Enhancing RI-Australia military ties

Chappy Hakim, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Opinion | Wed, December 05 2012, 11:09 AM

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Indonesia is sandwiched between two great bodies of water: the Pacific and the Indian oceans. Indonesia, with economic growth that has placed the country in a group of countries with gross domestic products greater than US$1 trillion, will continue to grow in importance, both from a political and a security perspective.

Friendly, warm and intimate military relations between Indonesia and Australia have developed significantly since the 1980s. Yet, this does not mean that close relations between the nations had not flourished before that time.

Historically, Australia and Indonesia have been good neighbors since Indonesia became a nation. Australia was one of the first countries that officially acknowledged the independence of Indonesia on Aug. 17, 1945.

Just as in the relations between other nations in the world, there have been highs and lows reflecting the dynamism between Indonesia and Australia, each with its own cultural background and perspective.

Thus, it was inevitable for the two countries to experience some friction in their relations, such as during the period of Sukarno’s konfrontasi, or confrontation, with Malaysia in the early 1960s, or when East Timor seceded from Indonesia in 1999.

Other factors, such as human trafficking, drug smuggling and marine border disputes have also surfaced from time to time.

However, generally speaking, the dynamism of the nations’ bilateral relations has not had any significant impact on the security and stability of the Pacific region.

For the last 50 years, harmonious relations among the member nations of ASEAN and other Pacific nations have never reached the boiling point.

 We can confidently say that any major direct attack on the Indonesian homeland is very unlikely to happen in the short- to medium-term. Bridging the air-sea gap around the coastlines of the region would require a massive transport and logistical effort that only a few powers have the ability to conduct.

However, while the chance of a direct invasion of Indonesia look to be remote, low-level armed clashes are still possible.

Further, the very intimate and close relationship among the military elites of ASEAN member nations and Australia has contributed positively to the security of Pacific Rim. And when we look more deeply, Australia and Indonesia are, in fact, the final decision makers in maintaining cordial ties among Pacific countries.

However, the US, as one of the most massive military powers in the world, also plays a significant role in the region.

Military relations between Indonesia and the US cannot be detached from their pre- and post-Cold War contexts.

Examining Indonesian–US military relations evokes sensitive issues, such as human rights, or terrorism, where al-Qaeda and other extremists are the main actors.

On a larger scale, the prolonged economic crisis afflicting the US and European countries and the magnificent growth shown by Asian countries such as China and India have shown the transition of power, and of strategic policies, to the Pacific region.

During the transition, Indonesia’s military ties with Australia and the US have become more important in stabilizing the region — an outcome that has become quite difficult to predict politically, since developed countries have continued to struggle with economic crises.

Hence, Indonesia and Australia had best refer back to the early 1980s to find a stepping stone to advance the military relations between the nations, whose speedy development has been supported by a willingness evinced on both sides. Both armed forces, for example, have established joint training and education programs for junior officers.

However, military training in the Pacific region should focus on the current border disputes and incidents in the South China Sea.

It is becoming Indonesia’s responsibility, as part of the Pacific community, to be able to oversee any threat to our own national interests. And now, the problem is how to maintain Indonesian-US relations within the framework of the Pacific region amid security challenges.

Closer relations between the US, Australian and Indonesia militaries can contribute to the security of the region. Joint training and education for junior officers are just two ways that closer ties can be fostered in the region.

The writer, a retired air chief marshal, was Air Force chief of staff from 2002 to 2005.

Forging our future in the Asian region (Part 2 of 2)

Richard Woolcott, Adelaide | Opinion | Wed, December 05 2012, 11:13 AM

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We do not consult and talk with China at the Head of Government and Ministerial levels in the regular manner we should in the Asian Century. Although it will be more difficult because of cultural and political differences, political and business and academic leaders should communicate regularly with their counterparts.

This will not be easy but it is important. As a foundation member of the Australian-American Leadership Dialogue, I am conscious of the extent to which that dialogue has deepened the political engagement with the US of Australian politicians on both sides of politics.

We still lack a sufficiently deep engagement with China beyond trade and to understand more fully Chinese views. Just as alliance should not equate to compliance in the case of the US, understanding need not equate to agreement in the case of China.

The recent and present debate about China mainly assumes that Australia has no choice but to support American primacy in Asia against the threat of a perceived rising Chinese hegemony.

Former prime ministers Paul Keating and Malcolm Fraser have argued that this is a simplistic notion which should be challenged.

Similar concerns have been raised by a number of Australian business leaders, academics and commentators. No global regional problem can now be resolved without China’s involvement.

As well as rebalancing our relationships with China and the United States, we need to deepen and strengthen substantially our engagement, as the White Paper has indicated, with Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries. To this list I would add Russia. Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union it is clear that Russia is determined to restore its international influence and is also seeking to play an active role in the Pacific.

It is a nuclear super power, with a major naval presence in the Pacific, and it is an important supplier of energy. It successfully hosted the recent APEC meeting in Vladivostok.

The White Paper sensibly argues the importance of strengthening Australia’s diplomatic network in Asia. It is also a question of diplomatic style. As I have already noted, we need to strengthen regular improved consultation, as a habit, with the main Asian countries on a wide range of issues in advance of major policy decisions, especially those which affect them. A recent example of a failure to do so with negative consequences was the decision to ban live cattle exports to Indonesia.

In the handling of the so-called boat people and asylum seekers, both the government and the opposition, seem to be engaged in a race to the bottom, motivated by domestic politics, in sharp contrast to the handling of the Vietnamese refugees and boat people of the late 1970s and, indeed to the sentiment expressed in the second verse of our National Anthem.

We also need to avoid the perception in Asian countries that racism and religious intolerance remain present in our political and public attitudes. Because of our history, including the White Australia policy, and statements by some politicians we are on a “good behavior bond” in the eyes of many thinking Asians who remain uncertain about the depth and sincerity of our commitment to our Asian and South West Pacific neighborhood.

In the context of our identity as a nation, issues like moving out of the United Nations’ Western European and Others Group (WEOG) and moving into the Asian group and also the establishment of an Australian Republic are important.

They are not merely symbolic. They are significant indicators of the international image Australia should project and how we see ourselves and our place in the world. Occasional references to Australia as being part of the “Anglosphere” are outdated, except in an historical context, and are very unhelpful now to our increasing involvement in Asia.

Also, if one is talking about the future there are some other issues which I believe we need to consider. Australia is a wonderful country, with great potential, which I have represented mostly with pride overseas for many years.

The Asian Century now offers us major new opportunities as the White Paper points out. To take full advantage of them however, Australia must maintain its strong economy and continue the process of economic reform originally launched in the early 1980s by Bob Hawke and Paul Keating. Australia must be competitive if it is to take advantage of the opportunities created by a resurgent Asia.

Despite advancing years I still have causes which I hope to live to see achieved. One was that I did not want to go to my grave as our last representative on the Security Council. This has now been achieved and Australia will be a member of the Council from the 1st of January. Another is the Australian Republic, which I have
already mentioned.

The Republic was not mentioned in the White Paper but I believe that it should not have been overlooked. Australia is still a work in progress. The next constitutional step in the unfolding story of Australia should be the establishment of the Republic which will be, like Federation itself, a defining moment in our history.

Our anachronistic links with the English Monarchy and the fact that our Head of State is still the Queen of England limits the understanding overseas of Australia’s place in the world. The Queen of England is of decreasing relevance to an increasing number of migrants from many countries, including Asia, which have no links with the United Kingdom.

We are now a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society and the severance of this link with the British crown could be a rallying point for all Australians regardless of their origins.

Prediction is always a hostage to fortune and that the prospects for more effective management of common problems at the international level remain uncertain. Complex issues such as potential competition for scarce resources, climate change, continuing poverty, food insecurity, nuclear proliferation and unresolved territorial disputes in the Asia Pacific region all need to be addressed, and this puts a strong focus on how best to achieve more meaningful and coordinated action at a regional level to reduce tensions.

There is, for example, a danger that adversarial attitudes toward China could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. While China can be expected to resist American “hegemony” over the Asian region, it welcomes a continuing constructive US involvement in Asia.

China is not a natural enemy of the US. It is essential that both countries and the other major countries in the region develop the habit of discussing frankly difficulties as they arise within existing cooperative frameworks, such as the G-20 and the East Asian Summit which is a de facto emerging Asia-Pacific community.

Australia faces great opportunities and challenges in the Asian century. My comments about where Australia should be heading are based on sixty years’ experience working inside and outside of Australia and inside the public service and in the private sector, I have put them forward.

But it is for a new generation of forward looking men and women to carry the torch to ensure Australia is in the future a less complacent and a more economically competitive and compassionate country, integrated more fully with its Asia and South West Pacific neighborhood. We need to think big and not small. We need to be less inward looking and more outward looking, especially toward a resurgent Asia-Pacific region.

This article is excerpted from the “2012 Annual Hawke Lecture” delivered by Ambassador Richard Woolcott on Nov. 5 at the Adelaide Town Hall. Mr Woolcott is Australia’s veteran diplomat who has been assigned to many postings, including Jakarta and the United Nations in New York. He was prime minister Hawke’s special envoy in the development and evolution of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) throughout 1989.

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Bob Hawke’s comments

He (Woolcott) spoke about some fundamentally important things and none more important than the question of China and the US and Australia in terms of that relationship.

Now there is so much bloody nonsense talked about China and so good to hear a man of this experience and erudition, clearing away that fog of nonsense.

There is an attempt in some parts in the US and elsewhere to almost equate China with the Soviet Union as the enemy we must have. You know, they suffer from the EDS, the enemy deficiency syndrome. Got to have an enemy.

Now it is absolutely absurd to attempt in any way to equate China with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union by definition was an eudemonistic organization committed to expansion and the conversion around the globe.

China has not got an eudemonistic history. Remember about 600 years ago now, admiral Ho made those seven voyages with the biggest fleet ever heard of, the largest troops, going from China all the way through the Southeast Asia, Asia, right down the east coast of Africa with no attempt to colonize.

Essentially doing what they’re doing today, opening up trading opportunities and trying to go guarantee the safety of trading routes.

The contrast with the situation of the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and comparing with China and the US now, there simply is no comparison. The basic point being of course that in the period of the Cold War there was no economic relationship at all between the Soviet Union and the US.

They didn’t trade with one another, didn’t invest. Whereas in the present situation China and the US fundamentally depend each upon the other and intelligent self-interest will demand that they work out a modus vivendi. I must say that essentially I am optimistic. It’s not good just being optimist, it’s going to work out, we have to work on it but the essentials are there for the emergence of, as I say, a modus vivendi because it’s in the intelligent self-interest of both the US and China that that should happen.

The situation is one where Australia should, as Dick said, recognize that we should have no part of any concept of containment.

I know from my personal experience that the Chinese leadership understand when you tell them that we have a historic relationship with US, we’ll continue that, but it is not either/or. You can continue that relationship but get a burgeoning, developing, growing and deepening relationship with China.

There’s no doubt that the critical issue for the future peace of the region of the world is going to be the quality of the relationship between the US and China and Dick has spelled that out and I agree with every word he has said about that.

Just a couple of other comments. Dick, you rightly referred to the question of the republic. Our friends in Asia don’t understand it. My view, which I have put to Julia (Prime Minister Julia Gillard), is this; that there should be a referendum put to the Australian people in two parts.

One, are you in favor of Australia becoming a republic? The republic to come into effect at the end of the reign of the present monarch. And I believe that you’d get a 95 percent vote if you did that.

I’m not concerned about the Queen as the Queen of England but as head of the Commonwealth she has done an effective job. She hasn’t just been a figurehead, she’s been actively involved and people recognize that.

So we can wait. Let’s make the decision and let it come into effect at that time. I think that makes sense as far as Australia is concerned and it would clear the air as far as our friends in Asia are concerned.

Let me conclude by saying that historically the phrase about Australia and our position in the world was that we suffered from the tyranny of distance. That was coined, the term, in the period when the center of economic gravity was in mid-Atlantic in Europe, England.

But now we do not suffer from the tyranny of distance. We have the benefit of proximity. The benefit of proximity to the fastest growing region in the world and we all have the responsibility, this University, the state government, the federal government and all of us as business people and as citizens, if we want to get the best of our future for our children and grandchildren that is going to be done by forging the most effective, cordial, congenial, productive bonds with the people of Asia in general and I would suggest of China in particular.

This article is part of former prime minister Bob Hawke’s vote of thanks to Ambassador Woolcott’s presentation transcribed from audio recording.
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Eurozone versus East Asia (Part 2 of 2)

Anwar Nasution, Seoul | Opinion | Wed, December 05 2012, 11:16 AM

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As in its programs for the nations hit by the Asian crisis in 1997, the IMF’s programs for the Eurozone periphery also include a wide range of structural reforms as a lending conditionality.

The programs may have long-term merit, but their intermediate impact in restoring confidence and promoting growth is limited.

As they cannot devalue their money, the only instrument to increase the international competitiveness of the Euro periphery countries is to adopt a difficult and costly policy of “internal devaluation”, that is to lower the prices of their goods and services relative to other countries.

This is difficult to implement in the eurozone because of limited labor mobility and price and wage flexibility.

The Asian countries hit by the crisis in 1997 have switched to a flexible exchange rate system and adopted inflation targeting in monetary policy.

In theory, a flexible exchange rate system requires a smaller amount of foreign exchange reserves, as the system reduces the need for market intervention.

The need to build up external reserves has been reduced with the relaxation of the IMF conditionality requirements and creation of a regional safety net, namely the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI).

In reality, for a number of reasons, all Asian countries, including those hit by the crisis in 1997, have built up large external reserves. This was done for several reasons.

The first reason was to limit credit growth induced by capital inflows and export booms and thus temper excess leverage and asset price booms.

The second reason was to enable governments to avoid extreme fluctuations in their currencies in a relatively shallow foreign exchange market, and thus prevent the adverse impacts on the economy and the balance sheets of the banking system and the corporate sector.

Third, was to mitigate fear of inflation from exchange rate fluctuations by providing greater exchange rate flexibility, particularly given the limited technical and institutional capabilities of central banks to implement transparent
inflation targeting.

To achieve inflation targets, central banks could appreciate its currency to lower the prices of imports.

Fourth, building foreign reserves also allowed the undervaluation of exchange rates to be adopted as an instrument to promote an export-oriented development strategy.

Fifth, it acted as a hedge against speculation and foreign exchange instabilities resulting from a shortfall in exports and from capital flow reversals.

Sixth, the foreign reserves gave nations adequate fiscal space when facing a crisis.

However, holding large foreign exchange reserves incurs large fiscal costs from the negative carry and capital loss in case of appreciation.

In the case of Bank Indonesia (BI), the nation’s central bank, its capital is eroding as the interest expense used to buy the foreign exchange is much greater than the rate of returns to its investment.

At present, the annual interest rate for BI’s SBI certificates is 5.75 percent, while the return from its investment in US Treasury bills is close to zero.

The economic costs in term of foregoing domestic investment opportunities are also large.

Following the Asian crisis in 1997, Asia developed local and regional bond markets to reduce reliance on short-term capital for financing long-term investment projects and therefore avoid the double currency and maturity mismatches.

The emergence of local bond markets in the crisis-hit Asian countries started with the issuance of sovereign bonds to recapitalize ailing banks. Country like Indonesia devised new sovereign debt strategies.

During the administration of Soeharto from 1966 to 1998, budget deficits were entirely financed by official development aid from foreign donors.

After the Asian crisis, the budget deficit has been financed by the issuance of sovereign bonds in local and international markets.

The end of financial repression following the crisis has encouraged the corporate sector to raise fund either through capital market or bond market.

Development of regional bond markets are promoted by the Asian Bond Market Initiatives (ABMI), under the auspices of ASEAN+3, and Asian Bond Fund Initiatives, promoted by the Executive Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Bank (EMEAP), and managed by the Regional Office of Bank for International Settlement in Hong Kong.

The writer is a professor of monetary economics at University of Indonesia and a former senior deputy governor of Bank Indonesia.

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UN vote for Palestine marks diplomatic isolation of the US

Abdillah Toha, Jakarta | Opinion | Tue, December 04 2012, 10:12 AM

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When Barack Obama was elected for his first term as US president, there were high hopes in the Middle East and in the Muslim world that the US had finally installed a president who would dare to undertake new and brave foreign policy initiatives, particularly on the unabated conflict between Israel and Palestine.

Obama initially spoke out strongly against Israeli settlements and even coaxed Netanyahu into a partial freeze on settlement construction. But when that freeze expired and Netanyahu rejected Obama’s calls to extend it, Obama dropped the matter altogether.

Since then, as we later witnessed, Obama has shelved all matters relating to Middle East conflicts and imersed himself deeply in Medicare and other domestic affairs. When again early this year he proposed that peace negotiations be revived based on 1967 borders, Netanyahu hurriedly flew to Washington and lectured Obama in the White House on how wrong it was to even start thinking in this direction. Obama once again sealed his lips and dropped the matter.

When Israel bombarded Gaza in December 2008 and in the middle of November this year, to the disappointment of many who had pinned hopes on him, Obama supported Israeli actions and “Israel’s right to defend itself from outside attacks”, rather than stopping the attack on defenseless population of Gaza.

In the meantime the world saw more and more gross violations of human rights and injustice perpetrated by Israel toward Gaza, which has been besieged, blockaded and treated practically as the largest prison in the world.

When last year the UN Security Council blocked Palestinian attempts to become a member of the UN, the only way to get out of the barrier was to go straight to the General Assembly where there is no veto, and that decision was made based on simple majority.

As we now see, despite intense opposition from the US and Israel, Palestine finally got what it wanted — status as a non-member observer state — with the overwhelming majority support of the General Assembly.

The elevation in status, ironically, was granted on the anniversary of the General Assembly vote of Nov. 29, 1947, when British-ruled Palestine was partitioned into Jewish and Arab states, a step that led to the creation of Israel.

The oft-repeated rationale stated by the US and Israel for opposing the vote was that it would only create obstacles toward the peace process. This seemingly illogical reasoning was not acceptable to a majority of the members of the UN, including many European countries.

The unstated concern on the part of the US and Israel is actually a vote that would put Palestine on equal footing with Israel, meaning future talks would be conducted between two states, rather than between a military occupier and a people under occupation.

The vote also grants the Palestinian Authority overwhelming international endorsement for its key position: establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem: the territories captured by Israel in the 1967 war.

There is also an openly stated concern that once the vote is won, the doors will be opened to Palestine to join various UN institutions, including the International Criminal Court, where Palestine would be able to bring cases of war crimes against Israel.

The Geneva Convention forbids occupying powers from moving “parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies”, leaving Israeli officials potentially vulnerable to an ICC challenge. Israel says its settlements are legal, citing historical and Biblical ties to the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The fact that only nine countries voted in line with the US against the resolution shows that the US and Israel have been left isolated by a majority of the world’s nations.

This view is strengthened by the fact that even the conventional allies of US in Europe and Japan see the situation differently from the US and either voted in favor of the resolution or abstained.

Apparently trying to belittle the implications of the vote, the US representative at the UN, Susan Rice, stated: “Today’s grand pronouncements will soon fade and the Palestinian people will wake up tomorrow and find that little about their lives has changed, save that the prospects of a durable peace have only receded”.

The hectic campaigning before the vote and the statements made by various US officials before and after the vote, as well as the threat by a bipartisan US Senate group to cut off US contributions to the UN and aid to Palestine all clearly indicate that the US has failed to see the new reality and the shift in how the world views Israeli behavior thus far.

The US even has failed to appreciate the gravity of the challenge to Israel’s fundamental legitimacy in the world.

To the detriment of the US’ long-term national interest, its foreign policy when dealing with Israel has been so rigid and continuously controlled by the strong Israeli lobby in Washington. It is unfortunate that however well intentioned Obama is, his hands are apparently tied when dealing with foreign policy that involves Israel.

The fluidity of the situation in the Middle East, the rising economic and military power of China, the fiscal and debt problems of the US economy, the failure of military power in the last decade to neutralize and stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, or for that matter to combat terrorism, all should sensibly prompt the US administration, including Congress, to seriously rethink and review its outdated foreign policy.

Present and future US presidents should face off the corporate-controlled mainstream media that regularly misleads the public and come out of their cages to speak directly to the people on the merits of changing the direction of the American way of looking at the world.

To many of us who once admired Obama’s passionate and zealous oratory as a man of principle cannot but feel dispirited by an absence of action to make the world a better place to live in.


The writer is an advisor to the Vice President of Indonesia on strategic matters. The article is his personal opinion

Economic policies in crisis: Eurozone versus East Asia (Part 1 of 2)

Anwar Nasution, Seoul | Opinion | Tue, December 04 2012, 10:15 AM

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Except in Greece, the causes of the present economic crisis in the periphery of the eurozone are similar to those behind the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998: a current accounts crisis.

In contrast, the Greece crisis is closer to the Latin American model of financing of budget deficits by selling sovereign bonds to attract short-term capital inflows. At that time Asian countries had adopted fixed exchange rates.

Robust domestic growth and large interest rate differentials attracted huge short-term capital inflows, mainly channeled through weakly regulated and weakly supervised banking systems.

Banks in turn invested the short-term foreign borrowings in long-term investments, mainly in the unproductive non-traded sector of the economy. This led to a surge in investment and in the prices of land-based assets and caused double currency and maturity mismatches.

By joining a monetary union, the member nations of the eurozone abandoned their nominal exchange rates and monetary policies.

The monetary union rapidly integrated the financial systems of the eurozone and brought about a convergence in nominal interest rates through the free movement of capital across the eurozone and through cross-border credit.

Capital mainly moved from the core countries with high saving rates in the northern part of the
eurozone to the periphery countries in the south, which have traditionally been characterized by low savings rates.

In contrast, savings in Asia were invested in international financial markets and were recycled back into the region through non-regional financial institutions and in non-regional currencies.

Price levels in these nations rose more than in the core against a backdrop of excessive credit expansion with very low interest rates, thus fuelling domestic demand and eroding their international competitiveness.

The property boom during the first 10 years of the eurozone monetary union generated windfall revenue for the central and local governments in the periphery.

Combined with cheap credit after joining the euro, this provided extra resources for all tiers of government for building infrastructure projects and for the expansion of generous social programs.

The eurozone has no fiscal union and no unified debt strategy. Meanwhile, the fiscal and debt rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of the Maastrictht Treaty of 1991 have been continuously violated by all member countries. The European Union (EU) budget is small and not intended for counter-cyclical purposes.

The banking crisis in the eurozone began in Ireland in 2008 and escalated with increasing concern about the health of public finances in the periphery countries.

The haircut taken by the lenders owed Greece’s private debt raised doubts about the ability of the other crisis countries to service their sovereign debt. Debt reduction requires a primary surplus that can be attained only if the growth rate of the economy is higher than that of interest rates.

Debt forgiveness eroded the ability of the European banks to lend after the decline in the market value of sovereign bonds that they used as collateral on wholesale funding.

It also raised yields on the sovereign bonds of the periphery nations and their spread over the same securities issued by the core nations.

The increased cross-border dispersion of interest rates and worries about a euro break-up have encouraged intra-euro capital flight and reversed the financial integration of the eurozone.

In the process, savers and depositors transferred their savings from the periphery nations to perceived safe nations.

Economic agents in the periphery nations have to pay higher interest rates than in the core, and often banks just do not want to lend
at all. The fragmentation of the single financial market has disrupted the bank lending channel of monetary policy.

To provide liquidity to the banking system in the eurozone, the European Central Bank (ECB) provides long-term refinancing facilities (LTR) and buys sovereign debt in secondary markets to drive interest rates down to smooth market fluctuations.

The independent ECB, however, has no mandate to act as a lender of last resort. The EU has no banking union for the whole eurozone with a common supervisory and macroprudential framework, a deposit insurance scheme and bank resolution authority. As in Asia prior to the crisis in 1997, prudential regulation of financial institutions in the eurozone has been weak.

Controlled by political parties, the cajas, the local saving banks in Spain, for example, borrowed excessively from the core nations to lend to real estate developers, to financing white elephant projects and to make contributions to political parties.

The European Financial Stabilization Fund (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) provide emergency lending to stabilize troubled banks. The funds, however, are only made available through the national governments and are channeled to ailing banks.

This financing mechanism only transforms banking liabilities into sovereign liabilities, thus raising borrowing costs of sovereign nations that could lead to fiscal crises.

The writer is a professor of monetary economics at University of Indonesia and a former senior deputy governor of Bank Indonesia.

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Whither women’s rights in ASEAN?

Mahmudin Nur Al-Gozaly, Melbourne | Opinion | Tue, December 04 2012, 10:18 AM

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There have been two recent important moments to remember in relation to women’s rights in Southeast Asia: the adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration on Nov. 18 and the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women on Nov. 25. In the context of ASEAN, a fundamental issue to be borne in mind is the direction of women’s rights.

In Southeast Asia, progress in women’s rights has been quicker than other human rights, such as political and civil rights.

Women issues are maybe perceived to be “soft issues” and thus less likely to compromise the political stability of most member states. In fact, all member countries have already ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which could serve to help them comply with international human rights, especially women’s rights.

Nonetheless, taking a closer look at ASEAN experiences, the region is still facing uncertainty on the future of women’s rights.

First, most existing ASEAN women’s rights documents appear to have failed to address women’s issues. For example, three declarative documents born prior to the ASEAN Charter, namely the 1988 Declaration of the Advancement of Women, the 2004 Declaration against Trafficking in Persons, particularly Women and Children, and the 2004 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women have not overcome gender inequality problems due to their failure to articulate women’s rights in measurable plans, legislation, policies and programs in all areas and at all levels.

Four primary women’s issues in ASEAN, namely economic participation, migration and discriminatory laws, political participation and violence against women (Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN, 2012) cannot be tackled by merely a reliance on the above, inconclusive instruments.

Second, the ASEAN Charter (one might conceives it as “ASEAN constitution”) to which all member states adhere, emphazises the goal of fostering an institution to deal with human rights, but does not define descriptive ways how that objective can be achieved. It gives no mention to particular women’s rights.

Third, the majority of regional instruments are not meant to be legally binding. The Joint Statement and Commitment to Implement Gender Mainstreaming in 2008, for instance, may be considered progress for it recognizes the importance of the CEDAW as a guiding international framework. Yet, it is not legally binding, meaning that it is highly unlikely to tackle various women’s issues in the region.

Fourth, a necessary human rights body mandated by the ASEAN Charter has not reached international human rights benchmarks.

The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR), established in 2009, has come under criticism as its terms of reference (TOR) do not address any single provision on women’s rights.

International Women’s Rights Action Watch (IWRAW) Asia Pacific, for instance, criticized that women’s rights protection in the region not only failed to address the primary issues of women, but also showed failure of the organization to encourage its member states to comply with provisions under the CEDAW (IWRAW, 2008).

In 2010, progress could be seen when the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) was fostered, for it created the opportunity for public participation in the processes of women’s rights protection.

Nevertheless, similar to the AICHR, this commission aims to be an intergovernmental consultative body, so that poses concerns about the independence of its commissioners. Moreover, its TOR appear to put aside women migrant workers issues in the region, whereas they are vulnerable to violence and discrimination in the workplace.

The recent birth of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration has added to the region’s history of women’s rights. In fact, inherent weaknesses appear to exist in the declaration. A number of human rights limitations and the declaration’s non-legally binding nature are among its loopholes, and it carries little weight in the context of improving human rights in the future.

The full observance of the rights of women has a long way to go if there is no strong political will and determination to reform the structural and functional capacities of existing bodies dealing with women’s issues.

ASEAN leaders have only focused on how to strengthen cooperation but have not yet extended it to form an effective framework that can reinforce obligations as set out in numerous regional agreements. More importantly, such reinforcement mechanisms will be a key element for ASEAN member states’ obedience to the rules of the CEDAW.

Since the inception of ASEAN, member countries have maintained norms, such as non-interference, for the purposes of engaging themselves to manage intergovernmental relations. The principle has effectively promoted peace and stability in the region, but has often brought about a low standard of value recognized internationally.

It has hampered each member country in advocating and making judgments on others on issues of human rights. This fact has actually compromised the group’s external reputation and its collective engagement with other communities across the globe.

Therefore, ASEAN needs a binding treaty, encompassing a list of comprehensive women’s rights, related enforcement subsystems and a mandated independent body dealing with women. Member states should either reform existing ASEAN human rights bodies or establish another independent body that can exercise a fundamental monitoring role and an investigative function for women’s rights cases.

Such a body should be enabled to decide whether a state has committed violations against women or has failed to comply with women’s rights provisions under international human rights standards.

But do member states of ASEAN have such strong political will? The past shows otherwise, while the future remains uncertain.

The writer is a diplomat at the Foreign Ministry. The opinions expressed are his own.

Forging our future in the Asian region (Part 1 of 2)

Richard Woolcott, Adelaide | Opinion | Tue, December 04 2012, 10:20 AM

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Why does the Asian Century matter deeply to Australia?

We need to accept the reality that Australia is permanently situated in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific region. I have argued this since I joined the then department of external affairs in 1950.

This has always been a geographic reality but some Australians have yet to come to grips with the implications of this fact. Our adjustment to this reality will largely determine the success or possible failure of our diplomatic, strategic and commercial future.

In our approach to the Asian Century we need to acknowledge that Asia is a western geographical description of a huge region of great political, religious and social diversity.

It includes three monarchies, two of the world’s largest three democracies, four countries still administered by Communist Party governments and the extensive practice of four of the world’s main religions, as well as several philosophies (eg Confucianism) which differ from our own western orientated approach.

The idea that Australians do not have to choose between our history and our geography, is simplistic and has been a politically expedient cliché to avoid considering in depth our relationships with the United States and China.

Our history is our past; some of it noble and some of it shameful. The reality is that our future lies in our geography.

The steadily increasing importance of Asia and the need for Australia to adjust to its geographical environment is of course not new. Successive governments have advocated this but their responses, so far, have yet to reach stated outcomes or government rhetoric and have been far from adequate.

What is new is the urgency for Australia created by the unprecedented transfer of wealth from the West to the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, which will continue into the foreseeable future.

This seismic shift, driven by the spectacular rise of China in particular but also by the rise of India, the continuing economic strengths of Japan and South Korea in addition to the growing potential of Indonesia and Vietnam constitute an historic global turning point to which Australia must respond, if we are not to find ourselves left behind.

We now live in a much more interconnected and technologically advanced world. The Asia Pacific is the region where the world’s major power relationships most closely intersect.

It is where the template for the United States China relationship will largely be shaped. It is also the crucible in which the interrelationships on Asian and major global issues involving United States, China, Japan, Russia, India, Indonesia, South Korea and the main ASEAN countries will be forged.

What should we do to strengthen our place in the world, especially in Asia?

Firstly, I think Australians need a fundamental change to our national psyche, which will be focused more on Asia, than on our well established links with the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe.

We also need a continuous and sustained, rather than a spasmodic, approach to the countries of Asia. Both the White Paper and our membership of the Security Council are relevant to defining more clearly our national identity and place in a changing world.

The most important foreign and strategic policy issue Australia faces today, is the urgent need, to determine a more appropriate, and updated balance in our relations with the United States and China, the emerging superpower.

On this fundamental question our government will need to assess frankly the extent to which the United States, although it will continue to be militarily, if not economically, the strongest power in the world for the foreseeable future, and China are likely to evolve over the next decade.

We should not be afraid of forward looking change. For example, the ANZUS treaty, now 60 years on, is somewhat out of date and should not be regarded as an absolute guarantee of American military support, which it is not, or as a political sacred cow.

The only occasion on which Australia sought American support under ANZUS during Indonesia’s “confrontation” of Malaysia in 1964 in which our forces were involved in conflict with Indonesian forces in Kalimantan, the United States declined. Moreover, I find an increasing number of Australians consider that ANZUS, or our broader military alliance with the United States, has now involved us in three unsuccessful wars — Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, in support of policy decisions taken essentially in Washington.

In my view we should have withdrawn in 2010 when, as the new Prime Minister, Julia Gillard could have reviewed our policy. By the end of 2014, when the last Americans are due to cease fighting, the Taliban will not have been defeated, and a truly democratic government will not be in place.

Because support for the war in Australia is bipartisan (despite majority popular opposition according to our polls), it does not mean it is either right or in our national interest.

The White Paper is a timely and valuable document — I hope the government will make it clear it intends to maintain an unambiguous signal to the Australian public, to China, and to the United States, as well as other countries in the
Asia Pacific region that, while we have some different attitudes from China and are in an alliance with the United States, Australia welcomes the rise of China, opposes policies directed at the “containment” of China and sees no intrinsic reason why China, under its system of authoritarian capitalism, cannot continue to rise peacefully, although it faces major social and economic problems which it will need to address.

The rise of China, if mismanaged, could lead to instability and frustrate progress towards the shared and necessary goal of Asia Pacific regional cooperation, which is the corner stone for future peace, stability and continuing development in the Asian region.

It will be important for Australia, as an ally, to ascertain the precise nature of the United States “pivot to Asia”. Australia’s interest will be to avoid this developing in the context of a “containment” policy, an approach which Secretary of State Clinton has stated will not be the case. But this will need to be judged by actions rather than words.

This article is excerpted from the “2012 Annual Hawke Lecture” delivered by Ambassador Richard Woolcott on Nov. 5 at the Adelaide Town Hall. Mr Woolcott is Australia’s veteran diplomat who has been assigned to many postings, including Jakarta and the United Nations in New York. He was prime minister Hawke’s special envoy in the development and evolution of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) throughout 1989.