Fithra Faisal Hastiadi, Tokyo | Tue, 12/13/2011 9:28 PM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
A Distinguished Speakers Seminar (DSS) held by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo in November came to the powerful conclusion that the European mess was getting messier.
As stated by Wyplosz (2011), since late 2009 the European debt crisis has not shown any sign of recovery.
For several reasons, apparently, the policy responses have been wrong. Wyplosz argues that the mother of all mistakes may lie in the policy options to provide ¤110 billion to save Greece through its tough austerity program.
There were two major flaws in this policy. First, it violates the no-bailout clause in the European Central Bank (ECB) system; and second, austerity in the midst of recession cannot act as a remedy.
These factors eventually led to a liquidity crisis that has overwhelmed the European banking system (Collignon, 2011).
Colloquially speaking, the liquidity shock caused a sudden deterioration in specific classes of assets that has spilled over into banks, which are in dire need of liquidity.
The liquidity shortage then put banks in distress as the deteriorating asset prices affected their balance sheets and thus reduced bank capital. These difficulties then spilled over into the real economy in the form of a recession. This recession will most likely see Europe sinking into irrelevance.
Meanwhile, ASEAN is fueled by a youthful spirit that could bring new hope during the current global imbalances. ASEAN members are becoming increasingly connected. The ASEAN region has experienced sustainable growth of intra-regional trade share. In 1990, the intra-regional trade share was only 17 percent but in 2010 the figure swelled to 25.2 percent.
If we expand the coverage to include ASEAN’s plus three countries (China, Japan and Korea), the intra-regional trade figure is becoming more robust.
In 1990, it already reached 47.2 percent and developed over a decade as it leapt to 58.4 percent.
The FTAs and EPAs that have been emerging since mid-2000 have had made a significant contribution to warming of relations among ASEAN+3 countries.
An important factor explaining the success of the ASEAN+3 economies has been their participation in a dynamic, regionally integrated economic structure beyond just ASEAN+3. Strong and dynamic production networks have progressively linked East Asian and ASEAN+3 countries.
The fragmentation of manufacturing production and “fragmented trade” linked to rising intra-industry trade has enabled ASEAN+3 countries to maintain their competitiveness and successfully pursue an export-led development strategy. ASEAN+3 countries have also developed robust, flexible and vibrant small and medium size enterprise (SME) sectors.
While this region has experienced two periods of economic crisis (late 1997 and late 2008), it did well in bouncing back afterward.
During the first crisis, the total ASEAN+3 intra-regional exports fell from US$179,732.1 million in 1997 to $146,166.3 million in 1998. Imports also declined from $186,630.5 million in 1997 to $141,979.3 million in 1998. This number contributed to an almost 3 percent decline of ASEAN+3’s intra-regional trade from 49.9 percent in 1997 to 47.2 percent in 1998. But in 1999 this bounced back well to 49 percent, followed by 51.4 percent in 2000. This figure gave a big boost to East Asian countries at that time to recover from the crisis.
The second crisis in late 2008 also caused regional trade imbalances in ASEAN+3 countries as the total exports and imports fell from $547,427.5 million and $518,966.8 million in 2008 to $450,665.6 million and $411,663.3 million in 2009.
But, again, the regional economy bounced back in 2010 to $630,089.6 million for exports and $609,465.3 million for imports. This bounce was also seen in the intra-regional trade share figure that experienced a hike from 55.8 percent in 2008 to 58.4 percent in 2010.
Comparing these two crisis periods, we can draw the general conclusion that East Asia has learned well in coping with crises. This is reflected by the speed of recovery in 2010 which was better than that of 1999. Also, the closer integration among the countries has created a vaccine-like treatment in the region.
Looking into the future, based on ADB projections, in 2030, per capita GDP in 2007 constant US dollars, will reach 9,012 for ASEAN, 12,361 for China, 40,415 for Japan and 41,674 for Korea.
These figures surely indicate a very optimistic path for the region in taking a powerful role globally, but in order to play that role the region, especially the ASEAN countries, must pay more attention to several crucial factors.
The first of these is infrastructure. The simulation result confirms the importance of infrastructure to create greater room for the region to evolve. The second is industrialization. A one point rise in the industrial index will most likely increase the tendency of economic growth by 0.04 percent. The third is population.
Population is regarded as the most important variable that serves as a foundation for strong growth. A 1 percent increase in the total population will increase the likelihood of regional growth by 0.86 percent.
The sheer size of the East Asian population creates not only the potential demand for the goods traded in the region but also the supply of labor and low absolute level of wages.
This trend is very important since homogeneity in industrialization among countries in the region will assist the progress of economic integration, and thus economic growth.
To wrap up, ASEAN+3 countries should ensure countries within this region that are lagging behind to eventually catch up with the rest.
Sound policy measures that incorporate the expansion of production networks should be set as a common goal for the future of this region. Whether ASEAN+3 moves forward or ends the story like the Europeans is a matter of political will.
The writer is research associate at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo. The opinions expressed are his own.
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Risti Permani | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 06:12am
It's good to be an optimist, but the statistics do not seem to support the decoupling thesis ie. ASEAN or at a larger scope East Asian will be able to grow without the support of the rest of the world (ROW) including EU. In the 1998-2008 period (see Figure 2 on page 51: http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp2009/wp_econ_2009_09.pdf) intra-regional trade in East Asian region accounted for less than 40% of total trade, whilst parts and components accounted for more than 60%. This implies that the region still needs ROW to sell their final products to.
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Wednesday, December 14, 2011
RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoeanda Declaration
I Made Andi Arsana, Yogyakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:43 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoeanda Declaration
I Made Andi Arsana, Yogyakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:43 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
Local governments and Indonesian foreign policy
Yayan GH Mulyana, Jakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:52 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a directive in a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 2, asking, among other things, for governors to fully understand Indonesia’s standpoint regarding various international issues. This directive is very timely considering the increase in local government interest in conducting relations with foreign entities or governments.
While the authority for the formulation, making and implementation of foreign policy rests with the central government, local governments share some authority with the national government in conducting foreign relations, especially for economic and development purposes. Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which replaced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government, explicitly mentions the authority of a region to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation with institutions or agencies abroad relating to areas
under its authority (Article 88).
Article 41 of Law No. 32 /2004 stipulates that with the approval of the regional legislative council, a local government can propose and implement an international cooperation plan. In explanation of this article, “international cooperation” refers to regional cooperation with foreign parties, including twin or sister city cooperation, technical cooperation including humanitarian aid, cooperation on forwarding loans or grants, equity participation and joint cooperation in accordance with statutory regulations.
It is further stated that regional governments can accept foreign grants and can borrow foreign loans through the Ministry of Finance (Article 170).
In terms of foreign affairs relating to the authority of autonomous regions — as a solution to a conflict such as the Åland Islands in Finland, as recognition of special privileges to ethnic minorities such as in the Chinese provinces of Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Xizang, or as a result of a political process such as in Indonesia — economic and development cooperation is the most common dimension of such authority.
Based on existing practices, there are at least four patterns of interaction between local governments and their national governments in the conduct of foreign affairs.
First is a complementary pattern. In this pattern, the implementation of the local government’s authority in foreign affairs is in harmony with the central government’s foreign policy.
For example, in 1998, when the US imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar, the City Council of Los Angeles, California, issued an ordinance prohibiting the local government of Los Angeles executing contracts with companies that had investments or foreign relations activities with Myanmar.
Second is a complicating pattern. There have been cases where local governments in the US took legal and administrative measures that complicated US foreign policy. For example, in 2000, the state of California issued the Angelides’ guidelines that prohibited financial institutions in California investing in countries like Turkey and Egypt, which were US allies, as well as with China despite its special ties with the US. The guidelines placed the US in a difficult position in relation to its allies.
Third is a dissociating pattern. The central government will dissociate itself from the policy taken by autonomous local governments. For example, the Finnish government was not able to do anything when the European Commission demanded through the European Court that Finland abolish the “Snus Law” (law on chewing tobacco), which was applicable in the Autonomous Region of the Åland Islands.
The Finnish Government argued that health problems (including tobacco use) were within the full authority of the Autonomous Region of Åland Islands and chewing tobacco was an important commodity for the economy of the Åland Islands.
Fourth, there is a conflicting pattern. This pattern is visible when measures or policies taken by local governments conflict with the policies of national governments. In Indonesia, for example, it was once noticed that many local governments had expressed strong interest in advancing cooperation with Taiwan, which ran counter to Indonesia’s One China policy. Some had even proposed the foundation of a trade office in Taiwan.
Regional autonomy in Indonesia emerged from historical necessities and it is something that should not be undone. Yet, it is essential to ensure that local governments’ activism in foreign relations is pursued in the corridor of their limited authority and, in particular, on Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. It is important that local governments know their limits and respect and follow the policies set by the national government.
As local governments do not always have resources to support their foreign affairs activities, the central government could help equip local governments with such capacity, including information on various regulations and cooperation opportunities.
Local governments’ limited authority in foreign relations could also be empowered through institutional measures. The government of the state of California, for instance, formed the International Business Relations Program (IBRP) to support its foreign trade relations.
Local governments could also promote innovation. The Xinjiang Local Government, for example, annually holds the Xinjiang Urumqi Foreign Economic Relations & Trade Fair (Urumqi Fair), which has become the largest opportunity for trade transactions with Central Asia, Russia and Western China as target markets. Networking for local governments is important for exchanging best practices, for example through the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the Asia-Pacific Cities Summit.
The writer is an assistant to special staff to the President for international relations. The opinions expressed are his own.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a directive in a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 2, asking, among other things, for governors to fully understand Indonesia’s standpoint regarding various international issues. This directive is very timely considering the increase in local government interest in conducting relations with foreign entities or governments.
While the authority for the formulation, making and implementation of foreign policy rests with the central government, local governments share some authority with the national government in conducting foreign relations, especially for economic and development purposes. Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which replaced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government, explicitly mentions the authority of a region to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation with institutions or agencies abroad relating to areas
under its authority (Article 88).
Article 41 of Law No. 32 /2004 stipulates that with the approval of the regional legislative council, a local government can propose and implement an international cooperation plan. In explanation of this article, “international cooperation” refers to regional cooperation with foreign parties, including twin or sister city cooperation, technical cooperation including humanitarian aid, cooperation on forwarding loans or grants, equity participation and joint cooperation in accordance with statutory regulations.
It is further stated that regional governments can accept foreign grants and can borrow foreign loans through the Ministry of Finance (Article 170).
In terms of foreign affairs relating to the authority of autonomous regions — as a solution to a conflict such as the Åland Islands in Finland, as recognition of special privileges to ethnic minorities such as in the Chinese provinces of Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Xizang, or as a result of a political process such as in Indonesia — economic and development cooperation is the most common dimension of such authority.
Based on existing practices, there are at least four patterns of interaction between local governments and their national governments in the conduct of foreign affairs.
First is a complementary pattern. In this pattern, the implementation of the local government’s authority in foreign affairs is in harmony with the central government’s foreign policy.
For example, in 1998, when the US imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar, the City Council of Los Angeles, California, issued an ordinance prohibiting the local government of Los Angeles executing contracts with companies that had investments or foreign relations activities with Myanmar.
Second is a complicating pattern. There have been cases where local governments in the US took legal and administrative measures that complicated US foreign policy. For example, in 2000, the state of California issued the Angelides’ guidelines that prohibited financial institutions in California investing in countries like Turkey and Egypt, which were US allies, as well as with China despite its special ties with the US. The guidelines placed the US in a difficult position in relation to its allies.
Third is a dissociating pattern. The central government will dissociate itself from the policy taken by autonomous local governments. For example, the Finnish government was not able to do anything when the European Commission demanded through the European Court that Finland abolish the “Snus Law” (law on chewing tobacco), which was applicable in the Autonomous Region of the Åland Islands.
The Finnish Government argued that health problems (including tobacco use) were within the full authority of the Autonomous Region of Åland Islands and chewing tobacco was an important commodity for the economy of the Åland Islands.
Fourth, there is a conflicting pattern. This pattern is visible when measures or policies taken by local governments conflict with the policies of national governments. In Indonesia, for example, it was once noticed that many local governments had expressed strong interest in advancing cooperation with Taiwan, which ran counter to Indonesia’s One China policy. Some had even proposed the foundation of a trade office in Taiwan.
Regional autonomy in Indonesia emerged from historical necessities and it is something that should not be undone. Yet, it is essential to ensure that local governments’ activism in foreign relations is pursued in the corridor of their limited authority and, in particular, on Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. It is important that local governments know their limits and respect and follow the policies set by the national government.
As local governments do not always have resources to support their foreign affairs activities, the central government could help equip local governments with such capacity, including information on various regulations and cooperation opportunities.
Local governments’ limited authority in foreign relations could also be empowered through institutional measures. The government of the state of California, for instance, formed the International Business Relations Program (IBRP) to support its foreign trade relations.
Local governments could also promote innovation. The Xinjiang Local Government, for example, annually holds the Xinjiang Urumqi Foreign Economic Relations & Trade Fair (Urumqi Fair), which has become the largest opportunity for trade transactions with Central Asia, Russia and Western China as target markets. Networking for local governments is important for exchanging best practices, for example through the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the Asia-Pacific Cities Summit.
The writer is an assistant to special staff to the President for international relations. The opinions expressed are his own.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Future peace institute won’t violate non-interference principle: Marty
Dina Indrasafitri, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 05/06/2011 10:08 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that the plan for the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation was unlikely to breach the organization’s principle of non-interference.
“We don’t think the institution would contradict the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference because the institution’s concepts have been anticipated in ASEAN’s politics and security pillars,” he said Friday in Jakarta.
He was refereeing to the pillars stated in a 2003 ASEAN meeting in Bali, when member nations saw a declaration of an ASEAN community to be set upon three pillars: political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation
Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, is scheduled to host the 18th ASEAN summit. Preceding the summit, slated to begin on Saturday, are a number of meetings, including the ASEAN Politics and Security Community meeting and the Foreign Minister’s meeting.
One of Indonesia’s inputs for ASEAN has been the establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.
Marty said that the planned institute was a non-governmental initiative.
“This is part of the effort by the Indonesian government and by ASEAN to complement various instruments to prevent and settle conflicts, should they occur. In other words, not all [efforts] should be in the intergovernmental form. We can benefit from the institute to be established.” he said.
Two ASEAN members – Cambodia and Thailand – are currently engaged in an unsettling series of violent territorial clashes with each other, with the latest incident occurring last month.
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that the plan for the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation was unlikely to breach the organization’s principle of non-interference.
“We don’t think the institution would contradict the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference because the institution’s concepts have been anticipated in ASEAN’s politics and security pillars,” he said Friday in Jakarta.
He was refereeing to the pillars stated in a 2003 ASEAN meeting in Bali, when member nations saw a declaration of an ASEAN community to be set upon three pillars: political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation
Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, is scheduled to host the 18th ASEAN summit. Preceding the summit, slated to begin on Saturday, are a number of meetings, including the ASEAN Politics and Security Community meeting and the Foreign Minister’s meeting.
One of Indonesia’s inputs for ASEAN has been the establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.
Marty said that the planned institute was a non-governmental initiative.
“This is part of the effort by the Indonesian government and by ASEAN to complement various instruments to prevent and settle conflicts, should they occur. In other words, not all [efforts] should be in the intergovernmental form. We can benefit from the institute to be established.” he said.
Two ASEAN members – Cambodia and Thailand – are currently engaged in an unsettling series of violent territorial clashes with each other, with the latest incident occurring last month.
RI has created a ‘sound climate’ for resolving disputes
Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post | Fri, 07/22/2011 10:18 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
The South China Sea issues have prompted several ASEAN claimants to brandish their might in the face of Asian giant China, with the Philippines and Vietnam collecting support from the United States. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, as well as other Indonesian journalists after ASEAN and China agreed on guidelines for cooperation in the South China Sea. Below are excerpts from the interview.
Question: What progress has been made in the discussions on the South China Sea issues between ASEAN and China?
Answer: It has been six years of negotiations. I got the actual Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in Lombok, and I read all of it. This is it, the document that for five years has held back progress, the so-called guidelines.
I told my counterparts enough is enough, there comes a time when you must get things done. More delay does not mean everything stands still, but rather gets worse. That’s why I really pushed it to make sure we make real and concrete progress. If it is important to have guidelines, let’s do it, so we can move on to the Code of Conduct.
We have to work on the draft, but we have to make a climate conducive to an agreement to be achieved. That’s why I talked with my ASEAN colleagues, ASEAN claimant states, to China, to other parties, basically to create positive energy, competition in a positive way.
The guidelines have to be self-fulfilling. It’s not the content, but the idea behind this that ASEAN and China can sit together and should discuss this. Indonesia is keen to get this done.
There is competition going on over oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, with China’s assertiveness, and the fact that Indonesia has only several months left as chair of ASEAN, how do you deal with this?
This is a process. We have to remember to always differentiate chairmanship from leadership. Indonesia indeed is the chairman of ASEAN this year. But from the start, we wanted to show that we wanted not only to chair ASEAN, but also to show our leadership.
We told the Chinese that if we did not have an ASEAN-China script on [the South China Sea issues], the issues would always be a wild ball.
We will meet several times this week, ASEAN plus three, plus one, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the EAS [at the ministerial level]. If we do have a way-out, we can tell the world, “thank you for your attention”. But if we don’t have a script, it will become a wild ball. We are not underestimating the challenges.
Are ASEAN’s member states split over the South China Sea issues, with the Philippines and Vietnam leaning toward the United States?
With or without the participation of Russia and the US, they will play a role one way or another. They are too big for us to close the door to.
It also doesn’t have to be described as a black-and-white option because it’s a fact that some of us have special relations with other countries from outside the region. That’s a fact of life. It depends on how we make sure that this fact can be in harmony with what we are aiming for.
Don’t let it … create a new gap in our region and bring in a new Cold War.
Do the guidelines say anything about political and security activities that can make sure that there will be no escalation of tensions in the South China Sea in the future?
The guidelines is a by-product, a sub-element of the declaration, it doesn’t stand on its own. So the guideline is essentially on how to implement the declaration of conduct, most especially not on the code of behavior itself but on the projects.
That’s my main understanding, because if you look at the DOC, it makes references to certain projects in certain areas — marine environment, SARS, transnational crimes, the safety of navigation, biodiversity.
Those are four areas on which we can collaborate, we are supposed to collaborate.
What about joint activities in oil and gas exploration?
No. Oil and gas exploration is not specifically regulated in the DOC.
The South China Sea issues have prompted several ASEAN claimants to brandish their might in the face of Asian giant China, with the Philippines and Vietnam collecting support from the United States. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, as well as other Indonesian journalists after ASEAN and China agreed on guidelines for cooperation in the South China Sea. Below are excerpts from the interview.
Question: What progress has been made in the discussions on the South China Sea issues between ASEAN and China?
Answer: It has been six years of negotiations. I got the actual Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in Lombok, and I read all of it. This is it, the document that for five years has held back progress, the so-called guidelines.
I told my counterparts enough is enough, there comes a time when you must get things done. More delay does not mean everything stands still, but rather gets worse. That’s why I really pushed it to make sure we make real and concrete progress. If it is important to have guidelines, let’s do it, so we can move on to the Code of Conduct.
We have to work on the draft, but we have to make a climate conducive to an agreement to be achieved. That’s why I talked with my ASEAN colleagues, ASEAN claimant states, to China, to other parties, basically to create positive energy, competition in a positive way.
The guidelines have to be self-fulfilling. It’s not the content, but the idea behind this that ASEAN and China can sit together and should discuss this. Indonesia is keen to get this done.
There is competition going on over oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, with China’s assertiveness, and the fact that Indonesia has only several months left as chair of ASEAN, how do you deal with this?
This is a process. We have to remember to always differentiate chairmanship from leadership. Indonesia indeed is the chairman of ASEAN this year. But from the start, we wanted to show that we wanted not only to chair ASEAN, but also to show our leadership.
We told the Chinese that if we did not have an ASEAN-China script on [the South China Sea issues], the issues would always be a wild ball.
We will meet several times this week, ASEAN plus three, plus one, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the EAS [at the ministerial level]. If we do have a way-out, we can tell the world, “thank you for your attention”. But if we don’t have a script, it will become a wild ball. We are not underestimating the challenges.
Are ASEAN’s member states split over the South China Sea issues, with the Philippines and Vietnam leaning toward the United States?
With or without the participation of Russia and the US, they will play a role one way or another. They are too big for us to close the door to.
It also doesn’t have to be described as a black-and-white option because it’s a fact that some of us have special relations with other countries from outside the region. That’s a fact of life. It depends on how we make sure that this fact can be in harmony with what we are aiming for.
Don’t let it … create a new gap in our region and bring in a new Cold War.
Do the guidelines say anything about political and security activities that can make sure that there will be no escalation of tensions in the South China Sea in the future?
The guidelines is a by-product, a sub-element of the declaration, it doesn’t stand on its own. So the guideline is essentially on how to implement the declaration of conduct, most especially not on the code of behavior itself but on the projects.
That’s my main understanding, because if you look at the DOC, it makes references to certain projects in certain areas — marine environment, SARS, transnational crimes, the safety of navigation, biodiversity.
Those are four areas on which we can collaborate, we are supposed to collaborate.
What about joint activities in oil and gas exploration?
No. Oil and gas exploration is not specifically regulated in the DOC.
More than just ratifying CTBT
Muhamad Najib, Jakarta | Mon, 01/24/2011 9:35 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
At the end of the recent House of Representatives’ sitting session, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa submitted a bill on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In the current session, the House’s Commission I on foreign affairs and defense is opening opportunities to all stakeholders, including scholars, NGO activists and public figures, to provide input.
Input recently came from the National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan) and Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (Bapeten ). For the majority of the Commission I, it is not an issue of whether or not to ratify this international treaty but more about when and how to go about doing it in the best manner possible.
As Indonesia does not have any ambition of manufacturing nuclear weapons of its own, this is not a difficult decision to make.
The challenge, rather, is how Indonesia’s eagerness to ratify the CTBT can contribute to the treaty’s implementation, without any particular nation receiving special privileges in the process, regardless of the argument put forward to avoid due compliance.
We can take a lesson from the experience of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was aimed at preventing competition among nations in the development of superior stockpiles of nuclear weapons, disarming nations that already possessed such devices, as well as directing the use of nuclear technology exclusively toward peaceful objectives.
“
The very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase
its international
reputation.
”
In reality, the NPT, which was first opened for signature in 1968, failed to achieve its declared objective.
First, it had its flaws from the outset. The five nations that already had nuclear weapons were given the right to remain in possession of the weapons of mass destruction.
Second, in the matter of disarmament, there was no clear deadline and no penalties for those that did not comply. As a result, the treaty has effectively been running in place up to the present day.
Third, nations that later went on to build nuclear weapons have never been penalized. Even if a particular nation was penalized, this was more due to preferential treatment. Meanwhile, the countries that had actually ratified the treaty were placed under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and were always in danger of being penalized.
Practically speaking, the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons from Earth has not made any tangible progress.
The text of the CTBT, which includes a ban on all test detonations of nuclear weapons and all other types of nuclear detonations, with the ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament, was finally completed in 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and was adopted by a UN General Assembly in the same year.
At present, 182 nations have signed this agreement. There are 44 nations with nuclear reactors that are listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, including Indonesia.
To date, only 35 nations have ratified the treaty. This means nine countries have not yet ratified it, including Indonesia.
Looking at these facts, Indonesia should view this as an opportunity. If the Indonesian Foreign Ministry would undertake some effort to lobby the other eight nations, in order for all of them to ratify it at the same time, Indonesia would certainly become highly respected, apart from demonstrating its seriousness in carrying out exceedingly noble humanitarian work.
The decision to do so does not have much chance of succeeding, based on the fact that most of the nations that have not ratified the treaty are large and powerful, and they secretly want to hold on to and exploit their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against competing nations
However, the very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase its international reputation. This is because it would be a tremendous achievement if the effort is successful. So why not go ahead and try it?
The writer is a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense.
At the end of the recent House of Representatives’ sitting session, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa submitted a bill on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In the current session, the House’s Commission I on foreign affairs and defense is opening opportunities to all stakeholders, including scholars, NGO activists and public figures, to provide input.
Input recently came from the National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan) and Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (Bapeten ). For the majority of the Commission I, it is not an issue of whether or not to ratify this international treaty but more about when and how to go about doing it in the best manner possible.
As Indonesia does not have any ambition of manufacturing nuclear weapons of its own, this is not a difficult decision to make.
The challenge, rather, is how Indonesia’s eagerness to ratify the CTBT can contribute to the treaty’s implementation, without any particular nation receiving special privileges in the process, regardless of the argument put forward to avoid due compliance.
We can take a lesson from the experience of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was aimed at preventing competition among nations in the development of superior stockpiles of nuclear weapons, disarming nations that already possessed such devices, as well as directing the use of nuclear technology exclusively toward peaceful objectives.
“
The very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase
its international
reputation.
”
In reality, the NPT, which was first opened for signature in 1968, failed to achieve its declared objective.
First, it had its flaws from the outset. The five nations that already had nuclear weapons were given the right to remain in possession of the weapons of mass destruction.
Second, in the matter of disarmament, there was no clear deadline and no penalties for those that did not comply. As a result, the treaty has effectively been running in place up to the present day.
Third, nations that later went on to build nuclear weapons have never been penalized. Even if a particular nation was penalized, this was more due to preferential treatment. Meanwhile, the countries that had actually ratified the treaty were placed under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and were always in danger of being penalized.
Practically speaking, the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons from Earth has not made any tangible progress.
The text of the CTBT, which includes a ban on all test detonations of nuclear weapons and all other types of nuclear detonations, with the ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament, was finally completed in 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and was adopted by a UN General Assembly in the same year.
At present, 182 nations have signed this agreement. There are 44 nations with nuclear reactors that are listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, including Indonesia.
To date, only 35 nations have ratified the treaty. This means nine countries have not yet ratified it, including Indonesia.
Looking at these facts, Indonesia should view this as an opportunity. If the Indonesian Foreign Ministry would undertake some effort to lobby the other eight nations, in order for all of them to ratify it at the same time, Indonesia would certainly become highly respected, apart from demonstrating its seriousness in carrying out exceedingly noble humanitarian work.
The decision to do so does not have much chance of succeeding, based on the fact that most of the nations that have not ratified the treaty are large and powerful, and they secretly want to hold on to and exploit their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against competing nations
However, the very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase its international reputation. This is because it would be a tremendous achievement if the effort is successful. So why not go ahead and try it?
The writer is a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense.
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