statute, based on several reasons and arguments such as the presumption of the primacy position of ICC over national courts, anxiety over a possible threat to national sovereignty, poor information and a lack of preparation within the national legal system.

The ICC was established for the purpose of investigating and prosecuting individuals who commit “the most serious crimes of international concern,” such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. No provision relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the responsibility of states under international law.

The ICC is therefore not a supra-national body but an international body, because it is only binding on its state parties. It is thus not a substitute for national criminal jurisdiction. Rather, the exercise of its jurisdiction is “complementary” to national criminal jurisdiction of its state parties when they are considered “unable” or “unwilling” to investigate or prosecute the case (Knoops, 2003).

Regarding the promotion and protection of universal human rights in a globalized world, there is a necessary re-characterization of state sovereignty from sovereignty as a privilege and control to sovereignty as a responsibility both for internal and external duties.

State authorities, national political authorities and the agents of state are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens and promotion of their welfare as well as to the international community through the United Nations mechanism for their actions.

The existence of the ICC is very important in efforts to ensure that atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity and threaten peace, security and the wellbeing of the world must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must also be ensured by taking measures at a national level and by enhancing international cooperation. The national criminal justice system remains the primary forum to be respected, unless it fails to perform professionally based on the statute standards.

The consistency to uphold the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law; the prohibition of analogy and confirmation in cases of ambiguity; and that definitions shall be interpreted in favor of the persons being investigated, prosecuted or convicted; are another minimum guarantees of the statute that could realize the principles of legal certainty, justice and utility.

In a nutshell, Indonesia’s ratification of the Rome Statute should be accelerated without too much worry. The ratification would also give a boost to its international reputation, particularly in connection with its current chairmanship of ASEAN.

The ratification is a manifestation of the country’s third national goal stipulated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, which mandates Indonesia to participate in the formation of a world order based on freedom, perpetual peace and social justice.

The inclusion of the statute’s ratification in the National Plan of Action of Human Rights and the implementation of several standards of the statute adopted in the 2006 Law on Human Rights Court in terms of alleged gross violations of human rights in Timor Leste have positively impacted on Indonesia’s efforts to familiarize the norms and values of the Rome Statute as a legal regime.

The writer is a professor of law at Diponegoro University, Semarang, and a former governor of the National Resilience Institute.

Discourse: China’s progress contributes to prosperity, opens opportunity for ASEAN

The Jakarta Post | Thu, 04/28/2011 11:12 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will arrive in Jakarta on Thursday for a three-day official visit to Southeast Asia’s largest economy. Before his departure from Beijing, he gave three Indonesian journalists, including The Jakarta Post’s Abdul Khalik, a rare interview. Below is the final part of the interview:

Question: ASEAN-China relations have made big strides in recent years. Do you see any challenges in the ASEAN-China relationship? What steps will China take to promote ASEAN-China relations?

Answer: This year marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of the dialogue relationship between China and ASEAN. Over the past 20 years, we have moved from a dialogue relationship to good neighborly relations and to a relationship of strategic cooperation. China and ASEAN now enjoy all-round cooperation. Take China-Indonesia relations for example. Our two countries established a strategic partnership in 2005, and later we formulated the plan of action for the implementation of the strategic partnership, bringing our bilateral relations onto a new stage.

Now, China-ASEAN relations have entered a stage of forging ahead in all respects. ASEAN integration has made steady progress. The China-ASEAN FTA has been established, and our cooperation in finance, infrastructure, connectivity and other areas has deepened. Although ASEAN members are at different stages of development, I believe we can all benefit from our cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and win-win results.

I hope that China-ASEAN cooperation will continue to move along this healthy track in the right
direction.

Some countries, including Indonesia, have some concern over the implementation of the China-ASEAN free trade arrangement, what’s your view on that?

I would like to say that much preparation was made before the FTA was officially inaugurated last year. I believe that the China-ASEAN FTA has brought benefits to both China and ASEAN countries. We have witnessed a tremendous growth in trade between the two sides. For example, China-Indonesia trade expanded by nearly 40 percent in the first quarter of this year, and achieved basic balance.

I want to use this opportunity to address the concerns in the minds of some businesses and individuals with regard to CAFTA. The China-ASEAN free trade arrangement is of mutual benefit and brings win-win results to all parties concerned. We need to make full use of the favorable conditions, especially the preferential policies set out in the FTA. And in the course of the China-ASEAN FTA development, we should constantly improve this arrangement in the light of actual circumstances.

We need to accommodate the interests of small and medium-sized enterprises, and work together to ensure that the FTA will contribute to the economic development of all sides. With regard to all these aspects, China has always pursued an open approach.

Will China hold talks with those ASEAN countries having sovereignty disputes with China in the South China Sea on joint development?

China remains committed to the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Territorial disputes and disputes over maritime rights and interests should be resolved between the countries concerned through peaceful consultations. We disapprove of referring bilateral disputes to multilateral forums because that will only make these issues bigger and more complicated.

Second, I fully believe that in spite of their territorial disputes and disputes over maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, the countries concerned should and can carry out joint development in the South China Sea. This is in the interest of peace and stability in the South China Sea. It also serves the interests of the countries concerned and all relevant parties.

Some say that China’s remarkable progress has created suspicion. How do you comment on this issue?
I know some ASEAN countries have shown a keen interest in this topic. I would like to say that China remains a developing country. With over 30 years of reforming and opening up, we have achieved much progress in our economic and social development.

However, China remains a big country with a large population and a weak economic foundation. That means we still have to work long and hard if we are to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects and achieve our goal of modernization.

China adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace and the policy of building good neighborly relationships and partnerships with neighboring countries. This is our policy when China is not a developed country. It will remain to be our policy even when China becomes a developed country in the future. China will never seek hegemony.

China’s development in itself is a major contribution to human progress and prosperity. China’s development also represents an opportunity for its neighboring countries, especially ASEAN countries.

We are of the view that only by maintaining a peaceful external environment and a stable domestic environment can China and ASEAN countries enjoy continuous development and progress.

Great changes have taken place in the region of East Asia. How will China handle its relations with extra-regional powers such as the United States, which has been included in the East Asia Summit?

I believe it is important that we follow the following three principles: First, we need to consolidate, enhance and further develop the existing cooperation mechanisms. This is of the highest and most practical significance. We need to work together to establish and improve long-term cooperation plans, increase input in cooperation and work for the full implementation of all cooperation plans with a view to delivering real benefits to people of all East Asian countries.

Second, we need to respect the diversity of East Asian cooperation. China has always advocated and adhered to the one important principle that is East Asian cooperation should always have ASEAN play the leading role and contribute to the progress of ASEAN integration and development of all ASEAN countries.

Third, East Asian cooperation should stay open and inclusive. Our cooperation has been constantly expanded, and from this year, leaders of the United States and Russia will attend the East Asia Summit.

I believe the East Asia Summit should stick to its nature as a leaders-led strategic forum. This forum should be conducive to peace and stability in East Asia and contribute to stronger East Asian cooperation and the development and progress of East Asia.

Discourse: China offers RI extensive bilateral, regional and global cooperation

The Jakarta Post | Wed, 04/27/2011 11:37 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao will arrive in Jakarta on Thursday on a three-day official visit to Southeast Asia’s largest economy. In his first visit as Chinese premier, Wen will hold talks with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to lay out the two countries’ future relations. Before his departure from Beijing, the premier gave three Indonesian journalists, including The Jakarta Post’s Abdul Khalik, a rare interview. Below is the first part of the interview:

Question: What is your impression of Indonesia?

Answer: Indonesia is a country with vast and extensive territory with rich natural resources and a large population. It’s a country with a long coastline and a lot of islands, known as the emerald of the equator. Exchanges between the two countries have a long history and the relations between the two countries have enjoyed rapid development in recent years.

I came to know a country by the name of Indonesia when I was a child, and even when I was very young I could hum the tune of some famous Indonesian folk songs, including Ayo Mama and Rasa Sayange.

So, I have a very fond impression about Indonesia.

What is your take on the mutual understanding between the two countries?

When it comes to exchanges between the two countries, we can recall that in the 4th century, an eminent monk by the name of Fa Hien had already visited Indonesia, and in the 8th century, another famous monk visited Indonesia, and it was during this time that a lot number of Chinese started visiting and settling in Indonesia.

The most famous historical episode of exchanges between the two countries was the western sea voyage of famous Muslim navigator Admiral Cheng He in the early 15th century. He helped establish a number of mosques in Indonesia, and many remain very well preserved until now.

In modern times, the most memorable episode of our exchanges was the Asia-Africa conference in Bandung when then Indonesian president Sukarno and Chinese premier Chou En-lai made tremendous efforts to bring about a successful conference, and together they worked to initiate the 10 important principles for peaceful co-existence of Asian and African countries.

In order to gain present knowledge and understanding about our important historical event, I want to pay a special trip to the relevant venues in Bandung.

Can you comment on current China-Indonesia relations, and how the two countries enhance their cooperation?

I believe long-term economic plans of the two countries present tremendous opportunities for cooperation between our two countries, and what we need now is to seize the opportunities and work toge ther to translate that into concrete results.

To do this I believe it’s important that we take the following steps in six areas. First, we should enhance high-level exchanges, establish a mechanism for regular mutual visits at the leadership level and increase our mutual political trust.

Second, we need to carry out closer economic cooperation and trade. We can enhance our cooperation in energy, infrastructure development and some important sectors including manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries.

Third, we need to step up maritime cooperation that includes maritime security, navy-to-navy exchanges, antiterrorism joint exercises and military drills, development of marine resources and research development of marine science and technology. We should also enhance our cooperation in disaster preparedness for tsunamis and earthquakes.

Fourth, we need to enhance culture and people-to-people contact, we need to enhance our exchanges in science, technology, culture and education.

Speaking of education, I believe both educational and cultural exchanges represent the future of our friendship and form the foundation of our cooperation. We need to work together for early conclusion of agreement on mutual recognition of each others’ degrees and diplomas of higher education.

We should also further increase the exchanges between students. They have a lot of meaning for both countries.

Fifth, we need to enhance cooperation in ASEAN. Indonesia now holds the rotating presidency of ASEAN and we hope Indonesia will continue to play an active and constructive role in promoting ASEAN-China cooperation.

Sixth, we should step up cooperation on major international and regional issues. Indonesia is a member of the Group of 20. It is now a big and major emerging market economy.

The country now enjoys increasingly extensive influence not only in Asia but also in the world. We hope that the two countries will step up cooperation in international affairs and make joint contribution to promote world peace, prosperity and progress.

Slow internationalization of the Chinese renminbi

Anwar Nasution, Jakarta | Mon, 08/22/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post.

The renminbi (RMB) is a potential candidate for a leading international currency. Some pundits have predicted that in the long run the RMB will become one of the anchors of the international monetary system in addition to the US dollar and the euro.

The RMB deserves the international currency status, as China is now the second-largest exporter after Germany and has surpassed Japan as the second-largest economy after the US.

China’s economic growth has been at its highest during the past three decades, ranging between 8 and 10 percent per year, and has become the growth engine for both emerging economies and the global economy.

The export-led development strategy adopted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since the 1980s has produced surpluses both in its current account and capital account that has allowed the country to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserve amounting to more than US$3 trillion at present. Nearly two-thirds of the external reserves are held in US Treasury bills and sovereign bonds.

There are three objectives of the RMB internationalization. First, trade invoicing in the RMB eliminates risks for China in conducting international trade and finance both as a unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store of value.

Second, elevation of the RMB status to a reserve currency reduces the need for China to accumulate large external reserves in other major currencies, including the US dollar.

Third, it would fix the structural weakness of the present unipolar international financial system dominated by the US dollar as a reserve currency.

Unlike a domestic currency that is declared by the government as a legal tender, international money is not mandated by the central bodies of the international monetary system, such as the IMF.

The composition of international reserve holdings are decided by individual economic agents and countries.

Making the RMB a global money requires a wide range reforms in China. The present fixed exchange rate system that pegs the RMB to the US dollar at an undervalued rate should be replaced by a free-floating exchange rate system.

To make the RMB fully convertible, capital account should be liberalized and capital controls should stop.

China also needs to nurture a deep, wide and liquid world-class financial center, ending the financial repression, and corporatize state-owned financial institutions that are presently being used as instruments to pursue the government’s industrial and development policies.

In terms of assets and liabilities, the Chinese banks may be the largest in the world, but none of them measure up to the clout of major Western banks in international financial intermediation.

It takes decades and a lot of effort to meet these prerequisites. Only with these modern and market-based systems can the RMB be used as an unit of account, a medium of exchange and a store value for transactions between non-residents of China.

In spite of several calls of the governor of its central bank to shift away from the US dollar, China cannot escape from the present of the US dollar’s preeminence as a reserve currency.

China’s dependency on the US dollar is partly a factor of the structure of its economy, which is only part of intra-regional trade in East Asia.

China serves as an export platform that assembles spare parts, components and other intermediate inputs produced in Japan, Korea and other Asian economies and exports the final products to the rest of the world, mainly the US and EU markets.

China’s exports and imports are expected to be denominated in the US dollar and euro. Energy, raw materials and foods imported by China are also denominated in those currencies.

China will likely use a gradual approach and the ASEAN+3+3 platform (including Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao) to pursue its objective in making the RMB a global currency.

Unlike in the European Union, this region has no regional economic common market with a single currency.

However, the regional approach makes sense because trade, investment and financial relations between the ASEAN+3+3 countries and China has became closer and deeper, giving its trading partners an incentive to use more RMB for transactions purposes and reserve holdings.

Currencies of several of these neighboring countries are either pegged to the RMB or to baskets of major currencies in which the RMB has a large weight. In some of its immediate neighbors the RMB is accepted as a substitute for local currencies.

For those countries that fix its exchange rate t o the RMB, it is making commitment to monetary, fiscal and other economic policies aiming at maintaining the fixed rate.

Fostering monetary and financial cooperation in the ASEAN+3+3 region also depends on the progress of the CMI (Chiang Mai Initiatives) and ABMI (Asian Bond Market Initiative). Like the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the CMI provides liquidity supports in addition to the IMF facility to member countries of ASEAN+3 against financial turbulence.

As they are denominated in local currencies, ABMI reduces currency mismatches and builds deep and resilient regional capital markets. The meeting of ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers in Madrid in 2008 multilateralized the CMI, and enlarged the size of the facility. This was a giant leap toward greater political cohesion in the ASEAN+3 countries as, for the first time they transferred some national powers to a regional institution.

China has taken three steps toward the internationalization of the RMB. First, in April 2004 China introduced a pilot Trade Settlement Scheme (PRTSS) that allows eligible enterprises in China to settle trade payments in RMB with their corresponding enterprises in Hong Kong and other countries. This allows for the invoice of exports and imports from and to selected countries in RMB.

Eligible enterprises in Hong Kong are allowed to open corporate RMB accounts at selected banks in Hong Kong. By the end of 2010, more than 67,000 exporters in 20 provinces in China were licensed to invoice in RMB.

The PRTSS Scheme started with trade between five main cities in China with ASEAN+3 countries and now has been expanded to other cities in China and other regions in Central Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa. The value of the scheme has also been expanded rapidly from a modest beginning at RMB 5 billion in the first quarter of 2010 to more than RMB 100 billion at present.

Second, it has allowed for the issuance of RMB denominated bonds in offshore markets. Five state-owned Chinese banks issued RMB bonds in Hong Kong in 2007 and were followed by foreign institutions including HSBC, IFC and ADB.

To set benchmark risk-free interest rates for RMB debt instruments for Chinese companies, the authorities issued sovereign bonds denominated in RMB in Hong Kong on September 28, 2009. With huge external reserve holdings, China does not need to borrow to finance its budget deficit.

The third step to expand the use of the RMB for trade settlement was the provision of a currency swap facility with nine countries, including Indonesia, during the Global Financial Crisis in 2007-9. The currency swaps allowed China to receive payments in RMB for its exports to the participating countries.

China collects seigniorage from foreign holdings of the RMB. On the other hand, China has to maintain the RMB outside its boundaries, controlling counterfeiting and providing depository vaults for new currency available to be exchange for old RMB. For these purposes, China has opened RMB trading centers in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taipei.

The writer is professor of monetary economics at the University of Indonesia. He is also a former senior deputy governor of Bank Indonesia.

Insight: China’s pacific accommodation with America

Juwono Sudarsono, Jakarta | Tue, 08/23/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post.

Talks of growing strategic rivalry between the US and China have gained steam among columnists, book writers, think tanks and strategic analysts. Themes of American imminent decline (“Post American World”, “Asia’s New Globalism”) are juxtaposed with the growing rise of China’s economic and military profile.

Concern over current plans to cut America’s military spending (US$345 billion over the next 10 years) coincide with reports on China’s soaring defense budget ($120 billion a year and rising). Worry over a “dangerous confrontation” between the US and China is compounded over concerns that China may replace the US as the region’s “essential security guarantor”.

For the moment, the reality is less worrying. First, current American economic travails must be viewed in the context of the long-standing fusion of the economies of the US, Japan, Korea and China as inseparable trade, investment and financial trans-regional entities. The $14.5 trillion US economy is directly linked to South Korea (GDP $1.8 trillion), Japan GDP ($5 trillion) and China (GDP $5.2 trillion).

Notwithstanding the persistent trade and fiscal surpluses with the US for almost 20 decades, all three East Asia economies remain strongly welded to the American trade and financial markets. The US dollar remains the only currency with the backing of a credible and flexible market. The presence of well over $10 trillion in treasuries and foreign exchange reserves held by Korea, Japan and China are clear indications of the staying power of US stock, whatever the fluctuations of the bond and money markets. Chinese bankers agree there is no viable alternative to US treasury bonds.

Second, global markets do not and cannot operate in a security vacuum. Therein lies the importance of understanding the economic and security interface among the US, Korea, Japan and China. The fiscal and monetary positions of each of the East Asian economies are inextricably linked to the prevailing security assurance of US military preponderance, especially of its naval forces. Three generations of Korean and Japanese and two generations of Chinese economic officials implicitly understand the imperative of American naval, air and land forces providing strategic assurance throughout Northeast Asia.

While China’s leaders implicitly acknowledge the imperative of American dominance, its more pragmatic leaders must periodically defer to their hard-line factional rivals and register open defiance over America’s role in Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and in the South China Sea. From Deng Xiao ping to Hu Jintao, China’s more pragmatic leaders in the end prevailed in accepting American dominance, albeit as a “transient necessity”.

Like their Korean, Japanese counterparts, Chinese economic and business leaders understand that access to iron ore, oil, gas and other strategic minerals from points in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia rely on the secure sea lanes provided by America’s unmatched US Navy carrier strike groups in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and in the Gulf region. In short, China’s future economic sustenance depends on continued American strategic preponderance.

US military power ensures that the stock, bond and financial markets in Seoul, Tokyo, Shanghai and Hong Kong are inextricably linked to the New York Stock Exchange and to Chicago Mercantile. Hong Kong and Shanghai’s global financial links to New York, London and Frankfurt are based on the premise that Chinese access to world markets rest a stable American military assurance. Japanese, Korean and Chinese holdings build manufacturing bases in the US because their parent companies were secured by American strategic assurance in Northeast Asia.

The habitual concern over China’s increased military assertiveness is a reflection of the enduring factionalism between hardline nationalists and pragmatic internationalists within the Chinese Communist Party leadership. It is also a constant feature of policy differences between China’s hard-line defense ministry nationalists and pragmatist internationalists in the foreign policy and economic bureaucracies. Issues over Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea are part of the perennial contest for key policy decisions. These gyrations are reflected in the US between hardliners, who want to “punish” or “roll back” China, and those who understand that China’s assertiveness carry more rhetorical style than hard policy substance and that American prevalence, if not dominance, will continue for another generation.

China’s anti-satellite capability, its recent launch of its first aircraft carrier and stealth fighter capability, and other features of China’s military modernization, have important symbolic value to satisfy Chinese pride but they do not adversely reduce American strategic presence in East Asia. On this score, cool-headed defense and military leaders in the US and China share a much more in tacit understanding than appears in reported public debate.

There is finally the all-important but less publicly discussed issue of China’s severe internal economic and social problems, with their attendant dangers of political, economic and cultural unrest. It is in the interest of the US and of China’s neighbors in Northeast and Southeast Asia that China’s current internal political, economic and social unrest do not fuel passion within the country’s masses and its elites, giving fuel to channel aggressive nationalism abroad.

The “Fifth Generation” of China’s leaders who will gain top leadership positions in 2012 are expected to continue to focus on both surmounting the dangers of internal unrest and maintaining the path of peaceful accommodation between America and China. All nations and economies of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and indeed the rest of the world, watch with keen anticipation that China’s peaceful development complements its continued peaceful accommodation with America.

The writer is a professor of international relations and geopolitics at the University of Indonesia and former defense minister.

ASEAN at 44: Toward a solid community

Yoes Kenawas, Singapore | Sat, 08/20/2011 8:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post.

This year the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) celebrates its 44th anniversary. Forty-four years of maintaining peace and stability in one of the most dynamic regions in the world is a remarkable achievement for an association that was built in the midst of the Cold War.

However, as the Cold War came to an end, the forces of globalization and interdependence became something inevitable for most countries around the world, including ASEAN member states.

Therefore, to strengthen its cooperation and cohesion, they have decided to go further beyond its original form.

ASEAN wants to make a solid community under the umbrella of the ASEAN Community, which consists of three pillars, namely: the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC); the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC); and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). The deadline set for the establishment of this new form of cooperation among Southeast Asian countries is 2015.

The ASCC Blueprint has stated that building an ASEAN identity is one of its objectives. Thus, the ASCC aims to promote awareness and common values within ASEAN to its people, as well as to create a sense of belonging, mutual understanding, and togetherness.

By doing so, ASEAN hopes that its citizens will give their full support toward the establishment of the ASEAN Community by 2015.

Citizens’ support is a vital precondition to establish a solid network and cooperation among ASEAN member countries. Without it, cooperation at the elite level will be “soulless” because their people, which are their ultimate reason to cooperate with each other, will not be aware of the benefits of such cooperation, leading to potential pessimism and skepticism among ASEAN’s populations about cooperation.

In short, without the support of citizens, cooperation among the governments of Southeast Asia will be less effective, if not useless.

One of the many ways by which this support can be obtained is via people-to-people contact.

People-to-people contact can bring strong support for ASEAN governments that want to form any kind of positive cooperation.

Through interactions, citizens in ASEAN countries can get to know each other better, build mutual understanding, develop the sense that they are facing common problems and, ultimately, seek for common solutions to their problems.

The latter issue is where governments can play a key role by cooperating with each other to create
common policies or programs, which can then be accepted and implemented by all members of ASEAN, reassured that such policies and programs will bring benefits to their people.

People-to-people interaction does not necessarily mean direct interaction (although it is the most effective way).

Indirect interaction through various channels, such as through mass media, online communities, or through social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter, can offer alternatives to bridging communication among the 600 million people across the region.

Interaction among ASEAN citizens is still minimal. And yet, there are a great many meetings, policies, and programs that have already been carried out with the aim to increase interaction between ASEAN citizens; for example, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Youth (AMMY); the ASEAN Committee on Women; the ASEAN Education Ministers’ Meeting; the ASEAN Foundation’s programs; the ASCC Blueprint; free social visit visas for citizens of ASEAN countries (although not available in all member countries); and many other forms of cooperation.

In essence, ASEAN’s respective governments are trying their best to serve the needs of ASEAN people.

However, most Southeast Asians are still not aware about these meetings, policies and programs. The reason being, that there is no intensive news coverage on ASEAN issues or any intensive promotion and dissemination of information by the government to the general public.

With only four years left until 2015, people-to-people interaction to increase social cohesion among Southeast Asians needs to be accelerated. Otherwise, ASEAN Community 2015 will only emulate most ASEAN cooperation in the past, which is to say it starts and ends at the elite level while the people are left behind.

Some solutions can be suggested to foster people-to-people interaction in the region.

First, considering mass media is one of the most effective channels to disseminate information to broader audiences, the governments of Southeast Asia need to be more focused on efforts to embrace and engage with the mass media in ASEAN countries.

Thus, intensive, innovative, and integrated media relations programs need to be developed immediately. Intense engagement of the media could encourage media channels or the press community to write more about ASEAN.

Second, Southeast Asian governments need to increase the number of activities, such as youth exchanges and youth camps, teacher and lecturer exchanges, as well as other activities that could provide direct interaction among community leaders or opinion makers from ASEAN member states.

Those activities should be evaluated from time to time and networks that are built among the participants should be maintained.

Third, the governments of Southeast Asia need to provide more support to the non-governmental and private sectors’ efforts that can help promote people-to-people interaction across ASEAN.

If governments cannot support this interaction in terms of funding, they can at least facilitate and provide access to meet the needs of cooperation with partner institutions from other ASEAN countries.

Finally, ASEAN governments need to utilize the power of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Flickr, and others, to generate support among ASEAN
populations.

These social media can be employed as the powerful tools they are for helping people to get to know each other better, exchange ideas, share experiences, and seek common solutions.

Hopefully, by 2015, ASEAN can establish a solid ASEAN Community with the full support of its citizens who share the same idea: “Think, feel, and act ASEAN”. Congratulations ASEAN.

The writer is a research analyst in the Indonesian Program at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

ASEAN faces 'critical period' in a changing world

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Wed, 01/17/2007 4:16 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

During their summit over the weekend, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) approved a blueprint for the landmark ASEAN Charter. Former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas, who represents Indonesia in the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) that drafted the charter, shared his view of the charter with The Jakarta Post's Abdul Khalik at the summit in Cebu, the Philippines.

Question: What is the importance of the charter?

Answer: After 40 years of existence, we finally have a legal basis or constitution to direct the course of our relations. This is very significant because besides providing legally-binding principles, the charter will give a very clear organizational structure to ASEAN.

At 40, ASEAN is facing a critical period in the changing world. It must reposition itself to be able to face this new situation and the challenges from greater interdependence, competition and the rise of new forces, such as China and India. One of the things that will make ASEAN different than before is the proposed principles and objectives. The old principles that we have agreed on, like non-interference and others, are still there. But we added new ones to show that ASEAN is adapting itself to the new challenges. We included democracy, good government, human rights and humanitarian laws.

Many said sanction mechanisms were the key thing to include in the charter. Is the EPG recommending their inclusion?

We can't let members just do what they like. If there is non-compliance with certain commitments or even certain basic principles and objectives, then there are measures to address this non-compliance.

Previously, we used the term sanction for this. But measures to address non-compliance means the same thing; it is simply softer. There will be an implementation monitoring mechanism. We will ask the (ASEAN) secretariat to be the monitoring body.

We discussed various measures. It can go as far as suspension of certain rights: for instance, suspension from participating in ASEAN meetings, of certain rights to chair meetings, etc. We also asked ourselves: should we go as far as expulsion?

The majority of ASEAN member countries thought we were a special group and like a family. We should not think of expelling any one of us, nor should we allow any one of us to withdraw from ASEAN as we know that the other side of expulsion is withdrawal. Several members, however, want expulsion to be included.

At the last minute of a long discussion and compromise, we said expulsion would only be decided on by heads of state and government in very extraordinary cases. So, the door is open for expulsion but it is not the rule. The rule is only suspension.

What about the decision-making process? Will there be votes?

So far, we have used consensus to reach decisions. But, while consensus is good to develop a sense of equality among big and small members, as well as mutual solidarity, it is a negative when it impedes agreement.

Sometimes, only one or two members prevent consensus because they disagree, so no decision is made. So we are subject to the lowest common denominator if we stick to consensus all the time. That's why we now open the door to voting.

So we are saying consensus remains the primary method for very important issues -- for instance, political issues or decisions on suspension so that one or two countries don't feel they are left out of the process. On less sensitive issues, like economic issues, if no consensus can be reached then we can go on to a vote.

As to when there will be a vote and on what issues as well as what kind of voting criteria, whether it should be a majority, simple majority or two-thirds majority vote, we leave it to the leaders and to the rules of procedure to be decided on by the task force.

Many people complain that ASEAN is no more than officials talking, that it doesn't touch on the needs of the people. Does EPG recommend something for the charter on this?

As per the request of the heads of state and government, we tried to draw up a charter which would change ASEAN into a more people-centered organization, not just a place for government officials and diplomats. During our work, we asked civil society to come and tell us what they want and how they see ASEAN and so on.

We talked to AIPO (ASEAN Inter-Parliament Organization), think-tanks such as the ISEAS (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies) and various other groups.

We decided that one way to make sure that their views are constantly being heard is to have a regular channel of communication at all levels of ASEAN.

You talk about giving ASEAN a clear organizational structure. Can you elaborate?

We also made a proposal on the organizational structure -- for instance, the summit of heads of state and government we call the ASEAN Council. We recommend that they meet more than once a year or twice a year. We suggest this because during their current once-a-year meeting, they talk a lot because of limited time.

The secretariat and the secretary general must also be strengthened.

The organizational structure must owe its origin to the fact that we are now moving from an association to a community. So, we propose the ASEAN Council remain at the top, comprising heads of state and government. Below it, there are three ministerial councils for each of the three pillars of the community -- one political and security, one economic, and one socio-cultural council.

Then, we should also establish a new body, called the ASEAN Institution, because we found that the secretariat lacks the capacity for thorough research and analysis and so on. They are taken up too much by day-to-day tasks.

How does the charter contribute to development within ASEAN, especially in the less-developed areas?

We talk a lot about how to close the development gap between certain new members and older members of ASEAN. Up until now, we have only tried to narrow the gap through projects, such as the Mekong Delta Project. But now, we are proposing special funds for it. The funds consist of voluntary contributions and innovative arrangements. We have asked our financial experts to study whether we can, for instance, raise the funds from sales taxes and airport taxes from all countries.