Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Klipping Jakarta Post
US, China rivalry may sway ASEAN agenda at EAS
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 07/30/2010 10:40 AM | World
A | A | A |
Officials and experts voiced concerns over the inclusion of the US and Russia into the East Asia Summit (EAS), saying it could weaken the current 16-strong forum if their rivalry was to simmer amid the absence of proper modalities to address it.
Singaporean Foreign Minister George Yeo warned recently of the “danger of EAS losing its original focus”, referring to tensions
between the two powers. He pointed to sharp rhetoric between China and the US over the South China Sea dispute that has involved other Asian countries.
“Yes, there is some tension, which we could detect during the Shangri- La dialogue, and reports that it was manifested when the US and China had a strategic dialogue. Again, it is over the South China Sea,” he said, referring to the recent international security dialogue in Singapore attended by US Defense Minister Robert Gates and high ranking Chinese defense officials.
The US has joined Russia in announcing its interest in joining the East Asia Summit, which next year convenes ten ASEAN members with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and New Zealand, when Indonesia chairs ASEAN. The modalities to host the two Cold War rivals is still under discussion and Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said it would come under an expanded EAS instead of the new
ASEAN+8 forum. Yeo said the new inclusion of the US and Russia should not sway the already agreed proposals of connectivity programs that would see the initial 16 members getting more integrated into a free-trade zone.
“The modalities that the ministers have tasked the officials to work on have become very important. We must make sure that the regional focus is retained and existing priority areas remain a point of focus,”
he said.
University of Indonesia international relations lecturer Syamsul Hadi said the expansion of the EAS may risk the effectiveness of the forum as US-Chinese rivalry for influence would hog the spotlight at the forum.
However, he said, an expanded EAS was inevitable because the dynamic of the region had changed the orientation of the US to be more Asia-focused.
“China will not feel comfortable with the presence of the US as the US’ new membership would be perceived as an effort to counter China’s role in the forum.”
“China would again be challenged with the presence of the US. But this a political dynamic in which both countries should exercise their diplomacy muscle, especially China, to convince ASEAN partners that they are not a threat that needs to be countered,” he said.
China has said it welcomed the inclusion of the US but that ASEAN+3 (ASEAN states plus China, Japan and South Korea) should become the driving force. On the other
hand, the new EAS would rival Japan’s idea of the East Asia Community (EAC), floated last year during the leadership of Yukio Hatoyama, to boost Japan’s leadership role in the region.
Japanese Ambassador to ASEAN Takio Yamada said the EAC was a long-term goal and the expansion of the EAS would not diminish the new regional architecture idea floated by his government.
Klipping Jakarta Post : Asian regionalism and RI’s comparative advantage Kiki Verico, Tokyo | Thu, 08/19/2010 10:08 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
Undeniably, we’re heading towards the globalization of world trade. At the same time countries face challenges other than globalization: regionalism and bilateralism. Indonesia simultaneously faces different levels of trade liberalization, whether at the global (World Trade Organization or WTO), regional (ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFTA) or bilateral level (such as with Australia).
The existence of these trade agreements makes world trade relations more complicated. This phenomenon is known as the “spaghetti bowl effect”. There is still hope in dealing with this kind of complexity.
Regional trade agreements such as AFTA allow “discriminative trade liberalization” between members and non-members of ASEAN. However, AFTA also recognizes the “open regionalism principle” that independently allows members to establish trade agreement with non-members.
Theoretically, bilateral trade agreements (BTA) between regional members and non-members will stimulate a “domino effect” to other member countries as no member country wants to be left behind. This is why after Singapore and Thailand effectively negotiated BTAs with non-ASEAN members such as the US and Japan. Other ASEAN members followed suit. This action followed the logic of the “prisoner’s dilemma”.
In the end, competitive trade liberalization forces regional member to negotiate BTAs with non-members. Increasing BTAs in Southeast Asia will drive the original “discriminative principle” out of the region. It means BTAs are indirectly transforming regionalism to be the complement to globalism.
BTAs are not fit for all members. In this case, some regional members must deal with the “hub and spokes” problem. Non-members with advanced economies will gain benefit more than members that are less advanced.
The more advanced a member’s economy, the easier it is to achieve a “win-win solution” with advanced non-member economies. Most ASEAN members are not in a feasible position to create direct BTAs with non-members unless it is done under ASEAN’s umbrella, such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and so on. It is why ASEAN’s open regionalism is a crystal-clear advantage.
Prior to that, Indonesia needs to identify its trade competitiveness by identifying comparative trade advantages. This can be done by combining net export (NX) of the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The most competitive products are those with positive of G-L index (export value higher than its import value) and higher than one for the RCA index.
Based on my calculations using WTO statistics, Indonesia’s greatest comparative advantage is in primary products (agriculture and mining) and labor-intensive industries (such as textiles). Yet RI still has a comparative advantage in medium-high technology industries such as telecommunication equipment production.
Indonesia still has opportunities in electronic data processing, office equipment, and integrated circuit and electronics component production. However, the country faces a negative G-L index & less than of RCA index in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery and transport equipment production.
There are some products where Indonesia competes with other Asian countries. We compete in agricultural products including food with Thailand, Vietnam and India. For textiles, we compete with Thailand, China, Korea and India while for clothing; the competitors are Vietnam and the Philippines. For manufactured products (telecommunication equipment), we compete with Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan and Korea.
On the other hand, we rely on Japan and India to fulfill our domestic market demand for iron and steel products. As for pharmaceuticals, we depend on India, and for machinery and transport equipment Indonesia relies on Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Japan and Korea. Indonesia’s automotive product demand is fulfilled by Japan and Korea. As for chemical products, empirically, most of Asian domestic market including Indonesia still depends on external markets outside of Asian region.
In sum, mapping the comparative trade advantages of different products in different countries will help Indonesia to plan its best strategy to cope with the world’s manufactures competition that can be started from the Asian region.
Since market mechanism works naturally, ruled by “natural law” (Francois Quesnay, 1758) and driven by the “invisible hand” (Adam Smith, 1776), it is the role of the government to map out Indonesia’s comparative advantages in more detail. Such a public good is naturally provided by the government, private sector will not develop this kind of information.
Trade comparative advantage mapping will significantly help Indonesia develop its best strategy to take part in future global and regional trade architectures, together with Brazil, Russia, India and China. Let the government plays this important role. We need to be optimistic and think positively for our own bright future.
The writer is a doctoral student at Waseda University, Tokyo and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia.
The existence of these trade agreements makes world trade relations more complicated. This phenomenon is known as the “spaghetti bowl effect”. There is still hope in dealing with this kind of complexity.
Regional trade agreements such as AFTA allow “discriminative trade liberalization” between members and non-members of ASEAN. However, AFTA also recognizes the “open regionalism principle” that independently allows members to establish trade agreement with non-members.
Theoretically, bilateral trade agreements (BTA) between regional members and non-members will stimulate a “domino effect” to other member countries as no member country wants to be left behind. This is why after Singapore and Thailand effectively negotiated BTAs with non-ASEAN members such as the US and Japan. Other ASEAN members followed suit. This action followed the logic of the “prisoner’s dilemma”.
In the end, competitive trade liberalization forces regional member to negotiate BTAs with non-members. Increasing BTAs in Southeast Asia will drive the original “discriminative principle” out of the region. It means BTAs are indirectly transforming regionalism to be the complement to globalism.
BTAs are not fit for all members. In this case, some regional members must deal with the “hub and spokes” problem. Non-members with advanced economies will gain benefit more than members that are less advanced.
The more advanced a member’s economy, the easier it is to achieve a “win-win solution” with advanced non-member economies. Most ASEAN members are not in a feasible position to create direct BTAs with non-members unless it is done under ASEAN’s umbrella, such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6 and so on. It is why ASEAN’s open regionalism is a crystal-clear advantage.
Prior to that, Indonesia needs to identify its trade competitiveness by identifying comparative trade advantages. This can be done by combining net export (NX) of the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index with the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index. The most competitive products are those with positive of G-L index (export value higher than its import value) and higher than one for the RCA index.
Based on my calculations using WTO statistics, Indonesia’s greatest comparative advantage is in primary products (agriculture and mining) and labor-intensive industries (such as textiles). Yet RI still has a comparative advantage in medium-high technology industries such as telecommunication equipment production.
Indonesia still has opportunities in electronic data processing, office equipment, and integrated circuit and electronics component production. However, the country faces a negative G-L index & less than of RCA index in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery and transport equipment production.
There are some products where Indonesia competes with other Asian countries. We compete in agricultural products including food with Thailand, Vietnam and India. For textiles, we compete with Thailand, China, Korea and India while for clothing; the competitors are Vietnam and the Philippines. For manufactured products (telecommunication equipment), we compete with Malaysia, Thailand, China, Japan and Korea.
On the other hand, we rely on Japan and India to fulfill our domestic market demand for iron and steel products. As for pharmaceuticals, we depend on India, and for machinery and transport equipment Indonesia relies on Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Japan and Korea. Indonesia’s automotive product demand is fulfilled by Japan and Korea. As for chemical products, empirically, most of Asian domestic market including Indonesia still depends on external markets outside of Asian region.
In sum, mapping the comparative trade advantages of different products in different countries will help Indonesia to plan its best strategy to cope with the world’s manufactures competition that can be started from the Asian region.
Since market mechanism works naturally, ruled by “natural law” (Francois Quesnay, 1758) and driven by the “invisible hand” (Adam Smith, 1776), it is the role of the government to map out Indonesia’s comparative advantages in more detail. Such a public good is naturally provided by the government, private sector will not develop this kind of information.
Trade comparative advantage mapping will significantly help Indonesia develop its best strategy to take part in future global and regional trade architectures, together with Brazil, Russia, India and China. Let the government plays this important role. We need to be optimistic and think positively for our own bright future.
The writer is a doctoral student at Waseda University, Tokyo and a lecturer at the University of Indonesia.
Klipping Jakarta Post : Russia, E. Asia geopolitics and ASEAN factor Victor Sumsky, Moscow | Sat, 10/30/2010 11:06 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
The Russia-ASEAN summit caused mixed feelings both in Moscow and in the capitals of the Ten. Indubitably, our relations are not stagnating. Yet it is obvious that both the Russian Federation and the countries of the Association currently profit more by working with other partners.
Some people may hasten to recall that neither Russia nor ASEAN countries are up to competing with China in terms of global economy and ability to fascinate the world with its achievements. It is for this reason that both we and the people of ASEAN look up to it more often than we do with regard to each other.
After all, both Russia and ASEAN members live side by side with a country that is now assuming the role of the 21st century’s most influential power. Isn’t this reason enough for us to “compare notes”, collate our impressions, and think of what can be done jointly, especially in the areas of production and technology, to cut a dignified figure against the stature of the regional and world leader?
As Russia adopted the modernization agenda, the debate was revived as to which external partnerships might best help us implement that policy. Again we hear that the West, and the West alone, commands the mysteries of high-tech and will share those secrets with us if we but play on its side in the game of geopolitics. We’ve been through all that in the 1990s, and past experiences, just as the present crisis leaves no room for illusions.
The more so that it is no longer possible to ignore the alternative of proactive cooperation with East Asia, which is currently achieving obvious success in modernization. The position of this country’s top leadership is a perfectly unequivocal testimony to that. In July this year at the conference on socioeconomic issues that President Dmitry Medvedev chaired in Khabarovsk the problems of Russia’s modernization, development of its Far Eastern areas and consolidation of partnership relations with neighboring Asian countries were considered as a single cluster.
But our “eternal Westernizers” remain undaunted. They will respond to the above arguments by reminding us that virtually all East Asian countries and territories where rapid modernization occurred in the second half of the 20th century were at the very least members of political, and often also of military, alliances with the United States.
Those alliances were open (as in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) or informal (as in the case of Indonesia and China), but they invariably involved trade and economic preferences without which the Asian “miracles” could hardly have happened. This point can be accepted, but with three reservations.
First, all of that happened in Cold War conditions, which are certain never to return.
Second, even then it was vital to do everything in moderation: Not one of the ASEAN founder states had so close a relationship with the US as did the Philippines. But it was precisely in the Philippines that modernization was, and still is, far from smooth.
Third, no one is saying that relations with the West should be scrapped. All that is being suggested is following the example of the West in what it has always been good at — in being realistic in estimates and actions. And this attitude requires taking stock of all available opportunities and options of cooperation with the outer world.
More than that, it requires a certain kind of circumspection precisely in the East Asian sector, where we had better lose no more time in making our presence felt.
At this point one feels like making a pause to hear out a remark from oneself, for a change. Obviously, an alarmist mood is not desirable, but there is definitely food for thought there, especially if one views modernization not in a rectilinear technocratic way, but as a controversial process in which new achievements always entail new problems. That was the way Samuel Huntington viewed it.
While pointing out that it took a minimum of political controllability to “kick-start” modernization programs and the end goal of such programs was stability characteristic of developed modern society, he emphasized that modernization per se was a most destabilizing thing. And the danger of destabilization was the more real, the higher the rate of transformations.
These ideas have lost none of their explanatory force, if seen, say, in light of the last few years’ events in Thailand, a country going through a crisis not because of chronic backwardness, but as the result of accelerated development.
Painful in themselves, such crises are even more dangerous when occurring in areas still suffering from the Cold War legacy (Korea, the Taiwan Straits) where tensions in relations between neighboring countries, protracted territorial disputes, or the so-called new threats to security, like cross-border crime, are plentiful.
But perhaps the most disquieting thing is that we observe the start of rivalry over regional and global domination between the United States and China. The picture is made even more complicated by old resentments along the China-India, and also China-Japan lines, and by simultaneous attempts by the chief rivals to win over both ASEAN as a whole and its individual members.
Are the leaders of East Asia aware of that? Do their advisers ponder all this, do they discuss these matters among themselves? They are and they do. Otherwise the search for a “new regional architecture” of cooperation and security would not have acquired the paramount importance in that part of the world that it now has.
The readiness of the East Asia Summit participants to admit Russia to their circle is a sign that Russia is expected to make a more significant contribution to the search.
What shape might that contribution take? Nothing could be better than defense of one’s own national interests, for as regards East Asia, they virtually coincide with the region’s collective interest. The objective of our Far Eastern territories developing in conjunction with the neighboring political and economic areas, basically formulated in Khabarovsk, will have its rationale if East Asia preserves economic dynamism. And it can only do so if escalation of the current regional contradictions, let alone their degenerating into a conflict phase, is avoided.
Peace in East Asia is something the overwhelming majority of participants in regional developments need, and all of them, ourselves included, will have to fight for it. After all, passivity is a synonym of lack of preparedness for trials, and if one imagines such a contingency, Russia with its vast open spaces and resources will be drawn into a confrontation we need like a hole in the head.
Assuming that this argumentation is not altogether groundless, we will see that ASEAN is as good as a natural ally to us. Like Russia, the Association and its members are mere losers in the context of growing contradictions between the US and China.
It would appear that neither we nor our ASEAN friends have yet realized in full measure our strategic need for each other. Let us hope that the process of its realization will give us extra incentives for economic exchanges, while the latter in turn will consolidate the basis for political partnership.
The writer is director of the ASEAN Centre of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO-U) and chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS.
The article first appeared in the Special Issue of International Affairs Magazine (Russia ).
Some people may hasten to recall that neither Russia nor ASEAN countries are up to competing with China in terms of global economy and ability to fascinate the world with its achievements. It is for this reason that both we and the people of ASEAN look up to it more often than we do with regard to each other.
After all, both Russia and ASEAN members live side by side with a country that is now assuming the role of the 21st century’s most influential power. Isn’t this reason enough for us to “compare notes”, collate our impressions, and think of what can be done jointly, especially in the areas of production and technology, to cut a dignified figure against the stature of the regional and world leader?
As Russia adopted the modernization agenda, the debate was revived as to which external partnerships might best help us implement that policy. Again we hear that the West, and the West alone, commands the mysteries of high-tech and will share those secrets with us if we but play on its side in the game of geopolitics. We’ve been through all that in the 1990s, and past experiences, just as the present crisis leaves no room for illusions.
The more so that it is no longer possible to ignore the alternative of proactive cooperation with East Asia, which is currently achieving obvious success in modernization. The position of this country’s top leadership is a perfectly unequivocal testimony to that. In July this year at the conference on socioeconomic issues that President Dmitry Medvedev chaired in Khabarovsk the problems of Russia’s modernization, development of its Far Eastern areas and consolidation of partnership relations with neighboring Asian countries were considered as a single cluster.
But our “eternal Westernizers” remain undaunted. They will respond to the above arguments by reminding us that virtually all East Asian countries and territories where rapid modernization occurred in the second half of the 20th century were at the very least members of political, and often also of military, alliances with the United States.
Those alliances were open (as in the case of Japan, Taiwan and South Korea) or informal (as in the case of Indonesia and China), but they invariably involved trade and economic preferences without which the Asian “miracles” could hardly have happened. This point can be accepted, but with three reservations.
First, all of that happened in Cold War conditions, which are certain never to return.
Second, even then it was vital to do everything in moderation: Not one of the ASEAN founder states had so close a relationship with the US as did the Philippines. But it was precisely in the Philippines that modernization was, and still is, far from smooth.
Third, no one is saying that relations with the West should be scrapped. All that is being suggested is following the example of the West in what it has always been good at — in being realistic in estimates and actions. And this attitude requires taking stock of all available opportunities and options of cooperation with the outer world.
More than that, it requires a certain kind of circumspection precisely in the East Asian sector, where we had better lose no more time in making our presence felt.
At this point one feels like making a pause to hear out a remark from oneself, for a change. Obviously, an alarmist mood is not desirable, but there is definitely food for thought there, especially if one views modernization not in a rectilinear technocratic way, but as a controversial process in which new achievements always entail new problems. That was the way Samuel Huntington viewed it.
While pointing out that it took a minimum of political controllability to “kick-start” modernization programs and the end goal of such programs was stability characteristic of developed modern society, he emphasized that modernization per se was a most destabilizing thing. And the danger of destabilization was the more real, the higher the rate of transformations.
These ideas have lost none of their explanatory force, if seen, say, in light of the last few years’ events in Thailand, a country going through a crisis not because of chronic backwardness, but as the result of accelerated development.
Painful in themselves, such crises are even more dangerous when occurring in areas still suffering from the Cold War legacy (Korea, the Taiwan Straits) where tensions in relations between neighboring countries, protracted territorial disputes, or the so-called new threats to security, like cross-border crime, are plentiful.
But perhaps the most disquieting thing is that we observe the start of rivalry over regional and global domination between the United States and China. The picture is made even more complicated by old resentments along the China-India, and also China-Japan lines, and by simultaneous attempts by the chief rivals to win over both ASEAN as a whole and its individual members.
Are the leaders of East Asia aware of that? Do their advisers ponder all this, do they discuss these matters among themselves? They are and they do. Otherwise the search for a “new regional architecture” of cooperation and security would not have acquired the paramount importance in that part of the world that it now has.
The readiness of the East Asia Summit participants to admit Russia to their circle is a sign that Russia is expected to make a more significant contribution to the search.
What shape might that contribution take? Nothing could be better than defense of one’s own national interests, for as regards East Asia, they virtually coincide with the region’s collective interest. The objective of our Far Eastern territories developing in conjunction with the neighboring political and economic areas, basically formulated in Khabarovsk, will have its rationale if East Asia preserves economic dynamism. And it can only do so if escalation of the current regional contradictions, let alone their degenerating into a conflict phase, is avoided.
Peace in East Asia is something the overwhelming majority of participants in regional developments need, and all of them, ourselves included, will have to fight for it. After all, passivity is a synonym of lack of preparedness for trials, and if one imagines such a contingency, Russia with its vast open spaces and resources will be drawn into a confrontation we need like a hole in the head.
Assuming that this argumentation is not altogether groundless, we will see that ASEAN is as good as a natural ally to us. Like Russia, the Association and its members are mere losers in the context of growing contradictions between the US and China.
It would appear that neither we nor our ASEAN friends have yet realized in full measure our strategic need for each other. Let us hope that the process of its realization will give us extra incentives for economic exchanges, while the latter in turn will consolidate the basis for political partnership.
The writer is director of the ASEAN Centre of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO-U) and chief research fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS.
The article first appeared in the Special Issue of International Affairs Magazine (Russia ).
Klipping Jakarta Post : Assessing SBY’s foreign policy Yayan GH Mulyana, Bogor | Mon, 11/01/2010 9:32 AM | Opinion A | A | A |
In the past year, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s foreign policy has been characterized primarily by the increasing use of economic diplomacy. The choice of economic diplomacy as a foreign policy instrument is timely and realistic because since 2008/2009 Indonesia has been working hard to consolidate its resilience against the remaining repercussions caused by the global financial crisis.
Indonesia has used this economic diplomacy not only to keep the country economically resilient, but also to create a new architecture of global financial systems through a joint effort of the G20 forum. Being an active member of the forum, Indonesia consistently pronounces the urgency of a balanced, fair, transparent and credible global financial system.
And in the G20 Summit this month in Seoul, Indonesia will not only continue to advocate such a pronouncement, but also will emphasize the issue of development, including financial inclusion, which is of paramount importance to developing countries.
Indonesia’s strong commitment to environment diplomacy continued in the past year. As an ardent advocate for the efforts to address climate change, Indonesia spares no effort to ensure that the implementation of the 2007 Bali Plan of Action on climate change stays the course. Indonesia’s continued environment diplomacy will remain needed to assure, in collaboration with other countries, the successful outcome of the forthcoming Cancun Conference.
In the political and security realm, Indonesia’s diplomacy has been dedicated to the development of a regional security architecture marked by a dynamic equilibrium among its parties. Indonesia has done its utmost to ensure the role of ASEAN as the driving force in the regional architecture building process; to ensure the centrality of ASEAN in the “plus one” and “plus three” processes as well as the ARF, EAS, APEC and ASEM.
On the Middle East issue, Indonesia has been firm and steadfast in its support for a comprehensive just, and lasting peace in the region. On the Israeli-Palestinian track, last month on the sidelines of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, Indonesia hosted the Four Country Initiative on Palestine. This is an important step in Indonesia’s contribution to the efforts in resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
The Indonesian government has also continued to use peacekeeping operations as a foreign policy instrument, especially in fulfilling the constitutional mandate to keep international peace and order.
Indonesia has large contingents in UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIS (Sudan) and MONUC (Congo). In April 2010, Indonesia deployed a sigma class corvette “KRI Frans Kasiepo – 368” as part of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. The presence of an Indonesian navy vessel in Lebanese waters has been very much appreciated by the international community, and marked a new chapter in the history of Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
On the bilateral level, despite specific challenges that emerged to confront relations between Indonesia and Malaysia as well as between Indonesia and The Netherlands, Indonesia has generally gained a lot for its national development from various bilateral initiatives.
The President’s visit to several countries in the past year has resulted not only strengthened bilateral relations but also produced pledges of increased investment from the governments and private sectors of those partner countries.
Foreign policy establishment in Indonesia has developed in a positive direction in the past year. On foreign relations issues, the government has always listened to the people’s voices attentively while exerting firm and reasonable positions. The role of parliament in foreign policy has been respected, and the traditionally limited role of the vice president in foreign relations has been expanded by his participation in the US-initiated Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, and in the recent US-ASEAN Summit in New York last month.
In the years ahead, there will be more room for Indonesia’s foreign policy activism. The chairmanship of Indonesia in ASEAN in 2011 will provide Indonesia with the opportunity to lead and to strive for the realization of the ASEAN Community. Indonesia came up with the idea five years ago, and now it is a chance through stewardship to ensure its realization for the common good of ASEAN as well as the global family of nations.
Some glitches over the year in Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Netherlands relations have taught us one very important lesson: There is no fit-for-all strategy in bilateral diplomacy. A strategy for bilateral diplomacy with Scandinavian countries would be different from that with Malaysia, Australia, The Netherlands and Timor Leste.
With the Netherlands, unless resolved once and for all, “history” will continue to affect Indonesia’s bilateral relations. Thus, in strategizing, bilateral diplomacy must be recalibrated. In its implementation, it will require consideration for the particularities of each partner country while maintaining long standing conventional practices.
Another important lesson is the need for greater foreign relations literacy among the Indonesian populace. There is a need for educational in Indonesian foreign policy to bridge the gap between the public’s expectations, which have often been seen to be influenced by emotion, such as in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and the government’s policies, which have been rational and abide by the principles of peacefully settling disputes.
An informed public will offer reasonable and constructive input, free from mockery and cynicism. It is a shared responsibility to educate the public — it is the responsibility of the government, the media, politicians, parliamentarians, foreign affairs experts, analysts and academicians.
It is also pertinent to recalibrate Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, which has been serving as a legal basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy. New realities have emerged at home and abroad since the Law took effect on Sept. 14, 1999. In the future, Indonesia’s foreign policy will need a legal basis that reflects those new developments.
A greater consideration should also be given to the dynamism in the Indian Ocean Rim and the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Ocean’s strategic and historical value warrants serious thought on what role Indonesia can play in the sub-region. On the Non-Aligned Movement, the need for its revitalization remains strong. As one of the founding states, it is natural that Indonesia would be expected to play a leading role in rejuvenating the movement. In the future, with 118 member states, the movement will need a diverse leadership.
On the doctrinal level, the principle of bebas aktif (active but not aligned) has been consistently heeded, and I believe that it will remain so in the coming years.
The writer is an Indonesian diplomat. The opinions expressed are his personal thoughts.
Indonesia has used this economic diplomacy not only to keep the country economically resilient, but also to create a new architecture of global financial systems through a joint effort of the G20 forum. Being an active member of the forum, Indonesia consistently pronounces the urgency of a balanced, fair, transparent and credible global financial system.
And in the G20 Summit this month in Seoul, Indonesia will not only continue to advocate such a pronouncement, but also will emphasize the issue of development, including financial inclusion, which is of paramount importance to developing countries.
Indonesia’s strong commitment to environment diplomacy continued in the past year. As an ardent advocate for the efforts to address climate change, Indonesia spares no effort to ensure that the implementation of the 2007 Bali Plan of Action on climate change stays the course. Indonesia’s continued environment diplomacy will remain needed to assure, in collaboration with other countries, the successful outcome of the forthcoming Cancun Conference.
In the political and security realm, Indonesia’s diplomacy has been dedicated to the development of a regional security architecture marked by a dynamic equilibrium among its parties. Indonesia has done its utmost to ensure the role of ASEAN as the driving force in the regional architecture building process; to ensure the centrality of ASEAN in the “plus one” and “plus three” processes as well as the ARF, EAS, APEC and ASEM.
On the Middle East issue, Indonesia has been firm and steadfast in its support for a comprehensive just, and lasting peace in the region. On the Israeli-Palestinian track, last month on the sidelines of the 65th session of the UN General Assembly, Indonesia hosted the Four Country Initiative on Palestine. This is an important step in Indonesia’s contribution to the efforts in resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict.
The Indonesian government has also continued to use peacekeeping operations as a foreign policy instrument, especially in fulfilling the constitutional mandate to keep international peace and order.
Indonesia has large contingents in UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNMIS (Sudan) and MONUC (Congo). In April 2010, Indonesia deployed a sigma class corvette “KRI Frans Kasiepo – 368” as part of UNIFIL Maritime Task Force. The presence of an Indonesian navy vessel in Lebanese waters has been very much appreciated by the international community, and marked a new chapter in the history of Indonesia’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations.
On the bilateral level, despite specific challenges that emerged to confront relations between Indonesia and Malaysia as well as between Indonesia and The Netherlands, Indonesia has generally gained a lot for its national development from various bilateral initiatives.
The President’s visit to several countries in the past year has resulted not only strengthened bilateral relations but also produced pledges of increased investment from the governments and private sectors of those partner countries.
Foreign policy establishment in Indonesia has developed in a positive direction in the past year. On foreign relations issues, the government has always listened to the people’s voices attentively while exerting firm and reasonable positions. The role of parliament in foreign policy has been respected, and the traditionally limited role of the vice president in foreign relations has been expanded by his participation in the US-initiated Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in April 2010, and in the recent US-ASEAN Summit in New York last month.
In the years ahead, there will be more room for Indonesia’s foreign policy activism. The chairmanship of Indonesia in ASEAN in 2011 will provide Indonesia with the opportunity to lead and to strive for the realization of the ASEAN Community. Indonesia came up with the idea five years ago, and now it is a chance through stewardship to ensure its realization for the common good of ASEAN as well as the global family of nations.
Some glitches over the year in Indonesia-Malaysia and Indonesia-Netherlands relations have taught us one very important lesson: There is no fit-for-all strategy in bilateral diplomacy. A strategy for bilateral diplomacy with Scandinavian countries would be different from that with Malaysia, Australia, The Netherlands and Timor Leste.
With the Netherlands, unless resolved once and for all, “history” will continue to affect Indonesia’s bilateral relations. Thus, in strategizing, bilateral diplomacy must be recalibrated. In its implementation, it will require consideration for the particularities of each partner country while maintaining long standing conventional practices.
Another important lesson is the need for greater foreign relations literacy among the Indonesian populace. There is a need for educational in Indonesian foreign policy to bridge the gap between the public’s expectations, which have often been seen to be influenced by emotion, such as in the case of Indonesia-Malaysia relations, and the government’s policies, which have been rational and abide by the principles of peacefully settling disputes.
An informed public will offer reasonable and constructive input, free from mockery and cynicism. It is a shared responsibility to educate the public — it is the responsibility of the government, the media, politicians, parliamentarians, foreign affairs experts, analysts and academicians.
It is also pertinent to recalibrate Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations, which has been serving as a legal basis of Indonesia’s foreign policy. New realities have emerged at home and abroad since the Law took effect on Sept. 14, 1999. In the future, Indonesia’s foreign policy will need a legal basis that reflects those new developments.
A greater consideration should also be given to the dynamism in the Indian Ocean Rim and the revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Ocean’s strategic and historical value warrants serious thought on what role Indonesia can play in the sub-region. On the Non-Aligned Movement, the need for its revitalization remains strong. As one of the founding states, it is natural that Indonesia would be expected to play a leading role in rejuvenating the movement. In the future, with 118 member states, the movement will need a diverse leadership.
On the doctrinal level, the principle of bebas aktif (active but not aligned) has been consistently heeded, and I believe that it will remain so in the coming years.
The writer is an Indonesian diplomat. The opinions expressed are his personal thoughts.
ASEAN and contemporary US diplomacy in East Asia
Evi Fitriani, Jakarta | Fri, 08/13/2010 9:09 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Despite US President Barack Obama twice postponing his visit to Indonesia, there has been a marked increase in high-ranked US officials reaching out to Southeast Asia.
The most prominent being the visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Jakarta to discuss the future of US-Indonesian military cooperation and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s presence at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi last month.
China’s economic growth and its ability to capitalize its economic strength to political-strategic influence in the region and global diplomacy has irritated the US. The world’s sole superpower now depends on Chinese investment to secure its economy.
The US does not only suffer continuous trade deficits against China, but also has to finance its budget on government bonds, much of which have been bought by China.
Clinton flew to China soon after the collapse of American financial market in 2009 to assure the Chinese government that China’s capital is safe in US hands. There is a global shift in power. The US may still be the strongest military power in the world but it needs strong economic support.
In contrast, with high economic growth and around US$2.45 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the biggest in the world, China can afford to build a very modern military, including a blue-ocean navy that may project its leverage in the Pacific and beyond.
On top of this hard power, China’s business interests have expanded into Africa and Latin America. With a very close link between politics and business in China and the centralized political system controlled by the Chinese authority, economic tools can be used to pursue political-strategic interests, and vice versa.
China has used its economic strength as a powerful tool in international relations which, in turn, may threaten US interests in Asia and around the globe.
In short, China’s economic strength and political-strategic influence have made the US more vulnerable domestically and abroad.
The US’ current outreach to countries in Southeast Asia is to balance China’s influence and mitigate its vulnerability.
America’s traditional ally in Asia, Japan, seems unable to play a significant role in balancing China in Asia due to its domestic political and economic problems.
Japan’s continuing struggle to reform its economic and political systems have taken a toll in the country’s diplomacy and limited its foreign policy. The US can’t rely on Japan to secure US interests in Asia.
Consequently, the US has actively approached ASEAN countries and insisted on joining the East Asian Summit (EAS). While the intensity may be different, all of the 10 members of the ASEAN have had their own historical engagements with the US.
The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 has been widely perceived as one part of the US’ strategy to contain communism in the region during 1960s.
Perhaps, ASEAN is the only realistic choice for the US to pursue its interests in Asia. While it has been criticized for being too weak institutionally and too compromising politically, ASEAN is the world’s longest running geo-political organization after the EU.
ASEAN countries have not only maintained the longevity of their regional institution beyond the Cold War, but expanded the institution’s membership to include almost all countries in Southeast Asia.
In addition, despite the emergence of various regional institutions in the region, ASEAN has developed as the core of Asian regional architecture since 1990s.
While there are frequent questions about ASEAN’s institutional capability to handle regional affairs and crises, ASEAN countries seem to occupy the driver’s seat in Asian regional forums.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s important position in the regional architecture means the organization’s leaders should not overlook challenges in regard to the US’ revitalized presence in Asia and its accession to the EAS.
History teaches us that the reasons behind the absence of solid Asian regionalism and identity derive not only from domestic problems and inter-state distrust among Asian countries, but also from the presence of external powers like the US in the region.
While traditional US strategy in East Asia is to oppose any single notion of domination, ASEAN should not let the Americans re-establish their own domination in the region.
ASEAN should be able to become the host in Asia and determine the course of Asian regional architecture based on reciprocal respect and mutual benefits between countries and external actors.
Despite the need to use acceptable diplomatic language, ASEAN countries have to be able to safeguard the region’s interests vis-à-vis external actors.
ASEAN countries need to balance China’s influence in the region too. The strategy looks to be to include Japan and Australia in the EAS. With the accession of the US, ASEAN should have more room to maneuver in dealing with China.
The revitalization of US presence in the region can be used to increase Southeast Asian countries’ bargaining power against China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. At the ASEAN Regional Forum last week, we saw antagonism between the US and China in handling the Spratly Islands conflict.
Nevertheless, ASEAN should not become the victim of the US – China competition in the region.
ASEAN countries should increase their institutional capability and build inter-state trust in order to become a smart mediator that can deal with external actors without sacrificing their own interests.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the International relations Department, University of Indonesia (Jakarta), and a PhD candidate in the Australian National University (Australia).
A | A | A |
Despite US President Barack Obama twice postponing his visit to Indonesia, there has been a marked increase in high-ranked US officials reaching out to Southeast Asia.
The most prominent being the visit by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Jakarta to discuss the future of US-Indonesian military cooperation and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s presence at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi last month.
China’s economic growth and its ability to capitalize its economic strength to political-strategic influence in the region and global diplomacy has irritated the US. The world’s sole superpower now depends on Chinese investment to secure its economy.
The US does not only suffer continuous trade deficits against China, but also has to finance its budget on government bonds, much of which have been bought by China.
Clinton flew to China soon after the collapse of American financial market in 2009 to assure the Chinese government that China’s capital is safe in US hands. There is a global shift in power. The US may still be the strongest military power in the world but it needs strong economic support.
In contrast, with high economic growth and around US$2.45 trillion in foreign exchange reserves, the biggest in the world, China can afford to build a very modern military, including a blue-ocean navy that may project its leverage in the Pacific and beyond.
On top of this hard power, China’s business interests have expanded into Africa and Latin America. With a very close link between politics and business in China and the centralized political system controlled by the Chinese authority, economic tools can be used to pursue political-strategic interests, and vice versa.
China has used its economic strength as a powerful tool in international relations which, in turn, may threaten US interests in Asia and around the globe.
In short, China’s economic strength and political-strategic influence have made the US more vulnerable domestically and abroad.
The US’ current outreach to countries in Southeast Asia is to balance China’s influence and mitigate its vulnerability.
America’s traditional ally in Asia, Japan, seems unable to play a significant role in balancing China in Asia due to its domestic political and economic problems.
Japan’s continuing struggle to reform its economic and political systems have taken a toll in the country’s diplomacy and limited its foreign policy. The US can’t rely on Japan to secure US interests in Asia.
Consequently, the US has actively approached ASEAN countries and insisted on joining the East Asian Summit (EAS). While the intensity may be different, all of the 10 members of the ASEAN have had their own historical engagements with the US.
The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 has been widely perceived as one part of the US’ strategy to contain communism in the region during 1960s.
Perhaps, ASEAN is the only realistic choice for the US to pursue its interests in Asia. While it has been criticized for being too weak institutionally and too compromising politically, ASEAN is the world’s longest running geo-political organization after the EU.
ASEAN countries have not only maintained the longevity of their regional institution beyond the Cold War, but expanded the institution’s membership to include almost all countries in Southeast Asia.
In addition, despite the emergence of various regional institutions in the region, ASEAN has developed as the core of Asian regional architecture since 1990s.
While there are frequent questions about ASEAN’s institutional capability to handle regional affairs and crises, ASEAN countries seem to occupy the driver’s seat in Asian regional forums.
Nevertheless, ASEAN’s important position in the regional architecture means the organization’s leaders should not overlook challenges in regard to the US’ revitalized presence in Asia and its accession to the EAS.
History teaches us that the reasons behind the absence of solid Asian regionalism and identity derive not only from domestic problems and inter-state distrust among Asian countries, but also from the presence of external powers like the US in the region.
While traditional US strategy in East Asia is to oppose any single notion of domination, ASEAN should not let the Americans re-establish their own domination in the region.
ASEAN should be able to become the host in Asia and determine the course of Asian regional architecture based on reciprocal respect and mutual benefits between countries and external actors.
Despite the need to use acceptable diplomatic language, ASEAN countries have to be able to safeguard the region’s interests vis-à-vis external actors.
ASEAN countries need to balance China’s influence in the region too. The strategy looks to be to include Japan and Australia in the EAS. With the accession of the US, ASEAN should have more room to maneuver in dealing with China.
The revitalization of US presence in the region can be used to increase Southeast Asian countries’ bargaining power against China’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea. At the ASEAN Regional Forum last week, we saw antagonism between the US and China in handling the Spratly Islands conflict.
Nevertheless, ASEAN should not become the victim of the US – China competition in the region.
ASEAN countries should increase their institutional capability and build inter-state trust in order to become a smart mediator that can deal with external actors without sacrificing their own interests.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the International relations Department, University of Indonesia (Jakarta), and a PhD candidate in the Australian National University (Australia).
Klipping Jakarta Post
East Asia Summit: ASEAN’s centrality and the challenges ahead
Awidya Santikajaya, Washington, DC | Fri, 10/29/2010 10:36 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Asia Pacific leaders are meeting this week at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Together with ASEAN and APEC, the EAS is a key element of Asia Pacific regionalism. Current members of the EAS are ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Countering claims that it is ineffective, the EAS has made meaningful concrete achievements, including cooperation on disaster management and the establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Further, the coming EAS is crucial because it will officially invite the US and Russia to join, after the previous East Asia Ministerial Meeting last August made this recommendation.
Since its establishment in 2005, the EAS was intended to be an ASEAN-led block, and has been linked to ASEAN Summits. An important issue ASEAN faces in the recent development of the EAS is whether it is can maintain its “centrality” in the grouping.
ASEAN has been regarded as one of the most stable regional groupings in the developing world. With a population of around 600 million, Southeast Asia is emerging politically, economically and strategically, attracting external powers.
Donald E. Weatherbee explained that ASEAN has become a stage where great power rivalries and competition for influence are being played out.
Among these external powers, the US and China are the two most important countries. China’s dilating economic and military capacities have boosted its diplomatic assertiveness over its neighbors, including Southeast Asia. Early this year, ASEAN and China began implementing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
The US also now intends to regain its lost influence in the “forgotten region” to maintain its global domination.
The US orientation toward Southeast Asia could be seen when President Barack Obama missed the US-EU Summit in Madrid last May, but hosted the ASEAN-US Summit in September, and plans to attend the EAS in Indonesia next year.
In this development, the political gravitation of China and the US has seriously challenged “ASEAN’s Centrality”. Using the dependency theory, we may conclude that the relations between ASEAN, on the one hand, and the US and China on the other are unusual. Normally, the “center” is more powerful than the “periphery”, but in this case the US and China (peripheries) are far stronger than ASEAN (center).
“There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement it will be.”
Recently, the accretion of rivalry between the US and China has been coloring Asia Pacific international relations. At the second ASEAN-US Summit, in New York last September, for instance, the US insistently espoused the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The US also expressed its willingness to help craft a legally binding “code of conduct” to prevent armed hostilities among countries with territorial claims. Responding to this issue, Chinese Foreign Minister Jiang Yu stated that China opposed any internationalization and expansion of the South China Sea dispute because it would only make the issue more complicated.
So far, the ASEAN’s main position toward external powers’ involvement is to exploit those powers’ interests for regional benefit. And it is gaining ground, at least for some countries. Vietnam, for example, has gained tremendous advantages from the aggressive approaches of America and China to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, besides of course both countries’ own economic and strategic interests.
China has already invested around $1.6 billion in a large bauxite mining and alumina refining project in Vietnam. On the other hand, last March Vietnam and the US, two former rivals during the Cold War, launched talks on nuclear cooperation, including the possibility of allowing Hanoi the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium.
ASEAN has consistently worked to mitigate balances of power by maintaining peace, security and prosperity as the main principles of EAS. The gavel is now obviously on the ASEAN’s side because all external powers already praise the concept of ASEAN plus in the EAS, “thanks to” the disappearance of Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community ideas.
While ASEAN has already set the rules and time-keeping, it does not necessarily mean ASEAN has succeeded in leading all EAS members to follow the existing path designed by ASEAN. What made Asia Pacific countries let ASEAN drive the regionalization process was ASEAN’s integrity, neutrality and acceptability to all stakeholders.
However, ASEAN’s centrality to the EAS will be interrupted if ASEAN cannot address two important challenges: First, overcoming intra-ASEAN differences, and second, satisfying non-ASEAN countries’ needs to join the EAS.
Despite its success in minimizing inter-state conflicts and fostering economic cooperation, ASEAN’s precept of loose cooperation (the “ASEAN Way”) makes it difficult to have a truly integrated community.
ASEAN has already moved toward extraordinary achievements through the creation of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and other instruments.
In spite of its sophisticated institutionalization, ASEAN often faces distrust from its members. In the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict mid this year, for example, there were diplomatic maneuvers by both countries in determining whether the dispute should be settled through a bilateral mechanism or by regional cooperation. ASEAN did not do much, except to suggest that both parties assuage the situation.
In this sense, if Cambodia and Thailand believed in ASEAN, why did not they agree to use ASEAN to host a dispute-settlement mechanism?
The next question is if its members do not fully trust ASEAN will that make ASEAN cumbersome as a default chairman of the EAS?
ASEAN’s chairmanship also should have the wits to think about providing more opportunities for non-ASEAN members to utilize the EAS.
There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement will be.
While maintaining its flexibility, at least for the short-to-medium term, ASEAN should initiate the construction of EAS institutions, such as a secretariat, which is separate from, but located in ASEAN countries.
Non-ASEAN members also should become co-chairs of the EAS concurrently with the ASEAN chair, to put them into a more precise scheme.
The writer is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
Awidya Santikajaya, Washington, DC | Fri, 10/29/2010 10:36 AM | Opinion
A | A | A |
Asia Pacific leaders are meeting this week at the fifth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hanoi, Vietnam.
Together with ASEAN and APEC, the EAS is a key element of Asia Pacific regionalism. Current members of the EAS are ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Countering claims that it is ineffective, the EAS has made meaningful concrete achievements, including cooperation on disaster management and the establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA).
Further, the coming EAS is crucial because it will officially invite the US and Russia to join, after the previous East Asia Ministerial Meeting last August made this recommendation.
Since its establishment in 2005, the EAS was intended to be an ASEAN-led block, and has been linked to ASEAN Summits. An important issue ASEAN faces in the recent development of the EAS is whether it is can maintain its “centrality” in the grouping.
ASEAN has been regarded as one of the most stable regional groupings in the developing world. With a population of around 600 million, Southeast Asia is emerging politically, economically and strategically, attracting external powers.
Donald E. Weatherbee explained that ASEAN has become a stage where great power rivalries and competition for influence are being played out.
Among these external powers, the US and China are the two most important countries. China’s dilating economic and military capacities have boosted its diplomatic assertiveness over its neighbors, including Southeast Asia. Early this year, ASEAN and China began implementing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA).
The US also now intends to regain its lost influence in the “forgotten region” to maintain its global domination.
The US orientation toward Southeast Asia could be seen when President Barack Obama missed the US-EU Summit in Madrid last May, but hosted the ASEAN-US Summit in September, and plans to attend the EAS in Indonesia next year.
In this development, the political gravitation of China and the US has seriously challenged “ASEAN’s Centrality”. Using the dependency theory, we may conclude that the relations between ASEAN, on the one hand, and the US and China on the other are unusual. Normally, the “center” is more powerful than the “periphery”, but in this case the US and China (peripheries) are far stronger than ASEAN (center).
“There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement it will be.”
Recently, the accretion of rivalry between the US and China has been coloring Asia Pacific international relations. At the second ASEAN-US Summit, in New York last September, for instance, the US insistently espoused the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The US also expressed its willingness to help craft a legally binding “code of conduct” to prevent armed hostilities among countries with territorial claims. Responding to this issue, Chinese Foreign Minister Jiang Yu stated that China opposed any internationalization and expansion of the South China Sea dispute because it would only make the issue more complicated.
So far, the ASEAN’s main position toward external powers’ involvement is to exploit those powers’ interests for regional benefit. And it is gaining ground, at least for some countries. Vietnam, for example, has gained tremendous advantages from the aggressive approaches of America and China to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, besides of course both countries’ own economic and strategic interests.
China has already invested around $1.6 billion in a large bauxite mining and alumina refining project in Vietnam. On the other hand, last March Vietnam and the US, two former rivals during the Cold War, launched talks on nuclear cooperation, including the possibility of allowing Hanoi the right to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium.
ASEAN has consistently worked to mitigate balances of power by maintaining peace, security and prosperity as the main principles of EAS. The gavel is now obviously on the ASEAN’s side because all external powers already praise the concept of ASEAN plus in the EAS, “thanks to” the disappearance of Hatoyama’s East Asia Community and Kevin Rudd’s Asia Pacific Community ideas.
While ASEAN has already set the rules and time-keeping, it does not necessarily mean ASEAN has succeeded in leading all EAS members to follow the existing path designed by ASEAN. What made Asia Pacific countries let ASEAN drive the regionalization process was ASEAN’s integrity, neutrality and acceptability to all stakeholders.
However, ASEAN’s centrality to the EAS will be interrupted if ASEAN cannot address two important challenges: First, overcoming intra-ASEAN differences, and second, satisfying non-ASEAN countries’ needs to join the EAS.
Despite its success in minimizing inter-state conflicts and fostering economic cooperation, ASEAN’s precept of loose cooperation (the “ASEAN Way”) makes it difficult to have a truly integrated community.
ASEAN has already moved toward extraordinary achievements through the creation of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and other instruments.
In spite of its sophisticated institutionalization, ASEAN often faces distrust from its members. In the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict mid this year, for example, there were diplomatic maneuvers by both countries in determining whether the dispute should be settled through a bilateral mechanism or by regional cooperation. ASEAN did not do much, except to suggest that both parties assuage the situation.
In this sense, if Cambodia and Thailand believed in ASEAN, why did not they agree to use ASEAN to host a dispute-settlement mechanism?
The next question is if its members do not fully trust ASEAN will that make ASEAN cumbersome as a default chairman of the EAS?
ASEAN’s chairmanship also should have the wits to think about providing more opportunities for non-ASEAN members to utilize the EAS.
There is no need to dramatically transform the existing regional order since it is too soon to conclude what kind of sustainable Asia Pacific regional arrangement will be.
While maintaining its flexibility, at least for the short-to-medium term, ASEAN should initiate the construction of EAS institutions, such as a secretariat, which is separate from, but located in ASEAN countries.
Non-ASEAN members also should become co-chairs of the EAS concurrently with the ASEAN chair, to put them into a more precise scheme.
The writer is a graduate of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.
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