The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Wed, 12/28/2005 5:13 PM A | A | A | Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta - Klipping The Jakarta Post
If ever there was a time for Indonesia to have a banner year in foreign affairs, it was 2005.
All the elements were in place: A newly elected president who emerged as a poster boy for emerging democracy; a leader who -- compared to his bumbling and lumbering predecessors -- acted with the dignified flair becoming of a president in the international spotlight; global sympathy in the wake of the tsunami; and domestic political stability unprecedented since the fall of Soeharto in 1998.
This arsenal of sympathy, democracy and stability was a powerful tool for improving the international perception of Indonesia as a responsible, dependable and resourceful actor in international fora.
But propriety will only get you so far in the global forum. Talk is cheap and glossy veneers can be delusional.
In the end, style can never replace substance.
In all, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made at least seven excursions abroad, for bilateral or summit meetings, covering 14 countries. That was some one-and-a-half months abroad.
In almost all his foreign visits, the President was greeted with glowing praise. Finally, Indonesians had a president who they could be proud to parade around. Someone who could deliver speeches coherently and fluently in a foreign language, a man whose physical presence was undeniable in photo lineups with regional leader. At last there was a leader to challenge Singapore's Lee Hsien Loong in the height department.
The President -- with the able assistance of the foreign ministry -- certainly won several foreign policy trophies through his diplomacy.
Indonesia also hosted the Asian-African Summit and a post-tsunami summit, along with several other high-level meetings.
It put down its foot in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) as it pushed forward the concept of enlarging the East Asia Summit to include India and Australia, to the chagrin of summit host Malaysia.
Several breakthroughs were also achieved, not least the resumption of military ties with the United States.
In many ways, it was a year of reassertion.
Jakarta was once again showing the Javanese traits of a (sub) regional leader -- it may be shy in admitting that it wants to lead ASEAN, but gets upset when someone else tries to.
Poor and full of pandemonium though the country may still have been domestically, its coherent foreign policy was forcing the region to again take account of Indonesian wishes.
Yes, 2005 was a year in which Indonesia staked its claim as the first among Southeast Asian equals.
Susilo and the boys at Pejambon (the street where the foreign ministry is located) were doing all the old things right.
Which thus begs the question: What about the new?
What ""tangible"" indication was there that our rejuvenated foreign policy consistently reflected the new dynamics of Asia's newest bastion of democracy?
There was no shortage of high speeches and platitudes -- diplomats and politicians are attuned to the fine art of empty promises and deception -- but there was little ""unadulterated"" policy action which reflected what Indonesia is today.
Pretentious though it may seem, it is only natural that this country promote, defend and act to uphold the values which its people's have so painfully suffered for.
Several years ago a young journalist in an article in this newspaper asked the question, ""Why has RI's foreign policy become so foreign?""
That same query should again be raised given Jakarta's consistency in not being consistent with the nation's emerging values.
Persistently turning the other cheek, or providing face-saving alternatives to Myanmar, it took international reproach before Indonesia and ASEAN started to budge on its from its stance on the military regime there.
Another case of style over substance is the fact that despite all the standing ovations he received abroad -- and even hosting a special summit on investment -- the President's charm has not succeeded in wooing investors to this country.
Of course, the burden should not all be placed on the execution of foreign policy. But it shows this inconsistency of policy implementation within the administration, and the fallibility of exterior beauty.
""Attractive, but difficult,"" was the realistic assessment of a prospective investor after standing to applaud Susilo during a speech abroad.
Despite the long hours of brainstorming and stacks of papers by officials at Pejambon, there has also been no realistic vision of how Indonesia will place itself in Asia's evolving geostrategic balance. It seems to be neither here nor there.
Perhaps it is too early to hedge bets, but based on the President's statements there seems to be no clue about where the third largest country in Asia (Indonesia) will position itself vis-a-vis China and India.
""In the middle"" would be the crude answer, but this is not a simple case of parking a car between a container truck and a bulldozer.
Both India and Indonesia have been reaching out more visibly to each other this year, but what this signifies in the long run we dare to contend that not even the President knows.
So a banner for Indonesia's foreign policy in 2005? ""Definitely no, but it wasn't bad.""
A better 2006? ""Perhaps.
Monday, November 21, 2011
East Asia must show leadership to keep trade free
Hadi Soesastro, JAKARTA | Mon, 03/16/2009 11:05 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
The top priority of the London Summit will have to be cleaning up the global financial system. This has become crystal clear as various other measures taken at the national and global levels have shown meager results.
But keeping global trade open must be given a prominent place on the Summit’s agenda. Leaders must go beyond airing the usual rhetoric, which many have done. Concrete action must be taken.
Global trade has already shrunk and will continue to do so unless real action is taken. In fact, trade could become a fundamental part of the solution to the global economic crisis. Concluding the Doha Round could result in a significant global stimulus package being issued in the form of a trade deal.
But most importantly, it could help reverse the growing economic nationalism that is being manifested in various forms of trade and financial protectionism.
Leaders must provide the political push to keeping trade open. In their informal meeting at Davos recently, trade ministers shared with each other their difficulties in facing rising political pressures at home, leading to the introduction of different forms of trade barriers. They remain uncertain as to whether a global trade deal can be reached this year.
Until then, they will find themselves fighting a battle on their own and without an effective weapon. The Indonesian trade minister, for instance, has recently introduced domestic transparency procedures in the decision making process for protectionism in an attempt to minimize the damage.
The London Summit is where words must be translated into action. President Obama will be there and he will participate with a clean slate. The many noises that have come from Washington D.C., including the “Buy America” provision, have been worrying.
Obama has clearly and unequivocally signaled his opposition to that provision. He also pledged
to curb direct payments to agricultural producers. President Obama is the one that can provide the necessary leadership for open trade at home as well as globally. A clear signal from him at the London Summit would have a tremendous impact.
But the burden of leadership cannot be placed on Obama alone. President Obama’s leadership at home cannot be sustained if he is unable to show that others will favorably respond to his initiatives. East Asia must share this burden by making significant concessions. This is in East Asia’s self-interest, as the region has a very great stake in global trade.
To do so, East Asia must be organized and come up with a common stance on the key issues affecting regional and global trade and, most importantly, on how they can play a shared leadership role.
Commitment on enforcing new measures must come from the highest political level. Leaders from many East Asian countries have reiterated their commitment to “promoting free trade” but they have not been explicit in “enforcing a stand still”.
East Asia can offer credible shared leadership on trade if regional countries agree to a number of things. East Asians should be confidence that they can afford to do so.
Japan was the first country to pledge to provide resources to the IMF. At Davos the Japanese Prime Minister made another pledge to provide aid to other East Asian countries to help overcome the crisis.
China has demonstrated its “openness” to trade by dispatching a trade delegation on a “Buy European” campaign. But they and other East Asian countries need to focus on collective efforts to be able to exercise effective leadership in order to keep trade open.
First, they must commit to using their actual tariff rates, rather then their bound tariff rates, as a reference. This is the time for East Asia to make that move. They need not make this a part of their negotiations in the Doha Round, but they can rest assured that this significant decision will not go unnoticed there.
East Asian countries can proudly show that actual tariff rates in the region have fallen much faster than in other regions since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. However, their bound tariff rates remain high.
Second, East Asian countries need to support this move by setting up a system of compliance monitoring. In their recent meeting in New Zealand, the APEC business advisory council (ABAC), representing the business community in the broader, called for the creation of such a system.
East Asian (or APEC) governments should grab this proposal and direct it back to the business community to immediately establish an “independent” monitoring system.
Unlike the EU, East Asia (or APEC) does not have a body such as the European Commission to undertake that task. It appears that even in Europe this cannot be taken for granted, as indicated by Danish Premier Rasmussen’s recent calls to the Commission to make sure that EU rules on free trade be upheld by its members. The system must focus on protectionist measures that come in disguised forms.
It may well be that a regionwide consultation is in the offing. At the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Thailand at the end of February, the Singaporean Prime Minister, as chair of APEC 2009, took the initiative to have meetings with the Indonesian President and the ASEAN Chairman (Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva), who will both be at the London Summit.
They discussed the global crisis as well as trade issues and regional economic integration. The three leaders need to follow this up with approaches to other East Asian G20 leaders, including Australia and India. South Korea, the next chair of the G20, should immediately be drawn into this endeavor.
An East Asian role in the global context helps to strengthen its own regional endeavors, including deepening regional economic integration. East Asia can also demonstrate to the world the real meaning of “open regionalism”, namely to organize the region for the well-being of the region and the world at large.
The writer is executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.
The top priority of the London Summit will have to be cleaning up the global financial system. This has become crystal clear as various other measures taken at the national and global levels have shown meager results.
But keeping global trade open must be given a prominent place on the Summit’s agenda. Leaders must go beyond airing the usual rhetoric, which many have done. Concrete action must be taken.
Global trade has already shrunk and will continue to do so unless real action is taken. In fact, trade could become a fundamental part of the solution to the global economic crisis. Concluding the Doha Round could result in a significant global stimulus package being issued in the form of a trade deal.
But most importantly, it could help reverse the growing economic nationalism that is being manifested in various forms of trade and financial protectionism.
Leaders must provide the political push to keeping trade open. In their informal meeting at Davos recently, trade ministers shared with each other their difficulties in facing rising political pressures at home, leading to the introduction of different forms of trade barriers. They remain uncertain as to whether a global trade deal can be reached this year.
Until then, they will find themselves fighting a battle on their own and without an effective weapon. The Indonesian trade minister, for instance, has recently introduced domestic transparency procedures in the decision making process for protectionism in an attempt to minimize the damage.
The London Summit is where words must be translated into action. President Obama will be there and he will participate with a clean slate. The many noises that have come from Washington D.C., including the “Buy America” provision, have been worrying.
Obama has clearly and unequivocally signaled his opposition to that provision. He also pledged
to curb direct payments to agricultural producers. President Obama is the one that can provide the necessary leadership for open trade at home as well as globally. A clear signal from him at the London Summit would have a tremendous impact.
But the burden of leadership cannot be placed on Obama alone. President Obama’s leadership at home cannot be sustained if he is unable to show that others will favorably respond to his initiatives. East Asia must share this burden by making significant concessions. This is in East Asia’s self-interest, as the region has a very great stake in global trade.
To do so, East Asia must be organized and come up with a common stance on the key issues affecting regional and global trade and, most importantly, on how they can play a shared leadership role.
Commitment on enforcing new measures must come from the highest political level. Leaders from many East Asian countries have reiterated their commitment to “promoting free trade” but they have not been explicit in “enforcing a stand still”.
East Asia can offer credible shared leadership on trade if regional countries agree to a number of things. East Asians should be confidence that they can afford to do so.
Japan was the first country to pledge to provide resources to the IMF. At Davos the Japanese Prime Minister made another pledge to provide aid to other East Asian countries to help overcome the crisis.
China has demonstrated its “openness” to trade by dispatching a trade delegation on a “Buy European” campaign. But they and other East Asian countries need to focus on collective efforts to be able to exercise effective leadership in order to keep trade open.
First, they must commit to using their actual tariff rates, rather then their bound tariff rates, as a reference. This is the time for East Asia to make that move. They need not make this a part of their negotiations in the Doha Round, but they can rest assured that this significant decision will not go unnoticed there.
East Asian countries can proudly show that actual tariff rates in the region have fallen much faster than in other regions since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. However, their bound tariff rates remain high.
Second, East Asian countries need to support this move by setting up a system of compliance monitoring. In their recent meeting in New Zealand, the APEC business advisory council (ABAC), representing the business community in the broader, called for the creation of such a system.
East Asian (or APEC) governments should grab this proposal and direct it back to the business community to immediately establish an “independent” monitoring system.
Unlike the EU, East Asia (or APEC) does not have a body such as the European Commission to undertake that task. It appears that even in Europe this cannot be taken for granted, as indicated by Danish Premier Rasmussen’s recent calls to the Commission to make sure that EU rules on free trade be upheld by its members. The system must focus on protectionist measures that come in disguised forms.
It may well be that a regionwide consultation is in the offing. At the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Thailand at the end of February, the Singaporean Prime Minister, as chair of APEC 2009, took the initiative to have meetings with the Indonesian President and the ASEAN Chairman (Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva), who will both be at the London Summit.
They discussed the global crisis as well as trade issues and regional economic integration. The three leaders need to follow this up with approaches to other East Asian G20 leaders, including Australia and India. South Korea, the next chair of the G20, should immediately be drawn into this endeavor.
An East Asian role in the global context helps to strengthen its own regional endeavors, including deepening regional economic integration. East Asia can also demonstrate to the world the real meaning of “open regionalism”, namely to organize the region for the well-being of the region and the world at large.
The writer is executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.
ASEAN must include US in talks on South China Sea
Jessica Brown, Sydney | Mon, 07/04/2011 9:53 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
Chastened by its failure to successfully negotiate a settlement in the recent border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia has been noticeably silent on the recent explosion of tensions in the South China Sea.
Only a few months ago, Indonesia was positioning itself as an ‘honest broker’ in the South China Sea dispute. Now it appears much more circumspect. Jakarta knows that only through wider regional discussions, which must include the US, can the quarrels be resolved.
Indonesia took up the rotating chair of ASEAN at the beginning of the year with a great sense of confidence. The largest country in the region, with a booming economy and flourishing — if messy — democracy, Jakarta saw the ASEAN chair as a good opportunity to solidify its credentials as the region’s de facto leader.
In January Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa signaled that the long-running series of territorial disputes in South China Sea, which had again flared up during 2010, would be a key focus of Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts.
Since then, Natalegawa has been distracted by another territorial spat closer to home.
Following an outbreak of fighting between Thailand and Cambodia around the disputed Preah Vihear temple in February, which resulted in 10 deaths, Natalegawa flew to Bangkok and Phnom Penh attempting to negotiate a solution.
In its capacity as ASEAN chair, Jakarta agreed to send unarmed Indonesian observers to monitor the situation on both sides of the border.
Yet despite months of frantic diplomatic effort, including a crisis meeting on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in May, the dispute remains unsolved. In spite of Indonesia’s efforts at a regionally brokered solution, Cambodia has now taken its case to the International Court of Justice.
If ASEAN can’t resolve a territorial quarrel between its own member states, can it expect to broker a solution in the high-stakes South China Sea?
The Cambodia-Thailand border dispute is a reminder of the limited role that ASEAN can realistically play in assuring regional security.
The only real option available to ASEAN in the South China Sea disputes, and to Indonesia as its chair, is to continue encouraging the US to play an active role in the region to counterbalance to China’s growing weight.
This does not mean ASEAN is irrelevant. China maintains that the South China Sea disputes should be settled on a bilateral basis. But the ASEAN states involved – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – recognize that only by acting in concert can they hope to stand up to their powerful northern neighbor.
Strength in numbers has long been ASEAN’s raison d’être. Formed in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, the founding five members thought that sticking together would give them the best chance of standing up to the circling superpowers.
A pact of non-interference in each other’s internal security affairs enabled them to put their own animosities aside. But it also meant that security cooperation always lagged well behind economic integration. It has been through the US-led ‘hub and spokes’ system of bilateral relationships, rather than formal multilateral agreements, that security cooperation in Southeast Asia has largely taken place. ASEAN’s key role has been to bring the major players together.
This should again be its role in the South China Sea.
Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, could push for the issue to be resolved in a wider ASEAN-led multilateral forum such as the East Asia Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum, where the presence of the USA might force China to moderate its behavior. Jakarta understands that keeping both China and the USA inside the ASEAN tent is crucial.
Last year Indonesia welcomed US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s offer to mediate the dispute, made in response to China’s claim (which it has since backed away from) that Beijing would now consider the South China Sea a ‘core interest’ on par with Taiwan and Tibet.
ASEAN’s subsequent invitation for America (along with Russia) to join the East Asia Summit was widely interpreted as an attempt to dilute China’s growing influence in the grouping, giving the Southeast Asian states more bargaining power in areas such as the South China Sea.
Jakarta’s failure to broker a deal between Cambodia and Thailand is a reminder that settling territorial quarrels is not ASEAN’s strong suite. It is a cautionary warning against institutional overreach. ASEAN is not the best forum in which to tackle the South China Sea disputes.
Where ASEAN can play a role is in bringing the major regional powers together, and giving the smaller Southeast Asian states a bigger voice than they could muster alone.
Indonesia’s recent silence on the issue suggests it has realized this.
The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) in Sydney and author of Jakarta’s Juggling Act, published by the CIS
Follow our twitter @jakpost
& our public blog @blogIMO
| | | | | | | | Comments (7)
ken | Thu, 07/07/2011 - 09:07am
if those CNN and other western tv's said about asia nothing but bad, maybe you have bias side toward western news, wondering what you think about our local tv stations toward our own people and politics and everything else? have you thought about arab springs to promote democracy and freedom?
Report Abuse
Agus | Wed, 06/07/2011 - 14:07pm
Asians still do not realise how Western government would ONLY do things for their self interest. Just look at CNN or BBC, western TV and how they project negatively the image of ASIA!. We need to wake up and realise that inviting US to this region would create more conflict and war!!!. All we need is economic progress and peace!!!
Report Abuse
Brian | Wed, 06/07/2011 - 14:07pm
Why do we need US at all?. Asians can handle and discuss things better than Western counterparts. Asians don't need anymore "DIVIDE and CONQUER" policy by any western governments. We've had enough of the colonialism and time to set our future together. Besides, Asia does not need anymore war caused by the US and its allies!!!!
Report Abuse
access_access | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 11:07am
Chastened by its failure to successfully negotiate a settlement in the recent border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia has been noticeably silent on the recent explosion of tensions in the South China Sea.
spot on ! and that kind of attitude is what we expect from a loser, no? just don't exert yourself too hard or don't bite off more than you can chew.
it can't even prevent its citizens from being slaughtered overseas. have mercy on this current ASEAN chairman.
if those ASEAN members should feel the need to include the US, then those members don't have self-confidence and trust among themselves and they might as well join NATO instead.
Report Abuse
Mr. Lux | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 10:07am
It seems that Indonesia is quite and not active in their Asean Chair this year in both clash Cambodia and Thailand as well as the burning issue of South China Sea.
China is more agressive and non raison d'etre in the region.
the USA should play a greater role to balancing powers.
Asean countries expect Indonesia does much more. Solving the South China Sea problem is the TOP priority of Asean.
I do hope the chairman Asean can bring the issue at ARF in Bali.
As Asean citizens and want a Asean zone peaceful, safe prosperous, we look and see.
Report Abuse
Outsider | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 08:07am
Indonesia needs to support its fellow Asean members and be firm on China. Much of the area now claimed by China has rightly been claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam previously.
The 200 nautical mile economic exclusion zone has been recognised by most countries and should be used where possible in this dispute.
The best article I have seen on the topic is:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349
Report Abuse
hai win | Mon, 04/07/2011 - 11:07am
I agree with the author's suggestion for ASIAN-initiated and US-participated diplomacy for South China sea dispute. I may also add Japan, Australia and India as contributors to dilute some pressure on China. Indonesia is in the best position to lead this effort.
My reasons, in addition to the author's are as follow:
1.Indonesia should look at their recent setback on Cambodia-Thailand mediation as motivation to to take on the SCS with more urgency: before any conflict become too distorted, overtly emotional and bloody which Philippines/Vietnam and China potentially will be. Remember, after Indonesia the ASEAN chair will rotate to Cambodia and Laos with a lot less interests and capabilities.
2. ASIAN must be united in dismissing Chinese demand of bi-lateral negotiation. I did not work before and less likely to work in the future as China has become a more significant economic and military power. Since the SCS dispute involves several claimants of diverse interests and ambitions, what China may offer one will invariably be rejected by the other. More significantly, since China assumes SCS as backyard pond only international powers can force them to reconsider or bear consequences. Presently,the best standard available is UNCLOS.
Report Abuse
Chastened by its failure to successfully negotiate a settlement in the recent border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia has been noticeably silent on the recent explosion of tensions in the South China Sea.
Only a few months ago, Indonesia was positioning itself as an ‘honest broker’ in the South China Sea dispute. Now it appears much more circumspect. Jakarta knows that only through wider regional discussions, which must include the US, can the quarrels be resolved.
Indonesia took up the rotating chair of ASEAN at the beginning of the year with a great sense of confidence. The largest country in the region, with a booming economy and flourishing — if messy — democracy, Jakarta saw the ASEAN chair as a good opportunity to solidify its credentials as the region’s de facto leader.
In January Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa signaled that the long-running series of territorial disputes in South China Sea, which had again flared up during 2010, would be a key focus of Indonesia’s diplomatic efforts.
Since then, Natalegawa has been distracted by another territorial spat closer to home.
Following an outbreak of fighting between Thailand and Cambodia around the disputed Preah Vihear temple in February, which resulted in 10 deaths, Natalegawa flew to Bangkok and Phnom Penh attempting to negotiate a solution.
In its capacity as ASEAN chair, Jakarta agreed to send unarmed Indonesian observers to monitor the situation on both sides of the border.
Yet despite months of frantic diplomatic effort, including a crisis meeting on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in May, the dispute remains unsolved. In spite of Indonesia’s efforts at a regionally brokered solution, Cambodia has now taken its case to the International Court of Justice.
If ASEAN can’t resolve a territorial quarrel between its own member states, can it expect to broker a solution in the high-stakes South China Sea?
The Cambodia-Thailand border dispute is a reminder of the limited role that ASEAN can realistically play in assuring regional security.
The only real option available to ASEAN in the South China Sea disputes, and to Indonesia as its chair, is to continue encouraging the US to play an active role in the region to counterbalance to China’s growing weight.
This does not mean ASEAN is irrelevant. China maintains that the South China Sea disputes should be settled on a bilateral basis. But the ASEAN states involved – Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – recognize that only by acting in concert can they hope to stand up to their powerful northern neighbor.
Strength in numbers has long been ASEAN’s raison d’être. Formed in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, the founding five members thought that sticking together would give them the best chance of standing up to the circling superpowers.
A pact of non-interference in each other’s internal security affairs enabled them to put their own animosities aside. But it also meant that security cooperation always lagged well behind economic integration. It has been through the US-led ‘hub and spokes’ system of bilateral relationships, rather than formal multilateral agreements, that security cooperation in Southeast Asia has largely taken place. ASEAN’s key role has been to bring the major players together.
This should again be its role in the South China Sea.
Indonesia, as ASEAN chair, could push for the issue to be resolved in a wider ASEAN-led multilateral forum such as the East Asia Summit or the ASEAN Regional Forum, where the presence of the USA might force China to moderate its behavior. Jakarta understands that keeping both China and the USA inside the ASEAN tent is crucial.
Last year Indonesia welcomed US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s offer to mediate the dispute, made in response to China’s claim (which it has since backed away from) that Beijing would now consider the South China Sea a ‘core interest’ on par with Taiwan and Tibet.
ASEAN’s subsequent invitation for America (along with Russia) to join the East Asia Summit was widely interpreted as an attempt to dilute China’s growing influence in the grouping, giving the Southeast Asian states more bargaining power in areas such as the South China Sea.
Jakarta’s failure to broker a deal between Cambodia and Thailand is a reminder that settling territorial quarrels is not ASEAN’s strong suite. It is a cautionary warning against institutional overreach. ASEAN is not the best forum in which to tackle the South China Sea disputes.
Where ASEAN can play a role is in bringing the major regional powers together, and giving the smaller Southeast Asian states a bigger voice than they could muster alone.
Indonesia’s recent silence on the issue suggests it has realized this.
The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) in Sydney and author of Jakarta’s Juggling Act, published by the CIS
Follow our twitter @jakpost
& our public blog @blogIMO
| | | | | | | | Comments (7)
ken | Thu, 07/07/2011 - 09:07am
if those CNN and other western tv's said about asia nothing but bad, maybe you have bias side toward western news, wondering what you think about our local tv stations toward our own people and politics and everything else? have you thought about arab springs to promote democracy and freedom?
Report Abuse
Agus | Wed, 06/07/2011 - 14:07pm
Asians still do not realise how Western government would ONLY do things for their self interest. Just look at CNN or BBC, western TV and how they project negatively the image of ASIA!. We need to wake up and realise that inviting US to this region would create more conflict and war!!!. All we need is economic progress and peace!!!
Report Abuse
Brian | Wed, 06/07/2011 - 14:07pm
Why do we need US at all?. Asians can handle and discuss things better than Western counterparts. Asians don't need anymore "DIVIDE and CONQUER" policy by any western governments. We've had enough of the colonialism and time to set our future together. Besides, Asia does not need anymore war caused by the US and its allies!!!!
Report Abuse
access_access | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 11:07am
Chastened by its failure to successfully negotiate a settlement in the recent border dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, Indonesia has been noticeably silent on the recent explosion of tensions in the South China Sea.
spot on ! and that kind of attitude is what we expect from a loser, no? just don't exert yourself too hard or don't bite off more than you can chew.
it can't even prevent its citizens from being slaughtered overseas. have mercy on this current ASEAN chairman.
if those ASEAN members should feel the need to include the US, then those members don't have self-confidence and trust among themselves and they might as well join NATO instead.
Report Abuse
Mr. Lux | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 10:07am
It seems that Indonesia is quite and not active in their Asean Chair this year in both clash Cambodia and Thailand as well as the burning issue of South China Sea.
China is more agressive and non raison d'etre in the region.
the USA should play a greater role to balancing powers.
Asean countries expect Indonesia does much more. Solving the South China Sea problem is the TOP priority of Asean.
I do hope the chairman Asean can bring the issue at ARF in Bali.
As Asean citizens and want a Asean zone peaceful, safe prosperous, we look and see.
Report Abuse
Outsider | Tue, 05/07/2011 - 08:07am
Indonesia needs to support its fellow Asean members and be firm on China. Much of the area now claimed by China has rightly been claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam previously.
The 200 nautical mile economic exclusion zone has been recognised by most countries and should be used where possible in this dispute.
The best article I have seen on the topic is:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349
Report Abuse
hai win | Mon, 04/07/2011 - 11:07am
I agree with the author's suggestion for ASIAN-initiated and US-participated diplomacy for South China sea dispute. I may also add Japan, Australia and India as contributors to dilute some pressure on China. Indonesia is in the best position to lead this effort.
My reasons, in addition to the author's are as follow:
1.Indonesia should look at their recent setback on Cambodia-Thailand mediation as motivation to to take on the SCS with more urgency: before any conflict become too distorted, overtly emotional and bloody which Philippines/Vietnam and China potentially will be. Remember, after Indonesia the ASEAN chair will rotate to Cambodia and Laos with a lot less interests and capabilities.
2. ASIAN must be united in dismissing Chinese demand of bi-lateral negotiation. I did not work before and less likely to work in the future as China has become a more significant economic and military power. Since the SCS dispute involves several claimants of diverse interests and ambitions, what China may offer one will invariably be rejected by the other. More significantly, since China assumes SCS as backyard pond only international powers can force them to reconsider or bear consequences. Presently,the best standard available is UNCLOS.
Report Abuse
The East Asia Summit: High stakes for ASEAN
Anindya Novyan Bakrie, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Sat, 11/19/2011 11:01 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
As Indonesia is hosting the sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, intense focus will fall on its two newest members, Russia and the United States. But while Moscow’s energy security will be paramount, Washington will offer a strategic security in part opposing another member — a fast-growing China.
The other 16 EAS participants will acutely observe the policies Washington advocates at the Summit. And China, whose own economic and now strategic rise is setting the broader EAS agenda, will be paying particular attention. It is well warranted, for while the US does not seek to fully block Beijing’s influence in East Asia, it will certainly push to counterbalance it.
Indonesia, the largest country in the key region of Southeast Asia, has a keen interest in the continually evolving relations between the US and China. To this end, the EAS will provide a useful forum for the articulation of American and Chinese positions.
Given its strategic location amid overlapping Sino-US spheres of influence in Pacific Asia, a clear understanding of this dynamic is essential to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which Indonesia currently chairs.
One area of critical importance for ASEAN nations is security in the South China Sea. Ocean areas and the Paracels and the Spratlys, two island chains claimed in whole or in part by China and Taiwan as well as four ASEAN members — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — are at the heart of the dispute.
Increasing Chinese assertiveness over its claims has led ASEAN to look to the US for countervailing support. Washington has obliged. In doing so, it has emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More broadly, it has asserted its own national interest in seeing the maritime claims resolved without any use or threat of force.
The US stance is widely seen as a response to Beijing’s desire to treat the South China Sea as a core interest. This would place it on par with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, other places over which China has declared its national sovereignty — and justifications for military intervention when needed.
It will be fascinating to see whether and how the South China Sea dispute — and the contrasting positions of China and the US — features in the EAS discussion. However, even as ASEAN countries turn to the US for strategic reassurance, they do so in full knowledge that their economic future depends on closer cooperation with a booming China.
An important part of this relationship lies in the area of ASEAN connectivity. The recent establishment of the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, worth nearly US$500 million, is a small but significant step toward integrating the region through roads, railways and other infrastructural projects.
These projects could form the core of an ambitious enterprise to connect ASEAN with Northeast Asia, particularly China, thereby building a more viable East Asian Community. The construction of a Singapore-Kunming rail link, for example, could be extended to Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city, which would help connect an important part of ASEAN into China’s expanding economic interests.
These factors make the EAS a compelling one. Moreover, it is natural for ASEAN to seek closer relations with both the US and China. But the group’s endeavors will be frustrated should the world’s two most powerful nations drift apart.
For instance, US House legislation forcing China to revalue its currency, the renminbi — so the US can better compete with Chinese exports — has prompted Beijing to threaten a trade war.
Such a showdown would be disastrous as Asian growth is one of the few reasons for confidence in a world beset by the US and Europe’s economic slumps.
And although ASEAN can do little about the Sino-American currency dispute, it would be devastated by a trade war. Moreover, in an EAS in which two important countries are warring economically, the resolution of other issues important to the region, such as piracy in the Indian Ocean, will likely go unresolved.
Of course, the EAS is not the only pan-Asian mechanism for regional issues. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum facilitates economic cooperation while expanding trade and investment. APEC’s footprint now covers 55 percent of global GDP in a market of 2.7 billion consumers accounting for 43 percent of world trade.
But APEC’s agenda is largely economic and, no matter how fast globalization spreads, economic prosperity in itself will never fully substitute for security. Hard security issues, such as the South China Sea dispute, complicate and could disrupt stability across East Asia.
The EAS meeting in Indonesia will provide a true test as to whether the region can maintain solid footing at a time when the world’s economic center of gravity is moving steadily toward Asia. One way or the other, East Asia needs both American military muscle and China’s economic momentum to stay on course.
The writer is deputy chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the CEO of Bakrie Telecom and chairman of VIVA Media Group. He is also the President-appointed representative for the APEC Business Advisory Council and is a board member of the International Council of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
As Indonesia is hosting the sixth East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali, intense focus will fall on its two newest members, Russia and the United States. But while Moscow’s energy security will be paramount, Washington will offer a strategic security in part opposing another member — a fast-growing China.
The other 16 EAS participants will acutely observe the policies Washington advocates at the Summit. And China, whose own economic and now strategic rise is setting the broader EAS agenda, will be paying particular attention. It is well warranted, for while the US does not seek to fully block Beijing’s influence in East Asia, it will certainly push to counterbalance it.
Indonesia, the largest country in the key region of Southeast Asia, has a keen interest in the continually evolving relations between the US and China. To this end, the EAS will provide a useful forum for the articulation of American and Chinese positions.
Given its strategic location amid overlapping Sino-US spheres of influence in Pacific Asia, a clear understanding of this dynamic is essential to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which Indonesia currently chairs.
One area of critical importance for ASEAN nations is security in the South China Sea. Ocean areas and the Paracels and the Spratlys, two island chains claimed in whole or in part by China and Taiwan as well as four ASEAN members — Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam — are at the heart of the dispute.
Increasing Chinese assertiveness over its claims has led ASEAN to look to the US for countervailing support. Washington has obliged. In doing so, it has emphasized the importance of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. More broadly, it has asserted its own national interest in seeing the maritime claims resolved without any use or threat of force.
The US stance is widely seen as a response to Beijing’s desire to treat the South China Sea as a core interest. This would place it on par with Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, other places over which China has declared its national sovereignty — and justifications for military intervention when needed.
It will be fascinating to see whether and how the South China Sea dispute — and the contrasting positions of China and the US — features in the EAS discussion. However, even as ASEAN countries turn to the US for strategic reassurance, they do so in full knowledge that their economic future depends on closer cooperation with a booming China.
An important part of this relationship lies in the area of ASEAN connectivity. The recent establishment of the ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, worth nearly US$500 million, is a small but significant step toward integrating the region through roads, railways and other infrastructural projects.
These projects could form the core of an ambitious enterprise to connect ASEAN with Northeast Asia, particularly China, thereby building a more viable East Asian Community. The construction of a Singapore-Kunming rail link, for example, could be extended to Surabaya, Indonesia’s second-largest city, which would help connect an important part of ASEAN into China’s expanding economic interests.
These factors make the EAS a compelling one. Moreover, it is natural for ASEAN to seek closer relations with both the US and China. But the group’s endeavors will be frustrated should the world’s two most powerful nations drift apart.
For instance, US House legislation forcing China to revalue its currency, the renminbi — so the US can better compete with Chinese exports — has prompted Beijing to threaten a trade war.
Such a showdown would be disastrous as Asian growth is one of the few reasons for confidence in a world beset by the US and Europe’s economic slumps.
And although ASEAN can do little about the Sino-American currency dispute, it would be devastated by a trade war. Moreover, in an EAS in which two important countries are warring economically, the resolution of other issues important to the region, such as piracy in the Indian Ocean, will likely go unresolved.
Of course, the EAS is not the only pan-Asian mechanism for regional issues. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum facilitates economic cooperation while expanding trade and investment. APEC’s footprint now covers 55 percent of global GDP in a market of 2.7 billion consumers accounting for 43 percent of world trade.
But APEC’s agenda is largely economic and, no matter how fast globalization spreads, economic prosperity in itself will never fully substitute for security. Hard security issues, such as the South China Sea dispute, complicate and could disrupt stability across East Asia.
The EAS meeting in Indonesia will provide a true test as to whether the region can maintain solid footing at a time when the world’s economic center of gravity is moving steadily toward Asia. One way or the other, East Asia needs both American military muscle and China’s economic momentum to stay on course.
The writer is deputy chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the CEO of Bakrie Telecom and chairman of VIVA Media Group. He is also the President-appointed representative for the APEC Business Advisory Council and is a board member of the International Council of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
Bracing for the game of thrones in Asia’s future
Evan A. Laksmana, New York | Sat, 11/19/2011 10:56 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post
“We’re back, Asia Pacific. Don’t worry about China’s bullish behavior. Our leadership — underpinned by our growing military presence and new economic ties — will lead to regional stability and prosperity. Sure, we have our economic problems and two wars that continue to drag our feet, but Asia is our future and so we will be around.”
In a simplified and stylized nutshell, this seems to be the oft-cited mantra coming out of Washington these days with regards to the United States of America’s renewed engagement of Asia.
Little wonder that some pundits are looking favorably at the recent announcement by US President Barack Obama on the eve of the East Asia Summit in Bali this week that the US will expand its defense ties with Australia and would in the future “permanently” station around 2,500 Marines in Darwin.
Others, however, believe such engagement, especially when directed at “containing” China, may further polarize Asia. Perhaps even to the point of potentially reviving a supposedly defunct bipolar Cold War logic in the region. Though more moderate views deny such possibility and argue instead that America’s “dual” economic and military engagement in Asia may further “socialize” China into accepting and behaving by the “rules of the game”.
Regardless, China is not warmly embracing this development. In response to Obama’s announcement, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was quoted: “It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the interests of countries within this region.” Indonesia has also expressed its concern about the decision to station US Marines in Darwin.
With the South China Sea and other regional tensions continuing to brew, these debates are worth exploring. But as it stands now, I fear they may have missed the mark on some points.
First of all, while the expansion of US military presence in the Asia Pacific has been ongoing for several years — including the basing of some of its most sophisticated platforms such as the F-22s — it is hard for Jakarta not to take note of Darwin in particular as the future center of operations for the coming deployment of the US Marines.
Not only has Darwin been described as a “frontier port and military outpost across the Timor Sea”, which some in military circles view could strengthen Canberra’s hand in Indonesia’s soft eastern underbelly, but for others, Timor Leste’s strategic value has not been entirely forgotten.
As during the Cold War where a “Cuban island” in Indonesia’s backyard was among the cited fears and rationales for invading the area in the 1970s, unfinished border security issues as well as the growing presence and profile of China and other regional powers in Indonesia’s backyard continue to worry some in Jakarta.
So, while a conventional direct threat from US Marines may have been an overblown fear in some local press reports, Timor Leste’s strategic location and the ongoing “game of thrones” among regional powers attached to it means that Jakarta will take serious note of the US presence in Darwin. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Indonesia has been a key proponent of Dili’s inclusion into ASEAN.
Second, with regard to the region-wide dynamic in the Asia Pacific, a second “game of thrones” for influence and leadership between Beijing and Washington is increasingly exhausting other regional countries.
China’s economic growth could benefit regional countries — the ASEAN-China free trade area, if properly managed, could prove this point. And Beijing “charm offensive” in the past decade may have also helped alleviate some fears raised in the early 2000s.
But this should not be construed as a regional acquiescence of Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture in the South China Sea and the lack of transparency in its offensive naval developments. A “Sino-centric” regional order or a Pax Sinica remains undesirable.
On the other hand, America’s growing engagement with Asia — either through its bilateral alliances, strategic partnerships, or military presence — has indeed from time to time ensured regional stability. But there are times when they have ruffled some feathers and increased regional tension too. Domestic politics being what it is in Washington — and economic pressures being the ultimate arbiter — it is not surprising that not everyone is warmly embracing a future Pax Americana for Asia, too.
Why must it always be either an American or Chinese leadership that guides the region towards stability? What of regional institutions like ASEAN? What of a new “concert of powers” between the region’s rising and democratic forces like Indonesia, Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea?
The answer is of course a question mark at best. But this does not mean that the nature of US-China relations, or some variation of leadership or hegemony of either one, should always determine Asia’s future. Whether Beijing and Washington likes it or not, the Asia Pacific Century should belong to other Asian powers, too.
Finally, while US basing plans and the South China Sea continue to occupy the headlines on the eve of the signing of Bali Concord III, one cannot refute Jusuf Wanandi’s recent remarks on Indonesia’s accomplishments as ASEAN Chair this year.
But if Indonesia wants to move beyond ASEAN and lead the charge to redefine and reshape the Asia Pacific region for the 21st century, Jakarta should not shy away from standing up.
Our inability to forcefully speak up against China or fellow ASEAN friends when their actions in the South China Sea jeopardize regional stability for example, often makes us look timid and hesitant. And this unfortunately means President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should stop playing his own domestic “game of thrones” and start making full use of his remaining years in office to step up to the plate of true regional leadership.
The writer is a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta and currently a Fulbright Ph.D scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, New York. This is his personal opinion.
“We’re back, Asia Pacific. Don’t worry about China’s bullish behavior. Our leadership — underpinned by our growing military presence and new economic ties — will lead to regional stability and prosperity. Sure, we have our economic problems and two wars that continue to drag our feet, but Asia is our future and so we will be around.”
In a simplified and stylized nutshell, this seems to be the oft-cited mantra coming out of Washington these days with regards to the United States of America’s renewed engagement of Asia.
Little wonder that some pundits are looking favorably at the recent announcement by US President Barack Obama on the eve of the East Asia Summit in Bali this week that the US will expand its defense ties with Australia and would in the future “permanently” station around 2,500 Marines in Darwin.
Others, however, believe such engagement, especially when directed at “containing” China, may further polarize Asia. Perhaps even to the point of potentially reviving a supposedly defunct bipolar Cold War logic in the region. Though more moderate views deny such possibility and argue instead that America’s “dual” economic and military engagement in Asia may further “socialize” China into accepting and behaving by the “rules of the game”.
Regardless, China is not warmly embracing this development. In response to Obama’s announcement, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman was quoted: “It may not be quite appropriate to intensify and expand military alliances and may not be in the interests of countries within this region.” Indonesia has also expressed its concern about the decision to station US Marines in Darwin.
With the South China Sea and other regional tensions continuing to brew, these debates are worth exploring. But as it stands now, I fear they may have missed the mark on some points.
First of all, while the expansion of US military presence in the Asia Pacific has been ongoing for several years — including the basing of some of its most sophisticated platforms such as the F-22s — it is hard for Jakarta not to take note of Darwin in particular as the future center of operations for the coming deployment of the US Marines.
Not only has Darwin been described as a “frontier port and military outpost across the Timor Sea”, which some in military circles view could strengthen Canberra’s hand in Indonesia’s soft eastern underbelly, but for others, Timor Leste’s strategic value has not been entirely forgotten.
As during the Cold War where a “Cuban island” in Indonesia’s backyard was among the cited fears and rationales for invading the area in the 1970s, unfinished border security issues as well as the growing presence and profile of China and other regional powers in Indonesia’s backyard continue to worry some in Jakarta.
So, while a conventional direct threat from US Marines may have been an overblown fear in some local press reports, Timor Leste’s strategic location and the ongoing “game of thrones” among regional powers attached to it means that Jakarta will take serious note of the US presence in Darwin. This is perhaps one of the reasons why Indonesia has been a key proponent of Dili’s inclusion into ASEAN.
Second, with regard to the region-wide dynamic in the Asia Pacific, a second “game of thrones” for influence and leadership between Beijing and Washington is increasingly exhausting other regional countries.
China’s economic growth could benefit regional countries — the ASEAN-China free trade area, if properly managed, could prove this point. And Beijing “charm offensive” in the past decade may have also helped alleviate some fears raised in the early 2000s.
But this should not be construed as a regional acquiescence of Beijing’s increasingly assertive posture in the South China Sea and the lack of transparency in its offensive naval developments. A “Sino-centric” regional order or a Pax Sinica remains undesirable.
On the other hand, America’s growing engagement with Asia — either through its bilateral alliances, strategic partnerships, or military presence — has indeed from time to time ensured regional stability. But there are times when they have ruffled some feathers and increased regional tension too. Domestic politics being what it is in Washington — and economic pressures being the ultimate arbiter — it is not surprising that not everyone is warmly embracing a future Pax Americana for Asia, too.
Why must it always be either an American or Chinese leadership that guides the region towards stability? What of regional institutions like ASEAN? What of a new “concert of powers” between the region’s rising and democratic forces like Indonesia, Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea?
The answer is of course a question mark at best. But this does not mean that the nature of US-China relations, or some variation of leadership or hegemony of either one, should always determine Asia’s future. Whether Beijing and Washington likes it or not, the Asia Pacific Century should belong to other Asian powers, too.
Finally, while US basing plans and the South China Sea continue to occupy the headlines on the eve of the signing of Bali Concord III, one cannot refute Jusuf Wanandi’s recent remarks on Indonesia’s accomplishments as ASEAN Chair this year.
But if Indonesia wants to move beyond ASEAN and lead the charge to redefine and reshape the Asia Pacific region for the 21st century, Jakarta should not shy away from standing up.
Our inability to forcefully speak up against China or fellow ASEAN friends when their actions in the South China Sea jeopardize regional stability for example, often makes us look timid and hesitant. And this unfortunately means President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono should stop playing his own domestic “game of thrones” and start making full use of his remaining years in office to step up to the plate of true regional leadership.
The writer is a researcher with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta and currently a Fulbright Ph.D scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, New York. This is his personal opinion.
ASEAN unity ‘can blunt effects of US-China rivalry’
Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post, NUSA DUA, BALI | Sat, 11/19/2011 11:45 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
While rivalry between the US and China can draw ASEAN members into conflict, the grouping’s fate depends on it alone rather than outside powers if it sticks together, the leader of ASEAN says.
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said he hoped the perception of tension or rivalry would not be “a product of anybody making any arrangements with anyone”.
“I think it’s up to ASEAN, up to ASEAN’s diplomatic finesse to make sure that with all this conflicting and contending agenda … that we will be able in the end to achieve stability, confidence and security for our region,” he told reporters here on Friday.
Several East and Southeast Asian allies of the United States have expressed support for the US’ plan to establish a military base in Darwin, Australia’s northernmost city.
Japan, a US ally, thinks that the planned US military base in Darwin is one way for the US to show its commitment to the region, a senior Japanese government official says.
“This is something that is based on consultation, showing the US’ high attention to contribute to [security in] the region,” deputy cabinet secretary for public affairs Noriyuki Shikata told a press conference on Friday on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit and its related summits.
Japan has irked China with its comment on South China Sea issues, saying it is not an interest only of the claimants — China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan — but also of everyone else who uses the sea lanes for their merchant vessels to pass through.
But he stopped short of commenting on whether the US’ plan could lead to turning the Southeast Asian region into a battlefield. “It is difficult for me to make a comment because it’s a matter of a third party,” he said.
Meanwhile, current chair of ASEAN, Indonesia, has seemingly softened its stance on the issue, with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa backtracking on an earlier statement he made on the US’ Darwin plan.
“What I would hate to see is for the agreement to provoke a reaction and counter-reaction that would create a vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust,” he told a press conference on Wednesday in Bali.
However, he softened his stance the next day.
On Thursday, when asked if the US’ Darwin military base plan could provoke further tension in the region, he said: “This must not be seen as something disturbing.”
On Friday, he also said the matter was the US and Australia’s business in their bilateral agreement.
US President Barack Obama said in Australia on Thursday, before jetting to the Asia meetings on Bali, that the US military would expand its Asia-Pacific role despite budget cuts, declaring America was “here to stay” as a Pacific power, Reuters reported.
A first step in extending the US’ military reach in Southeast Asia will see US marines, naval ships and aircraft deployed to northern Australia from 2012. Sharing the same view as Japan, the Philippines said the US’ presence in the region meant an ultimately stabilizing force.
“Given the defense relationship we have [with the US], I think it bolsters our ability to assert our sovereignty over certain areas,” Philippine communications secretary Ricky Carandang said on Thursday on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit.
China has questioned the new US deployment, with a foreign ministry spokesman raising doubts about whether strengthening such alliances helped the region pull together at a time of economic gloom.
While rivalry between the US and China can draw ASEAN members into conflict, the grouping’s fate depends on it alone rather than outside powers if it sticks together, the leader of ASEAN says.
ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan said he hoped the perception of tension or rivalry would not be “a product of anybody making any arrangements with anyone”.
“I think it’s up to ASEAN, up to ASEAN’s diplomatic finesse to make sure that with all this conflicting and contending agenda … that we will be able in the end to achieve stability, confidence and security for our region,” he told reporters here on Friday.
Several East and Southeast Asian allies of the United States have expressed support for the US’ plan to establish a military base in Darwin, Australia’s northernmost city.
Japan, a US ally, thinks that the planned US military base in Darwin is one way for the US to show its commitment to the region, a senior Japanese government official says.
“This is something that is based on consultation, showing the US’ high attention to contribute to [security in] the region,” deputy cabinet secretary for public affairs Noriyuki Shikata told a press conference on Friday on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit and its related summits.
Japan has irked China with its comment on South China Sea issues, saying it is not an interest only of the claimants — China, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan — but also of everyone else who uses the sea lanes for their merchant vessels to pass through.
But he stopped short of commenting on whether the US’ plan could lead to turning the Southeast Asian region into a battlefield. “It is difficult for me to make a comment because it’s a matter of a third party,” he said.
Meanwhile, current chair of ASEAN, Indonesia, has seemingly softened its stance on the issue, with Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa backtracking on an earlier statement he made on the US’ Darwin plan.
“What I would hate to see is for the agreement to provoke a reaction and counter-reaction that would create a vicious cycle of tensions and mistrust,” he told a press conference on Wednesday in Bali.
However, he softened his stance the next day.
On Thursday, when asked if the US’ Darwin military base plan could provoke further tension in the region, he said: “This must not be seen as something disturbing.”
On Friday, he also said the matter was the US and Australia’s business in their bilateral agreement.
US President Barack Obama said in Australia on Thursday, before jetting to the Asia meetings on Bali, that the US military would expand its Asia-Pacific role despite budget cuts, declaring America was “here to stay” as a Pacific power, Reuters reported.
A first step in extending the US’ military reach in Southeast Asia will see US marines, naval ships and aircraft deployed to northern Australia from 2012. Sharing the same view as Japan, the Philippines said the US’ presence in the region meant an ultimately stabilizing force.
“Given the defense relationship we have [with the US], I think it bolsters our ability to assert our sovereignty over certain areas,” Philippine communications secretary Ricky Carandang said on Thursday on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit.
China has questioned the new US deployment, with a foreign ministry spokesman raising doubts about whether strengthening such alliances helped the region pull together at a time of economic gloom.
RI can't `sacrifice' China ties to court US
Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Tue, 07/27/2010 10:33 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
Recent US moves to cooperate with the Indonesian Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) and to join the East Asia Summit were aimed at gaining Indonesian support for the US against China, experts said.
Washington has courted Jakarta diplomatically by ending a decades-long ban on joint military action with Kopassus and by announcing it would join the expanded East Asia Summit after previously hinting that neither was likely to happen in the short term.
The US' sudden change of direction was reciprocated by Indonesia's welcoming of an American role in managing disputes in the South China Sea that have placed China in stand-off with Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan over overlapping claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
"It is clear that the US has sought Jakarta's support in its disputes with China in many areas, from currency appreciation to military power to human rights," said Syamsul Hadi, a lecturer in East Asian relations at the University of Indonesia.
However, Indonesia should avoid becoming a buffer for the US in its struggle with China because it would harm Jakarta's relationship with Beijing.
"We are tied more closely to China than to US, geographically and economically. If we risk ruining our relationship with China, it will be more harmful than if Jakarta refused to support the US," he said.
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on Thursday, when the pair discussed lifting the US ban on Kopassus and potential conflicts in the South China Sea.
Although Indonesia is trying to balance its position between the two giants, Yudhoyono seemed to agree Thursday with the US position.
Syamsul said the "political exchange" that has seen Washington lift its military ban in return for Indonesian support for a US role in South China Sea disputes has not benefited the country equally.
"The biggest US stake in Indonesia is their mining investment. We should ask for more concessions in this field instead of asking for a lift of the military," he said.
China's claims over parts of the South China Sea have become a source of concern for the US even though the US has no territorial claims in the resource-rich sea.
The area around the Spratly Islands region is estimated to have 17.7 billion tons in oil and natural gas reserves, making it the world's fourth-largest reserve bed, according to reports.
Washington has paid close attention to China's increasing military budget, which is ranked second in the world after the US, and its rising influence in Asia.
"Washington has tried to get closer with Indonesia through a two-pronged diplomatic approach, with the announcement of new policies from the State Department and Department of Defense," said Suzie Sudarman, director of the American Studies Center at the University of Indonesia.
"Jakarta should avoid being manipulated by the interests of conflicting parties," she said.
Indonesia has no territorial claims in the South China Sea but has been concerned that China's rising influence and naval power might affect settlement of its own dispute with China.
Last year, six Chinese fishing vessels entered Indonesian territorial waters near Natuna in the South China Sea. Beijing previously claimed that the waters near Natuna are traditional Chinese fishing territory.
China has drawn a maritime border that left open claims to the Natuna waters. There have been no negotiations to date with China on ending the dispute.
Defense Ministry spokeman I Wayan Midhio said there was not connection between the Kopassus agreement and Indonesian support of a US role in the South China Sea.
"The US is welcomed to play a role because stability in the region is the responsibility of more than just the surrounding countries. The US can play a role because they have the capability to do so," he said.
Recent US moves to cooperate with the Indonesian Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) and to join the East Asia Summit were aimed at gaining Indonesian support for the US against China, experts said.
Washington has courted Jakarta diplomatically by ending a decades-long ban on joint military action with Kopassus and by announcing it would join the expanded East Asia Summit after previously hinting that neither was likely to happen in the short term.
The US' sudden change of direction was reciprocated by Indonesia's welcoming of an American role in managing disputes in the South China Sea that have placed China in stand-off with Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan over overlapping claims to the Spratly and Paracel Islands.
"It is clear that the US has sought Jakarta's support in its disputes with China in many areas, from currency appreciation to military power to human rights," said Syamsul Hadi, a lecturer in East Asian relations at the University of Indonesia.
However, Indonesia should avoid becoming a buffer for the US in its struggle with China because it would harm Jakarta's relationship with Beijing.
"We are tied more closely to China than to US, geographically and economically. If we risk ruining our relationship with China, it will be more harmful than if Jakarta refused to support the US," he said.
US Defense Secretary Robert Gates met with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on Thursday, when the pair discussed lifting the US ban on Kopassus and potential conflicts in the South China Sea.
Although Indonesia is trying to balance its position between the two giants, Yudhoyono seemed to agree Thursday with the US position.
Syamsul said the "political exchange" that has seen Washington lift its military ban in return for Indonesian support for a US role in South China Sea disputes has not benefited the country equally.
"The biggest US stake in Indonesia is their mining investment. We should ask for more concessions in this field instead of asking for a lift of the military," he said.
China's claims over parts of the South China Sea have become a source of concern for the US even though the US has no territorial claims in the resource-rich sea.
The area around the Spratly Islands region is estimated to have 17.7 billion tons in oil and natural gas reserves, making it the world's fourth-largest reserve bed, according to reports.
Washington has paid close attention to China's increasing military budget, which is ranked second in the world after the US, and its rising influence in Asia.
"Washington has tried to get closer with Indonesia through a two-pronged diplomatic approach, with the announcement of new policies from the State Department and Department of Defense," said Suzie Sudarman, director of the American Studies Center at the University of Indonesia.
"Jakarta should avoid being manipulated by the interests of conflicting parties," she said.
Indonesia has no territorial claims in the South China Sea but has been concerned that China's rising influence and naval power might affect settlement of its own dispute with China.
Last year, six Chinese fishing vessels entered Indonesian territorial waters near Natuna in the South China Sea. Beijing previously claimed that the waters near Natuna are traditional Chinese fishing territory.
China has drawn a maritime border that left open claims to the Natuna waters. There have been no negotiations to date with China on ending the dispute.
Defense Ministry spokeman I Wayan Midhio said there was not connection between the Kopassus agreement and Indonesian support of a US role in the South China Sea.
"The US is welcomed to play a role because stability in the region is the responsibility of more than just the surrounding countries. The US can play a role because they have the capability to do so," he said.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)