Duncan Graham, The Jakarta Post, Malang, East Java | Wed, 11/23/2011 9:45 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
In 2006 the two relevant foreign ministers, Alexander Downer and Hassan Wirajuda, signed the Australia-Indonesia Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation.
It took two years of negotiations to develop the document, which replaced the 1995 formal defense pact. What’s now known as the Lombok Treaty committed both nations to cooperation and consultation in defense and law enforcement, combating international crime and terrorism, and sharing intelligence.
The two countries also agreed they would not “in any manner support or participate in activities by any person or entity which constitutes a threat to the stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the other Party”.
Then, suddenly last week Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and US President Barack Obama announced that up to 2,500 American Marines would be stationed in Darwin, the largest port in Australia closest to Indonesia. This newspaper described the news as a “bombshell”.
Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa had apparently been alerted ahead of the announcement. Did this comply with the Lombok Treaty clause on “consultation”? Only if you embrace Australian newspeak where the word has become synonymous with informing others after a cast-iron decision has been made.
That wasn’t the only gulf in interpretation. It seems Australia’s decision to allow heavily armed foreign forces to dig in on the border doesn’t fall into the category of threatening the other’s “stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity”.
Indonesia appears to differ. Natalegawa, who was educated in the UK and Australia and is no slouch in understanding the subtleties of English, was reported as saying it could create “a vicious circle of tension and mistrust”. In plain speak, this is instability. The treaty was designed to do the opposite.
Establishing a US base in northern Australia is meant to send a message to India and China, the two growing super-powers. But between those faraway places and the Great South Land lies a lovely archipelago, the world’s third-largest democracy. This strategic zone will now have American warships, warplanes, submarines and helicopter gunships on a nearby beach — and Indonesians weren’t asked what they thought.
Perception depends on position. Living a few hundred kilometers northwest of Darwin, I have a different view of plans to turn the Northern Territory into an armed camp than when I lived in Perth.
If I was still in my home state (and earlier state of ignorance about Southeast Asia), I might have thought the idea of beefy American soldiers between little me and the land-hungry masses of Asia to be comforting.
Most Australians know about their nation’s empty interior and over-populated neighbors. We’ve grown up fearing the menacing arrows of descending communism believing that only the gallant forces of the Free World could stop the evil Red Tide, just as they halted the Japanese in the 1940s.
But then we matured and it seemed that the gravity theory driving Australian foreign policy had been buried. Wrong. Last week it was exhumed and revived.
It’s been embarrassing trying to explain to Indonesians why a sovereign nation would allow foreign troops to be based on its soil, unless, of course, the host is weak, insecure and subservient to a colonial master.
That’s the obvious logic, and no end of rabbiting on about independent alliances and historical ties will shake local opinion. My friends are just a mite confused — why the US military and not the UK when Australia has the Union Jack on its flag and the Queen’s head on its currency?
It would be easier trying to explain cricket.
The Indonesian media response has been robust with commentators asking how the deal sits alongside the regular pleas for Australians to develop friendly grassroots relationships with the people next door. There’s been much talk of a new Pearl Harbor.
How would Australians react if Indonesia suddenly announced a similar number of Chinese troops being stationed in Bali? Would Canberra accept the “normal bilateral agreement” line? If our Javanese neighbors in suburban Malang invite Ambonese hardmen (the preman usually used for “protection”) to settle in and flex their muscles, my family would be rapidly reappraising our community relationships.
Does Indonesia have territorial ambitions on Australia? It’s about as impossible to erase this deeply-
embedded but absurd fear in the Australian psyche, as it is to convince the electorate that the US will not necessarily dash into the fray should the continent be attacked.
The Indonesian armed forces would be formidable defenders of their land, but don’t appear to have the equipment, funds, or enthusiasm to invade 7.69 million square kilometers. There’s no discernable political appetite for such an insane adventure. Terrorists occasionally add Australia in their visions of a Caliphate but these crackpots are on the fringe of the fringe.
The last test of US resolve in this region came during the 1999 East Timor Referendum crisis when Australia appealed for American involvement. Then president Bill Clinton maneuvered a few warships but kept them over the horizon. The tension with Indonesia was an Australian problem, and no grunts’ boots were among the international peacekeepers that trod the turf of what is now Timor Leste.
The realpolitik is that future US policy will be based on that nation’s national interests at the time and having a US Marine base in Australia will make not a whit of difference. If Washington decrees these troops will be deployed elsewhere or sent back to their northern hemisphere home, Canberra’s agreements with the US will have no more value than the Lombok Treaty.
In the meantime, we Australians have to remain in this region for the rest of our existence. Better Gillard puts her government’s energies into encouraging us to understand and appreciate our neighbors than being matey with the Marines.
If we really must have a US presence, then invite the Peace Corps.
The writer is an East Java-based journalist.
Tuesday, November 22, 2011
Monday, November 21, 2011
Integration, no; Major power rivalry, yes
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Wed, 12/14/2005 4:18 PM A | A | A | Eric Teo Chu Cheow, Jakarta - Klipping The Jakarta Post
The inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) will be held in Kuala Lumpur on Dec. 14 under Malaysian Chairmanship, organized in concurrence with the ASEAN and ""ASEAN+3"" Summits. But its odds are probably greater in geo-strategic and political than pure economic and trade terms.
First, big Asian powers have their own agenda, with the latest thinking in Beijing of perhaps ""downplaying"" it in favor of the existing ""ASEAN+3"" or ""10+3"".
Second, and consequently, the ""numbers"" game has begun for the EAS, between ""ASEAN+3+3"" and ""ASEAN+6"", as India battles tenaciously for the second formula, with Japanese ""acknowledgement"".
More importantly, it could prove to be decisive for Japan and China in their future role and leadership in East Asia, just as smaller Asian nations fear of being caught between them in their increasing rivalry within the region.
But where does its future of Asia (integrated or not) really lie in geo-strategic, economic and psychological terms, with Washington's shadow looming behind?
Symbolically, Malaysia has been lobbying hard for the EAS as a fruition of the idea of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who had mooted an East Asia Economic Caucus or Grouping (EAEC/EAEG) in the early 1990s to ""bring Asians together"". But the situations then and now widely differ.
Some Chinese scholars have in fact recently mooted the idea of the EAS as a sort of an ""Asian coordinating group"" for APEC (just as the existing ""ASEAN+3"" grew from the necessity for Asians to coordinate their positions in the face of the EU at ASEM); but it has one fundamental problem --- India is not a member of APEC and would need to join APEC for this logic to work! Understandably, Beijing may be seeking to assuage American concerns of being left out from the EAS (as expounded by a senior Chinese official recently), as well as to probably ""downplay"" this event, so as to consolidate its own influence within existing ""ASEAN+3"" mechanisms. Big power politics may already be at play behind the EAS before its effective launch!
Two geo-political factors have already influenced the final ASEAN choice of participants to the EAS, which should stand at sixteen when launched.
First, the United States will be absent, unlike the recent APEC Summit in South Korea, and is taking a wait-and-see attitude on the EAS; hence there is a real ""need"" to cater for its ""non-participation"" in this ""pure Asian grouping"", which is on the minds of many Asians.
Second, the rapid rise of India in the past few years has made it necessary for ASEAN to bring India into the mainstream of Asian regional integration, even as a counter-balance to China, as some smaller Asian nations would bashfully admit.
Bearing in mind these two trends, ASEAN Foreign Ministers in a retreat in Cebu, Philippines in May, agreed on three criteria for membership to the EAS ""club"". Firstly, they must be dialogue partners of ASEAN; secondly, they must have substantial economic linkages with the region, and lastly, they must sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), before being admitted to the EAS.
China, Japan and South Korea automatically qualify; India qualified too, when it signed the TAC. But it was only after careful consideration and negotiations that Australia and New Zealand agreed to sign the TAC (because of Canberra's special military alliance with the United States); the last two countries were probably included in the EAS as a ""strategic assurance"" to Washington, viz to allay the latter's concerns that the EAS would not be in any way against American fundamental interests within the region, as was initially feared.
But although the EAS' orientation appears to be logically tilted towards economic cooperation (given the present difficulties of bridging serious and fundamental political contentions, especially between Beijing and Tokyo), some observers wonder if the EAS could perhaps ""mesh"" into APEC's agenda, as informally put forward by some Chinese analysts; this would also have the added advantage of balancing Washington with the two Asian feuding giants, as well as India.
Socio-economic issues should thus naturally form the crux of the EAS agenda (for geo-political reasons!), whether in symbiosis with APEC or not.
Many observers had in fact thought that the EAS could envision a sort of pan-Asian Free Trade Area (FTA), a precursor of an Asian Economic Community, whilst others have mooted the possibility of building first an Asian Energy Community, along the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community (amongst its initial six members) in the 1950s.
Energy cooperation would certainly be high on the agenda, as Asian countries, ranging from China and Japan to Indonesia and the Philippines battle the current oil price hike and the ensuing inflationary spiral that may slow down Asian economies. Still others had hoped for an Asian Financial Community, based on the existing Chiang Mai Initiative. But initial hopes and aspirations of a nascent Asian Economic Community of sorts may now prove premature in KL.
More fundamentally, at stake is the future relationship between ""ASEAN+3"" and the EAS, as the former already has intensified cooperation and linkages in almost all fields, which the three new members could ""tag"" on to. But India would feel more comfortable with it was an ""ASEAN+6"" grouping, as it would then not be relegated to the ""third circle"" in KL.
In fact, the future relationship between the EAS (either as a ""ASEAN+3+3"" or ""ASEAN+6"") and the current ""ASEAN+3"" could probably become the thorniest issue in Kuala Lumpur; this ""numbers game"" is clearly a manifestation of the deeper geo-politics that run beneath the EAS.
But the ultimate bottleneck at the EAS would remain undoubtedly the Sino-Japanese feud, which could turn out to be the unfortunate ""highlight"" of this Summit. Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi would be trying to meet bilaterally with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Kuala Lumpur on the margins of the Summit, a bilateral, which Chinese President Hu Jintao had clearly denied Koizumi in Busan during APEC.
Beijing has argued that the last Sino-Japanese bilateral in Jakarta during the April Bandung 50th anniversary commemoration proved futile, as Koizumi still visited Yasukuni Shrine, though briefly, on Oct. 17. Moreover, it appears that there are enormous difficulties this year in organizing the ""traditional"" China-Japan-ROK breakfast summit (as in the past five years) on the margins of the ""ASEAN+3"" Summit, given the serious unhappiness in Beijing and Seoul over Koizumi.
In reality, as long as Beijing-Tokyo relations do not effectively mend, the EAS and its future organization would have little hopes of taking off effectively and Asia would remain unfortunately split (amidst growing Sino-Japanese rivalry) and ""non-integrated"" (with neither a Chinese or Japanese or Indian leadership, or even their co-leadership of Asia); after all, politics still prime over economics (to quote the words of the former Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-toung), and especially in Asia today!
The writer, a business consultant and strategist, is Council Member of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA).
The inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) will be held in Kuala Lumpur on Dec. 14 under Malaysian Chairmanship, organized in concurrence with the ASEAN and ""ASEAN+3"" Summits. But its odds are probably greater in geo-strategic and political than pure economic and trade terms.
First, big Asian powers have their own agenda, with the latest thinking in Beijing of perhaps ""downplaying"" it in favor of the existing ""ASEAN+3"" or ""10+3"".
Second, and consequently, the ""numbers"" game has begun for the EAS, between ""ASEAN+3+3"" and ""ASEAN+6"", as India battles tenaciously for the second formula, with Japanese ""acknowledgement"".
More importantly, it could prove to be decisive for Japan and China in their future role and leadership in East Asia, just as smaller Asian nations fear of being caught between them in their increasing rivalry within the region.
But where does its future of Asia (integrated or not) really lie in geo-strategic, economic and psychological terms, with Washington's shadow looming behind?
Symbolically, Malaysia has been lobbying hard for the EAS as a fruition of the idea of former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed, who had mooted an East Asia Economic Caucus or Grouping (EAEC/EAEG) in the early 1990s to ""bring Asians together"". But the situations then and now widely differ.
Some Chinese scholars have in fact recently mooted the idea of the EAS as a sort of an ""Asian coordinating group"" for APEC (just as the existing ""ASEAN+3"" grew from the necessity for Asians to coordinate their positions in the face of the EU at ASEM); but it has one fundamental problem --- India is not a member of APEC and would need to join APEC for this logic to work! Understandably, Beijing may be seeking to assuage American concerns of being left out from the EAS (as expounded by a senior Chinese official recently), as well as to probably ""downplay"" this event, so as to consolidate its own influence within existing ""ASEAN+3"" mechanisms. Big power politics may already be at play behind the EAS before its effective launch!
Two geo-political factors have already influenced the final ASEAN choice of participants to the EAS, which should stand at sixteen when launched.
First, the United States will be absent, unlike the recent APEC Summit in South Korea, and is taking a wait-and-see attitude on the EAS; hence there is a real ""need"" to cater for its ""non-participation"" in this ""pure Asian grouping"", which is on the minds of many Asians.
Second, the rapid rise of India in the past few years has made it necessary for ASEAN to bring India into the mainstream of Asian regional integration, even as a counter-balance to China, as some smaller Asian nations would bashfully admit.
Bearing in mind these two trends, ASEAN Foreign Ministers in a retreat in Cebu, Philippines in May, agreed on three criteria for membership to the EAS ""club"". Firstly, they must be dialogue partners of ASEAN; secondly, they must have substantial economic linkages with the region, and lastly, they must sign the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), before being admitted to the EAS.
China, Japan and South Korea automatically qualify; India qualified too, when it signed the TAC. But it was only after careful consideration and negotiations that Australia and New Zealand agreed to sign the TAC (because of Canberra's special military alliance with the United States); the last two countries were probably included in the EAS as a ""strategic assurance"" to Washington, viz to allay the latter's concerns that the EAS would not be in any way against American fundamental interests within the region, as was initially feared.
But although the EAS' orientation appears to be logically tilted towards economic cooperation (given the present difficulties of bridging serious and fundamental political contentions, especially between Beijing and Tokyo), some observers wonder if the EAS could perhaps ""mesh"" into APEC's agenda, as informally put forward by some Chinese analysts; this would also have the added advantage of balancing Washington with the two Asian feuding giants, as well as India.
Socio-economic issues should thus naturally form the crux of the EAS agenda (for geo-political reasons!), whether in symbiosis with APEC or not.
Many observers had in fact thought that the EAS could envision a sort of pan-Asian Free Trade Area (FTA), a precursor of an Asian Economic Community, whilst others have mooted the possibility of building first an Asian Energy Community, along the lines of the European Coal and Steel Community (amongst its initial six members) in the 1950s.
Energy cooperation would certainly be high on the agenda, as Asian countries, ranging from China and Japan to Indonesia and the Philippines battle the current oil price hike and the ensuing inflationary spiral that may slow down Asian economies. Still others had hoped for an Asian Financial Community, based on the existing Chiang Mai Initiative. But initial hopes and aspirations of a nascent Asian Economic Community of sorts may now prove premature in KL.
More fundamentally, at stake is the future relationship between ""ASEAN+3"" and the EAS, as the former already has intensified cooperation and linkages in almost all fields, which the three new members could ""tag"" on to. But India would feel more comfortable with it was an ""ASEAN+6"" grouping, as it would then not be relegated to the ""third circle"" in KL.
In fact, the future relationship between the EAS (either as a ""ASEAN+3+3"" or ""ASEAN+6"") and the current ""ASEAN+3"" could probably become the thorniest issue in Kuala Lumpur; this ""numbers game"" is clearly a manifestation of the deeper geo-politics that run beneath the EAS.
But the ultimate bottleneck at the EAS would remain undoubtedly the Sino-Japanese feud, which could turn out to be the unfortunate ""highlight"" of this Summit. Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi would be trying to meet bilaterally with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Kuala Lumpur on the margins of the Summit, a bilateral, which Chinese President Hu Jintao had clearly denied Koizumi in Busan during APEC.
Beijing has argued that the last Sino-Japanese bilateral in Jakarta during the April Bandung 50th anniversary commemoration proved futile, as Koizumi still visited Yasukuni Shrine, though briefly, on Oct. 17. Moreover, it appears that there are enormous difficulties this year in organizing the ""traditional"" China-Japan-ROK breakfast summit (as in the past five years) on the margins of the ""ASEAN+3"" Summit, given the serious unhappiness in Beijing and Seoul over Koizumi.
In reality, as long as Beijing-Tokyo relations do not effectively mend, the EAS and its future organization would have little hopes of taking off effectively and Asia would remain unfortunately split (amidst growing Sino-Japanese rivalry) and ""non-integrated"" (with neither a Chinese or Japanese or Indian leadership, or even their co-leadership of Asia); after all, politics still prime over economics (to quote the words of the former Chinese Chairman Mao Tse-toung), and especially in Asia today!
The writer, a business consultant and strategist, is Council Member of the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA).
ASEAN and China form strategic partnership
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Thu, 12/15/2005 4:20 PM A | A | A | Jusuf Wanandi, Jakarta - Klipping The Jakarta Post
A new era has dawned in East Asia. ASEAN and China have forged a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This partnership will have positive implications that go beyond the relationship between ASEAN and China. It will benefit the wider East Asian region and the world. The strategic partnership is a means to making an effective contribution to regional and global peace and prosperity.
ASEAN and China will play an increasingly important role in global affairs. They also have a growing stake in global developments. They are open economies and are rapidly integrating into the global economy. They want to cooperate with each other so that their full integration into the global economy can proceed smoothly -- for each of them and without causing major dislocations within the global economy.
The economies of ASEAN, and particularly China, because of its size, will assume a more prominent place in the global economy within the next two decades. The ASEAN countries will continuously reform, restructure and integrate their economies toward the creation of a single market and production base in 2020.
China, on its part, is making the same effort, and is doing that at a remarkably rapid pace. ASEAN and China can benefit from each other's experiments and experiences. The Framework Agreement for ASEAN-China Closer Economic Relations provides a forum for such productive and open exchanges. They should be undertaken on a regular basis with the involvement of experts from academia, business and the policy community -- from both sides as well as from the wider region.
The transformation of the economies of ASEAN and China may be one of the major developments in the 21st century. Both sides must make a special effort to prevent misperceptions and misunderstandings regarding their development by the global community.
ASEAN and China will need to participate actively in various regional cooperation arrangements, the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as in the international arena -- the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other such bodies. Their increased role in regional and global affairs will shape and be shaped by the emerging regional and evolving international regimes.
ASEAN and China can have a greater influence if they coordinate and harmonize their policies and activities. They can help create a globalization environment that will better facilitate the pursuit for progress of all developing countries. The strategic position of ASEAN and China in those regional and international bodies should be employed to the maximum. They should initiate and actively engage other regional and international participants in the discussion, formulation and implementation of action plans.
To be effective, ASEAN and China have to develop and nurture good relations with other powers in the region, in particular Japan, the United States and India. In this context, ASEAN is in a favorable position, because it has excellent economic and political relations with other regional countries, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States and the European Union.
ASEAN has pursued regional cooperation and integration in Southeast Asia and, at the same time, deepened its relations with all its partners. This reflects its policy of open regionalism, which should also characterize the ASEAN-China strategic partnership. In building an ASEAN Community, ASEAN governments have agreed to intensify the engagement of civil society in regional community building.
The strengthening of the ASEAN-China partnership also necessitates greater people-to-people interaction and cooperation. The voices of the people should also be brought to the attention of governments. A second track ASEAN-China collaboration should be encouraged and facilitated by governments, and be invited to develop ideas and make concrete suggestions to substantiate the strategic partnership.
Economic, political and security issues have become intertwined. Many new cross-border security issues directly affect the people. Although ASEAN and China need to give attention to traditional security issues, such as on the Korean Peninsula, it is the new security issues that require their priority attention. These include trans-border environmental problems, cross-border health issues, drug and people trafficking, smuggling and piracy.
They pose a real threat to the security of the peoples in the region, but they can become sources of conflict among states. These issues form a part of the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the time has come for this forum to develop mechanisms for conflict prevention beyond the confidence-building measures. ASEAN and China can initiate this process as both parties have developed a high degree of trust and confidence. Others will then be encouraged to enhance their participation in this forum.
ASEAN and China are also faced with the common challenge of political development so as to be able to sustain their longer-term economic and national developments. Their open economies need to be accompanied by a gradual opening up of political systems. Some ASEAN countries have begun this process and can share their experience with other ASEAN countries and China.
Recent experience in the region has shown that nations that are ill-prepared to undergo political transformation have experienced great and costly disruptions. Open exchanges on these challenges can be facilitated by the second-track. Such exchanges can make important contributions to political development in the two parties because of the mutual trust and mutual understanding that have developed between them.
ASEAN and China must not forgo this historic moment in their relationship. They have produced a variety of initiatives that can further strengthen their mutual trust and mutual understanding. However, they must rightly focus on the strategic initiatives of working together to deepen their relations and at the same time be actively engaged to promote cooperation, peace and prosperity in the wider region.
The vehicles for doing so are there. They must be willing to make the investment to develop mechanisms to realize the East Asian regional objectives, strengthening of trans-Pacific relations through APEC, and productive interactions with other regions in the world through ASEM and FEALAC.
The writer is vice chairman of the Board of Trustees and a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.
A new era has dawned in East Asia. ASEAN and China have forged a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. This partnership will have positive implications that go beyond the relationship between ASEAN and China. It will benefit the wider East Asian region and the world. The strategic partnership is a means to making an effective contribution to regional and global peace and prosperity.
ASEAN and China will play an increasingly important role in global affairs. They also have a growing stake in global developments. They are open economies and are rapidly integrating into the global economy. They want to cooperate with each other so that their full integration into the global economy can proceed smoothly -- for each of them and without causing major dislocations within the global economy.
The economies of ASEAN, and particularly China, because of its size, will assume a more prominent place in the global economy within the next two decades. The ASEAN countries will continuously reform, restructure and integrate their economies toward the creation of a single market and production base in 2020.
China, on its part, is making the same effort, and is doing that at a remarkably rapid pace. ASEAN and China can benefit from each other's experiments and experiences. The Framework Agreement for ASEAN-China Closer Economic Relations provides a forum for such productive and open exchanges. They should be undertaken on a regular basis with the involvement of experts from academia, business and the policy community -- from both sides as well as from the wider region.
The transformation of the economies of ASEAN and China may be one of the major developments in the 21st century. Both sides must make a special effort to prevent misperceptions and misunderstandings regarding their development by the global community.
ASEAN and China will need to participate actively in various regional cooperation arrangements, the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), as well as in the international arena -- the United Nations, the World Trade Organization and other such bodies. Their increased role in regional and global affairs will shape and be shaped by the emerging regional and evolving international regimes.
ASEAN and China can have a greater influence if they coordinate and harmonize their policies and activities. They can help create a globalization environment that will better facilitate the pursuit for progress of all developing countries. The strategic position of ASEAN and China in those regional and international bodies should be employed to the maximum. They should initiate and actively engage other regional and international participants in the discussion, formulation and implementation of action plans.
To be effective, ASEAN and China have to develop and nurture good relations with other powers in the region, in particular Japan, the United States and India. In this context, ASEAN is in a favorable position, because it has excellent economic and political relations with other regional countries, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, as well as the United States and the European Union.
ASEAN has pursued regional cooperation and integration in Southeast Asia and, at the same time, deepened its relations with all its partners. This reflects its policy of open regionalism, which should also characterize the ASEAN-China strategic partnership. In building an ASEAN Community, ASEAN governments have agreed to intensify the engagement of civil society in regional community building.
The strengthening of the ASEAN-China partnership also necessitates greater people-to-people interaction and cooperation. The voices of the people should also be brought to the attention of governments. A second track ASEAN-China collaboration should be encouraged and facilitated by governments, and be invited to develop ideas and make concrete suggestions to substantiate the strategic partnership.
Economic, political and security issues have become intertwined. Many new cross-border security issues directly affect the people. Although ASEAN and China need to give attention to traditional security issues, such as on the Korean Peninsula, it is the new security issues that require their priority attention. These include trans-border environmental problems, cross-border health issues, drug and people trafficking, smuggling and piracy.
They pose a real threat to the security of the peoples in the region, but they can become sources of conflict among states. These issues form a part of the agenda of the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the time has come for this forum to develop mechanisms for conflict prevention beyond the confidence-building measures. ASEAN and China can initiate this process as both parties have developed a high degree of trust and confidence. Others will then be encouraged to enhance their participation in this forum.
ASEAN and China are also faced with the common challenge of political development so as to be able to sustain their longer-term economic and national developments. Their open economies need to be accompanied by a gradual opening up of political systems. Some ASEAN countries have begun this process and can share their experience with other ASEAN countries and China.
Recent experience in the region has shown that nations that are ill-prepared to undergo political transformation have experienced great and costly disruptions. Open exchanges on these challenges can be facilitated by the second-track. Such exchanges can make important contributions to political development in the two parties because of the mutual trust and mutual understanding that have developed between them.
ASEAN and China must not forgo this historic moment in their relationship. They have produced a variety of initiatives that can further strengthen their mutual trust and mutual understanding. However, they must rightly focus on the strategic initiatives of working together to deepen their relations and at the same time be actively engaged to promote cooperation, peace and prosperity in the wider region.
The vehicles for doing so are there. They must be willing to make the investment to develop mechanisms to realize the East Asian regional objectives, strengthening of trans-Pacific relations through APEC, and productive interactions with other regions in the world through ASEM and FEALAC.
The writer is vice chairman of the Board of Trustees and a senior fellow at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta.
Indonesia 'must play leading global role'
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Sat, 08/20/2005 10:58 AM A | A | A | Ivy Susanti, The Jakarta Post/Jakarta - Klipping the Jakarta Post
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said Indonesia must play a leading role in world affairs and suggested it could start by engaging East Asian and Pacific countries.
""Speaking about changes, people are usually faced with three options: whether we should be part of the change, follow the change or lead the change. Indonesia, God willing, surely cannot only be a follower in the changing world but, as former president Sukarno and others showed us, we should be able to lead on certain issues in international relations. This is our ultimate goal, and we can only achieve it if we are doing well at home, such as creating good governance, so we can have strength, capacity and credibility to do more in world affairs,"" he said.
Susilo was speaking during a foreign policy breakfast -- a gathering of the foreign minister, legislators, businesspeople, the media, students, social and religious organizations and academics -- on the occasion of the foreign ministry's 60th anniversary on Aug. 19.
Susilo said Indonesia's foreign policy was founded on four principles: maintaining a constructive approach to diplomacy, maintaining the country's identity in the world, maintaining a nationalistic attitude and avoiding military alliances with other countries.
""Our national interests include, how to rebuild Indonesia after the 1997 economic crisis? How to maintain national sovereignty and regional integrity? And how to accomplish national reform successfully? These are the questions that should be kept in mind when making foreign policy.""
He said Indonesia should take more active role in regional and international forums, like those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the East Asian Summit, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Asian-African Conference and the United Nations.
""We want to work with Pacific countries like Australia, New Zealand, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, Nauru and many others. If we want to become the center of regional cooperation and friendship, we must not neglect these countries. They are actually part of the solution,"" he said.
While the world is governed by what he referred to as the ""universal norms"" of capitalism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and environmental concerns, a ""new sovereignty"" in which countries can intervene in the affairs of other countries on certain grounds like human rights, and a single superpower, Susilo said Indonesia should understand but not necessarily adopt all of these values.
""Speaking about Indonesia's free and independent foreign policy, we must have independent judgment and freedom of action ... Not all countries can build a Great Wall like the Chinese to stop outside influences and values from entering the country,"" he said.
He stressed the importance of involving people from all walks of life in formulating Indonesia's foreign policy. But he said that anyone involved in diplomacy should use their intellect rather than emotion.
""We have to mix emotions with rationality. We all have hearts but we should also use rational thinking in situations where Indonesia is cornered by others,"" he said.
At the end of his speech, Susilo shared his own way of dealing with foreign leaders. He said he took the time to call the leaders personally whenever a problem arose.
""We have to be visionary, but at the same time remain practical. Sometimes, I call foreign leaders at midnight for a discussion. When we had disagreements with Malaysia over Ambalat, their handling of our migrant workers and now we have the haze problem, I took the time to call Abdullah Badawi (the Malaysian prime minister). I also called (John) Howard (the Australian PM) and Xanana (Gusmao, the Timor Leste president) on other issues. My point is, we need to be practical sometimes without worrying about losing face,"" he said.
Also present at the event were several Cabinet ministers and legislators, People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Hidayat Nur Wahid, Nahdlatul Ulama chairman Hasyim Muzadi and Indonesian Ulema Council secretary-general Din Syamsuddin.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said Indonesia must play a leading role in world affairs and suggested it could start by engaging East Asian and Pacific countries.
""Speaking about changes, people are usually faced with three options: whether we should be part of the change, follow the change or lead the change. Indonesia, God willing, surely cannot only be a follower in the changing world but, as former president Sukarno and others showed us, we should be able to lead on certain issues in international relations. This is our ultimate goal, and we can only achieve it if we are doing well at home, such as creating good governance, so we can have strength, capacity and credibility to do more in world affairs,"" he said.
Susilo was speaking during a foreign policy breakfast -- a gathering of the foreign minister, legislators, businesspeople, the media, students, social and religious organizations and academics -- on the occasion of the foreign ministry's 60th anniversary on Aug. 19.
Susilo said Indonesia's foreign policy was founded on four principles: maintaining a constructive approach to diplomacy, maintaining the country's identity in the world, maintaining a nationalistic attitude and avoiding military alliances with other countries.
""Our national interests include, how to rebuild Indonesia after the 1997 economic crisis? How to maintain national sovereignty and regional integrity? And how to accomplish national reform successfully? These are the questions that should be kept in mind when making foreign policy.""
He said Indonesia should take more active role in regional and international forums, like those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the East Asian Summit, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the Asian-African Conference and the United Nations.
""We want to work with Pacific countries like Australia, New Zealand, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea, Nauru and many others. If we want to become the center of regional cooperation and friendship, we must not neglect these countries. They are actually part of the solution,"" he said.
While the world is governed by what he referred to as the ""universal norms"" of capitalism, democracy, human rights, the rule of law and environmental concerns, a ""new sovereignty"" in which countries can intervene in the affairs of other countries on certain grounds like human rights, and a single superpower, Susilo said Indonesia should understand but not necessarily adopt all of these values.
""Speaking about Indonesia's free and independent foreign policy, we must have independent judgment and freedom of action ... Not all countries can build a Great Wall like the Chinese to stop outside influences and values from entering the country,"" he said.
He stressed the importance of involving people from all walks of life in formulating Indonesia's foreign policy. But he said that anyone involved in diplomacy should use their intellect rather than emotion.
""We have to mix emotions with rationality. We all have hearts but we should also use rational thinking in situations where Indonesia is cornered by others,"" he said.
At the end of his speech, Susilo shared his own way of dealing with foreign leaders. He said he took the time to call the leaders personally whenever a problem arose.
""We have to be visionary, but at the same time remain practical. Sometimes, I call foreign leaders at midnight for a discussion. When we had disagreements with Malaysia over Ambalat, their handling of our migrant workers and now we have the haze problem, I took the time to call Abdullah Badawi (the Malaysian prime minister). I also called (John) Howard (the Australian PM) and Xanana (Gusmao, the Timor Leste president) on other issues. My point is, we need to be practical sometimes without worrying about losing face,"" he said.
Also present at the event were several Cabinet ministers and legislators, People's Consultative Assembly Speaker Hidayat Nur Wahid, Nahdlatul Ulama chairman Hasyim Muzadi and Indonesian Ulema Council secretary-general Din Syamsuddin.
Navigating turbulent seas
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Tue, 01/02/2007 2:24 PM A | A | A | Bantarto Bandoro, Jakarta - Klipping The Jakarta Post
At a session of the Central National Commission on Sept. 2, 1948, Vice President Mohammad Hatta formulated the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy; namely a free and active foreign policy, reflected in his metaphor ""rowing between two reefs"". This year marks the 58th anniversary of the implementation of this foreign policy.
In response to the continuing and rapid changes in our strategic environment, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduced his own metaphor, ""navigating a turbulent sea"", to describe the challenges facing Indonesian foreign policy.
Vice President Jusuf Kalla then joined the chorus of our foreign policy when, commenting on the current international position of Indonesia under the leadership of President Yudhoyono, he said that Indonesia could be a ""mover and shaker"" for regional security and world peace (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2006).
What does all this branding tell us about our foreign policy. Discussion on the country's foreign policy, particularly during the Yudhoyono government, seems to have been aimed, unintentionally of course, at telling the public here at last three things.
First, to let them know where Indonesia is in the context of the current state of international relations. When Yudhoyono said that the world we live in today is radically different than the one faced by our forefathers, he meant to indicate that the country is now in a particular era of history where foreign policy needs to be adjusted in a way that meets the expectations of the public. Our forefathers were not exposed to such things as globalization, interdependence and the cyberworld -- all things which are part of the country's present-day world.
Second, to let the public know where Indonesia is in its foreign policy discourse. This used to indicate the standpoint of Indonesia when it faced antagonism between the opposing Eastern Communist and Western Capitalist blocks.
This actually refers to the message carried by Hatta's historic reference to ""rowing between two reefs"", that Indonesia should avoid choosing sides between the two blocks. ""Rowing"" perhaps indicates a hard and difficult journey or path for the country. It may be telling us that Indonesia is choosing the hard path. Such a chosen path, however, was able to serve the country's national interests in the following decades.
Third, to let the public know where Indonesia is going in its foreign policy. Referring to Yudhoyono's ""turbulent ocean"", the public is told of the importance of activism in our foreign policy, meaning that such an ""ocean"" must be seen as providing ample diplomatic opportunity for Indonesia rather than risk.
This metaphor by Yudhoyono seems to have been based on the assumption that if Indonesia is to make the right decisions, it must understand how things ""work"" in the ""ocean"" and how they interact. The major foreign policy decisions the country has taken so far, at the regional as well as global level, reflect the recognition of the role of the ""ocean"" in the country's life-support system and its value for the prosperity of the people.
Thus, ""navigating a turbulent ocean"" is assumed to refer to channeling our foreign policy to meet the country's long-term objectives. Navigating the ocean will also allow us to develop extensive and strategic international links that will hopefully secure our external resources for development, as well as for domestic stability.
Perhaps it is within this context that our foreign policy now carries with it a theme which was unthinkable before, namely strategic partnership. Strategic partnerships can be very significant in providing a combined effect to produce intended policy objectives.
So, as we have seen, on the bilateral level we have strategic partnerships with almost all major powers in the world. The seemingly stable and improved domestic conditions serve as a kind of modality for the Yudhoyono government to embark on a new chapter in Indonesia's foreign relations. There is a process of institutional building in the country's foreign relations.
The branding of strategic partnership in our foreign relations has gained popularity -- at least in the eyes of our foreign policymakers -- at a time when the prospects for Indonesia to become, in the words of Jusuf Kalla, a ""mover and shaker"" for world peace is becoming more evident, as indicated by its membership on the United Nations Security Council, as well as its role in seeking peace in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula.
Given the many fresh foreign policy initiatives, it is no exaggeration to say that Indonesia has actually passed the two reefs. With its rather ""new"" outlook in foreign relations, Indonesia hopes to gain more strategic benefits by appearing to be different in its approach to salient foreign policy issues.
By navigating the turbulent ocean, Indonesia is attempting to connect itself with the wider world, which is crucial not only to enhance the performance of our independent and active foreign policy, but also to secure the achievements Indonesia has already gained.
One, however, should not ignore the asymmetrical relationship, if any, between Indonesia and its strategic partners, which in turn might effect the sustainability and effectiveness of these partnerships in the future. Indonesia's partnerships with the U.S., China and Japan seem unequal in terms of resources, skills, size, diplomatic leverage and so forth.
Thus, Yudhoyono's metaphor of ""navigating a turbulent ocean"" should not be interpreted as automatically directing the country's foreign policy to ""safety"". Being a smaller partner, Indonesia will likely face the problem of making its partnerships serve its interests without becoming simply a function of the interests of its partners.
This is to say that to sustain its full international engagement and obtain maximum diplomatic and strategic gains, Indonesia should be able to break through any ""barricades"" that might result from expansion of its international transactions. Indonesia's new activism in it foreign policy should be managed in such a way so that it will not hit all the reefs.
The writer is chief editor of The Indonesian Quarterly published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. He is also a lecturer in the International Relations Postgraduate Studies Program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. He can be contacted at bandoro@csis.or.id
At a session of the Central National Commission on Sept. 2, 1948, Vice President Mohammad Hatta formulated the principle of Indonesia's foreign policy; namely a free and active foreign policy, reflected in his metaphor ""rowing between two reefs"". This year marks the 58th anniversary of the implementation of this foreign policy.
In response to the continuing and rapid changes in our strategic environment, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduced his own metaphor, ""navigating a turbulent sea"", to describe the challenges facing Indonesian foreign policy.
Vice President Jusuf Kalla then joined the chorus of our foreign policy when, commenting on the current international position of Indonesia under the leadership of President Yudhoyono, he said that Indonesia could be a ""mover and shaker"" for regional security and world peace (The Jakarta Post, Oct. 19, 2006).
What does all this branding tell us about our foreign policy. Discussion on the country's foreign policy, particularly during the Yudhoyono government, seems to have been aimed, unintentionally of course, at telling the public here at last three things.
First, to let them know where Indonesia is in the context of the current state of international relations. When Yudhoyono said that the world we live in today is radically different than the one faced by our forefathers, he meant to indicate that the country is now in a particular era of history where foreign policy needs to be adjusted in a way that meets the expectations of the public. Our forefathers were not exposed to such things as globalization, interdependence and the cyberworld -- all things which are part of the country's present-day world.
Second, to let the public know where Indonesia is in its foreign policy discourse. This used to indicate the standpoint of Indonesia when it faced antagonism between the opposing Eastern Communist and Western Capitalist blocks.
This actually refers to the message carried by Hatta's historic reference to ""rowing between two reefs"", that Indonesia should avoid choosing sides between the two blocks. ""Rowing"" perhaps indicates a hard and difficult journey or path for the country. It may be telling us that Indonesia is choosing the hard path. Such a chosen path, however, was able to serve the country's national interests in the following decades.
Third, to let the public know where Indonesia is going in its foreign policy. Referring to Yudhoyono's ""turbulent ocean"", the public is told of the importance of activism in our foreign policy, meaning that such an ""ocean"" must be seen as providing ample diplomatic opportunity for Indonesia rather than risk.
This metaphor by Yudhoyono seems to have been based on the assumption that if Indonesia is to make the right decisions, it must understand how things ""work"" in the ""ocean"" and how they interact. The major foreign policy decisions the country has taken so far, at the regional as well as global level, reflect the recognition of the role of the ""ocean"" in the country's life-support system and its value for the prosperity of the people.
Thus, ""navigating a turbulent ocean"" is assumed to refer to channeling our foreign policy to meet the country's long-term objectives. Navigating the ocean will also allow us to develop extensive and strategic international links that will hopefully secure our external resources for development, as well as for domestic stability.
Perhaps it is within this context that our foreign policy now carries with it a theme which was unthinkable before, namely strategic partnership. Strategic partnerships can be very significant in providing a combined effect to produce intended policy objectives.
So, as we have seen, on the bilateral level we have strategic partnerships with almost all major powers in the world. The seemingly stable and improved domestic conditions serve as a kind of modality for the Yudhoyono government to embark on a new chapter in Indonesia's foreign relations. There is a process of institutional building in the country's foreign relations.
The branding of strategic partnership in our foreign relations has gained popularity -- at least in the eyes of our foreign policymakers -- at a time when the prospects for Indonesia to become, in the words of Jusuf Kalla, a ""mover and shaker"" for world peace is becoming more evident, as indicated by its membership on the United Nations Security Council, as well as its role in seeking peace in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula.
Given the many fresh foreign policy initiatives, it is no exaggeration to say that Indonesia has actually passed the two reefs. With its rather ""new"" outlook in foreign relations, Indonesia hopes to gain more strategic benefits by appearing to be different in its approach to salient foreign policy issues.
By navigating the turbulent ocean, Indonesia is attempting to connect itself with the wider world, which is crucial not only to enhance the performance of our independent and active foreign policy, but also to secure the achievements Indonesia has already gained.
One, however, should not ignore the asymmetrical relationship, if any, between Indonesia and its strategic partners, which in turn might effect the sustainability and effectiveness of these partnerships in the future. Indonesia's partnerships with the U.S., China and Japan seem unequal in terms of resources, skills, size, diplomatic leverage and so forth.
Thus, Yudhoyono's metaphor of ""navigating a turbulent ocean"" should not be interpreted as automatically directing the country's foreign policy to ""safety"". Being a smaller partner, Indonesia will likely face the problem of making its partnerships serve its interests without becoming simply a function of the interests of its partners.
This is to say that to sustain its full international engagement and obtain maximum diplomatic and strategic gains, Indonesia should be able to break through any ""barricades"" that might result from expansion of its international transactions. Indonesia's new activism in it foreign policy should be managed in such a way so that it will not hit all the reefs.
The writer is chief editor of The Indonesian Quarterly published by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. He is also a lecturer in the International Relations Postgraduate Studies Program at the University of Indonesia, Jakarta. He can be contacted at bandoro@csis.or.id
RI's forecast foreign policy
M. Hadianto B. Wirajuda, London | Mon, 02/02/2009 4:06 PM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
The last year saw Indonesia playing an active international role and witnessed the challenges faced by the country, both in the global and domestic spheres. Indonesia's diplomacy has been tested on a wide range of issues, from the Iranian nuclear issue to the diassent in ASEAN.
Not to mention the problematic issue of citizen protection abroad and the longstanding case of the Israel-Palestine conflict. On the latter, Indonesia has been actively involved in capacity-building for mid-level Palestinian diplomats engaged in Indonesia's Ministry's Education Center. One of Indonesia's diplomatic milestones in 2008 was the successful role of the CTF, the Truth and Friendship Commission, established with Timor Leste to investigate the violence leading up and surrounding the referendum in 1999.
Although parts of the CTF report's suggestions may not be in Indonesia's best interests, it has deliberately managed to exclude international intervention in solving the dispute, and hence introduced a new method for dispute resolution.
At home, the Foreign Ministry remains content to complete its bureaucratic reform, as shown, at least, by the appointment of a deputy foreign minister from its internal staff, although some said the appointment was filled with an eye to political interest, to secure the institution should the Foreign Ministry be led in future by a politician. To a larger and more significant extent, the appointment is to support the missing variable in Indonesia's diplomacy as well as to complete the ideal structure of a foreign policy institution in a democratic era and facing dynamic international challenges.
In 2009 Indonesia will once again put into practice a primary component of democracy: Elections. The 2004 elections were a great success; violence was relatively low and people were able to carry out their right to vote for their desired leaders. In the foreign policy realm during the busiest period of Indonesia's five-year presidency, Yudhoyono's metaphor that Indonesia's foreign policy resembled navigating the turbulent ocean remains relevant in the coming year. What can be shown to endorse the logic of this?
First and foremost is the most apparent global economic crisis. As we found out a decade ago, forging an ideal foreign policy during economic turbulence is rather problematic.
Foreign policy will not work well if domestically our people live under a stagnant economy with poor living standards. The government policy to reduce fuel prices should not be seen as a policy filled with a political mission. It would be wiser for us to think that the policy is a conscious attempt to save the nation from more acute suffering from the ongoing global economic turbulence. Still relevant to Indonesia's measured steps in countering the crisis is Indonesia's preference to avoid taking the same route as in 1998 by relying on international funding agencies.
Understanding the unpleasant experience of such agency mechanisms has raised the awareness of the government (and the people) that going down that road would not be wise. Instead, Indonesia might undertake a bilateral approach with East Asian countries. Therefore, Indonesia's predicted leaning towards East Asia will mostly be motivated by economic interests.
Recent strikes in Gaza have turned Indonesia's attention to the Mideast conflict. Indonesia needs to play a larger role in urging the UN to defuse the tension. Indonesia should practice what it preaches as the world's largest Muslim population by initiating a leading role in the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to reduce the conflict. The government should have the confidence that a religious-cultural approach, such as facilitating interfaith dialogue between religious leaders from Palestine and Israel, as we successfully did in an Asian-Pacific context, might be an alternative to the problem. However both Israelis and Palestinians are also human beings with a certain faith they live by.
The third challenge for Indonesia's foreign policy is the increasing threat of terrorism. Having not witnessed the threat for almost two years, the world was shocked by the Mumbai terrorist attack toward the end of 2008. Consequently, the security alert has been raised in Indonesia, as home to an amalgamation of moderate and radical Muslims.
To this end, Indonesia should maintain its de-radicalization strategy as an effectively proven strategy to counterterrorism; this can be an asset to revive Indonesia's foreign policy on security issues.
As for ASEAN, the enactment of the ASEAN Charter has brought a new dimension to the organization and it is unlikely that Indonesia will neglect ASEAN from its primary foreign policy concentric circle. Democratic values should be continually promoted to non-democratic members of ASEAN, however this effort should not be seen as an attempt to violate the principle of non-interference but rather as an endeavor to create a coexistence in Southeast Asia because, as believed by the realists, peace is likely to be achieved when states engage in democratic values, to this extent values agreed upon and attuned with the ASEAN way.
The writer is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London
The last year saw Indonesia playing an active international role and witnessed the challenges faced by the country, both in the global and domestic spheres. Indonesia's diplomacy has been tested on a wide range of issues, from the Iranian nuclear issue to the diassent in ASEAN.
Not to mention the problematic issue of citizen protection abroad and the longstanding case of the Israel-Palestine conflict. On the latter, Indonesia has been actively involved in capacity-building for mid-level Palestinian diplomats engaged in Indonesia's Ministry's Education Center. One of Indonesia's diplomatic milestones in 2008 was the successful role of the CTF, the Truth and Friendship Commission, established with Timor Leste to investigate the violence leading up and surrounding the referendum in 1999.
Although parts of the CTF report's suggestions may not be in Indonesia's best interests, it has deliberately managed to exclude international intervention in solving the dispute, and hence introduced a new method for dispute resolution.
At home, the Foreign Ministry remains content to complete its bureaucratic reform, as shown, at least, by the appointment of a deputy foreign minister from its internal staff, although some said the appointment was filled with an eye to political interest, to secure the institution should the Foreign Ministry be led in future by a politician. To a larger and more significant extent, the appointment is to support the missing variable in Indonesia's diplomacy as well as to complete the ideal structure of a foreign policy institution in a democratic era and facing dynamic international challenges.
In 2009 Indonesia will once again put into practice a primary component of democracy: Elections. The 2004 elections were a great success; violence was relatively low and people were able to carry out their right to vote for their desired leaders. In the foreign policy realm during the busiest period of Indonesia's five-year presidency, Yudhoyono's metaphor that Indonesia's foreign policy resembled navigating the turbulent ocean remains relevant in the coming year. What can be shown to endorse the logic of this?
First and foremost is the most apparent global economic crisis. As we found out a decade ago, forging an ideal foreign policy during economic turbulence is rather problematic.
Foreign policy will not work well if domestically our people live under a stagnant economy with poor living standards. The government policy to reduce fuel prices should not be seen as a policy filled with a political mission. It would be wiser for us to think that the policy is a conscious attempt to save the nation from more acute suffering from the ongoing global economic turbulence. Still relevant to Indonesia's measured steps in countering the crisis is Indonesia's preference to avoid taking the same route as in 1998 by relying on international funding agencies.
Understanding the unpleasant experience of such agency mechanisms has raised the awareness of the government (and the people) that going down that road would not be wise. Instead, Indonesia might undertake a bilateral approach with East Asian countries. Therefore, Indonesia's predicted leaning towards East Asia will mostly be motivated by economic interests.
Recent strikes in Gaza have turned Indonesia's attention to the Mideast conflict. Indonesia needs to play a larger role in urging the UN to defuse the tension. Indonesia should practice what it preaches as the world's largest Muslim population by initiating a leading role in the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to reduce the conflict. The government should have the confidence that a religious-cultural approach, such as facilitating interfaith dialogue between religious leaders from Palestine and Israel, as we successfully did in an Asian-Pacific context, might be an alternative to the problem. However both Israelis and Palestinians are also human beings with a certain faith they live by.
The third challenge for Indonesia's foreign policy is the increasing threat of terrorism. Having not witnessed the threat for almost two years, the world was shocked by the Mumbai terrorist attack toward the end of 2008. Consequently, the security alert has been raised in Indonesia, as home to an amalgamation of moderate and radical Muslims.
To this end, Indonesia should maintain its de-radicalization strategy as an effectively proven strategy to counterterrorism; this can be an asset to revive Indonesia's foreign policy on security issues.
As for ASEAN, the enactment of the ASEAN Charter has brought a new dimension to the organization and it is unlikely that Indonesia will neglect ASEAN from its primary foreign policy concentric circle. Democratic values should be continually promoted to non-democratic members of ASEAN, however this effort should not be seen as an attempt to violate the principle of non-interference but rather as an endeavor to create a coexistence in Southeast Asia because, as believed by the realists, peace is likely to be achieved when states engage in democratic values, to this extent values agreed upon and attuned with the ASEAN way.
The writer is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), London
Foreign policy Indonesia outlines post-2015 agenda for ASEAN
Abdul Khalik and Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Wed, 01/05/2011 10:46 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
While trying to lead ASEAN to achieve its goal of becoming a community by 2015, Indonesia highlighted its agenda for the 10-member group in the post-2015 period as Southeast Asia’s largest economy chairs the group this year.
Indonesia proposed that this year the ASEAN Community should start playing a role on the global stage by tackling global issues such as climate change, development and conflict and security problems so that after 2015 the group would have a common platform to deal with those global issues.
“We must be outward looking, not self-absorbed,” Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told The Jakarta Post.
“We should begin drafting a road map this year so that in 10 years we have a common platform on global issues, not a common foreign policy as ASEAN is not a supranational organization.”
Apart from playing a greater role in world affairs, Marty said Indonesia’s main task was to guide the group to reach the goal of becoming a community by 2015 while giving substance to ongoing regional architecture building — in this case East Asia and the Pacific.
“Our main basic responsibility is to ensure that during the course of 2011 we continue to make progress to achieve ASEAN’s goal of becoming a community by 2015,” he said.
ASEAN leaders agreed that the community would be built on three main pillars — economic, political and security and sociocultural — to ensure people in ASEAN countries could coexist in a single community.
Marty said that apart from building on developments so far, Indonesia would also propose areas within the three pillars that had not benefited from strong efforts until now.
“For example, how we address maritime issues in our region. We are concerned as maritime issues have become problematic, involving navies and fishing vessels, not only from ASEAN but also from Northeast Asian countries,” he said.
Marty said the seas should a unifying factor for the region.
“We will be keen to develop a maritime forum, discussing how we deal with such incidents, the rules of engagement and standard operating procedures. We don’t want unintended incidents spiraling out of control,” he said.
Analysts warned that Indonesia’s chairmanship would be challenged by problems faced by member countries, and that it had been pushed to balance its position between the US and China, both looking to make the region their sphere of influence.
Border disputes among member countries and outsiders, notably China in the South China Sea, will test Indonesia’s leadership. For instance, if it mediated in the South China Sea dispute between China and six ASEAN countries, Indonesia as a non-claimant state to the territory is expected to show impartiality.
Marty said that under Indonesia’s chairmanship, dialogue between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea dispute would continue, with the hope that all parties could develop codes of conduct on how to settle the problem of claims to the area.
Related News >>
RI's forecast foreign policy
Navigating turbulent seas
RI foreign policy a case of style over substance
Indonesia 'must play leading global role'
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muradali_shaikh | Wed, 19/01/2011 - 19:01pm
BIG TROUBLE IN TUNISIA FOR AMERICA’S MIDEAST RAJ
January 17, 2011
Oops! Something has gone terribly wrong with Washington’s plans for regime change in the Mideast. Wasn’t there supposed to be a US and British engineered revolution against Iran’s mullahs, followed by installation of a cooperative pro-western government and a bonanza for western oil companies?
The revolution came, all right, but in the wrong place. The explosion of popular fury in Tunisia that ousted its dictator of 23-years is sending shock waves across the Arab world and has alarm bells ringing in Washington.
Pay no attention to President Barack Obama’s pious bromides welcoming the revolution in Tunisia. The US, France and their Arab satraps are deeply worried that Tunisia’s popular revolution could spark similar uprising against the dictatorships or monarchies in other members of America’s Mideast Raj, notably Egypt.
It has come to light that Tunisia’s ruling elite had dinners and wine flown in from Paris at government expense for lavish parties in their beachside villas. Shades of the Iranian revolution, when women of the ruling elite in Tehran used to send their dirty laundry to Paris for hand washing, or fly to Paris to have their hair done for a soiree.
In a zesty bit of irony totally lost on the US media, just as a people’s revolution was ousting Tunisia’s brutal US-backed regime, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Qatar piously lecturing local oil monarchs on good government and the need to promote democracy.
Tunisia has not had much strategic importance since Carthage – whose ruins and great war harbor lie in a residential suburb of Tunis – fought Rome in the three Punic Wars. During World War II’s North Africa campaign, Tunisia was battled over by the British, Germans and Italians.
Since then, little Tunisia has been a backwater, known mainly for sunshine, cheap beach vacations, and as a refuge for Italian crooks.
In 1957, Tunisia “gained” independence from former colonial master, France. But it was a sham independence. The French put their own stooge, Habib Bourguiba, in power, who ran the country for France.
After Bourguiba went senile in 1987, the army commander, General Zine Ben Ali, overthrew him and seized power with the blessing of Paris. Ben Ali as ruled with an iron first for the ensuing 23 years.
The US and France have always hailed Tunisia as a poster-boy for “moderation, stability, and democracy. ”
Translation: 1. moderation: following orders from Washington and making nice to Israel; 2. stability: crushing all opposition, particularly Islamist-oriented parties, muzzling the media, and paving the way for US business; 3. democracy: holding fake elections every few years. The US media soft-soaped Ben Ali and gushed over Tunisia’s “moderate” virtues. They did the same for Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.
America’s other “moderate” Arab clients, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman and some of the Gulf states, followed precisely the same model of ersatz elections, ferocious internal oppression, and absolute obedience to Washington.
Tunisia closely resembled other Arab non-oil states in having very high unemployment, social and intellectual stagnation, lack of free speech or expression, and no hope for the future unless one had links to the rapacious, self-serving, western-backed ruling oligarchy. On top of this, in most Arab states, over 60% of the population is under 25.
Gen. Ali’s extended family and business cronies followed a pattern of malfeasance, nepotism and plundering public assets common to most Arab nations. In the Mideast, such oligarchies are commonly called “mafias.” Their secret police are notorious for torture, murder, mass arrests and sadism. Arab armies are designed to cow their people, not protect the nation’s borders.
After the Bush and Obama administrations felt obliged to make a token appeal to their Arab clients for the appearance of at least sham democracy, General Ali obliged by winning his most recent rigged election in 2009 by “only” a razor-thin 89% victory, rather than his usual 94% or 95% win.
Tunisians are known as an easy-going, even-tempered people. US and French aid was supposed to keep a lid on the country and defuse popular unrest. So just about everyone was caught by surprise when Tunisia went critical.
In a heart-warming finale to Gen. Ben Ali’s brutal dictatorship, he fled to France seeking asylum. France’s president, Nicholas Sarkozy, showing remarkable ingratitude even for this notorious ingrate, refused this faithful, long-time French servant refuge. Two other former western plantation overseers who were dying of cancer, Congo’s late Gen. Mobutu and the ousted Shah of Iran, were similarly refused refuge by their American patrons.
As of this writing, Tunisia is in turmoil. There may be a military takeover, which would greatly please Washington, Paris and Cairo, or further convulsions.
The leader of the most important Islamic-oriented party that was outlawed, Rashid Gannouchi (not to be confused with the current figurehead prime minister of the same name), is due to return and is calling for genuine democratic elections. His party, Nahda, would likely win any free elections. So would Islamist parties in every other Arab country, if the west ever allowed them to hold free elections, which it won’t.
In the only two cases in modern Arab history where truly honest elections were held, moderate Islamists won in Algeria, and the Hamas movement won in Gaza. The Algerian army, backed by Paris and Washington, crushed the election and imposed martial law. After Hamas won the Palestinian election, the US, Israel and Egypt locked up Hamas under siege in Gaza and sought to overthrow it using Palestinian mercenaries.
Mainstream Islamist parties in the Mideast have nothing to do with al-Qaida (which barely exists any more) or anti-Western programs. Their primary concern is getting rid of the western-backed oligarchies that keep the Muslim world backwards and in thrall. Their platform is sharing resource wealth, social welfare, education, uprooting thieving oligarchies and fighting endemic corruption.
The big question now is will Tunisia’s dramatic events be a harbinger of other explosions across the volatile Arab world? All eyes are on Egypt, the home of a third of all Arabs. Egypt’s 83-year old military ruler, Husni Mubarak, is a giant version of Tunisia’s Gen. Ben Ali.
Mubarak was engineered into power by the US after the killing of longtime CIA “asset” Anwar Sadat. Gen. Mubarak and has ruled Egypt like a modern-day pharaoh ever since, crushing both violent extremist and legitimate political opposition. Mubarak’s rigged elections, winked at by Washington, are every bit as egregious as Tunisia’s.
So could the flames of Tunisia’s revolution spread to Egypt? Mubarak’s regime is tottering. Egyptians are as restive and disgusted as their Tunisian neighbors. Egyptians, too, are a famously passive, amiable lot, but Egypt’s repression, grinding poverty and rapacious western-aligned elite have enraged most ordinary people.
Tunisia’s neighbors Libya, Algeria and Morocco are similarly unstable and racked by unemployment, a high birth rate, and ferocious repression by their regimes. Col. Khadaffi’s oil-rich Libya is particularly fertile ground for a major convulsion after five decades of eccentric government.
All these authoritarian regimes have crushed opposition, leaving only underground revolutionaries to replace them when revolution inevitably comes. Islamists will be the last men standing. By encouraging repression and thwarting the emergence of democracy in the Arab world, the US has sown the dragon’s teeth of further violence and rises.
We are now seeing what the “stability” and “moderation” so beloved of Washington in the Arab world really brings. The mighty American Raj is built on such euphemisms that really mean dictatorship, corruption, torture, and subservience.
If Washington really wants to foster the democracy that it preaches, then it should help Tunisia’s people create a truly democratic government rather than engineering yet another cooperative general and his grasping family into power as it has done so often since the 1950’s.
30
copyright Eric S. Margolis 2011
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zul | Thu, 06/01/2011 - 05:01am
Appalling behavior and political bastardry by BN and that goose NAJIB-what's his face. Nothing will save them. They have left an indelible stain on Malaysian history
Report Abuse
bab | Wed, 05/01/2011 - 16:01pm
The year 2015 presents a critical challenge to ASEAN sas it is the year of launching its goal: ASEAN Economic Community, that binds its 10 member states into an EU-like economic union. With a population of over 500 million peoples, ASEAN is an economic powerhouse, still emerging with huge potentials, to play a major power roles in both regional and international politics. With varying degrees of liberalization and democratization, ASEAN is actually mosaic of cultures, races, religious beliefs with divergent historical-cultural backgrounds, with some ruled by kings or queens, others by military regimes, and yet some are booming communist states. How well the ASEAN Economic Community can prosper under such diversities or even divergence, is interesting.
Of paramount significance are long standing internal conflicts plaguing ASEAN. Except for Singapore, and the former Indochinese states: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, all suffer problems of insurgencies, rebellion or secession. Quite unsettling are the Pattani problem in Southern Thailand, Achinese clamor separate Islamic state, the Moro rebellion in Southern Philippines, and the clamor of Malaysia's own Kadazans-Dozon natives in North Borbeo/Sabah for its own independent state, not mention Sabah itself is being claimed by the Philippines.
Of these domestic conflicts, the Moro rebellion presents the biggest challenge to the Philippines and Malaysia, the GRP-MILF peace talks mediator. Intricate issues webbed and worsened by recalcitrant Philippines refusing to honor commitments under the OIC-brokered GRP-MNLF peace agreement signed in September 1996. Malaysia is the facilitator of the GRP-MILF talks, which bogged down two years ago over an interim agreement granting concession to the MILF over the Bangsa Moro ancestral domain in most of the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in Southern Philippines. Left unresolved, the Moro problem is a big torn to ASEAN and the parties involved. Sabah is the other Bangsa Moro ancestral homeland, being "owned" by the defunct Sulu Sultanate. Such a "sovereignty-based" conflict seems intractable, and a potential debacle to the ASEAN itself.
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While trying to lead ASEAN to achieve its goal of becoming a community by 2015, Indonesia highlighted its agenda for the 10-member group in the post-2015 period as Southeast Asia’s largest economy chairs the group this year.
Indonesia proposed that this year the ASEAN Community should start playing a role on the global stage by tackling global issues such as climate change, development and conflict and security problems so that after 2015 the group would have a common platform to deal with those global issues.
“We must be outward looking, not self-absorbed,” Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told The Jakarta Post.
“We should begin drafting a road map this year so that in 10 years we have a common platform on global issues, not a common foreign policy as ASEAN is not a supranational organization.”
Apart from playing a greater role in world affairs, Marty said Indonesia’s main task was to guide the group to reach the goal of becoming a community by 2015 while giving substance to ongoing regional architecture building — in this case East Asia and the Pacific.
“Our main basic responsibility is to ensure that during the course of 2011 we continue to make progress to achieve ASEAN’s goal of becoming a community by 2015,” he said.
ASEAN leaders agreed that the community would be built on three main pillars — economic, political and security and sociocultural — to ensure people in ASEAN countries could coexist in a single community.
Marty said that apart from building on developments so far, Indonesia would also propose areas within the three pillars that had not benefited from strong efforts until now.
“For example, how we address maritime issues in our region. We are concerned as maritime issues have become problematic, involving navies and fishing vessels, not only from ASEAN but also from Northeast Asian countries,” he said.
Marty said the seas should a unifying factor for the region.
“We will be keen to develop a maritime forum, discussing how we deal with such incidents, the rules of engagement and standard operating procedures. We don’t want unintended incidents spiraling out of control,” he said.
Analysts warned that Indonesia’s chairmanship would be challenged by problems faced by member countries, and that it had been pushed to balance its position between the US and China, both looking to make the region their sphere of influence.
Border disputes among member countries and outsiders, notably China in the South China Sea, will test Indonesia’s leadership. For instance, if it mediated in the South China Sea dispute between China and six ASEAN countries, Indonesia as a non-claimant state to the territory is expected to show impartiality.
Marty said that under Indonesia’s chairmanship, dialogue between ASEAN and China in the South China Sea dispute would continue, with the hope that all parties could develop codes of conduct on how to settle the problem of claims to the area.
Related News >>
RI's forecast foreign policy
Navigating turbulent seas
RI foreign policy a case of style over substance
Indonesia 'must play leading global role'
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& our public blog @blogIMO
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muradali_shaikh | Wed, 19/01/2011 - 19:01pm
BIG TROUBLE IN TUNISIA FOR AMERICA’S MIDEAST RAJ
January 17, 2011
Oops! Something has gone terribly wrong with Washington’s plans for regime change in the Mideast. Wasn’t there supposed to be a US and British engineered revolution against Iran’s mullahs, followed by installation of a cooperative pro-western government and a bonanza for western oil companies?
The revolution came, all right, but in the wrong place. The explosion of popular fury in Tunisia that ousted its dictator of 23-years is sending shock waves across the Arab world and has alarm bells ringing in Washington.
Pay no attention to President Barack Obama’s pious bromides welcoming the revolution in Tunisia. The US, France and their Arab satraps are deeply worried that Tunisia’s popular revolution could spark similar uprising against the dictatorships or monarchies in other members of America’s Mideast Raj, notably Egypt.
It has come to light that Tunisia’s ruling elite had dinners and wine flown in from Paris at government expense for lavish parties in their beachside villas. Shades of the Iranian revolution, when women of the ruling elite in Tehran used to send their dirty laundry to Paris for hand washing, or fly to Paris to have their hair done for a soiree.
In a zesty bit of irony totally lost on the US media, just as a people’s revolution was ousting Tunisia’s brutal US-backed regime, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in Qatar piously lecturing local oil monarchs on good government and the need to promote democracy.
Tunisia has not had much strategic importance since Carthage – whose ruins and great war harbor lie in a residential suburb of Tunis – fought Rome in the three Punic Wars. During World War II’s North Africa campaign, Tunisia was battled over by the British, Germans and Italians.
Since then, little Tunisia has been a backwater, known mainly for sunshine, cheap beach vacations, and as a refuge for Italian crooks.
In 1957, Tunisia “gained” independence from former colonial master, France. But it was a sham independence. The French put their own stooge, Habib Bourguiba, in power, who ran the country for France.
After Bourguiba went senile in 1987, the army commander, General Zine Ben Ali, overthrew him and seized power with the blessing of Paris. Ben Ali as ruled with an iron first for the ensuing 23 years.
The US and France have always hailed Tunisia as a poster-boy for “moderation, stability, and democracy. ”
Translation: 1. moderation: following orders from Washington and making nice to Israel; 2. stability: crushing all opposition, particularly Islamist-oriented parties, muzzling the media, and paving the way for US business; 3. democracy: holding fake elections every few years. The US media soft-soaped Ben Ali and gushed over Tunisia’s “moderate” virtues. They did the same for Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.
America’s other “moderate” Arab clients, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Oman and some of the Gulf states, followed precisely the same model of ersatz elections, ferocious internal oppression, and absolute obedience to Washington.
Tunisia closely resembled other Arab non-oil states in having very high unemployment, social and intellectual stagnation, lack of free speech or expression, and no hope for the future unless one had links to the rapacious, self-serving, western-backed ruling oligarchy. On top of this, in most Arab states, over 60% of the population is under 25.
Gen. Ali’s extended family and business cronies followed a pattern of malfeasance, nepotism and plundering public assets common to most Arab nations. In the Mideast, such oligarchies are commonly called “mafias.” Their secret police are notorious for torture, murder, mass arrests and sadism. Arab armies are designed to cow their people, not protect the nation’s borders.
After the Bush and Obama administrations felt obliged to make a token appeal to their Arab clients for the appearance of at least sham democracy, General Ali obliged by winning his most recent rigged election in 2009 by “only” a razor-thin 89% victory, rather than his usual 94% or 95% win.
Tunisians are known as an easy-going, even-tempered people. US and French aid was supposed to keep a lid on the country and defuse popular unrest. So just about everyone was caught by surprise when Tunisia went critical.
In a heart-warming finale to Gen. Ben Ali’s brutal dictatorship, he fled to France seeking asylum. France’s president, Nicholas Sarkozy, showing remarkable ingratitude even for this notorious ingrate, refused this faithful, long-time French servant refuge. Two other former western plantation overseers who were dying of cancer, Congo’s late Gen. Mobutu and the ousted Shah of Iran, were similarly refused refuge by their American patrons.
As of this writing, Tunisia is in turmoil. There may be a military takeover, which would greatly please Washington, Paris and Cairo, or further convulsions.
The leader of the most important Islamic-oriented party that was outlawed, Rashid Gannouchi (not to be confused with the current figurehead prime minister of the same name), is due to return and is calling for genuine democratic elections. His party, Nahda, would likely win any free elections. So would Islamist parties in every other Arab country, if the west ever allowed them to hold free elections, which it won’t.
In the only two cases in modern Arab history where truly honest elections were held, moderate Islamists won in Algeria, and the Hamas movement won in Gaza. The Algerian army, backed by Paris and Washington, crushed the election and imposed martial law. After Hamas won the Palestinian election, the US, Israel and Egypt locked up Hamas under siege in Gaza and sought to overthrow it using Palestinian mercenaries.
Mainstream Islamist parties in the Mideast have nothing to do with al-Qaida (which barely exists any more) or anti-Western programs. Their primary concern is getting rid of the western-backed oligarchies that keep the Muslim world backwards and in thrall. Their platform is sharing resource wealth, social welfare, education, uprooting thieving oligarchies and fighting endemic corruption.
The big question now is will Tunisia’s dramatic events be a harbinger of other explosions across the volatile Arab world? All eyes are on Egypt, the home of a third of all Arabs. Egypt’s 83-year old military ruler, Husni Mubarak, is a giant version of Tunisia’s Gen. Ben Ali.
Mubarak was engineered into power by the US after the killing of longtime CIA “asset” Anwar Sadat. Gen. Mubarak and has ruled Egypt like a modern-day pharaoh ever since, crushing both violent extremist and legitimate political opposition. Mubarak’s rigged elections, winked at by Washington, are every bit as egregious as Tunisia’s.
So could the flames of Tunisia’s revolution spread to Egypt? Mubarak’s regime is tottering. Egyptians are as restive and disgusted as their Tunisian neighbors. Egyptians, too, are a famously passive, amiable lot, but Egypt’s repression, grinding poverty and rapacious western-aligned elite have enraged most ordinary people.
Tunisia’s neighbors Libya, Algeria and Morocco are similarly unstable and racked by unemployment, a high birth rate, and ferocious repression by their regimes. Col. Khadaffi’s oil-rich Libya is particularly fertile ground for a major convulsion after five decades of eccentric government.
All these authoritarian regimes have crushed opposition, leaving only underground revolutionaries to replace them when revolution inevitably comes. Islamists will be the last men standing. By encouraging repression and thwarting the emergence of democracy in the Arab world, the US has sown the dragon’s teeth of further violence and rises.
We are now seeing what the “stability” and “moderation” so beloved of Washington in the Arab world really brings. The mighty American Raj is built on such euphemisms that really mean dictatorship, corruption, torture, and subservience.
If Washington really wants to foster the democracy that it preaches, then it should help Tunisia’s people create a truly democratic government rather than engineering yet another cooperative general and his grasping family into power as it has done so often since the 1950’s.
30
copyright Eric S. Margolis 2011
Report Abuse
zul | Thu, 06/01/2011 - 05:01am
Appalling behavior and political bastardry by BN and that goose NAJIB-what's his face. Nothing will save them. They have left an indelible stain on Malaysian history
Report Abuse
bab | Wed, 05/01/2011 - 16:01pm
The year 2015 presents a critical challenge to ASEAN sas it is the year of launching its goal: ASEAN Economic Community, that binds its 10 member states into an EU-like economic union. With a population of over 500 million peoples, ASEAN is an economic powerhouse, still emerging with huge potentials, to play a major power roles in both regional and international politics. With varying degrees of liberalization and democratization, ASEAN is actually mosaic of cultures, races, religious beliefs with divergent historical-cultural backgrounds, with some ruled by kings or queens, others by military regimes, and yet some are booming communist states. How well the ASEAN Economic Community can prosper under such diversities or even divergence, is interesting.
Of paramount significance are long standing internal conflicts plaguing ASEAN. Except for Singapore, and the former Indochinese states: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, all suffer problems of insurgencies, rebellion or secession. Quite unsettling are the Pattani problem in Southern Thailand, Achinese clamor separate Islamic state, the Moro rebellion in Southern Philippines, and the clamor of Malaysia's own Kadazans-Dozon natives in North Borbeo/Sabah for its own independent state, not mention Sabah itself is being claimed by the Philippines.
Of these domestic conflicts, the Moro rebellion presents the biggest challenge to the Philippines and Malaysia, the GRP-MILF peace talks mediator. Intricate issues webbed and worsened by recalcitrant Philippines refusing to honor commitments under the OIC-brokered GRP-MNLF peace agreement signed in September 1996. Malaysia is the facilitator of the GRP-MILF talks, which bogged down two years ago over an interim agreement granting concession to the MILF over the Bangsa Moro ancestral domain in most of the islands of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan in Southern Philippines. Left unresolved, the Moro problem is a big torn to ASEAN and the parties involved. Sabah is the other Bangsa Moro ancestral homeland, being "owned" by the defunct Sulu Sultanate. Such a "sovereignty-based" conflict seems intractable, and a potential debacle to the ASEAN itself.
Report Abuse
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