RI is not leading ASEAN country in tourism: Report

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Wed, 05/30/2012 10:37 PM

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Indonesia is not among the most potential ASEAN countries to develop travel and tourism, a recent report says.



According to this year’s ASEAN Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report, which was released on Wednesday, Indonesia fell well short of neighboring countries Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.



English Thai newspaper The Nation reported on Wednesday that Singapore was deemed “the most attractive environment among ASEAN countries” to develop travel and tourism, ranking 10th out of 139 countries.



Malaysia and Thailand was at the 35th and 41st spots respectively, while Indonesia ranked 74th behind Brunei Darussalam, which placed 67th.



Indonesia, with Brunei and Vietnam, ranked 80th, were deemed ASEAN countries that were “demonstrating clear strengths, counterbalanced by weaknesses”.



Meanwhile, the Philippines, ranked 94th and Cambodia, 109th, were considered “presenting shortcomings in most dimensions”.



"Travel and tourism is not the only a critical driver of economic development and social progress. It also represents a formidable factor of regional integration," said Børge Brende, managing director of World Economic Forum, as quoted by the newspaper.



"By improving connectivity and mobility, travel and tourism contributes to creating a regional identity, a sense of 'ASEANness' among citizens,” he added.



The report was based on data covering areas such as policy rules and regulations, environmental sustainability, safety and security, health and hygiene, air transportation infrastructure, ground transportation infrastructure, tourism infrastructure and human resources. (asa)

ASEAN firms resilient amid slowdown

The Jakarta Post, Jakarta
Thu, 05/31/2012 7:41 AM

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The economic slowdown in Europe and US has not affected the shipping industry in Southeast Asia due to vibrant trade within the region that comprised 27 percent of total ASEAN trade last year, analysts from Frost and Sullivan said.



“People are questioning the impact of the slower growth of the economy in the US and Europe. Apparently it hasn’t had any impact on us, because trading among the countries in ASEAN is increasing. We are expecting an intra-trading increase from 27 percent to 29 percent this year,” Frost and Sullivan vice president for transportation and logistics in the Asia-Pacific region Gopal R said.



According to Gopal, there was an aggressive expansion plan for major ASEAN ports to build their capacity, which reflected the healthy condition of the industry in the region.



For example, the port of Singapore, with a current capacity of 29.9 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEU), will be expanded to 55 million TEU in 2018, while Port Klang in Malaysia is going to be expanded to 10 million TEU 2013 from the current 8 million TEU, and Tanjung Priok will be expanded to 11 million TEU in 2017 from its current 5.9 million TEU.



According to Indonesian Shipowners Association (INSA) chairperson Carmelita Hartoto, the overall shipping industry in the country and the region was still strong and many shipping companies booked profits last year.



“Few shipping companies are facing financial difficulties due to freight market that focuses on US and European countries. They are affected by decreasing demand and the high price of fuel,” Carmelita told The Jakarta Post.



Among the shipping firms that have been hardest hit by lower demand from the US and Europe are Berlian Laju Tanker (BLTA), which announced a covenant breach in its debt payments this year; Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line, which has undertaken a debt restructuring program; and Humpuss Intermoda Transport (HITS), which may soon file for bankruptcy.



“Shipping companies that focus on the domestic market and the ASEAN market generally have a positive outlook this year because the freight demand is high,” she added.



Deputy Transportation Minister Bambang Susantono said that Southeast Asia remained an important hub for cargo flow given its strategic location and the strong growth in the region.



“Due to the economic crisis in Europe and US, along with the shift of economic power from west to east, Southeast Asia will remain the most interesting region for the next 20 years. This situation means new opportunities are open for new markets, for example Indonesia,” Bambang said.



Gopal said that ASEAN had a few trading obstacles, such as a lack of border management capabilities, lack of trade facilitation and a low competency level in infrastructure.



“As for Indonesia, the priorities in port development to support the inter-trade with ASEAN members are, among other things, the improvement of port infrastructure, quality road networks between ports and strict and transparent policy in customs processes,” he said. (nad)

Quo vadis Indonesian peacekeeping?

Bagus Jatmiko, Jakarta
Tue, 05/29/2012 9:00 AM

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International Peacekeepers’ Day has been celebrated annually every May 29 since 2003. The day is commemorated to honor the extraordinary contribution of the men and women who have participated in peacekeeping missions across the world.



For Indonesia, the commemoration should serve as a momentum to reconfirm its aspiration as a well-respected nation in international forums through its deployment of peacekeeping troops under the UN flag.



Throughout the history of deployment of the Garuda Contingent — after which Indonesia’s peacekeeping force is named — Indonesia’s role in peace missions is quite outstanding because we have contributed to every peacekeeping operation since our first mission in Egypt in 1957 up to the present day. Indonesian peacekeepers have served in many parts of the world, ranging from Lebanon to Haiti.



Deployments are in line with Indonesia’s foreign policy, which is based on the non-aligned and active principle so that Indonesia does not have to rely on the political views of a particular alliance or treaty that would bind all members to comply with a particular collective agreement.



The objective of such deployments is focused more on conflict settlement rather than the interests of certain parties involved in a conflict. Therefore, Indonesia manages to fulfill one of the most important principles of peacekeeping, which is impartiality.



But how far has Indonesia capitalized on its experiences in peacekeeping missions to support the accomplishment of its foreign policy? Or to utilize its experiences as a bargaining power to leverage Indonesia’s position in international forums, particularly in international policy making related to the settlement of conflicts around the world?



The number of Indonesian peacekeepers has gradually climbed to 4,000 personnel currently with more diverse specialties of peacekeepers, who comprise not only military personnel but also civilian police.



Indonesia has even gone further by sending its Maritime Task Force (MTF) to Lebanon, which altogether has greatly enhanced Indonesia’s participation in the peacekeeping mission.



I often ask myself, however, whether this increase implies the optimal diplomatic role of each mission to support Indonesia’s efforts to reach its foreign-policy goals.



Unfortunately, the answer is no. The reputation cultivated from Indonesia’s involvement in peacekeeping missions has not been aimed at strengthening our leverage to address our own bilateral conflicts.



This is due to the absence of an intensive and effective follow up on our part to take advantage of our strategic position in the UN, whether in the DPKO (Department of Peacekeeping Operations), the General Assembly or the Security Council (as a UNSC non-permanent member), as a means to lobby other nations to act in our favor whenever we are embroiled in a conflict with other countries over borders or natural resources.



Such inaction has triggered criticism that Indonesian diplomatic policy is only short term in its approach and is not formulated to achieve long-term goals.



Thus, whatever reputation or privilege we achieve is seen only as a one-off achievement with neither any future use nor serving as a milestone for a long-term goal.



It is even more ironic if Indonesian diplomacy lacks obvious direction and can only follow a trend. This would contradict the basis of Indonesia’s independent and active foreign policy that requires us to be tough yet flexible.



This discrepancy is visible when we are faced with a regional conflict, in which all too often we apparently have no diplomatic strength to address it.



How can this happen? With all due respect to the efforts of Indonesian diplomacy so far, it seems obvious that there have been no serious measures put in place to strengthen Indonesia’s diplomacy.



For instance, has Indonesia made full use of its active participation in UN peacekeeping missions to secure support from countries and influential organizations in pursuing its national interests?



Furthermore, the ignorance of our government and the House of Representatives of peacekeeping missions in general is apparent from the way they view peacekeeping as only a routine obligation that must be fulfilled at the international level, while failing to comprehend the values and opportunities that can be derived from it. Such utter disregard deprives us of a positive opportunity for our country.



Indonesia’s active participation in peacekeeping missions and the UN’s appreciation of our role are in fact adequate to enable this country to raise its diplomatic profile and significance in the international arena.



Unfortunately, the attention paid by our policymakers to peacekeeping missions is merely symbolic and temporary.



The government and the House are too busy taking care of their own political interests rather than managing the country as a whole, while sufficient attention to the actual capacity of Indonesia’s diplomacy could raise our dignity and ensure that we are not underestimated by other countries.



This could surely help the country guard and defend its sovereignty.



The author is a lieutenant in the Navy, served in peacekeeping missions under Garuda XX-G in Congo in 2009-2010.

The long road to ASEAN rights charter

Hafid Abbas, Jakarta
Wed, 05/23/2012 7:58 AM

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Since the ASEAN Charter came into force on Dec. 15, 2008, some monumental follow-up actions have been made to promote and protect human rights, including the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body (AHRB).



Indeed, the establishment of this body had been initiated since the Joint Communiqué at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore on July 23-24, 1993, which adopted a commitment to the establishment of an ASEAN human rights mechanism.



In the two decades since the Joint Communiqué was issued, it is likely the appropriate momentum to adopt the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD) as a triggering factor to promote and protect human rights in the region.



As mandated by Article 4.2 on its Terms of Reference, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is responsible for developing an AHRD. However, there has been no significant progress despite that mandate. The following reflection could be a comparative input to avoid such stagnation.



First, AHRD and other regional human rights instruments have to be made realistic to address the existing challenges facing rights in the region. ASEAN has been identified the most diverse part of the world in various dimensions.



In terms of religion, for example, Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country (86.1 percent of population), while Thailand has a Buddhist majority (94.6 percent) and the Philippines is Roman Catholic (81 percent). In terms of territory and population, Brunei’s size is about 5,700 square kilometers occupied by over 300,000 people, while Indonesia is about 2 million sq km with more than 240 million people.



Similarly, their government systems vary, with Myanmar still under a military regime, Malaysia being a constitutional monarchy and Vietnam a communist state. Other extreme differences include languages, with Malay so much different from Thai, Chinese and Tagalog.



Therefore, potential for suspicion among the states remain in their dynamic interactions. Under these circumstances, it is a utopia to make ASEAN member states voice human rights in the same tone.



In comparison, the European Union (EU) had started human rights from the same tone which was largely triggered by two concerns. First, the genocide of approximately 6 million Europeans during World War II, a systematic state-sponsored murder by Nazi Germany, led by Adolf Hitler throughout Nazi-occupied territory.



Second, the human rights convention was a response to the growth of communism in Eastern Europe and designed to protect member states of the Council of Europe from communist subversion. These common denominators prompted the EU to adopt its human rights convention.



In a similar way, centuries of colonialism and apartheid policy appeared to be Africa’s common denominators to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, which then lead to the establishment of a regional human rights system.



For ASEAN, its common denominators to human rights remain in a grey area, weakening its social cohesion to human rights if not decaying the commitment from within.



Second, the AHRD and other regional human rights instruments have to adopt flexibility to address the diverse interests on human rights in the region.



It is a paradoxical reality that some countries in the region resist the universality of human rights over fears it could deteriorate their development. Mahathir Mohammad and Lee Kwan Yew, for examples, led Malaysia and Singapore, respectively, with the exclusion of human rights from Asian values.



In this context, it would be less controversial to make the declaration as a road map for regional human rights development for years to come, as has been proposed by the Secretary General of ASEAN, Surin Pitsuwan.



I think this paradox is the source of suspicion among NGOs, which have called on the AICHR to take necessary steps to ensure a transparent process of the AHRD formulation that involves consultation with civil society organizations in the region.



Third, the AHRD and other regional human rights instruments have to be substantively linked to the spirit of the 1993 Joint Communiqué or even the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. The AICHR could explore, for example, the common denominators to adopt the 1993 Joint Communiqué.



Why could this communiqué lead to various consecutive initiatives, such as a working group on ASEAN Human Rights Mechanisms in 1995, the National Human Rights Institutions establishment (Philippines 1987, Indonesia 1993, Thailand 1998, Malaysia 1999), the adoption of Vientiane Action Program of 2004, the Declaration of Cooperation among the four National Human Rights Institutions of 2007, the signing of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the establishment of the AHRB in 2009. This long process could inspire the AICHR to sustain this continuity in drafting the AHRD.



Finally, the AICHR has to immediately map out a common area of concerns to human rights issues prior to the adoption of the AHRD, such as border conflicts, smuggling, trafficking of women, children and drugs, illegal smuggling, migrant workers, money laundering and terrorism. The AHRD and other regional human rights instruments have to be unifying factors to address those common concerns.



The absence of transparency and participation of civil society in the drafting process of the AHRD will mark a setback for human rights promotion and protection in the region.



The writer is a professor at State University of Jakarta and former director general of human rights at the Law and Human Rights Ministry.

To what end, ASEAN?

Kevin HR Villanueva, Leeds, UK
Wed, 05/23/2012 7:59 AM

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With the hype and fanfare settled over the recent 20th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, the ASEAN Secretariat has turned its eyes back to the headquarters in Jakarta, and the 10 heads of state are safe and back to the daily grind of national politics.



But the summer respite leaves us wondering whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) genuinely offers benefits to member states. There have been three common criticisms against the organization since its creation in 1967, which are worth considering.



First, it is said that the bloc has been nothing else but an empty shell, pretty much like the quiet corridors of its Jakarta headquarters that buzz only when the coterie of diplomats alight for one of the 300 or so meetings held every year, with little or nil effect on the domestic reforms.



Now politics will always be riddled with detractors and free riders or, indeed, the classical realists who believe that multilateral institutions will always be at the service of the state, so it will be difficult to put up a defense of ASEAN against its cynics.



There are, however, some undeniable facts that ought to make ASEAN pull its weight not only in international politics but also in the management of domestic affairs. From the time ASEAN was conceived, major interstate conflagrations have been avoided.



ASEAN has been an integral part what some scholars have called the decades of “East Asian Peace”, especially since 1989 when Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia.



ASEAN has also been increasingly used as the preferred multilateral forum with the European Union (EU) (called the Asia-Europe Meeting or ASEM), and significantly of late, the Philippines has called for the organization to take the lead in bringing the claimants to the Spratly Islands to a rules-based, multilateral and peaceful resolution of this simmering conflict.



At a time when the region is fast becoming the proxy playing field between the US waning in its imperial might and China on the heels of its ascending star, ASEAN can turn conflict into opportunity.



Second, the grand vision of an ASEAN Community by 2015 is underway but it is turning into either an enclave of an elite group of bureaucrats and retired wannabes from previous national administrations or a closed circle of seasoned diplomats wary of the meddling of the international community — especially of the West — and the hidden agenda of supposedly well-meaning civil society organizations.



The charge that ASEAN continues to be clouded in secrecy seems to me a problem of political perspective. The endless multi-sector meetings that comprise representatives from the various national ministries regularly engage civil society advocates and international institutions.



Civil society organizations in Southeast Asia do not operate like Western NGOs — embedded civil society activists weave in and out of the ASEAN institutions as experts and specialists or as national appointees, wearing two hats but always respecting the imaginary boundaries between these two spheres of action. There is an understanding that most reforms are on account of the strength and experience of these individuals.



The civil society consultations that came out of the Phnom Penh summit (say the Joint Statement of the ASEAN Civil Society Conference/ASEAN People’s Forum 2012) and multilateral trade agreements with long-standing dialogue partners (like the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement — AANZFTA) are clear indications that it would be foolish, nay impossible, for ASEAN to block out either the international donors that help it realize its international projects or the voices of its peoples who have been enshrined in the organization’s constitution since 2008 (the ASEAN Charter).



The great challenge for ASEAN is to stand behind its Secretariat and the region’s more mindful regional media networks to inform its national constituencies of pressing regional debates because national priorities are natural headline huggers of national dailies.



Finally, some quarters have gone as far as saying that all these meetings have now found a way of perpetuating themselves to the satisfaction of those who go on the trips and enjoy the perks and, for better or for worse, are now blind to the dreams of the forbearers of ASEAN.



To admit that ASEAN is turning on itself aimlessly is to dismiss the work of competent and determined individuals comprising the Secretariat, the Country Permanent Representatives and ASEAN senior officials who are liaising with their national ministries to foment trade and commerce, educational and socio-cultural initiatives that are at the essence of bringing money into this regional machine, but who are equally important in constructing a regional identity so that the peoples of ASEAN may relate more easily with regional institutions most akin to their national histories.



Close observers must not lose sight of the fact that there are indeed individuals who are jaded by the copious meetings and the endless reports that have to be hammered out in their wake, but who are hanging in there all the same.



While it is arguably easier to put up and sustain the UN, putting up ASEAN, just like putting up the EU, is a more realistic path in creating institutions from the bottom up if our dream is to create wider, more prosperous and peaceful international communities.



The idea behind the politics of ASEAN was to institutionalize an informal dialogue that would maintain peace and security in the region in the wake of konfrontasi. ASEAN has built on this achievement and I find that the association has evolved from being an “anti-socialist” (the original five — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore) to being a “pro-pluralist” (all the present 10 — now including Cambodia, Burma-Myanmar, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam) organization of sovereign states.



Today, it is in the interest of the 10 to hold together if they want to play on the world stage — and not least of their concerns is to capitalize on their shared natural resources by keeping the US and Chinese influences in the region in check.



ASEAN does not have this mandate but it is working toward a community that could give each of the 10 members the kind of leverage that will command respect from the great powers — ASEAN can dialogue with “pariah states” where the world chooses to look away (think Myanmar), it can afford time for colonies to play up the idea of and build a nation (say Indonesia) and give space for a city to become a powerful state (such as the likes of Singapore).



Without overestimating the contribution of ASEAN, it is so far the most practical, real and sustained effort in building institutions, which have promoted peace, security and a genuine sense of regional identity against the formidable sweep of global forces.



The writer is a university research scholar of East Asian Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, the University of Leeds, UK. He is the principal investigator of the LIAISON Project — Language and Power in Advocacy in Southeast Asian Networks.

Doubting RI’s diplomatic ambition on North Korea

Kornelius Purba, Jakarta | Tue, 05/01/2012 9:25 AM - Klipping The Jakarta Post

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In a meeting with journalists at his office last week, US Ambassador to Indonesia Scot Marciel focused his discussion on several international and regional issues such as the problems of Syria, rising tensions in the South China Sea, the encouraging political developments in Myanmar and the nuclear threat from North Korea.

The American diplomat was apparently aware of the scheduled visit by president of North Korea’s Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly Kim Yong-nam to Jakarta next month. However, he took a cautious stance when asked his opinion about the timing and meaning of the visit amid growing international concern over the nuclear threat, especially after North Korea’s failed rocket launch.

Emphasizing that it was up to Indonesia to decide how to conduct its foreign relations, Marciel nonetheless voiced a strong hope that Indonesia would make it clear to the visiting North Korean official that the country’s provocative actions and its nuclear-weapons threat is “unacceptable behavior”.

The rocket-launch that failed was originally aimed at boosting the image of North Korea’s new leader Kim Jong-un. The country had invited several international media organizations including a private TV station from Jakarta to showcase the advanced development of its sophisticated technology. 

There are widespread concerns in the international community that the humiliating rocket blast will trigger the North Korean military to speed up its nuclear-weapons buildup, very possibly at all costs and at any risks. In this context China may be reluctant to do much to stop the dangerous game.

As reported by The Jakarta Post in its April 16 edition, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa confirmed that President Susilo Bambang Yudho-yono himself will host the bilateral visit of the reputedly second-most powerful man in North Korea, after the young Kim Jong-un.

“There have been intensified talks for some time between Pyongyang and Jakarta over the planned visit,” Marty said, and added that “the two governments are still assessing the plan.”

The 84-year-old Kim Yong-nam, who also served as his country’s foreign minister, will likely be accompanied by other Cabinet members.

For sure, there will be no significant economic agenda during next month’s meeting in Jakarta because of North Korea’s poor purchasing power, its limited ability to repay commercial loans and its insignificant exports to Indonesia. 

Yudhoyono has a strong interest in the North Korean Peninsula, apparently because he believes that Indonesia has a strong moral position to convince the North Korean leadership to return to the negotiation table and abandon its nuclear-weapons plan. 

The President is apparently confident in his powers of persuasion because, after all, Indonesia played an important role in convincing Myanmar’s junta to open its door to the international community by acting as a responsible citizen of the world and by democratizing itself. Now the world is warmly embracing Myanmar.

“We hope the meeting will be successful, particularly given the importance of North Korea to world security,” Yudhoyono’s foreign affairs spokesman Teuku Faizasyah said. 

All of Indonesia’s six presidents, including Sukarno and Soeharto, had strong ambitions to become international peacemakers.

Soeharto was successful in helping to end the civil war in Cambodia in the 1980s and early 1990s. On North Korea, Soeharto was very pragmatic knowing the economic power of the North’s neighbors: South Korea and Japan.

Banking on her childhood friendship with Kim Jong-un’s father, Kim Jong-il, and the close relations between her father Sukarno and Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, the eternal leader of North Korea, Kim Il-sung, Megawati Soekarnoputri tried hard to be an influential peace broker, during and even after her presidential term which lasted from July 2001 to September 2004. It was a total failure.

North Korea naturally hopes to benefit, at least diplomatically, from next month’s meeting in Jakarta because Indonesia is the largest member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The country is becoming more isolated as other countries that have shown some level of support for North Korea’s position against the US, like Iran and Cuba, are now more preoccupied with their own domestic problems.

But knowing the decades-long stubbornness of the North Korean leadership even against its closest ally China, will Indonesia be able to persuade Pyongyang to be more flexible? Yudhoyono can certainly cite Myanmar as an example to the North Korean leader of how a country can suddenly become a “new best friend” of the international community through a decision to reform in a bid to emerge from self-isolation.

Until two years ago, people still readily associated North Korea with Myanmar. But with the rapid changes in Myanmar — and its rich natural resources — the country has gained lucrative concessions from its major trading partners and lenders such as Japan, and the US.

But again, will North Korea listen to Indonesia? It is very unlikely. So what can Yudhoyono expect from hosting the North Korean second-in-command? He can expect little in the short term, or perhaps even in the long term.

What can Pyongyang gain from Jakarta? Recognition from Indonesia of its important role in world security might be a “diplomatic consolation”, despite its continuous military build-up at the cost of the suffering of millions of its citizens many of them are near starvation.

Only time will tell whether Yudhoyono’s gamble will pay off on this occasion. Who knows? 

Maybe, no matter how small the chance might be, Kim Jong-un will follow in the footsteps of the leaders of Myanmar’s junta and end his country’s isolation.

The author is a staff writer at The Jakarta Post.