Quo vadis, national human rights body?

Benny YP Siahaan, Geneva | Opinion | Thu, March 28 2013, 10:37 AM

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I attended the Human Rights Council’s panel discussion on the commemoration of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action’s (VDPA) 20th anniversary in Geneva on Feb. 25. The UN secretary-general participated through a video conference at the event that was formally opened by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay.

The VDPA is considered one of the most successful documents produced in human rights history aside from the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It was adopted by consensus at the second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 1993 and comprised a number of recommendations to states and relevant stakeholders, including encouragement for states to establish their own national human rights commissions.

After 20 years, according to the UN, there are more than 100 national human rights commissions/institutions established worldwide, including in Indonesia which formed the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) in 1993. The question remains however just how effective those rights commissions are at promoting and protecting human rights.

Although its role and credibility was initially doubted since it was established by the Soeharto regime, during the course of its service Komnas HAM has gradually gained people’s respect and trust particularly from victims of rights abuses.

However, after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 specific national human rights institutions such as the national commission on women, children, etc, emerged, eroding Komnas HAM’s role, legitimacy and even relevance as the only quasi-state institution with a human rights promotion and protection mandate.

Hence, the ongoing rift within Komnas HAM has been much anticipated although quite disappointing. In fact, criticisms of Komnas HAM have been mounting for, among other reasons, its lack of focus.

Instead of improving their performance in promoting and protecting human rights in the country, the current members are busy with trivial issues such as the rotating chairmanship and privileges.

This kind of situation in fact could have been detected in the lack of aspirants applying for Komnas HAM posts. As widely reported, only 19 people registered with the selection committee more than a year after the vacancies were announced. As the law requires the panel to propose at least 30 candidates, committee chairman Jimly Asshiddiqie appealed to a number of human rights activists to join the race.

Hence, here are some thoughts to help the commission address its problems. First and foremost the current rights commissioners should realize that Indonesia today has changed a lot from the time of Soeharto’s regime. The commissioners need to make themselves relevant in the current situation.

No doubt people still need Komnas HAM, but it needs review and adjustment. The commissioners should redefine their roles in relation to the government and judicial institutions and in their relation to other human rights groups since they now operate in a new setting and environment — a free and democratic Indonesia.

Indeed, it was disturbing when I attended a discussion held by Komnas HAM recently focusing on its tasks and role. I was surprised when the commission’s research staff presented a kind of chart depicting Indonesia’s transition from autocracy to democracy but nothing in the chart said anything about Komnas HAM’s role during and after the transformation process. Surprisingly, the commissioners looked proud as if the chart was something original and timely.

In fact what they produced was nothing new and was even obsolete. It appears that it has taken them 14 years since reformation to realize their position.

Consequently, the current commissioners should forget the good old days of the complaint-inspired approach during the Soeharto era to a program-oriented approach. Theoretically and empirically, national human rights commissions that devote their time to receiving complaints are rarely sustainable.

It does not mean they should not ignore complaints but rather the commissioners should use a thematic approach to enable them to focus their resources on areas of dire need.

In this regard they should be able to relate complaints to the general policies of their focus. More importantly they should not concentrate only on civil and political rights but also economic, social and cultural rights.

In line with this thought, the commission requires qualified staff to support committed and independent commissioners. Up to now, the commissioners have been supported by government officials and sponsored staff.

There should be a mechanism to select only capable and independent staff.

While for the commission line-up, a balanced composition of the membership based on backgrounds is pressing. It is good for the commission to have members who previously held government posts as it may help it deal with government institutions.

Indeed, Komnas HAM has a unique role in the protection of human rights since it bridges the government and civil society. The commission does not represent parties, which underlines its independence.

Last but not least is the funding issue. With the flourishing number of national human rights institutions it is rather problematic for Komnas HAM to ask for its state budget allocation, let alone an increase, since the funds should be distributed to those other human rights institutions.

All in all, I believe Komnas HAM will remain relevant and able to perform effectively as long as it can quickly redefine and adjust its roles to the changing environment. Indeed, empirically national human rights bodies like Komnas HAM can work effectively when they operate within a functioning democratic environment.

Other than that, I don’t think we need another World Conference on Human Rights to solve the anomaly of Komnas HAM.

The writer is an alumnus of Tsukuba University in Japan and foreign service officer. The views expressed are personal.

A new altitude in Indonesian diplomacy

Andre Omer Siregar, Jakarta | Opinion | Thu, March 28 2013, 10:47 AM

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As Garuda-01 flight took off from Tegel International Airport, the Indonesian delegation members on board looked outside their windows to watch Berlin fall behind. Two German Eurofighter escorts approached each wing of the presidential aircraft.

Just the night before, the International Turismo Borse was co-hosted by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Western and eastern Europeans thronged the convention halls, enjoying a musical serenade performed by Indonesian-German violinists and pianist and various Indonesian dances.

Hours earlier, SBY and Merkel, in the Bundeskanzleramt, discussed bilateral cooperation and analyzed the regional and global situations.  Both leaders seemed very comfortable discussing various issues having met several times at G20 summits and in Jakarta during Chancellor Merkel’s visit in July 2012.

These small and yet meaningful events indeed reflect much of what Indonesian diplomacy, or total diplomacy, has achieved since the reforms.  Back in 1998, the world not only held its breath when watching Indonesia, but also feared it might become a failed state or even disintegrate. Instead, after 15 years of reform and transformation (and plenty of pending issues), Indonesia has certainly remade herself.

With the fourth largest population, a trillion-dollar economy (by purchasing power parity), a model for democracy and moderate Islam, an annual US$60 billion rate of economic growth, and more importantly a foreign policy that promotes stability, prosperity and justice, leaders from many regions are viewing
Indonesia with great interest.

If anything else, it could be seen as “hip” to befriend Indonesia: A good friend of the West, the East, the Muslims and a country cognizant of the need for cultural harmony, environmental sustainability and social inclusiveness. Seeing this recovery and political achievements, then how should the new Indonesia look at international relations?

In response to this, Diplomat-in-Chief and nominated International Statesman of 2013, President SBY delivered on March 8 a lecture aboard Garuda-01 en route to Dubai. The title of his airborne lecture was “Global governance, global power and the dynamic changing world”.

SBY began with a description of the new world order, where the global dynamics have made the G20 the new G7/8. He spoke of the importance of the United Nations’ centrality to global governance, despite many countries calling for greater action, especially by an disunited Security Council to end the Syrian humanitarian tragedy.

He explained about the many global powers, including the G2 (China/US), who are both rivals but need one another. At the same time, regional powers (ASEAN/EAS, EU, Latin America and Africa) also play a key role in maintaining stability and economic growth and preventing disaster.

At the same time, the new global architecture had also enlisted new (non-state) actors, as “game-changers and solidarity makers”. And now more and more silent forces are rising or the “un-led people power” as witnessed in North Africa and the Middle East, followed later by what SBY called “the workforce who are unemployed and looking for justice”.

Through these global and regional dynamisms, SBY wanted Indonesia to be alert, ready and geared up for its new role in international relations. He stated that domestically, it was imperative that Indonesia continued getting stronger economically, democratically, politically and in terms of defense, and a model of harmony between Islam and democracy, while promoting an “Indonesian way” that resists global shocks.

This is the duty of not one government and president, but every generation. Regionally, the country should continue leading in economics, promoting stability and shaping the region. Globally Indonesia is to continue playing an active and positive role, as some analysts predict Indonesia becoming the 10th largest world economy and, hence, a global power.

Consequently, as Indonesia emerges as a regional leader and active global player, the number of summits it has to attend increases, such as ASEAN twice a year, the East Asia Summit, the G20, APEC and now as cochair of the United Nations High-level Panel to formulate the post-2015 global development agenda. 

Whether or not we positively accept this new altitude in international relations or not does not matter anymore. The world sees Indonesia in a positive light. World leaders like Obama, Cameron, Merkel, Erdogan, Ferdinand de Kirchner, Abe, Hu and Lee perceive Indonesia as a partner. Indonesia’s influence is spreading to the Americas, Europe, Africa and Central Asia.  Almost as if they seek the views of Indonesia on various regional and global issues, if not her blessing.

In fact countries large and small have received the same respect from Indonesia as partners for global
stability, peace and prosperity.

And although these upbeat diplomatic relations are a welcome outcome, global issues like food, energy and water security for the expected 9 billion people in 2045 will still be a race for scarce resources for all countries. Hence, it becomes even more critical for Indonesia to take advantage of this positive momentum, standing at the right time in history to play a global role as Indonesia approaches its centenary.

With income per capita expected to reach $5,000 by 2014 (approaching $10,000 in 2020), Indonesia’s development could benefit not only itself, but also the region and world as she joins the global powers.

But before its diplomacy can further succeed, Indonesia must empower its expected 138 million middle class to face developing-country challenges, namely poverty and inequality, corruption and good-governance. Ultimately, it is important for Indonesia to secure its trajectory in international affairs.

Just as it lifted off after a crisis 15 years ago, its flight plan must be precise as it landing gears get ready.

The writer is assistant special staff to the President for international relations.  The views expressed
are personal.

Insight: Bogor to Bali: Building an Asia-Pacific community

Jusuf Wanandi & Tan Khee Giap | Insight | Fri, February 22 2013, 10:35 AM

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Almost 20 years ago, leaders of the Asia-Pacific region met in Bogor to “chart the future course of our economic cooperation, which will enhance the prospects of an accelerated, balanced and equitable economic growth not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but throughout the world”. In just a few months, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders will again meet in Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy. How far has the region come in achieving those goals and what more needs to be done?

 The headline achievements are impressive. To note just one, incomes in the region have more than doubled since 1994 from an average of US$10,000 to more than $23,000.

The journey to where we are today has not been easy. The region has been buffeted by economic crises, first in 1997-1998 and then in 2008-2009. This crisis is not yet over, a number of APEC members recently enacted stimulus measures to kick start growth, such as QE3 in the US and Japan’s new attempt to reflate its economy. There is a possibility of a new stimulus in China in response to a deteriorating external environment.

These measures, while focused on domestic growth, have some unintended consequences. We are seeing rising capital flows into Asia that pose challenges, including the need to minimize the risks of asset bubbles and excessive credit expansion. There is already talk of “currency wars” and competitive devaluations. While the rhetoric makes for exciting reading, the world is far too complex for simplistic reasoning.

At the outset of the crisis, many had feared a descent into beggar-thy-neighbor polices, but thus far, through the actions of the G20 and APEC, we have avoided this. At this critical juncture, when nationalist sentiments are rising, we need more cooperation and understanding. APEC is the embodiment of bridging differences and must continue to play its role in bringing a diverse community together.

While APEC has done well in terms of freeing up trade and investment, the world that it occupies has changed. In 1994, bilateral trade deals were the exception, today they are the rule.

Even this is changing. The ASEAN Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Framework will consolidate the ASEAN+1 agreements into a single area and the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement hopes to build on the Pacific 4 agreement. Outside our region, the US and the EU are talking about a trans-Atlantic trade agreement, which would create the single biggest market in the world.

These massive trade groups, while potentially building blocs to multilateralism, can make outsiders feel excluded. This is a dangerous path to go down and this region, through APEC, with its spirit of inclusiveness and openness, should ensure that no economy is left out.

However, strong headline growth has masked a dirty secret — income disparities have been growing both among and within regional economies. APEC leaders have long talked of the need for growth to be equitable — both in Bogor and in recent years such as in 2009 in Singapore — with a call to “foster inclusive growth” and in Yokohama where it was a key dimension of the APEC Growth Strategy.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set the objective of universal primary education by 2015. In this region, we should move ahead and aim to provide all our citizens with the skills to participate in this competitive global economy. While some economies have done particularly well in increasing tertiary education participation, for example in South Korea where the ratio has increased from 35 percent to almost universal enrollment since 1994, others lag behind.

However, enrollment rates are not a panacea. One need only look at high unemployment rates among recent graduates in parts of Europe to see this. Emphasis must be on flexibility and resilience. There is a need for educational institutions and businesses to work together to help to develop skills of our peoples to fulfill their potential. This requires a change in culture in both business and education providers.

Even if our people possess the skills to compete, they cannot do so if they are not connected to the market. We need our people and our businesses — large and small — to be able to connect to where opportunities exist. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that East Asia alone needs to invest some $8 trillion in infrastructure.

Much of this would be in transportation but a critical part of the creative economy is access to information. Access to the Internet varies tremendously in the region, from 2 to 84 in every 100 in Papua New Guinea and South Korea, respectively.

Another aspect of the integration process is how do our businesses reap the opportunities that lie ahead? It has been conventional wisdom that multinational corporations account for 70 percent of global trade, while at the same time small and medium enterprises (SMEs) account for 90 percent of all businesses.

The idea that products are made in one particular country has given way to the idea of being “made in the world”. The emergence of global value chains opens up opportunities for SMEs to participate, but SMEs face a distinct set of problems going global as trade rules and compliance costs disproportionately impact smaller businesses, and their access to finance and information about overseas markets is limited.

A focus on these three areas: education, infrastructure and barriers to SME participation, could help make a major difference to addressing APEC’s goals of equitable and inclusive growth in the years ahead. Calls for addressing inequality should not be misconstrued as calls for the redistribution of wealth — that has already been tried and failed. Making growth equitable and inclusive are essential to the region’s goal of community building — that is one in which we share a sense of common destiny and purpose.

These issues will be addressed during a conference organized by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), the Singapore National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (SINCPEC) and the Indonesian National Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation (INCPEC) on Feb. 22-23.

— Jusuf Wanandi is the co-chair of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and vice-chair of the Board of Trustees of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.

— Tan Khee Giap is the chair of the SINCPEC and co-director of the Asian Competitiveness Institute (Singapore) at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, NUS.

Insight: RI’s active role in global affairs: An Indonesian to head the WTO?

Jusuf Wanandi and Djisman Simandjuntak | Insight | Mon, February 25 2013, 9:20 AM

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One of the hallmarks of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s second term has been Indonesia’s willingness to once again take a leadership role in international and regional affairs.

The Indonesian government’s decision to put Tourism and Creative Economy Minister (and former trade minister) Mari Elka Pangestu forward as a candidate for director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is further proof of an Indonesia that is confident about its role in global affairs.

If Mari is elected as the new WTO director general, she will not only break the glass ceiling of being the first woman to hold this job, but will also remove another important barrier. Historically, Indonesia has been unwilling to send the best and brightest to international institutions because they are needed at home. It is something we all can be proud of. Indonesians taking top positions in global organizations is a testament to the progress we have made as a nation.

As an internationally renowned economist and academic with a seven-year tenure as Indonesian trade minister, Mari is widely held as one of the most capable candidates in a nine-person field of contenders for the WTO position.

Mari’s term as trade minister gave her wide exposure to the complexities and sensitivities of trade policy. Out-of-the box thinking, building consensus and finding inclusive solutions have been her trademark, and they are qualities that would serve her well at the WTO.

She was in charge when Indonesia’s free trade agreements with China, Japan and Korea (ROK) were negotiated, pursuing them as a second-best measure at a time when negotiations under the multilateral trading system (WTO) were at a standstill. When China and Japan could not agree whether an ASEAN +3 or an ASEAN +6 should become the template for free trade in East Asia, she and other ASEAN colleagues took the initiative to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), consisting of all ASEAN free trade agreements with the ASEAN +6 members and balanced commitments on measures of greater inclusion and sustainability.

That is why it is only appropriate that she will get support from East Asian governments. She has the experience, commitment, intellectual capacity and demeanor for the post she is being proposed to serve.

With stalled multilateral negotiations and the global trading system constantly under threat from narrow domestic agendas and beggar-thy-neighbor policies, it is more important than ever to look for the best candidate. And especially for a candidate from a region that is serving the world as the main source of economic growth and dynamism.

Mari can enrich the WTO process and the international community with valuable lessons from East Asian experiences of policy making. This is one of those opportunities where Indonesia’s achievements and leadership could be recognized, with a candidate who stands out as one of the best in her own right, and who will make a difference for
future free and fair trade globally.

Mari has the unique combination of being a scholar in trade economics, a “second track” activist with worldwide networking that has given ideas and input to governments and the public, as well as a practitioner in the form of trade minister.

Jusuf Wanandi is vice chair of the Board of Trustees at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Foundation. Djisman Simandjuntak is chair of the Board of Directors, CSIS Foundation.

Insight: Improving Indonesia’s energy security

Karen Agustiawan, Jakarta | Insight | Mon, March 11 2013, 9:36 AM

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It says much about the nature of global issues today that energy has entered the hitherto hallowed realm of security, which was once reserved for issues of state and war.

This change reflects a broader shift in which economics has become a part of the high politics of war and peace. Energy security has to do with reducing a state’s vulnerability to risks of availability and pricing of a commodity that are crucial to its economic development.

Superficially, Indonesia should not have to worry about energy security because it is blessed with substantial endowments of natural gas and coal, assets that make it a net exporter of energy.

However, its energy security could still be hurt by disruptions to global supplies of energy, sharp spikes in energy prices and the fallout from intensifying competition among nations for ownership and access to strategic energy resources.

Hence, there are several reasons why Indonesia should think seriously about revamping its domestic policies to bolster its energy security.

First, Indonesia’s dependence on imported oil is a vulnerability that affects its energy security. With its current oil consumption of around 1.36 million barrels per day (bpd) against oil production of only 826,000 bpd, of which 30 percent to 40 percent is exported, Indonesia is struggling to satisfy domestic demand for energy.

Compounding this, its limited refinery capacity serves only 70 percent of domestic demand. Thus, it has to rely on imports of refined oil products. Indeed, it imported more than 400,000 bpd of refined products in 2011.

Even though Indonesia is a signi-ficant net exporter of natural gas and coal, its reliance on oil exposes it to pricing and supply risks. This is particularly so because the possibility of geopolitical shocks hangs so heavily over the Middle East.

The situation has worsened in recent years because so many important oil exporters have been hit by political turbulence, or border on politically distressed countries.

Iraq, an important oil producer, is suffering from an upsurge in domestic violence. Iran is at risk of a military attack by nations that will not shy away from a military option to prevent it from gaining nuclear weapons. As if Iraq’s internal troubles were not enough, it borders Syria, which is in extreme distress because of the civil war that appears to have no end in sight.

Second, Indonesia is vulnerable because of the composition of its energy consumption. In 2011, 71 percent of that consumption was accounted for by hydrocarbons, out of which more than 40 percent comprised oil alone. More diversity in the sources of energy would aid its energy security.

If Indonesia is to effectively address energy security, it has to first resolve the problems with its current policy framework.

First, subsidies. Fuel subsidies have increased since their introduction in the 1960s. These subsidies, which delink the price of energy from underlying realities of supply and demand, reduce the degree to which Indonesians are aware of the true costs of the energy they use. This results in consumption that is both excessive and wasteful.

Second, resources. Fuel subsidies take an astonishing and unconscionable 20 percent or so of scarce budgetary resources! Such funds are better channeled into areas that can provide fundamental improvements to Indonesian livelihoods. Take, for instance, the country’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for 2015 where progress has been slow. The proportion of the population with sustainable access to clean water and sanitation has not increased significantly, while the proportion using improved sanitation facilities in urban and rural areas remains far below target. Scarce fiscal resources would be better channeled into conditional cash transfers that directly target the poorest segments or into the building of sanitation and water infrastructure.

Third, policy. As a result of inadequate attention to policy, the Indonesian energy sector has been left under-developed for far too long. Bogged down by outdated energy infrastructure and refining capabilities, this lacuna is trapping Indonesia at the bottom of the value chain and making it miss out on a stable domestic energy supply.

Fourth, decentralization. Since the decentralization of government in 2001, there has been a lack of coordination in energy policy implementation. Despite plans for local governments to invest in renewable energy, there is no framework to align their work with national policy directions set by the central government. This lack of coordination has derailed energy development plans.

These gaps urgently need to be filled.

There are a number of other measures Indonesia could take beyond tackling the policy weaknesses outlined above. The good news is that it is in a better position than most to improve its energy security.

First, it should shift toward greater reliance on natural gas. Natural gas production has increased by more than a third since 2005, making the greater use of coal bed methane (CBM) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) a viable proposition.

Second, Indonesia has immense potential to substantially expand its renewable energy supplies. For instance, it can maximize utilization of geothermal resources owing to its location in the Pacific Ring of Fire. The current contribution of about 1,200 megawatts (MW) out of a potential 27,000 MW, as estimated by the National Geological Agency of Indonesia, provides considerable room for improvement. Other alternatives exist in the form of ethanol and offshore wind production. But the government will have to push for change if it is to come.

Third, governments can support technological developments that boost energy security. Brazil, for example, has developed new ethanol production technologies. Indonesia could replicate such innovative approaches to fit its own situation.

Indonesia’s energy security can be improved if there is sufficient government resolve. Jakarta needs to bite the bullet now.

The writer sits on the International Council of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.

Conflicts and nuclear threats can trigger war in East Asia

Kornelius Purba, Jakarta | Opinion | Fri, March 08 2013, 10:31 AM

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Amid rising military tensions caused by regional territorial conflicts and the unpredictable nuclear arms development in North Korea, the East Asia region this year is marked with the emergence of new leaderships.

China’s Xi Jinping, who will soon take over the presidency from Hu Jintao, is facing slower economic growth and a rising number of middle class in China who want more say in daily political life. And one of the simplest ways to channel the aspirations and frustration of the people is by targeting the outside world, especially Japan, its former colonial master.

The new Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been preoccupied with an ambitious agenda to deliver on his campaign promise to revive the country’s dying economy. The meaning of rightist or ultra-nationalists is shifting as the nation is now moving closer to the right amid the stalled economy which has lasted for decades, while China continues to shine in the international arena.

Meanwhile, South Korean President Park Geun-hye was just sworn in last month and one of her most pressing concerns is how to deal with the North Korean leader who continues to threaten open war with the South and its military ally, the United States.

South Korea also has an overlapping sovereignty claim with Japan, and military forces of both countries are increasing their presence in the disputed waters although on a smaller scale compared to Japan’s problem with China. But the bitterness of Japan’s occupation still lives among millions of South Koreans and it triggers anti-Japanese sentiment from time to time.

When North Korea’s Kim Jong-un replaced his father Kim Jong-il last year, there was hope that as a young man he would be more open to the outside world, including the opening of its economic door because millions of North Koran people have been living under extreme poverty and China as its main donor may soon experience fatigue.

China was also upset with North Korea’s stubbornness on its nuclear program and Beijing has taken tougher measures against its ally by endorsing a UN resolution to condemn and to take tougher economic sanctions against the North.

The possibility of military conflict and even — limited — wars in East Asia cannot be completely ruled out because of the overlapping territorial claims and the confrontational behavior of Kim Jong-un, who apparently thinks war is one of the most realistic choices to maintain his family’s control over the country before the people say they can no longer endure the prolonged and severe poverty and human rights abuses.

A combination of tension between Japan and China on one side and between Japan and South Korea on the other, is provoking more hostilities and more rapid military buildups in the region. But
knowing the often irrational and unpredictable behavior of North Korean leaders, the source of open war is more likely to come from Pyongyang.

China and Japan are facing an escalation of military confrontation over the sovereignty rights on Diaoyu Island (the name of the island according to the Chinese) or Senkaku Island, according to Japan’s map. China has insisted that it would not hesitate to use maximum military means, while many people in Japan feel they should not allow China to behave as it likes. Domestic pressure on both sides can trigger direct military confrontation although both sides realize that they will pay a very high price when they cannot maintain the conflict at a manageable level.

Following its successful nuclear tests last month, the North Korean regime has increased its threats to attack the US and the South. While in the past both the allies refrained from reacting to such threats because they were perceived more as propaganda, now they regard them more seriously. The security of Kim Jong-un is now directly targeted.

“We have all preparations in place for strong and decisive punishment, not only against the source of the aggression and its support forces but also the commanding element,” said Maj. Gen. Kim Yong-hyun of the South Korea Military Army, as quoted by Reuters on Wednesday.

 Indonesia, as the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), needs to take the diplomatic initiative — no matter how small it is compared to other countries’ more powerful influence — to reduce tension in East Asia, because an open and direct military conflict and escalating armament in the neighboring area will have military and economic implications in this region.

The Associated Press quoted the UN investigator for human rights in North Korea, Marzuki Darusman from Indonesia, who recommended an investigation of the North’s “grave, widespread and systematic violations of human rights”.

 Indonesia has had good relations with the North for decades. Citing its own experience, Indonesia can raise the issues of Marzuki’s report to convince Kim Jong-un to pay more attention to improve the living conditions of the people; because in the end, the survival of a regime is not determined by its brutality but by its ability to bring a better life for the people.

The possibility of war in the East Asia region cannot be ruled out at all. And when it happens it is not just the people in the region who will suffer but also the world, because the region is one of the world’s powerful economic engines.

The writer is senior managing editor at The Jakarta Post.

Beijing's Road to Renewal

03 March 2013 | Issue 5080

ByJohn Lee

Klipping The Moscow Times

In a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on Feb. 22, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe informed the audience that Japan is "back" and will not stand down in its ongoing sovereignty dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. With Chinese provocations on the rise, U.S. President Barack Obama, Abe's host, appealed for calm and restraint on both sides.
Japan is likely to accede — grudgingly — to Washington's request, as it remains dependent on its alliance with the U.S. for its security. But it will be much more difficult to persuade China that it should stand down.
China's assertiveness over its sovereignty claim reflects more than a desire to exploit seabed resources or to gain a widened strategic gateway into the Pacific. It is also about national renewal and rejuvenation — the core of the Chinese Communist Party's raison d'être. Turning away from a fight with its former occupier and historical rival would be a step backward in this six-decade-long quest.
The idea of Chinese renewal or rejuvenation was popularized by then-Premier Zhao Ziyang in the late 1980s and promoted by Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Most recently, incoming President Xi Jinping, visiting the National Museum of China's "Road Toward Renewal" exhibition, pledged to continue the "great renewal of the Chinese nation."
What does "renewal" or "rejuvenation" mean to the Chinese? All nations — great and small — embody a combination of historical fact and myth. In this case, Beijing's view of rejuvenation is built on the belief that the zenith of Chinese power under the Ming and Qing dynasties represents the natural, just and permanent state of affairs for a 5,000-year-old civilization.
When Mao Zedong took power in 1949, his immediate goal was to re-establish the "greater China" of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), insisting that the Manchu-led empire was the permanent and enduring China. But while the assault on the Qing Dynasty by foreign powers is a historical fact, the notion that there has been one enduring China struggling against avaricious outsiders across several millennia is false and self-serving.
Mao achieved his goal following the so-called peaceful liberation of the East Turkestan Republic (now Xinjiang) in 1949 and the invasion of Tibet in 1950, which promptly increased China's size by more than one-third. Every Communist Party leader since has carried forward his vision of a greater China, adjusting and expanding it as the country's power grows.
The same can be said for China's growing stridency with respect to its claims in the South China Sea. In 2009, relying heavily on a dubious historical claim, China formally tabled its "nine-dotted line" map to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and has since referred to almost all of the South China Sea as being under its "indisputable sovereignty."
Having dominated East and Southeast Asia for all but the last two centuries of the past two millennia, China is chafing at the current U.S.-led regional order of sovereign states, in which even the smallest enjoys the same rights, privileges and protection as the largest. Modern China has benefited largely from this arrangement. Nonetheless, there is keen resentment that the Chinese civilization-state's vast achievements over several thousand years offer China no special status.
To a people imbued with a deep sense of superior moral worth, historical achievement and victimization by foreign powers, this state of affairs is unjust and unnatural. It follows that pulling back from any territorial dispute with smaller and inferior states would be seen as a humiliating defeat, rather than a step toward ensuring long-term regional stability.
Moreover, an expanding view of greater China implies that a resolution of the dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in China's favor would be likely to embolden rather than satisfy its ambitions. Making good on its claim to the South China Sea could be next.
As Obama and Abe forge a common strategy aimed at helping to manage China's rise peacefully, they must understand that China's conception of renewal seeks to resurrect a glorious past. This implies revision, not affirmation, of the existing regional order. It also means that they will have to limit China's strategic and military options, even if they cannot constrain its ambitions.

John Lee is a fellow and professor at the Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University. © Project Syndicate

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