Sunday, September 18, 2011

Re-establishing an Indonesia-Thailand alliance for ASEAN

Awidya Santikajaya, Jakarta | Fri, 09/16/2011 8:04 PM A | A | A |- Klipping the Jakarta Post

Thai Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra has begun an introductory tour to three Southeast Asian countries: Brunei, Indonesia and Cambodia. Among her visits to other countries, her trip to Cambodia could become the most deeply watched.

Observers are curious to see whether she is able to fix her country’s ties with Cambodia, especially with regard to the Preah Vihear border dispute.

Beside this issue, a more important issue to be monitored from her travels is how Yingluck actually translates her democratic achievement to reviving Thailand’s role in ASEAN.

Why did I say “reviving”? Thailand was once more than a prominent member of ASEAN. It played a pivotal role in initiating, facilitating and establishing ASEAN in 1967. Responding to criticism over ASEAN’s effectiveness in the late 1990s, then Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan entertained the idea of “constructive engagement” under which Southeast Asian leaders were persuaded to discuss domestic issues in the regional forum.

Unfortunately, a series of political crises has deteriorated Thai diplomacy. Thailand is still a leading actor in ASEAN, but its dominant role has gradually declined.

Thailand’s commitment to ASEAN is often disturbed by its domestic vulnerability as well as the nationalistic stance of certain groups inside the country. For instance, Thailand had to reschedule and relocate the ASEAN Summit in 2010 due to serious security concerns.

Furthermore, in response to the Thai-Cambodian dispute over the area around Preah Vihear temple, former Thai prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva repeatedly refused ASEAN involvement in mediating the conflict.

Abhisit rejected Indonesia’s offer to provide unarmed military observers in the disputed area and insisted that the conflict should be managed by bilateral channels instead of through ASEAN.

While Thailand’s role in ASEAN declines, Indonesia has been pursuing a more ASEAN-oriented foreign policy. ASEAN’s evolution from a “talk-shop” organization to a more formal institution has been strongly influenced by democratization in Indonesia.

Indonesia actively initiated and promoted the ASEAN Community, ASEAN Charter and ASEAN’s Inter-governmental Commission for Human Rights (AICHR). Time magazine once called Indonesia Southeast Asia’s political role model.

Thailand has gained momentum to come back to a diplomatic stage when it recently elected Yingluck as prime minister. Enjoying a landslide election victory, she is the most domestically-legitimate prime minister, compared to her four predecessors.

Legitimacy at home could become a powerful source for exercising foreign policy. Thailand has never had the best chance to normalize its position in ASEAN before.

It is really time to re-embrace regional supremacy, which Thai-land has initiated. In this sense, Thailand and Indonesia could become closer partners to strengthen ASEAN.

To Yingluck, reviving the Thai position in ASEAN is crucial for two reasons. First, it could be useful in tackling accusations from her political opponents who continuously question her little experience in public office.

Second, her proactive involvement in ASEAN could free her from being associated with her brother, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Why? It was Thaksin who actually “withdrew” Thailand from ASEAN. Following the Tak Bai incident in which about 85 people were killed in Narathiwat province, Thaksin threatened to walk out at the 2004 ASEAN Summit in Vientiane because he did not want other ASEAN countries to raise Thailand’s domestic problem.

At the same time, Indonesia also needs “a partner” in ASEAN. For years, some of Indonesia’s ideas for strengthening ASEAN have not been entirely and easily agreed on by other members.

In 2003, for example, Indonesia suggested establishing an ASEAN peacekeeping force, which was rejected by all ASEAN countries except the Philippines.

Indonesia has been frequently alone in its efforts to modify “the ASEAN Way”. It often has found it difficult to ease the sacred non-interference principle as well as to establish a democratic order in the region.

Partnership between Indonesia and Thailand in ASEAN is crucial. Both are two of the biggest economies and most advanced democracies in Southeast Asia. The two represent different geographical and to some extents geopolitical landscapes in the region.

More importantly, both countries have historically pursued independent, neutral and active foreign policies. Since the colonial period, Thailand has skillfully managed a balance of powers in the region. While it has a treaty alliance with the United States, Thailand might be China’s most friendly Southeast Asian friend.

On the other hand, Indonesia’ foreign policy doctrine is well known as bebas aktif (free and active), which was reflected by its central role in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This independent foreign policy stance is a key to preserving ASEAN’s centrality, which has been greatly rivaled by non-ASEAN political gravitations. Given the prominence of Indonesia and Thailand, it is not too overstated to say that behavior of both countries towards ASEAN will greatly influence the future of ASEAN.

Both President Yudhoyono and prime minister Yingluck face tough domestic obstacles during their tenure. Yudhoyono has to deal with widespread corruption and a fragile political coalition. Yingluck, at the same time, should publicly prove that she is not a puppet of anyone and also should maintain civilian supremacy over the powerful armed forces, a difficult task for any Thai leader.

Despite the many domestic problems, Yudhoyono and Yingluck have to work together more closely and more actively for ASEAN. As a group of small and medium-sized nations, ASEAN is vulnerable, especially when realpolitik dominates foreign policy. In a region where most nations are undemocratic and semi-democratic, realist-oriented foreign policy is logically more favorable. For this reason, for the sake of ASEAN’s future, two countries with historically strong commitments to multilateralism should be in the same boat.

The writer is a Jakarta-based political analyst and a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, DC.

Migrant workers as a foreign policy issue

Yayan G.H. Mulyana, Jakarta | Sat, 09/17/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post

In a state of union address before the House of Representatives on Aug. 16, 2011, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono underlined the paramount importance of the migrant workers issue in Indonesia’s relations with other countries, in particular those receiving our migrant workers.

The President reaffirmed Indonesia’s commitment to protecting the overseas workers through diplomacy and negotiations, as well as improvement of the internal recruitment mechanisms and decisions on sending people on missions abroad.

Previously, in the wake of the Ruyati case, President Yudhoyono issued some directives intended to provide greater protection and assistance to the Indonesian migrant workers. The directives included the application of a moratorium that suspends the dispatch of Indonesian migrant workers to Saudi Arabia, effective on Aug. 1, 2011; the establishment of a special task force particularly mandated to provide assistance to the Indonesian migrant workers facing death sentences and the formation of law and human rights attaché at Indonesian missions abroad.

Indonesia and the Philippines are two major Southeast Asian suppliers of migrant workers in response to the global demand for cheap labor. Like Indonesia, the Philippines puts protection of its overseas workers at the highest end of its foreign policy priorities. In addition to promoting national security and enhancing economic diplomacy and protecting the rights and welfare of Filipinos overseas is a critical pillar of the country’s foreign policy.

In his inaugural address on June 30, 2010, President Benigno C. Aquino III ordered the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and other related agencies to be more responsive to the needs and welfare of overseas Filipino workers. Section 27 of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act 1995 stipulates that the protection of the Filipino migrant workers and promotion of their tops the priority concerns of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Foreign Service Posts.

Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families defines migrant workers as persons to be engaged, are engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a national. The Convention also distinguishes migrant worker into eight categories: frontier worker, seasonal worker, seafarers, worker on an off-shore installation, itinerant worker, project-tied workers, specified-employment workers and self-employed workers.

Many countries, including Indonesia, have integrated the migrant worker issue into their foreign policy. But mainstreaming of the issue into the priority list of foreign policy should also be the concern of the receiving countries. This parallel commitment will lead to equal treatment and importance of protecting and promoting the rights of migrant workers.

For both sending and receiving countries, developing a foreign policy establishment that focuses on the migrant workers is also essential. This foreign policy establishment should have a capacity to develop preventive measures and, in time of emergency, help provide rapid responses, including administrative and legal measures aimed at protecting the migrant workers’ rights. In its operation, it involves governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, including employment agencies and users (companies or households).

Migrant workers will be part of this focused foreign policy establishment. Through this move, a coordinated preparation that provides migrant workers with cognitive, affective and psychomotor readiness to work abroad can be developed.

One important outcome resulting from the presence of such an establishment in receiving countries would be a convergence of foreign policies that focus on migrant worker matters. This convergence should be guided by the principle of mutual respect and shared responsibility. The convergence should generate a more structured and systematic modality of communication and consultation between sending and receiving countries in protecting the rights of migrant workers and providing a room for the performance of their responsibilities.

Since foreign policy regarding migrant workers is strongly affected by both domestic and external factors, continuing improvement of conditions at home and abroad that concern migrant workers is vital.

One important condition that receiving countries should create is legal certainty through the development of legal measures and ratification of relevant international legal instruments, such as UN and ILO conventions. For sending countries, strengthening the effectiveness of the migrant workers-related foreign policy establishment is as important as the development of administrative and legal measures.

For both sending and receiving countries, it is critical to continue efforts to achieve bilateral agreements that outline the mutually accepted principles and actions with a view to promoting the rights, dignity and welfare of the migrant workers. At the global level, building global labor governance that favors overseas workers will be an important agenda.

For countries whose domestic workers make up the most of their overseas workers, such as Indonesia, a new hope is emerging with the adoption of the ILO Convention on decent work for domestic workers (ILO Convention No. 189) by the International Labor Conference on June 16, 2011. ILO estimates there are between 50 and 100 million domestic workers employed around the world. The Conference also adopted Domestic Workers Recommendation (DWR) No. 201, which supplements Convention No. 189.

One key point for migrant workers diplomacy stipulated in paragraph 26 of DWR No. 201 is the significance of cooperation at bilateral, regional and global levels to enhance protection of domestic workers. The paragraph also underlines the importance of international cooperation and assistance, including support for social and economic development, poverty eradication programs and universal education.

In the future, it is critical for both sending and receiving countries to integrate the recommendations into their migrant worker-related foreign policy and in their diplomacy to make decent work for migrant workers.

For Indonesia, President Yudhoyono’s directives on the importance of promoting the welfare of Indonesian workers overseas and protecting their rights and dignity are crystal clear. Progress has been made, but there is still much to be done, including ratification of the ILO Convention No. 189 and other relevant UN/ILO conventions.

The writer is an assistant to Special Staff to the President for International Relations. The opinions expressed are his own.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

A decade later, US loses global preeminence

Endy M. Bayuni, Washington, DC | Tue, 09/13/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post

The Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington changed the United States and the world forever. But nobody would have predicted then that 10 years later, America would be a much weaker nation.

Whether it was because of 9/11 or in spite of it, the United States has lost much of the preeminence that it had attained as the world’s only superpower after the end of the Cold War, ironically even as it seems to be winning the global war on terror which it launched in the wake of the attacks on its soil.

The United States is still the most powerful nation on earth today, but recent events and developments in the world today show that it is rapidly losing much of its power to influence events in just about every part of the world.

Its position is increasingly being challenged by emerging and returning new and old powers in various regions. In Asia it is the rise of China, in the Middle East it has to deal with a defiant Iran and in Europe it is Russia.

More than two years into his presidency, US President Barack Obama has still to fulfill his 2008 election promises to pull the United States out of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Even if he manages to bring all the soldiers home before the November 2012 elections, they will be leaving behind two shaky democratically-elected governments presiding over countries that are continually wracked by endless violence.

Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the two figures that had symbolized the menacing terror threats to the US, are both dead, but Washington could hardly brag “mission accomplished” in Afghanistan or Iraq if and when its last troops leave.

But it is not only the violence and instability in Iraq and Afghanistan that threaten to unravel the entire region. The US has failed to defuse the nuclear threat from Iran, seen in Washington as the largest threat to peace and stability in the Middle East.

The Arab Spring this year has only complicated matters with one despotic tyrant after another brought down by popular and at times violent uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya while others are clinging to power by responding with greater violence.

Most if not all of these tyrants had enjoyed US support, treated as allies in the global war on terror and as bulwarks against the rise of Islamic radicalism.

How the Middle East is turning out, and what it means for US security interests and its influence, and for the peace prospects between Israel and its Arab neighbors, will not become clear until the region settles into a new equilibrium, which probably will not happen any time soon.

But it is in Asia that US global preeminence has most visibly weakened.

The region may face some equally if not more serious security challenges with tensions in the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan strait and now also in the South China Sea, and also with Islamic radicalism making its presence felt in Southeast Asia, but many of these Asian countries have nevertheless managed to build and develop their economies with impressively high growth rates.

Some in Washington are only now echoing what many in Asia have long argued that the US may have missed out on Asia’s rise while it busied itself with fighting terrorists at home and at source in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The rise of China, albeit peaceful so far, and to a lesser extent of India, has altered the power equation in Asia and has serious implications for the security situation and stability of the region.

An economically stronger China is also increasingly asserting itself in the region as it seeks to secure access to energy and natural resources vital to its booming economy, often putting it in direct competition with US strategic interests in the region.

Fortunately, Washington has allies and friends in Asia who share similar concerns about what a mighty China could do. The US’ “return to Asia” after President Barack Obama came to the White House in 2008, was warmly welcomed by some in the region.

The US may still enjoy vast military superiority, but its power and influence in Asia are being challenged by an increasingly confident China. China in 2010 took over from Japan as the second largest economy in the world. China is also modernizing its military capability and in August put to sea its first aircraft carrier.

Is this the case of the decline of America or, as Fareed Zakaria argues in “Post American World” more the case of the rise of others, most particularly of China, but also including India, Russia, Brazil and one can even throw in Indonesia?

With the US economy remaining weak more than three years after its worst recession in decades, it is looking more and more like the case of the decline of US economic power, and with it, its military and political powers.

Two wars (or two-and-a-half, if one includes the Libya operation) have stretched US resources, particularly when it still has a weak economy and a mountain of debt.

The recent heated debt ceiling debate in Washington and the coming 2012 election virtually guarantee that the US will be consumed by more domestic issues for the coming year, while Asia quietly grows in strides.

Whether this American decline in the past decade has anything to do with the 9/11 attacks, or with the way it responded, is an academic point today.

The US may have dealt with the threat of terrorism against its people and its interests, but it has also lost some of its power and influence in the intervening years.

The United States is not the same superpower it was a decade ago. This in itself has some implications for its strategic security interests.

The rest of the world changed with the United States after 9/11, but it seems to have set its own pace and direction independently. This is certainly true for much of Asia.

The writer is a visiting fellow at the East West Center in Washington and a senior editor with The Jakarta Post.

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

Indonesia’s policy of engagement with the Pacific region

Arto Suryodipuro, Jakarta | Thu, 09/08/2011 8:00 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post

Members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) are regrouping on Sept. 7 and 8 in Auckland, New Zealand, and will be followed by a meeting with the PIF’s dialogue partners on Sept. 9. Indonesia and 13 other entities will
participate in the Post Forum Dialogue (PFD).

The PFD is a forum for non-PIF entities to convey their cooperative and developmental assistance. Indonesia will be represented by Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, who will reiterate the importance of Indonesia’s relations with the Pacific and convey technical cooperation projects with the Pacific islands.

The PIF and the Pacific in general do not feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy as much as other parts of Indonesia’s neighborhood, such as Southeast Asia and Australia.

What are Indonesia’s interests in the Pacific? What are the features of Indonesia’s foreign policy in
the Pacific?

First, Indonesia is strengthening relations with all its neighbors, including the Pacific. It’s a strategy to ensure a stable and productive neighborhood, which in turn will support Indonesia’s interests. Indonesia is, for example, strengthening relations in Southeast Asia through ASEAN, as it is with Australia through the establishment of the annual heads of government and defense and foreign affairs ministers meetings.

Southeast Asia and the Pacific are also areas of strategic interest to the major powers, which makes the creation of a stable and predictable environment in Asia and the Pacific even more vital for Indonesia.

Second, Indonesia’s relations with the Pacific are multilayered.

At the bilateral level, Indonesia has bilateral diplomatic relations with 15 Pacific island countries and is in the process of establishing diplomatic relations with three more Pacific Islands countries — Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu.

Participating in the PIF Post Forum Dialogue in 2001 was another component in strengthening relations with the Pacific. Indonesia is one of 14 of the PIF’s dialogue partners, the others being Canada, China, the European Union, France, India, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom and the
United States.

The Pacific Islands Forum was founded in August 1971 and today comprises 16 states — Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Its goals are “to stimulate economic growth and enhance political governance and security for the region through the provision of policy advice; and to strengthen regional cooperation and integration through coordinating, monitoring and evaluating implementation of leaders’ decisions”.

Indonesia is strengthening relations with the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The MSG Summit last March in Fiji admitted Indonesia and Timor Leste as observers of the MSG.

The group consists of Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS) of New Caledonia. It was established in 1983 as a political and solidarity group and in 2007 transformed into a regional organization with broad purposes — to further economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security.

The group is not only an ethnic-based grouping; it is also a natural sub-region that connects naturally with Indonesia’s eastern boundaries and holds significant trade, investment, tourism and connectivity capacities in the South Pacific.

Indonesia also initiated with Australia the establishment of the Southwest Pacific Dialogue in 2002. It meets annually at the foreign ministers level. The membership also includes the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and New Zealand. Its focus of work is on people-to-people contact, sociocultural issues and connecting Southeast Asia with the South Pacific.

A recently-added layer of Indonesia’s relation with the Pacific was the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food Security (CTI). Established at the sidelines of the World Ocean Conference in 2009, it is a multilateral partnership to safeguard the rich marine resources of the Indo-Pacific region for future generations. It covers the territories of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Timor Leste.

Third, Indonesia’s relation with the Pacific is built on a broad range of common issues. It departs from the fact that Indonesia is a natural part of the Pacific. Indonesia’s eastern provinces share common geographic location, biogeography and ecosystems as well as cultural and ethnical similarities.

There are also common challenges. Foremost among them are natural disasters, including global warming and rising sea levels, earthquakes and tsunamis, typhoons and volcanic eruptions.

Food security is another area of common concern, especially when it comes to the sustainability of fishery resources.

Connectivity and economy of scale are issues in the Pacific that Indonesia also shares, such as distance between ports and adequacies of ports, availability of various transportation means, small population and density and small trade volumes.

Because of the similarities, Indonesia and Pacific island countries also have a lot of strategies to share in addressing those challenges.

Finally, Indonesia’s relation with the Pacific is thus far government-driven, but it needs to be broad-based, involving greater participation from the private sector and business community, academia, media and other elements of society. The idea is to increase their participation as diplomatic relations,
and regional institutions are being put in place.

The writer is director for intra-regional cooperation in Asia Pacific and Africa at the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

Contest of power in Asia Pacific: Who wins?

Calvin Michel Sidjaja, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Thu, 09/08/2011 8:00 AM A | A | A |- Klipping the Jakarta Post

There is striking similarity between the US today and the ancient Roman Empire. The latter was the biggest empire in its time. It had the largest territory, economy and military influence in Europe.

However, there was a price for maintaining such power. As the state expanded its territory and added more colonies, the Roman Empire eventually had to pay more to maintain its city-states.

The pattern can be found in the histories of the rise and fall of great powers. Problems always begin with excessive debt, and state bankruptcy increases social unrest because the government must cut its spending, causing inflation and price hikes.

The US has always been the central power in the Asia-Pacific region. However, its position will be challenged, as it is struggling to manage its economic problems.

The US has more debt than any country in the world. Even if all the 9,300 tons of gold in Fort Knox were liquidated, assuming the price is US$1,898 per troy ounce, it would only bring in $425 billion — about 3 percent of the nation’s $14.3 trillion debt, of which $6.1 trillion was accumulated during the Bush administration, $2.4 trillion from Obama’s and the rest by former administrations.

The gold would be sufficient to pay all the debt if the value increased 33 times the current level to $63,000 per troy ounce. Gold has increased an average of 5 percent in value since 1901.

However, since 1970, the average growth has been 11 percent. If gold increases 11 percent per annum, it would cover the current national debt in 34 years — although the US would have probably accumulated more debt by then.

The reason the US survives is that the current economic system enables other countries to finance indebted countries by issuing sovereign bonds. The US survives because other countries believe the empty words of Washington.

Money is not created from thin air. But the US has cheated the system by issuing more debt it says it can afford. It is only backed by the fact that the US is still the largest economy in the world and backed by two AAA grades.

Interest rates are the common benchmarks of measuring inflation in a country. A low interest rate means the country needs to increase its consumption to stimulate economic growth. The US, however, suffers multiple jeopardies: a huge trade deficit, account deficit and a high unemployment rate.

Similar conditions happened in 1981: The US encountered twin deficits in export and budget. Paul Volcker raised interest rates, which triggered a Latin crisis and bankrupted Mexico because the commercial banks were unable to pay their debts due to higher interest and appreciation of the dollar.

The Fed has lowered interest rates to trigger more spending, but with the high unemployment rate, people are more concerned about their job security than taking loans from banks.

When the Western Roman Empire fell, the country dissolved. The Eastern Roman Empire — the Byzantine Empire — survived and became another great power in its age before it collapsed in the 14th century.

When the Soviet Union fell, the United States quickly filled its place and turned out to be a central hegemony. However, this hegemony is now challenged by China.

In Asia Pacific, the balance of power in sub-regions has been disturbed by the absence of the US. The region accounts for approximately 60 percent of the world’s GDP and has high importance in the global economy.

The China-ASEAN Free Trade Area is one of China’s successful feats in securing its economic influence in the Southeast Asian sub-region, as it is currently the area with largest economic growth and consumption spending. With excessive foreign reserves and undervalued currency, China could shut its ear to any complaints from its Southeast Asian neighbors.

Even with all the Southeast Asian countries combined, their economies and military powers are small compared to China’s. It is also worsened by the tension of the South China Sea conflict.

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is still talking shop. It is still the only place to talk about security, consultation without a concrete result or binding decision.

The Middle Kingdom is the largest country in Asia — economically powerful with one of the largest military expenditures in the world and sophisticated technology. It puts China and ASEAN in a vertical position with little room to negotiate.

Indonesia, despite being the largest economy and country in Southeast Asia, is still unable to secure leadership in Southeast Asia. This is because it has tons of domestic problems, mainly corruption, aging infrastructure and government reform.

Its military expenditure is one of the smallest in the world (0.8 percent of GDP); it is not ready to balance China in Southeast Asia.

The US economic meltdown has created a vacuum of power in the Asia-Pacific region. There is not much to hope for from the US with its current recession.

Unless the US can tackle its domestic problem, China will be the new hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.

The writer is a researcher from HD Asia Advisory. The opinions expressed are his own.

Lessons from Japan’s new leadership

Pierre Marthinus and Ayaka Kimura, Jakarta | Wed, 09/07/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |- Klipping the Jakarta Post

Yoshihiko Noda, recently elected head of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), is now the country’s leader following a set of elections within the DPJ after, on Aug. 26, Prime Minister Naoto Kan made public his intention to resign from the post.

Interestingly, at first Noda was not the most popular and widely supported candidate within the DPJ. In terms of public popularity, previous poll results conducted by Yomiuri Shinbun recently showed that Japanese public opinion was divided and unevenly distributed toward the more popular former foreign minister Seiji Maehara (48 percent) and Economy, Trade, and Industry Minister Banri Kaieda (12 percent), with Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda receiving only 9 percent of support.

In terms of political support within the party, it was Kaieda who won the first round majority within the party, mainly due to political support from the group within the DPJ centered on Ichiro Ozawa, a senior politician embroiled in finance scandals.

In the final leg, however, smaller factions opted to pool their votes against Ozawa’s influential yet notorious group, granting Noda the majority vote.

Many saw that Noda’s election into the top seat was a political compromise in which “no one group” achieved what they initially wanted. Noda, 54, jokingly noted that due to his physical image, resembling an eel-like, bottom-feeding fish with whiskers, public expectations toward his government were so low from the outset that he might actually be able to fulfill them.

Ironically, the fact that previous leaders repeatedly could not fulfill public expectations and lost the support of their political counterparts indicates that Japan’s political turbulence is no joking matter. There are some important lessons that Indonesian political parties should learn from this.

First, public image, charm and popularity are the least reliable source of political leverage and do not always translate into political dividends, especially when the interests of other political actors are also involved.

Individuals with significant public popularity, such as Maehara or perhaps Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, might not always be able to convert such popularity into tangible political benefits when needed.

In contrast, corruption and finance scandals, such as those implicating Ichiro Ozawa or Indonesia’s Muhammad Nazaruddin, can easily haunt and taint the public image of their larger group and political party.

Second, it is also important to keep intra-party corruption scandals down to acceptable and tolerable levels. Although it is impossible to prevent every single act of corruption, any “real” political party should always have its own internal mechanisms of accountability, monitoring and ethics.

Therefore, the leading political party’s practice of “whitewashing” by framing recent corruption cases as separate incidents and individual acts unrelated to the political party should no longer be accepted by the Indonesian public.

Third, a weak and indecisive political leadership might limit a country’s ability to face its most pressing challenges. Japan’s post-tsunami reconstruction and the response to the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster had been seriously constrained by its unstable and discordant domestic politics. Although many international observers praised Japan’s response to the tsunami, its own public is not impressed.

Survey results from Yomiuri Shinbun indicated that public satisfaction with Japan’s post-tsunami response decreased from 43 percent in April to 33 percent in May and fell further to 28 percent in June while positive perception of the response to the Fukushima nuclear meltdown fell sharply from 27 percent in April to 19 percent in May and down to 17 percent in June.

The same can be said of the general public perception about Indonesia’s performance in the Failed State Index and its uphill battle against corruption.

Fourth, political support can — and will — be withdrawn as quickly as it was once given. The fact that Japan has had five prime ministers “pushed” out of office in the last five years under public distrust and intense political pressure should be a sign of caution for Indonesia’s current leaders.

Mounting public distrust in Yu-dhoyono in the face of corruption scandals and the obvious lack of protection of minority groups, if not managed in a timely manner, might create serious repercussions for his political party and potential successor.

Lastly, a country’s international image and role will partly be shaped by its own leaders at home. In contrast to Kaieda, who is seen as “more friendly” to China, Noda’s strong position on historical issues and the Yasukuni Shrine controversy might strain Japan’s relations with its immediate neighbor.

The focus on post-tsunami disaster management also means that other important issues for the region, such as North Korea, will have to be put on hold in regional meetings.

In the current political instability and economic downturn, Japan’s foreign policy, often dubbed as “checkbook diplomacy”, might mean fewer checkbooks and less diplomacy. Indonesia’s preoccupation with its “international image” might be just as problematic as Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” in the future.

There are many things that Indonesia and Japan, two of Asia’s largest democracies, can learn from one another. Observers need to refrain from over-generalization. It is safe to say that both nations want firm and stronger domestic political leadership for change.

Pierre Marthinus is program director of Pacivis at the University of Indonesia. Ayaka Kimura is a student at Waseda University, Japan.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Be wary of North Korea's charm offensive

Bruce Klingner, Washington | Tue, 09/06/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post.

Pyongyang’s latest attempts to re-engage the world have again raised expectations for resumption of nuclear negotiations or at least a lowering of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

During the past two months, Kim Jong-il or his subordinates have met with all member countries of the six-party talks. Pyongyang has proffered vague promises of progress in denuclearization but has yet to take any tangible actions.

Kim’s summit meetings with Russia and China, as well as a new willingness to re-engage with the United States and South Korea, reflect a shift in North Korean policy-though it is one that we have seen before. The North Korean ship of state typically veers back and forth between belligerence and engagement, though it always remains on a true course toward achieving long-term objectives.

In its typically schizophrenic way, the regime combines diplomatic entreaties with threats, resulting in a charm offensive that is more offensive than charming.

North Korea’s latest outreach efforts are correctly being met with greater skepticism by the United States and its allies. Although Washington and Seoul are more willing to engage with Pyongyang, doubts remain about the efficacy of returning to the six-party talks. As is always the case in dealing with the North Korean regime, any progress will be difficult, halting, overshadowed by fears of cheating and potentially illusory.

Kim Jong-il’s summit with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev recently was typically full of diplomatic and economic promises. North Korean diplomatic pledges-usually simply to return to the status quo ante-were given in return for foreign promises of economic largesse. But serious doubts linger about fulfillment of either.

After the Kim-Medvedev summit, headlines blared that Kim had promised a moratorium on his nuclear and missile programs. Yet the Russian spokesman merely stated that “in the course of the [six-party] talks, North Korea will be ready to resolve the question of imposing a moratorium on tests and production of nuclear missile weapons.” Far short of a pledge for unilateral action prior to resuming talks, the bland wording also gives Pyongyang plenty of opportunity to demand concessions during the six-party talks.

Similarly, former New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson (D) declared after his December 2010 trip to Pyongyang that the regime had vowed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to return to the North Korean nuclear facility. Richardson declared, “They will allow IAEA personnel to go to Yongbyon to ensure that they are not processing highly enriched uranium and are proceeding with peaceful purposes.”

Despite Richardson’s self-aggrandizing visit, Pyongyang never publicly made such a pledge nor carried it out.

During the Russia summit, North Korea reiterated its advocacy for returning to the six-party talks with “no preconditions” to appear more benevolent than the US and South Korean demands. But returning to the talks on North Korea’s terms would enable Pyongyang to move beyond its non-compliance with previous denuclearization commitments and its two unprovoked acts of war against South Korea last year.

Despite their lack of substance, the public relations impact of North Korean diplomatic efforts could spur (still glacially slow) movement back to multilateral nuclear negotiations. Pyongyang’s willingness to meet with South Korean officials in Bali last month, reversing an earlier pledge to have nothing to do with the Lee Myung-bak administration, was significant. Similarly, although bilateral US-North Korean talks in New York did not lead to an immediate breakthrough, they may form the basis for additional contact.

The Lee administration subsequently softened its policy toward Pyongyang by de-linking inter-Korean engagement from its previous demand for a formal North Korean apology for its two attacks in 2010. Seoul indicated a willingness to allow movement in humanitarian and nuclear issues even prior to receiving an apology.

The Obama Administration offered US$900,000 in flood relief supplies to Pyongyang, though it is still refraining from a decision on providing large-scale food aid. Hours after Washington’s announcement, North Korea offered to resume bilateral talks on repatriating the remains of US troops killed during the Korean War.

Though minor steps, these actions add to speculation that secret meetings with Pyongyang may be underway, such as those that preceded the surprise announcements of the Bali and New York meetings.

North Korea’s diplomatic outreach, however, was undermined by concurrent threats of war in response to annual South Korean-US military exercises and Pyongyang’s seizure of South Korean assets at the joint inter-Korean Kumgang Mountain tourist venue.

Whether the United States or South Korea agrees to additional meetings with North Korea should remain dependent on Pyongyang’s actions. Prior to returning to the six-party talks, Washington and Seoul should continue to require that North Korea take tangible steps to resume its denuclearization commitments and abide by UN resolutions.

The Obama administration, in concert with South Korean and Japanese allies, should call on Pyongyang to formally and publicly pledge to:

• Return IAEA inspectors to the Yongbyon nuclear facility;
• Issue a moratorium on any additional long-range missile or nuclear tests;
• Institute a freeze on nuclear activities, including its uranium-enrichment program; and
• Abide by the Armistice and inter-Korean agreements.

Pyongyang should also agree to additional inter-Korean meetings to address South Korean security concerns, including last year’s attacks by North Korea.

If North Korea were to do all of those things, it would fulfill allied preconditions for returning to the six-party talks. We should be clear, however, that a resumption of multilateral nuclear negotiations merely returns the combatants to the ring. None of the participating countries has high hopes for success.

Pyongyang is driven to its latest iteration of outreach by economic necessities that it perceives can best be fulfilled through diplomatic means. North Korea’s quest for food aid and economic benefits will moderate the regime’s behavior for the near term. Failure to achieve those objectives, however, will lead Pyongyang to resort to provocative actions once again.

Therefore, even as the United States remains open to diplomacy, it must retain sufficient defenses against the multifaceted North Korean security threat.

The Obama Administration should affirm an unequivocal commitment to defending Asian allies by maintaining the threefold US promise of extended deterrence comprised of forward-deployed conventional forces, missile defense, and the nuclear umbrella.

For its part, Congress should fully support ongoing US military realignment plans in South Korea and Japan. These plans include the Yongsan base relocation, land partnership plan, and family housing for accompanied tours.

Planned budget cuts by the Senate Armed Services Committee, including a US Marine Corps air unit on Okinawa, would undermine years of carefully crafted diplomacy that achieved US strategic objectives and resolved contentious issues with allies.

The writer is senior research fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation, Washington.