Tuesday, February 12, 2013


Historical ambiguity swirls in isles dispute

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The solitary islands of the East China Sea used to be the fancy of poets and fishermen. But today, these rocky outposts are at the heart of a tug of war churning the waters between Asia’s two biggest economies. The cluster of islands, which Japan calls Senkaku and China, Diaoyu, have become the lightning rod for what is seen as the worst downslide in bilateral relations between the two Asian powers, in 40 years.

“What really matters right now is who is physically occupying these islets. It is a fact that China did not show any serious interest in the Senkakus until the late 1960s when it was speculated that they were rich in oil, gas and other mineral deposits in the seas around the islands”, says KV Kesavan, an East Asia specialist at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

The five uninhabited islands that stand 400 kilometers off Okinawa, are submerged in the conflicting historical legacies of China, Japan and Taiwan (also a claimant), thus complicating the sovereignty issue of the isles.

Japan pegs its ownership of the Senkaku to 1895, claiming the islands were terra nullius, or belonging to no one when it took control of them. Japan refutes Chinese claims that it seized the islands following its victory over China in 1895, under the treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Sino-Japanese war.

With Japan’s surrender in the World War II, these desolate islands acquired new owners. The Americans took military control of the Senkaku and Okinawa, transferring them back to Japan only in 1972. Experts say the US intentionally left the ownership issue ambiguous, not wishing to hurt a rapprochement with China under then US president Nixon.

Despite their close trade ties, the stormy exchange between China and Japan, the world’s second and third largest economies continues to escalate.

China squarely rejects Japan’s 19th century assertion of ownership. It traces its legitimacy over the Diaoyu back to the 14th century, to the Ming and Qing dynasties, claiming Chinese envoys and traders discovered the islands during their maritime voyages. The Chinese still harbor deep resentment toward Japan’s military past, accusing it of seizing the islands from China during its imperial expansion. Furnishing ancient maps to bolster its case, China states the islands undisputedly belong to them.

The current intransigence over these islands underscores the importance of historical interpretation, given that the sovereignty issue of the islands is inextricably linked to the chronological lineage of the sparring nations.

With each country pegging its claim to a historical precedent, it makes a resolution of the problem intractable. While every nation has a fundamental right to its own version of history, experts say, there is also an urgent need to accommodate solutions that are acceptable to all.

A similar saber-rattling is reverberating across the South China Sea, making these busy sea-lanes choppier than usual. The theme is familiar — a race for resources fueled by rising nationalism, with China as the common denominator. Vietnam and China are fighting over the Paracel islands that lie southeast of China’s Hainan Island. Further south, high tides are battering the Spratlys, contested by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines.

To assert its ownership, China is using the controversial nine-dash line, a map that demarcates its control over more than 80 percent of the South China Sea, including the Paracel and Spratly islands. This line has riled Southeast Asian nations, who say it violates international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, or UNCLOS. The Philippines, which is protesting Chinese assertions over the Scarborough Shoal, has taken the dispute to a UNCLOS tribunal. A move it says it was forced to take after peaceful negotiations failed.

While no one really knows the extent of oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea, estimates vary. The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) pegs it at around 30 billion barrels, while China estimates nearly 200 billion barrels exist, calling it the “new Persian Gulf”.

Hungry for resources, China is therefore not likely to steer clear from these waters anytime soon. “Resource nationalism”, explains professor Thayer, “has trumped international law and common sense”.

Meanwhile, China is keeping a watchful eye on the United States deepening interest in Southeast Asia, a region with which China shares a flourishing business and economic partnership, and is its top trading partner.

China is wary of US President Barack Obama’s “rebalance” or “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region, a policy translated in Chinese as America’s “return to Asia”. China maintains it wants bilateral solutions with each of the claimants in the South China Sea, and is opposed to the so-called “internationalization” of the issue, involving the United States.

“The Obama administration’s ‘rebalancing’ moves portend a worrying trajectory for the Sino-American strategic relationship,” says Zhu Feng, deputy director of the school of international studies at Peking University. China, according to Zhu, is feeling insecure at what it perceives as America’s growing clout in Southeast Asia. ASEAN countries, he advises, should not alienate China by engaging deeper with the US.

In both the East and South China Seas, history and geography are inextricably linked. The region cannot escape the preponderance of the past, yet it cannot allow it to overshadow the future.

The monsoons lashing Southeast Asia will recede in the coming weeks, but the powerful currents ripping through one of the world’s most vital shipping arteries are unlikely to ease anytime soon. The potential bounty of undiscovered oil and gas reserves that lie deep underneath these waters will continue to test the peace and stability of the region, making it a potentially dangerous military flashpoint.

The writer is a freelance journalist based in Singapore and a former reporter for BBC Asia.

BRICS Profile : GDP in term of PPP ( Purchasing Power Parity


1.         Russia - US$ 15,806
2.         Brazil - US$ 11,289
3.         India - US$ 3,290
4.         China US$ 7,517
5.         South Africa US$ 10,505

Monday, February 4, 2013


ASEAN talk: A lot of room to grow

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ASEAN is set to be the region to be situated in in 2013. After an estimated growth of 5.2 percent purchasing power parity (PPP)-weighted basis, we project the region to grow by 5.3 percent in 2013, outpacing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) global growth estimate of 3.6 percent. The region is expected to see economies such as Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia matching or exceeding their 10-year average rates.

And more is expected from Myanmar in 2013, which has been making international headlines for the right reasons in 2012. Confidence is high, not just domestically but also among foreign investors, where the region attracted 7.6 percent of global foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2011 versus 4.3 percent in 2006. Indeed, since 2000, following the crippling financial crisis, the ASEAN region has outgrown the world by an average of 1.5 PPP. So, can the region keep running at this pace?

 Nothing runs in a straight line. Business cycles still exist. But there is certainly still a lot of room to grow. Despite the world-beating growth rates registered over the last decade or so, the region can still achieve more. The region is hardly at the stage where the factors for growth have become complicated. At a most basic level, the continued process of urbanization will help to drive “easy” growth.

This is the economics of agglomeration. Urbanization helps to improve the overall well-being of an individual by improving access to services and housing. This can boost productivity and consumption. Urbanization helps to increase efficiency as distances are shortened. This lowers costs of businesses or for government to provide infrastructure and necessities. Jobs and supply of labor are concentrated rather than dispersed.

The benefits of clustering together, for individuals and firms, are reflected in the growth activity being concentrated in cities, even if the size of the city is small relative to the whole country. For example, Jakarta accounts for about 17 percent of Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP) but only constitutes 0.04 percent of the country’s land mass and 4.2 percent of the population.

According to the World Bank, the world passed the 50 percent mark for urbanization in 2007. As of 2012, there are still six countries in ASEAN that have not passed the 50 percent point — Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Indonesia just crossed the mid-point at 51.4 percent. Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei are largely urbanized. As a region on the whole, we still have some low hurdles that we can cross to keep growth sustained.

Urbanization is typically associated with growing wealth. Measuring this by GDP per capita and using the world’s experience with urbanization as an example, every percentage point increase in urbanization raises GDP per capita by about US$ 500. Granted, every country’s experience will be different. How well urbanization is planned and implemented could affect the benefits accrued to the process. Or the productivity levels of agriculture, for example, could play a part in determining how much GDP per capita can increase relative to urbanization.

In fact, improper urbanization can result in diseconomies. Indeed, nowadays, when we think of a city, negative connotations such as congestion and pollution come to mind. But the fault does not lie with urbanization, but rather the way it is being carried out. Urbanization facilitates economic growth. And, given the relatively low levels of urbanization across ASEAN, the law of diminishing returns is not likely to be in play yet in any significant manner.

The low hurdles to growth can also be seen in the GDP per capita of countries in ASEAN. Compared to the world’s GDP per capita of $10,000 in 2011, only two countries (Singapore and Brunei) exceed this level (using World Bank data). Malaysia is nearly on par (based on 2011 numbers) but the next nearest country, Thailand, is only about half of the world’s GDP per capita.

At this level of growth, simple improvements to factors of production should help to support growth. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013, Cambodia and Vietnam are still at the most basic stage of economic development — the factor-driven stage. Myanmar and Laos are not included in this report, but would likely be categorized as such, too. Brunei and the Philippines are in the transition stage to efficiency-driven and Thailand and Indonesia are in the efficiency-driven stage.

At the earlier stages of development, adoption of existing technology and practices, investing in infrastructure, provision of basic institutional framework, and health and education facilities, should help to drive growth. In the region, only Singapore is considered to be in the stage of economic development that is innovation-driven. Malaysia is in the transition stage from efficiency-driven to innovation-driven. Hence, the region still has a lot of room for “easy” growth.

While this article highlights the growth potential of the region, growth is not granted. A right mix of fundamentals, policies and confidence is needed. At the moment, there is certainly a nice mix of these ingredients. Confidence is high, and even more so if it is seen in the context of the current weak global environment. Fundamentals are good and policies have been supportive of growth. But nothing stays constant and policies will need to stay
relevant and forward looking.

The writer is the head of Standard Chartered’s Southeast Asia economic research team.

Thursday, January 31, 2013


APEC’s supply chain connectivity and its benefit to agro-industry

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This year, Indonesia will host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference in October 2013, and will hold four Senior Officials Meetings (SOMs), 12 Sector Ministerial Meetings, an APEC CEO Summit and the Economic Leaders Meeting. From Jan. 24 to Feb. 8, APEC, SOM I and related meetings are taking place in Jakarta.

APEC is an intergovernmental forum dedicated to promoting free trade, investment and economic cooperation throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

As stated earlier this month by Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia will include its own national interest issues on the agenda such as economic resilience, improvement of small- and medium-scale business competitiveness, sustainable growth and food security.

One of the key issues in connection with food security is the sustainability of the supply chain in agricultural production.

The agro-industry — broadly described as the post-harvest activities involved in the transformation, preservation and preparation of agricultural products for intermediary or final consumption — occupies a dominant position in manufacturing as developing countries step up their growth.

In Indonesia, the agro-industry has become more important recently as data from the Central Statistic Bureau showed that in 2012, economic growth was spurred by the processing industry, many being agro-industries, responsible for 23.5 percent of Indonesian Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

The agro-industry processes the country’s top commodities, including oil palm, rubber, cocoa, fish, wood and paper.

In world’s food market, there is a growing trend of a global supply chain that involves the agro-industry and agriculture in developing countries.

Data reveals that since 2001 sales of global food processing has increased from US$250 billion in 2001 to more than $300 billion in 2008 (Mulle & Rauppener, 2010; 16).

As evidence indicates tariffs for agricultural goods and food-processing goods in the region have mostly been zero, in the future, the regional food supply chain will be a source of food security in Indonesia.

To be able to channel Indonesian products efficiently, rather than relying on supply from other countries, Indonesia should create an enabling environment and develop the capacity of small-hold farmers.

To create a favorable environment to boost the performance of the agro-industry, international cooperation is needed.

APEC has discussed a supply chain connectivity framework since 2010 and Indonesia is party to the negotiations.

The aim of APEC’s Supply Chain Connectivity Framework is to provide an enabling environment — logistics, transportation, cross-border transit, infrastructure — to APEC economies by developing partnerships among economies.

Out of eight points in the APEC Supply Chain Connectivity Framework, Indonesia has only participated in three: Action plan to improve transport infrastructure, action plan to improve local/regional logistics sub providers and action plan to enhance security and quality of cross-border communications. Indonesia led the analytical work for the logistics infrastructure sub-action plan.

To improve competitiveness in the agro-industry, Christy et.al (2009; 150), prescribes three kinds of enablers, which are essential (trade policy, infrastructure and land tenure), important (financial services, research and development, standard and regulation) and useful enablers (business linkages and business development services).

Referring to this scheme, the Indonesian government needs to improve international diplomacy in the food supply chain in order to increase competitiveness in the regional and world market.

Regarding prerequisites to survive the global food supply chain, developing the capacity of small-hold farmers also needs to be translated in policy language.

Besides the conventional “hardware” tools of the supply chain, such as infrastructure, service sector and trade policies, Indonesia also needs the “software” tool — research and development.

This discussion has been left out of the APEC Supply Chain Connectivity Framework, although under APEC Policy Partnership on Science, Technology and Innovation (PPSTI) the research and development area has been explored.

In some cases, trade among Asia Pacific economies can trigger the development of the agro-industry sector.

Vietnam, for example, has succeeded in developing an agricultural mechanization for rice
processing after the country imported machines from developed countries, thus, improving the quality and value of processing agricultural goods. Vietnam now is the second top rice exporter in the world market.

Why is Asia Pacific important for the Indonesian food supply chain? Economically, China, Japan, Singapore and America are the four principal export destinations for Indonesia.

Australia, an Asia Pacific economy, is also important for Indonesian export and import activities.

While Indonesia provides raw materials other APEC economies such as Australia, Japan, the US and Canada are advanced in service sectors that can bring positive contribution to our supply chain capacities.

Latin American countries, such as Chile, Peru, and Mexico, could be new channels for trade as Trade Minister Gita Wirjawan said that trade between Indonesia and Latin American economies was increasing by 10-20 percent after the ASEAN Latin Business Forum in 2012.

Another reason why Asia Pacific could be important for Indonesian agri-business is that politically Asia Pacific is the nearest extended network of ASEAN Economic Integration as well as ASEAN Integration.

APEC dialogue and agenda will benefit the transformation of the Indonesian economy from agriculture based to agro-industry based. Closer economic cooperation will enable the free movement of machinery and logistic services, which Indonesia needs.

Regional policy dialogue and communication will lead the Asia Pacific economies, including Indonesia, to harmonize sustainable standards of production regionally.

Thus, Indonesia as a chair of APEC Conference in 2013 should be able to pursue the important agenda of the food supply chain as part of national economic competitiveness as well as regional food security.

The writer is a researcher for the trade knowledge network program at the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD). The opinions expressed are personal.

New govt system to oil the wheels of trade in ASEAN

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The government will soon introduce a system that will simplify the procedure for exporters to obtain a Certificate of Origin (C/O) for their products.

This will make it easier for business players to enjoy zero trade tariffs under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).

The new system, which is still a pilot project, will grant some certified exporters the authority to issue invoice declarations for products to be traded within ASEAN.

Currently, the issuance of a C/O is under the authority of the Trade Ministry, which also sometimes involves officials at the regional administration, causing a long chain of bureaucracy. “Through this project, we aim to further facilitate trade within ASEAN and also increase the utilization rate of the [AFTA] preference,” the ministry’s newly-appointed director for ASEAN cooperation, Djatmiko Bris Witjaksono, told The Jakarta Post in Jakarta on Thursday.

As agreed during the ASEAN Summit in Cambodia last year, Indonesia will carry out the pilot project aimed at enabling business players, especially small and medium enterprises, to reap greater benefits under the AFTA, particularly the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (Atiga), along with the Philippines and Laos.

Under a different arrangement, a similar project was earlier conducted by Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in 2011.

Despite the low tariff, or zero percent tariff for trade between ASEAN members made available through the C/Os, only a few business players utilized the facility.

Out of Indonesia’s total exports to ASEAN members in 2011 of around US$40 billion, only 30 percent were covered by the facility, according to Trade Ministry statistics.

The figure was higher compared to the average utilization by other ASEAN members, which stood at 15.8 percent out of overall exports to Indonesia during a similar period.

The self-certification project would be part of the key measures that Indonesia took to anticipate the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (by 2015), Djatmiko said.

Apart from this project, the government would also improve the country’s national single-window system to smooth the flows of trade within the Southeast Asia region.

The system would prompt cross-border traders to submit regulatory documents at a single location.

Indonesia plans to ratify several agreements, such as the trade in goods in transit and the ninth package of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS).

A joint assessment of the score cards reviewing the progress of each ASEAN member toward the formation of the region’s single economic community shows that Indonesia achieved a total score of 82 percent last year, still below neighboring countries Malaysia and Thailand.

As envisioned by the AEC 2015 Blueprint, the community will be supported by four pillars: a single market and production base, a highly competitive economic region, a region with equitable economic development and a region fully integrated into the global economy.

The establishment of the community will continue earlier efforts made through the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) started in 1992.

Through the free trade pact, 99.11 percent of tariffs in the ASEAN-6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) have already been scrapped since 2010, while 98.86 percent
of tariffs of the ASEAN-4 (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) have been reduced to between 0 and 5 percent.

RI’s reemergence through summit diplomacy

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Early in February, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will join UK Prime Minister David Cameron and Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf in Monrovia, Liberia, in leading the third UN High-Level Panel Meeting for the Post 2015 Development Agenda discussions.

The discussions will continue in Bali in March, before a report is produced for the UN Secretary General in May, to serve as a basis for a new development agenda. Following the meeting in Africa, the President is expected to join the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Summit in Cairo to address the needs of the Ummah.

Later in 2013, he will join G20 leaders in St Petersburg to discuss economic inclusiveness and development at the premier forum for international economic cooperation.

At the regional level, Indonesia will host Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Bali, where leaders of the Asia Pacific will be encouraged to promote deeper and more inclusive cooperation to continue its role as the engine of world economic growth.

Also in 2013, Indonesia will continue its active role at the ASEAN Summit in Brunei Darussalam, in preparation for the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, as well as a peace dialogue at the East Asia Summit (EAS).

Of course there are other events like the Bali Democracy forum and state visits where leaders hold tête–à–tête meetings not only to enhance bilateral relations, but to also address international issues.

In 2011 and 2012, Indonesia summitry was just as active: Chairing ASEAN in 2011, facilitating dialogue for Thai-Cambodian border disputes, voicing Timor Leste’s ASEAN membership, convincing the US
of Myanmar’s democratic process and finalizing the guidelines of the  Declaration of Conduct (DoC) for South China Sea (SCS) discourse at the EAS.

In 2012, Indonesia facilitated dialogue regarding the Muslims Rohingya case; the ASEAN six point principle for the SCS and a three point solution for Syria at the D8 Summit.

All of these activities indicate the trust and expectation of world leaders and the international community toward Indonesia’s role in fostering peace, justice and prosperity. A trust based not only on Indonesian diplomacy, but also President Yudhoyono’s chemistry with other world leaders.

The players have indeed changed since the summits began to proliferate after 1945. And although some international relations analysts suggest its effectiveness had waned by 2000 (due to meeting fatigue, lower risks of regional wars, higher costs and the demand for greater grassroots benefits), the global environment continues to change for the worst, both economically and in terms of security.

The Euro crisis and the stagnant US economy (still) have made affect the world economy; pockets of tension in East Asia and the continuing political dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East has led world leaders to a deadlock when producing solutions.

New emerging countries since the G20 Summit in 2008 have been tasked with new responsibilities, taking away the dominance of G7/8 forums. Indonesia, along with China, India, Brazil and South Africa are those new players at the global level. With business meetings at the sidelines of meetings, Summit diplomacy is now also quite attractive for private sector.

For Indonesia, this is a big leap after all it has been through since 1998. Back then Indonesia’s economy collapsed, there were the May riots in Jakarta and violence in Sambas and Timor Leste colored the international media and the minds of other world leaders and observers.

Today however, after the hard work by all Indonesians, the country is viewed by the world with greater esteem, after producing a peace deal in Aceh, reconciling with Timor Leste and its active role in the G20, ASEAN, APEC and EAS. Other factors such as a thriving democracy, the fourth largest population, a growing middle class, 6 percent economic growth and a US$36 trillion expected market growth for the next five years means the country is quite attractive.

Of course this doesn’t mean all problems are solved. As a developing country, Indonesia still suffers daunting development challenges and the recurring challenge of managing 250 million people from various ethnicities, spread over islands with test-case regional autonomy governance.

Although these challenges are real, the world still looks to Indonesia to address international problems, such as plotting a new global development agenda, preserving regional stability in Asia and especially producing a solution for Palestine.

With many new world leaders arising in Greater East Asia, some leaders are returning to the West and are some retiring, it is encouraging to see that Indonesia’s leadership has ensured its own reemergence in the history books of international affairs.

Whether we believe it or not, Indonesia is now one of those countries expected to bridge dialogue between leaders in the new Asia Pacific century.

That is one of Indonesia’s leadership legacies we can all be proud to admit to and call our own.
The writer is an assistant to presidential special staff. The views expressed are personal.

Wednesday, January 30, 2013


Are we losing more islands after Sipadan-Ligitan dispute?

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On Jan. 19, okezone.com reported that Indonesia’s Semakau Island had been claimed by Singapore. In Indonesia, news about island claims, sovereignty issues and international disputes easily attract more attention compared to other matters. Such issues are sexy content for the media to play with.

In response to that, the governor of Kepulauan Riau, HM Sani sent a letter to Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, for clarification. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that there was more than one island called Semakau and the one in question was in fact Singapore’s.

The issue came about because Semakau Island was depicted on an official Singaporean map, apparently the governor thought that the island depicted on the Singaporean map was Indonesia’s.

It is now clear that was not the case. Ramadhan Pohan, deputy chairman of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Commission I, also clarified the issue by providing comprehensive data obtained from both Indonesia and Singapore (JPPN.com, Jan. 22).

This case reminds us of another similar case in 2005 regarding Berhala Island.

It was found that Malaysia promoted Berhala Island as a tourist destination and some parties in Indonesia thought that the one promoted was Indonesia’s. In fact there are several islands called Berhala and the one promoted was Malaysia’s.

Lesson learned: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are similar in many aspects, so it is not uncommon to have similarities even island names.

Now, enough with Semakau and Berhala: The most important question is “are we really losing more islands?” Is it really true that the case of Pulau Sipadan and Ligitan, which Indonesia lost in 2002, can happen to other islands?

The case of Sipadan and Ligitan is always cited whenever cases concerning sovereignty over islands are raised. Indonesia, with thousands of islands, is likely to face similar issues concerning island claims and even sovereignty disputes in the future. How are we required to anticipate these potential issues in the future?

First and foremost, it is important for us, citizens, and especially government officials, to know the geographic configuration of our country as well as other neighboring countries. It certainly is not nice to panic or to be confused about such a serious thing as sovereignty just because we do not know that other country shares island names.

Second, it is important to understand that the sovereignty of an island that has been officially part of one country’s territory cannot be taken over easily by other country through effective occupation.

The case of Sipadan and Ligitan is completely different. Malaysia won the case for the reason effective occupation because those islands were ownerless (terra nullius) when they were disputed by Indonesia and Malaysia.

Many people misunderstood, thinking that the two islands were once Indonesia’s and then taken over by Malaysia.

It was not the case. Indonesia and Malaysia claimed the islands and they did not manage to settle the dispute through negotiation so they brought the case before the International Court of Justice. The court then decided the case based on a principle called “effectivités” or effective occupation. It confirmed that Malaysia and its predecessor, Great Britain, had done a lot to the ownerless islands compared to Indonesia and its predecessor, the Netherlands, had done.

As a senior government official once said and I agree, Indonesia did not lose any islands it just failed to add two more. This might sound like a joke but the statement explains the situation nearly perfectly.

Third, it is important to take care of small islands — especially the outer ones. For an archipelagic country like Indonesia, those small outer islands are essential in defining baselines, the imaginary lines from which maritime areas are measured. It is worth noting that taking care of those islands should not be motivated by a phobic reason: Not to lose them.

We take care of small islands not because we are afraid that other countries will take them away from us but for the prosperity of people residing on or around the islands.

Sending a lot of people from the capital to hold a flag-raising ceremony on a small island might be a good idea but we should not forget that people residing in the island need more than just a-few-hours of happiness on Independence Day.

A flag-raising ceremony can certainly boost the spirit of nationalism but it will not solve the problems they are facing: Education, health, transportation, to name a few.

Fourth, it is a good idea to have a general understanding of cartography, how maps depict territory of countries. It is important to understand that the inclusion of an island belonging to country A in a national map of country B does not necessarily mean a sovereignty claim by country B. A complete Indonesian map, for example, may also show Singapore and other neighboring countries.

The use of color, tone, intensity and legend in particular will tell what a map really means by showing an object of territory.

So, are we losing more islands? As much as we should take care of small islands, we are not doing it merely to prevent other countries from claiming them.

We are doing it for more practical reason: Prosperity. So no, we are not losing more islands.

The writer is a lecturer at the department of geodetic engineering, Gadjah Mada University. He is currently an Alison Sudradjat Award Scholar for research fellowship at the Australian National Center for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong. The views expressed are his own