Budiono Kusumohamidjojo, Jakarta | Mon, 12/26/2011 6:17 PM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
The European economic crisis was triggered mainly by a flaw in the euro currency mechanism in late 2009, when Greece suddenly came close to a state default. Italy was on the way to follow suit. The ensuing crisis is only part of more complex problems plaguing the old continent and it directly threatens the fabric of the European societies.
Capitalism does not appear to be adequate for rescuing the welfare society. It is beyond doubt that Europe is in need of an overhaul of its social and political structures and institutions.
The trouble shaking Greece and Italy has startled European leaders, as both countries are cradles of European civilization and are in many ways also important contributors to our present world civilization.
There is general acknowledgment that the whole crisis has its cause in the enduring tacit complacency of European societies and their political leaders. Like it or not, they have been oblivious during the pleasant achievement of having rebuilt Europe from the rubble of the Second World War. Economists, sociologists and philosophers alike generally agree that Europe is now actually facing the fact that “it is pay day”.
Only Germany seems to have kept its track, based on its eight centuries old Hansa tradition supported by even older guilds, which combines innovative hard work, producing and trading. Still, even Germany cannot escape being part of a Europe now compelled to undergo a process of reconstruction, and if not deconstruction, of its social-cultural structure and institutions.
The idea of freedom being the philosophical product of the Renaissance and the French Revolution of 1789 has certainly played a decisive role in shaping European civilization. However, any civilization has its own failings. In some respects the idea of freedom and the creativity it stimulates has its price. Grave new problems, beyond human recognition, come to the surface and startle the “sacred” welfare society.
The good thing is that the European summit held recently in Brussels drew important lessons from the precarious situation. Seventeen of the 27 members of the EU have agreed to stringent disciplinary measures to bring the crisis under control. Still, in the depth of the crisis EU leaders also seem capable of reflecting the wisdom of the French Noble Prize winner Albert Camus (1913-1960), who once said something like, “if you are happy, don’t forget yourself, and if you are desperate, don’t kill yourself.”
Indonesia can learn a lot from the European experience and how their leaders are responding. Indonesian leaders should prepare for 2012, as the decisions made in Brussels will ensure a sort of austerity that will be felt in other parts of the world. The European golden economic ball of the 20th century is over.
The seeming anticlimax of the European civilization has obviously dragged the European leaders into resignation and concern about the future of Europe, while they concurrently watch the rise of new global players, particularly in East Asia and South America. And yet, compared to Europe, Indonesia is being confronted with more tremendous challenges not from forgotten achievements, but indeed from home works carried forward from the past, present pressing problems and looming challenges of the future.
Indonesia has neglected many of the problems of its own past. The dangerous thing is that many Indonesians even pretend to have forgotten them. We have yet to work on our nation building of a people inheriting a complex diversity that unites us simply because we are “Indonesia”. This is proven by the endemic violence and conflicts in the various regions.
After a lapse of 13 years of “Reformasi” that put an end to the Soeharto era, we are yet to prove that we can govern ourselves reasonably. To date we are merely working hard to manipulate democracy to the benefit of the “primordial us” rather than the whole nation. We have yet to prove that we are applying democracy to achieve a better life for the masses and justice for everyone.
We cannot afford to be ignorant, especially about the intense competition among nations that will only become fiercer due to the diminishing availability of resources indispensible for the survival of any nation. By the time we have to face the revolutionary world economic situation, we should have put our homework of nation building and governing ourselves democratically in good order.
If Indonesian leaders fail to address these three grand challenges in due time, Indonesians will encounter a crisis that is many times heavier than the one now plaguing Europe, even before the arrival of the mid 21st century.
The writer is senior adviser at the Centre for European Studies, University of Indonesia.
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| | | | | | | | Post Comments | Comments (4)
Paolo Scalpini | Tue, 27/12/2011 - 07:12am
Europe’s major problems are:
1) Too much focus on financial gain instead of the real economy: unnatural financial constructs with no real value behind it except for spend-more-than-you-have consumerism have created gigantic bubbles of imaginary wealth as well as debt. This is both a problem of big (inefficient) government as well as a short-sighted badly regulated and greed-driven free-market of mainly financial ‘products’. In the meanwhile there is a decline of productive and creative prowess creating an ugly trade balance.
2) Lack of unity, vision and leadership: the example of the Euro has been given already, but also the absurd austerity competition will not necessarily make things better. When different EU policymakers and their advisors start screwing up the essentials of the real economy as well instead of investing in people’s skills and competiveness, we will be in a greater need of welfare than ever. We cannot afford to not being able to afford social security. The demons of the last century are looming behind the corner in such a case.
3) Demographics
Last but not least, other parts of the world simply do not realize yet in what dire strait they are in. Inefficiency, plain stupidity, selfish materialism and wastefulness are not European monopolies. In fact, while European civilization might have started in Greece, the current downfall has started where it has reached a crest with a major banking bailout. Other parts of the world will indeed be hit much harder, because artificial constructs and ratings, based on for example over-subsidized exports and fake monetary depreciations to severe social instabilities and unsustainable economic growths, will eventually come tumbling down with much worse consequences.
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san san lim | Mon, 26/12/2011 - 23:12pm
it is shown welfare society has failed, it is time we switch to sound money, limited goverment, cut spending by 70%, reduce gov. by 80-90% and let the free market take care of us. I believe we will be more prosper and less corruption. The bigger the goverment the more corrupt the goverment will be, you know "absolute power is equal to absolut corrupt"
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Job | Mon, 26/12/2011 - 22:12pm
A more cogent analysis would focus on the role of the Euro in the European economic crisis. By creating a common currency which no central authority can control, economic problems in 1 member of the Eurozone cannot be contained domestically, with resultant contagion.
The crisis originated in the USA, spreading to Europe by reason of the globalisation of international capital markets. this is an inevitable consequence of free trade and market economics. While capitalism may not be prefect, I am yet to see a workable alternative.
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Tessarajan | Mon, 26/12/2011 - 22:12pm
ACTUAL REASON for EUROPE COLAPSE, due to EUROPE LOST their CAPATILISM because they INVESTED EMERGING MAEKET in CHINA and IMPORT CHEAP PRODUCT from CHINA, That causes EUROPE manufactured PRODUCT LOST BUSSINESS in WORLDWIDE.
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Monday, December 26, 2011
A new governance era and Asian anxieties
Simon Tay, Singapore | Tue, 12/27/2011 8:00 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
History may judge this was the year when the 21st century really began. Back in 2000, continuity seemed assured, with the US consolidating power and primacy. One decade on, changes potentially upend the global balance.
The financial crisis that began in the West in late 2008 is entering a second and more dangerous phase. The eurozone shows up not only sovereign financial problems but also the difficulties in exercising collective leadership. The US is not in acute crisis and its economy showed better demand in the last quarter of 2011.
Everyone agrees something needs to be done. Yet Washington, D.C. is gridlocked — witness failure to agree ways to cut the budget deficit. From very different ends of the American spectrum, the Tea Party revolution and the Occupy Wall Street movement evidence a welling restiveness.
Across the Middle East, the Arab Spring has turned into a longer season of uncertainty. Some celebrate Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s end and call for resolution in Syria.
But beyond old autocracies, the emerging concern is who will next govern, and how. With the landslide win for Islamist parties, Egypt’s December poll brings that question into sharp focus.
How has Asia coped? Growth continued for most for much of the year. Some commentators have predicted that this is the time when the region will soon catch up and then surpass the West. Reality is more complex.
Asia is not unaffected. Markets are in tumult, and economic growth rates across the region have been shaved. Prospects for 2012 are mixed, even for those like China and India with large domestic markets, let alone the smaller economies.
Politically, there is no Asian Spring. But governments across the region deal with new expectations from citizens. In erstwhile pariah state Myanmar, the newly installed government has freed political prisoners and will allow long detained Aung San Suu Kyi to contest elections. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore too have seen changes that make for greater participation and more complex politics.
For established Asian democracies — Indonesia, the Philippines and India, — the challenge goes beyond electoral issues.
Demands in this past year have grown for governance that is less corrupt and more effective. Public protests and a number of high profile prosecutions result.
Outside of some copycat demonstrations, the Occupy Wall Street movement has not shown strength across Asian cities.
But the political imperative from Singapore to Bangkok and Beijing is to close the stark gap between
the Haves and Have Nots.
Asset bubbles in housing and inflation in basics of food and energy have been testing governments to make growth more inclusive.
With its economy still running ahead, China has loomed larger this year in the expectations of others. Yet Chinese leaders grapple with many of these same issues, and on a much larger scale. External conditions are becoming more difficult, and domestic issues too.
Measures put in place to keep up growth have distorted the market with too much easy credit. With a dip in growth, social unrest is growing. With its upcoming leadership transition, China’s rulers must do all they can to prevent an economic hard landing and shore up political legitimacy.
As the Chinese military builds up and a more assertive diplomacy is heard, however, acceptability is also an issue with near neighbors.
Global changes in 2011 have come quick and complex — a political, economic and social vortex. Asian states have not been immediately caught in that swirl. But they feel the pull more than many admit.
This shows up an ongoing problem in the region’s relationship to the global system. Despite economic growth, Asians are currently more influenced by global trends than being able to influence what happens. As the US and Europe weaken, gaps in global governance show.
Witness the G-20’s current lack of coordination, and the lack of success in the Doha trade talks. Even the acclaimed success in the year-end climate change meeting only starts off negotiations toward a later agreement and we should expect continuing differences.
The world at year-end is no better than it was at the start. Indeed, conditions — especially in the last quarter — have become increasingly difficult. Asians may make a New Year wish for the US and Europe to put their houses in order.
But looking ahead, Asians must consider what they can and resolve to secure peace and prosperity
for themselves and the wider global system.
The writer is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and author of Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post Crisis Divide from America
History may judge this was the year when the 21st century really began. Back in 2000, continuity seemed assured, with the US consolidating power and primacy. One decade on, changes potentially upend the global balance.
The financial crisis that began in the West in late 2008 is entering a second and more dangerous phase. The eurozone shows up not only sovereign financial problems but also the difficulties in exercising collective leadership. The US is not in acute crisis and its economy showed better demand in the last quarter of 2011.
Everyone agrees something needs to be done. Yet Washington, D.C. is gridlocked — witness failure to agree ways to cut the budget deficit. From very different ends of the American spectrum, the Tea Party revolution and the Occupy Wall Street movement evidence a welling restiveness.
Across the Middle East, the Arab Spring has turned into a longer season of uncertainty. Some celebrate Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s end and call for resolution in Syria.
But beyond old autocracies, the emerging concern is who will next govern, and how. With the landslide win for Islamist parties, Egypt’s December poll brings that question into sharp focus.
How has Asia coped? Growth continued for most for much of the year. Some commentators have predicted that this is the time when the region will soon catch up and then surpass the West. Reality is more complex.
Asia is not unaffected. Markets are in tumult, and economic growth rates across the region have been shaved. Prospects for 2012 are mixed, even for those like China and India with large domestic markets, let alone the smaller economies.
Politically, there is no Asian Spring. But governments across the region deal with new expectations from citizens. In erstwhile pariah state Myanmar, the newly installed government has freed political prisoners and will allow long detained Aung San Suu Kyi to contest elections. Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore too have seen changes that make for greater participation and more complex politics.
For established Asian democracies — Indonesia, the Philippines and India, — the challenge goes beyond electoral issues.
Demands in this past year have grown for governance that is less corrupt and more effective. Public protests and a number of high profile prosecutions result.
Outside of some copycat demonstrations, the Occupy Wall Street movement has not shown strength across Asian cities.
But the political imperative from Singapore to Bangkok and Beijing is to close the stark gap between
the Haves and Have Nots.
Asset bubbles in housing and inflation in basics of food and energy have been testing governments to make growth more inclusive.
With its economy still running ahead, China has loomed larger this year in the expectations of others. Yet Chinese leaders grapple with many of these same issues, and on a much larger scale. External conditions are becoming more difficult, and domestic issues too.
Measures put in place to keep up growth have distorted the market with too much easy credit. With a dip in growth, social unrest is growing. With its upcoming leadership transition, China’s rulers must do all they can to prevent an economic hard landing and shore up political legitimacy.
As the Chinese military builds up and a more assertive diplomacy is heard, however, acceptability is also an issue with near neighbors.
Global changes in 2011 have come quick and complex — a political, economic and social vortex. Asian states have not been immediately caught in that swirl. But they feel the pull more than many admit.
This shows up an ongoing problem in the region’s relationship to the global system. Despite economic growth, Asians are currently more influenced by global trends than being able to influence what happens. As the US and Europe weaken, gaps in global governance show.
Witness the G-20’s current lack of coordination, and the lack of success in the Doha trade talks. Even the acclaimed success in the year-end climate change meeting only starts off negotiations toward a later agreement and we should expect continuing differences.
The world at year-end is no better than it was at the start. Indeed, conditions — especially in the last quarter — have become increasingly difficult. Asians may make a New Year wish for the US and Europe to put their houses in order.
But looking ahead, Asians must consider what they can and resolve to secure peace and prosperity
for themselves and the wider global system.
The writer is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and author of Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post Crisis Divide from America
Thursday, December 22, 2011
US envoy says six-party talks won't resume
Shino Yuasa, The Associated Press, Tokyo, Japan | Tue, 11/23/2010 9:30 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
Talks among six nations to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs in return for aid and other concessions won't resume while Pyongyang works on a new uranium enrichment facility, a U.S. envoy said Tuesday.
The new facility came to light over the weekend after North Korea showed it to a visiting American nuclear scientist, claiming that the highly sophisticated operation had 2,000 completed centrifuges. Top U.S. military officials warn that it could speed the North's ability to make and deliver viable nuclear weapons.
The U.S. special envoy on North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, ruled out any resumption of the stalled six-party talks among the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea while that program continues. The talks were started in 2003 in efforts to coax Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions.
"Needless to say, we regard this development with great seriousness," he told reporters at a Tokyo hotel. "We do not contemplate resuming negotiations while active programs are under way or while there is a possibility that North Koreans would test another nuclear device or test a missile."
Bosworth met in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara during the second stop of an Asian tour that also included South Korea. He was scheduled to fly later Tuesday to China.
"We are consulting with our partners in the six-party process," Bosworth said. "We are committed to moving forward in very close coordination with our partners, particularly of course with our allies, the government of Japan and the government of South Korea."
American scientist Siegried Hecker reported over the weekend that during a recent trip to the North's main Yongbyon atomic complex, he was taken to a small, industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility.
Hecker, a former director of the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory who is regularly given glimpses of the North's secretive nuclear program, said the North Korean program had been built in secret and with remarkable speed.
In Washington, officials said Monday the facility could be nothing more than a "publicity stunt," trying to calm fears while not playing down the seriousness of the problem.
White House press secretary Robert Gibbs called on the North to return to the six-party talks.
"We do not wish to talk simply for the sake of talking," Gibbs said. "The North Koreans have to be serious about living up to their obligations."
Talks among six nations to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear programs in return for aid and other concessions won't resume while Pyongyang works on a new uranium enrichment facility, a U.S. envoy said Tuesday.
The new facility came to light over the weekend after North Korea showed it to a visiting American nuclear scientist, claiming that the highly sophisticated operation had 2,000 completed centrifuges. Top U.S. military officials warn that it could speed the North's ability to make and deliver viable nuclear weapons.
The U.S. special envoy on North Korea, Stephen Bosworth, ruled out any resumption of the stalled six-party talks among the U.S., China, Russia, Japan, South Korea and North Korea while that program continues. The talks were started in 2003 in efforts to coax Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions.
"Needless to say, we regard this development with great seriousness," he told reporters at a Tokyo hotel. "We do not contemplate resuming negotiations while active programs are under way or while there is a possibility that North Koreans would test another nuclear device or test a missile."
Bosworth met in Tokyo with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara during the second stop of an Asian tour that also included South Korea. He was scheduled to fly later Tuesday to China.
"We are consulting with our partners in the six-party process," Bosworth said. "We are committed to moving forward in very close coordination with our partners, particularly of course with our allies, the government of Japan and the government of South Korea."
American scientist Siegried Hecker reported over the weekend that during a recent trip to the North's main Yongbyon atomic complex, he was taken to a small, industrial-scale uranium enrichment facility.
Hecker, a former director of the U.S. Los Alamos National Laboratory who is regularly given glimpses of the North's secretive nuclear program, said the North Korean program had been built in secret and with remarkable speed.
In Washington, officials said Monday the facility could be nothing more than a "publicity stunt," trying to calm fears while not playing down the seriousness of the problem.
White House press secretary Robert Gibbs called on the North to return to the six-party talks.
"We do not wish to talk simply for the sake of talking," Gibbs said. "The North Koreans have to be serious about living up to their obligations."
U.S, China disagree on more nuke talks with N.Korea
The Associated Press, Beijing, China | Wed, 11/24/2010 9:44 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post
A U.S. envoy called Wednesday for international condemnation of North Korea over its shelling of a South Korean island, a day after he ruled out resuming six-nation nuclear disarmament talks with the North while it works on a new uranium facility.
Washington's reluctance to resume the talks is at odds with China's position, which is keen to get back to discussions as soon as possible.
Stephen Bosworth has been conducting hurried consultations with North Korea's neighbors, including China, after a U.S. nuclear scientist reported visiting a new sophisticated uranium enrichment plant that could improve North Korea's ability to make and deliver nuclear weapons.
The situation was made more critical after North Korea on Tuesday shelled a populated South Korean island and the South returned fire.
"The United States calls upon the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) to cease its provocative and irresponsible actions against its neighbors and fully abide by the terms of the armistice and adhere to its international obligations," Bosworth told reporters at a Beijing hotel. "We call on all members of the international community to condemn the DPRK's acts and make clear that they expect the DPRK to cease all provocations and implement its denuclearization commitments."
The appeal for a strong reaction was clearly directed at China, North Korea's economic and political benefactor. Beijing's public reaction has been extremely cautious so far, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressing concern over the situation and calling on both the North and South to "do more to contribute to peace and stability on the peninsula."
On Tuesday in Tokyo, Bosworth said that North Korea's work on the new facility makes it impossible to resume negotiations on its nuclear disarmament that stalled last year.
"Needless to say, we regard this development with great seriousness," Bosworth told reporters at a Tokyo hotel. "We do not contemplate resuming negotiations while active programs are under way or while there is a possibility that North Koreans will test another nuclear device or test a missile."
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, however, said the report of the new nuclear installation made an early resumption of talks more necessary.
"We have taken note of the relevant report" on the facility, said the spokesman, Hong Lei. "What is imperative now is to restart six-party talks as soon as possible."
Disagreements between the U.S. and China over how best to coax Pyongyang to the table have occasionally roiled the talks, which also involve, Japan, Russia and South Korea as well as North Korea. Pyongyang had agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs in return for aid and other concessions before the talks foundered last year after North Korea conducted a second nuclear test.
Cooperation between Beijing and Washington is considered key, though, to any progress on the nuclear issue. After talking with the Chinese foreign minister, Bosworth made an apparent nod to that cooperation.
"We strongly believe that a multilateral, diplomatic approach is the only way to realistically resolve these problems," he said.
Despite North Korea's moves, Beijing worries more about instability in its communist neighbor, preferring to offer aid, trade and other incentives as a way to encourage Pyongyang's cooperation.
The new North Korean uranium facility, which Stanford University scientist Siegfried Hecker over the weekend reported that he was taken to, is part of the main Yongbyon atomic complex. Hecker reported that the facility appeared modern and that his North Korean hosts told him that it contained 2,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium.
The North's previously known nuclear program is plutonium-based. At low levels, uranium can be used in power reactors, but at higher levels it can be used in nuclear weapons.
A U.S. envoy called Wednesday for international condemnation of North Korea over its shelling of a South Korean island, a day after he ruled out resuming six-nation nuclear disarmament talks with the North while it works on a new uranium facility.
Washington's reluctance to resume the talks is at odds with China's position, which is keen to get back to discussions as soon as possible.
Stephen Bosworth has been conducting hurried consultations with North Korea's neighbors, including China, after a U.S. nuclear scientist reported visiting a new sophisticated uranium enrichment plant that could improve North Korea's ability to make and deliver nuclear weapons.
The situation was made more critical after North Korea on Tuesday shelled a populated South Korean island and the South returned fire.
"The United States calls upon the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) to cease its provocative and irresponsible actions against its neighbors and fully abide by the terms of the armistice and adhere to its international obligations," Bosworth told reporters at a Beijing hotel. "We call on all members of the international community to condemn the DPRK's acts and make clear that they expect the DPRK to cease all provocations and implement its denuclearization commitments."
The appeal for a strong reaction was clearly directed at China, North Korea's economic and political benefactor. Beijing's public reaction has been extremely cautious so far, with a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressing concern over the situation and calling on both the North and South to "do more to contribute to peace and stability on the peninsula."
On Tuesday in Tokyo, Bosworth said that North Korea's work on the new facility makes it impossible to resume negotiations on its nuclear disarmament that stalled last year.
"Needless to say, we regard this development with great seriousness," Bosworth told reporters at a Tokyo hotel. "We do not contemplate resuming negotiations while active programs are under way or while there is a possibility that North Koreans will test another nuclear device or test a missile."
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, however, said the report of the new nuclear installation made an early resumption of talks more necessary.
"We have taken note of the relevant report" on the facility, said the spokesman, Hong Lei. "What is imperative now is to restart six-party talks as soon as possible."
Disagreements between the U.S. and China over how best to coax Pyongyang to the table have occasionally roiled the talks, which also involve, Japan, Russia and South Korea as well as North Korea. Pyongyang had agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs in return for aid and other concessions before the talks foundered last year after North Korea conducted a second nuclear test.
Cooperation between Beijing and Washington is considered key, though, to any progress on the nuclear issue. After talking with the Chinese foreign minister, Bosworth made an apparent nod to that cooperation.
"We strongly believe that a multilateral, diplomatic approach is the only way to realistically resolve these problems," he said.
Despite North Korea's moves, Beijing worries more about instability in its communist neighbor, preferring to offer aid, trade and other incentives as a way to encourage Pyongyang's cooperation.
The new North Korean uranium facility, which Stanford University scientist Siegfried Hecker over the weekend reported that he was taken to, is part of the main Yongbyon atomic complex. Hecker reported that the facility appeared modern and that his North Korean hosts told him that it contained 2,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium.
The North's previously known nuclear program is plutonium-based. At low levels, uranium can be used in power reactors, but at higher levels it can be used in nuclear weapons.
US gets new chance to engage North Korea
Goh Sui Noi (The Straits Times), The Asia News Network, Singapore | Wed, 12/21/2011 10:23 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
Hours after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's death on Saturday, news reports out of Seoul said Pyongyang had agreed to suspend its enriched uranium nuclear weapons program.
This was a sign that denuclearization talks, stalled since April 2009 when North Korea pulled out, could resume. It was a key demand of the United States before it would agree to the resumption of talks.
The agreement, struck between North Korean and US negotiators in talks in Beijing last Thursday and Friday, included 240,000 tons worth of food aid from the US. The US was set to confirm the deal sometime this week.
Now, with Kim's passing, the news out of Washington is that the Obama administration may postpone decisions on re-engaging Pyongyang in nuclear talks and providing it with food aid.
Meanwhile, the Chinese have moved swiftly to throw their support behind Kim's son and successor, Kim Jong-un. In a condolence message, the Chinese Communist Party said: "We believe the [North Korean] people will carry forward the will of Coade Kim Jong-il and closely unite around the Korean Workers' Party, and under the leadership of Coade Kim Jong-un, turn grief into strength and march forward in building a strong socialist country and realising a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula."
Another statement, from the Chinese Foreign Ministry paid tribute to the elder Kim, calling him "a great leader of the North Korean people and a dear friend to the people of China".
Such support from the Chinese for the Kim regime would go some way to stabilizing the situation in Pyongyang. This is important as the younger Kim was designated as a successor only last year, and had had little time to learn the ropes of leadership, let alone consolidate his position.
The biggest worry of the Chinese is instability and even chaos during the period of power transition, particularly given the weak position of Kim Jong-un, who is perhaps not yet 30.
So, you can bet your bottom dollar that Beijing will do what it can to shore up the current regime and keep it stable.
While the elder Kim's death was sudden, it was not unanticipated, given that he had been in poor health since a reported stroke in 2008. Even as Pyongyang prepared for succession, Beijing had also likely been preparing for it.
It is imperative for China not only to keep North Korea stable during the power transition, but also to continue to exert influence over its close ally.
It would want to prevent waves of North Korean refugees from spilling over the border into its territory, which would likely happen if the situation in the North turns chaotic.
Beijing would also want to maintain sway over Pyongyang as this would ensure that it remains a buffer state between it, and the US and its allies.
And China is in a good position to do all this. In recent years, Pyongyang had faced greater isolation as a result of Kim's brinkmanship with the US over its nuclear weapons program, and become ever more reliant on the Chinese for political and economic support.
John Delury, a scholar of China and the two Koreas at Yonsei University in Seoul, told The New York Times: "Chinese diplomats are the only ones who can pick up the phone and talk to North Korean counterparts about what is going on, what to expect. This reveals the fatal weakness in Washington and Seoul's overreliance on sanctions over the past three years."
Kim had visited China four times in the past 18 months, mainly to gain economic support.
Yet, he visited Russia for the first time in a decade in August this year, meeting Russian President Dmitry Medvedev near Lake Baikal. The visit was to drum up economic support, but, one might add, also to reduce his country's reliance on its other giant neighbor next door.
Russia has proposed a trans-Korea gas pipeline running through the North to South Korea, but the South Koreans are wary of having their gas supply held to ransom by Pyongyang. As a result, negotiations for the pipeline are still ongoing.
However, in October, Russian Railways started work on the North Korean side to restore a 10,000-kilometer railway line between the two Koreas.
On the eve of his death, Kim's negotiators had struck a tentative deal with the Americans aimed at resuming nuclear talks and perhaps bringing his country in from the cold.
Whether the North Korean leader was seriously trying to change course or just doing his usual blowing of hot and cold is no longer important.
His passing has presented an opportunity for change which is up to the Americans to grasp. They can hold the younger Kim at arm's length and push him further into Chinese arms. Or they can extend a friendly hand and help guide him into the international fold.
In other words, they can choose to either engage or contain the new leadership.
The Americans have often criticized the Chinese for not using their influence on Pyongyang to get it to give up its nuclear weapons program. Now, with the power transition, Washington has an opportunity to build its own influence over the North Koreans.
It could, for a start, go through with the deal struck last week, beginning with the delivery of the 240,000 tons of food for which the North Koreans would be grateful.
How the Americans behave towards North Korea will go some way to determine the shape of its rivalry with China in the North-east Asian region.
It could also determine the success of their much-touted pivot towards Asia.
Hours after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's death on Saturday, news reports out of Seoul said Pyongyang had agreed to suspend its enriched uranium nuclear weapons program.
This was a sign that denuclearization talks, stalled since April 2009 when North Korea pulled out, could resume. It was a key demand of the United States before it would agree to the resumption of talks.
The agreement, struck between North Korean and US negotiators in talks in Beijing last Thursday and Friday, included 240,000 tons worth of food aid from the US. The US was set to confirm the deal sometime this week.
Now, with Kim's passing, the news out of Washington is that the Obama administration may postpone decisions on re-engaging Pyongyang in nuclear talks and providing it with food aid.
Meanwhile, the Chinese have moved swiftly to throw their support behind Kim's son and successor, Kim Jong-un. In a condolence message, the Chinese Communist Party said: "We believe the [North Korean] people will carry forward the will of Coade Kim Jong-il and closely unite around the Korean Workers' Party, and under the leadership of Coade Kim Jong-un, turn grief into strength and march forward in building a strong socialist country and realising a lasting peace on the Korean peninsula."
Another statement, from the Chinese Foreign Ministry paid tribute to the elder Kim, calling him "a great leader of the North Korean people and a dear friend to the people of China".
Such support from the Chinese for the Kim regime would go some way to stabilizing the situation in Pyongyang. This is important as the younger Kim was designated as a successor only last year, and had had little time to learn the ropes of leadership, let alone consolidate his position.
The biggest worry of the Chinese is instability and even chaos during the period of power transition, particularly given the weak position of Kim Jong-un, who is perhaps not yet 30.
So, you can bet your bottom dollar that Beijing will do what it can to shore up the current regime and keep it stable.
While the elder Kim's death was sudden, it was not unanticipated, given that he had been in poor health since a reported stroke in 2008. Even as Pyongyang prepared for succession, Beijing had also likely been preparing for it.
It is imperative for China not only to keep North Korea stable during the power transition, but also to continue to exert influence over its close ally.
It would want to prevent waves of North Korean refugees from spilling over the border into its territory, which would likely happen if the situation in the North turns chaotic.
Beijing would also want to maintain sway over Pyongyang as this would ensure that it remains a buffer state between it, and the US and its allies.
And China is in a good position to do all this. In recent years, Pyongyang had faced greater isolation as a result of Kim's brinkmanship with the US over its nuclear weapons program, and become ever more reliant on the Chinese for political and economic support.
John Delury, a scholar of China and the two Koreas at Yonsei University in Seoul, told The New York Times: "Chinese diplomats are the only ones who can pick up the phone and talk to North Korean counterparts about what is going on, what to expect. This reveals the fatal weakness in Washington and Seoul's overreliance on sanctions over the past three years."
Kim had visited China four times in the past 18 months, mainly to gain economic support.
Yet, he visited Russia for the first time in a decade in August this year, meeting Russian President Dmitry Medvedev near Lake Baikal. The visit was to drum up economic support, but, one might add, also to reduce his country's reliance on its other giant neighbor next door.
Russia has proposed a trans-Korea gas pipeline running through the North to South Korea, but the South Koreans are wary of having their gas supply held to ransom by Pyongyang. As a result, negotiations for the pipeline are still ongoing.
However, in October, Russian Railways started work on the North Korean side to restore a 10,000-kilometer railway line between the two Koreas.
On the eve of his death, Kim's negotiators had struck a tentative deal with the Americans aimed at resuming nuclear talks and perhaps bringing his country in from the cold.
Whether the North Korean leader was seriously trying to change course or just doing his usual blowing of hot and cold is no longer important.
His passing has presented an opportunity for change which is up to the Americans to grasp. They can hold the younger Kim at arm's length and push him further into Chinese arms. Or they can extend a friendly hand and help guide him into the international fold.
In other words, they can choose to either engage or contain the new leadership.
The Americans have often criticized the Chinese for not using their influence on Pyongyang to get it to give up its nuclear weapons program. Now, with the power transition, Washington has an opportunity to build its own influence over the North Koreans.
It could, for a start, go through with the deal struck last week, beginning with the delivery of the 240,000 tons of food for which the North Koreans would be grateful.
How the Americans behave towards North Korea will go some way to determine the shape of its rivalry with China in the North-east Asian region.
It could also determine the success of their much-touted pivot towards Asia.
Insight: After Kim Jong-il
Christopher Hill, Project Syndicate/Dateline | Fri, 12/23/2011 8:04 AM A | A | A |- Klipping The Jakarta Post
In one sense, the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il changes everything. It is by no means clear, for example, that Kim’s coddled youngest son, Kim Jong-un — now hailed as the “Great Successor,” but singularly unprepared to lead — will ultimately succeed his father in anything but name.
Working in Kim Jong-un’s favor is his striking resemblance to his grandfather, Kim Il-song, who, strangely, held a certain charisma for North Koreans. Looks aside, Kim III will need a lot of help; in the meantime, we can expect further consolidation by the Korean People’s Army of its leadership of the country. Even more than in the past, we must expect the unexpected in North Korea. Above all, the West must work closely with China. In that sense, nothing has changed.
Any conversation with Chinese officials nowadays leads to the same conclusion: China wants to restart the Six-Party Talks aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons program. The problem is that, despite commitment to the talks from all six participants – China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and even North Korea in recent months (a nominal pledge that is unlikely to be changed as a result of Kim Jong-il’s passing) — the results so far are insufficient to sustain the process.
Re-energizing the talks will require renewed focus on taking steps to achieve their ends. Unfortunately, China, the party with the greatest leverage over North Korea, seems least committed to doing what is required.
North Korea is China’s neighbor, and political or social instability there is not taken lightly. It has often been said that China fears a possible refugee flow. But that is just the start.
China’s attitude toward its belligerent, impoverished neighbor is actually very complex. While there are a great many modern, business-oriented Chinese anxious to build the country’s future, there are also those who see in their plucky little neighbor something strangely admirable. Resisting foreign “pressure” is a continuing theme in Chinese history, and who does it better than the North Koreans, who seem to be prepared to fight to their last starving child?
Chinese officials, who are committed, above all, to maintaining order at home, must lose sleep asking themselves what an implosion of North Korea’s Communist party-state would mean for them. This is not so much a foreign-policy issue as it is an issue concerning China’s internal politics. The closer a country is to China, the more China views it through the lens of domestic issues, particularly internal-security concerns. Would the withering away of North Korea’s party-state affect the debate within China about the future of its own brand of communism? Many Chinese officials don’t want to find out.
But perhaps the greatest difficulty worrying the Chinese stems from an underappreciated but familiar theme in international relations: “old think” — the inability to comprehend, much less address, new realities.
North Korea is a fragile state, even more so following Kim Jong-il’s death. For starters, it is not a national homeland, a characteristic that keeps many failing states from actually failing. The homeland is the Republic of Korea, located to the south, beyond the vistas of razor wire and well-tended minefields. North Korean propaganda has always tried to represent the country as “the true” Korea, where culture, language, and everything else is supposedly on offer in its purest form. But that argument is as threadbare as the rest of the country.
The Chinese recognize that North Korea cannot survive in its current form, and have sought to encourage its leaders to embrace economic reform without political change. But, with prosperous South Korea so close, any relaxation of borders would mean no one would be left to rebuild the country. That is why the Chinese road to reform is not available to North Korea. Consider the determination of North Korean refugees, who suffer the most perilous journeys to freedom in the world, but keep making them.
So why does China persist in the tortured fiction that there is some kind of future for a reformed North Korea? The answer seems to lie in the concern that North Korea’s demise would amount to a victory for the US and a defeat for China. After all, the successor state on the Korean peninsula would be South Korea, a treaty ally of the US.
The US should be prepared to make clear to the Chinese that any change in political arrangements on the Korean peninsula would not result in a strategic loss to China. For example, while the US should never bargain with the Chinese over America’s defense obligations to South Korea, it could engage the Chinese on some assurances that no US forces would ever be stationed above the 38th parallel. Indeed, given the current mood in the US, it might be difficult, in the context of Korean unification, to continue to station any US troops on the peninsula at all, let alone along the Yalu River.
Moreover, the US and South Korea have various plans for dealing with the humanitarian consequences of a North Korean collapse. So why not share them with the Chinese? Needless to say, such talks would be sensitive, but so would a North Korean collapse that was not preceded by a serious exchange of views on the subject.
Sooner or later, such a quiet but deeper dialogue needs to start. Given the uncertain future that it portends, Kim Jong-il’s passing might be the perfect moment.
The writer, former US assistant secretary of State for East Asia, was US ambassador to Iraq, South Korea, Macedonia and Poland, US special envoy for Kosovo, a negotiator of the Dayton Peace Accords, and chief US negotiator with North Korea from 2005-2009. He is now dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.
In one sense, the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il changes everything. It is by no means clear, for example, that Kim’s coddled youngest son, Kim Jong-un — now hailed as the “Great Successor,” but singularly unprepared to lead — will ultimately succeed his father in anything but name.
Working in Kim Jong-un’s favor is his striking resemblance to his grandfather, Kim Il-song, who, strangely, held a certain charisma for North Koreans. Looks aside, Kim III will need a lot of help; in the meantime, we can expect further consolidation by the Korean People’s Army of its leadership of the country. Even more than in the past, we must expect the unexpected in North Korea. Above all, the West must work closely with China. In that sense, nothing has changed.
Any conversation with Chinese officials nowadays leads to the same conclusion: China wants to restart the Six-Party Talks aimed at persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear-weapons program. The problem is that, despite commitment to the talks from all six participants – China, the United States, South Korea, Japan, Russia and even North Korea in recent months (a nominal pledge that is unlikely to be changed as a result of Kim Jong-il’s passing) — the results so far are insufficient to sustain the process.
Re-energizing the talks will require renewed focus on taking steps to achieve their ends. Unfortunately, China, the party with the greatest leverage over North Korea, seems least committed to doing what is required.
North Korea is China’s neighbor, and political or social instability there is not taken lightly. It has often been said that China fears a possible refugee flow. But that is just the start.
China’s attitude toward its belligerent, impoverished neighbor is actually very complex. While there are a great many modern, business-oriented Chinese anxious to build the country’s future, there are also those who see in their plucky little neighbor something strangely admirable. Resisting foreign “pressure” is a continuing theme in Chinese history, and who does it better than the North Koreans, who seem to be prepared to fight to their last starving child?
Chinese officials, who are committed, above all, to maintaining order at home, must lose sleep asking themselves what an implosion of North Korea’s Communist party-state would mean for them. This is not so much a foreign-policy issue as it is an issue concerning China’s internal politics. The closer a country is to China, the more China views it through the lens of domestic issues, particularly internal-security concerns. Would the withering away of North Korea’s party-state affect the debate within China about the future of its own brand of communism? Many Chinese officials don’t want to find out.
But perhaps the greatest difficulty worrying the Chinese stems from an underappreciated but familiar theme in international relations: “old think” — the inability to comprehend, much less address, new realities.
North Korea is a fragile state, even more so following Kim Jong-il’s death. For starters, it is not a national homeland, a characteristic that keeps many failing states from actually failing. The homeland is the Republic of Korea, located to the south, beyond the vistas of razor wire and well-tended minefields. North Korean propaganda has always tried to represent the country as “the true” Korea, where culture, language, and everything else is supposedly on offer in its purest form. But that argument is as threadbare as the rest of the country.
The Chinese recognize that North Korea cannot survive in its current form, and have sought to encourage its leaders to embrace economic reform without political change. But, with prosperous South Korea so close, any relaxation of borders would mean no one would be left to rebuild the country. That is why the Chinese road to reform is not available to North Korea. Consider the determination of North Korean refugees, who suffer the most perilous journeys to freedom in the world, but keep making them.
So why does China persist in the tortured fiction that there is some kind of future for a reformed North Korea? The answer seems to lie in the concern that North Korea’s demise would amount to a victory for the US and a defeat for China. After all, the successor state on the Korean peninsula would be South Korea, a treaty ally of the US.
The US should be prepared to make clear to the Chinese that any change in political arrangements on the Korean peninsula would not result in a strategic loss to China. For example, while the US should never bargain with the Chinese over America’s defense obligations to South Korea, it could engage the Chinese on some assurances that no US forces would ever be stationed above the 38th parallel. Indeed, given the current mood in the US, it might be difficult, in the context of Korean unification, to continue to station any US troops on the peninsula at all, let alone along the Yalu River.
Moreover, the US and South Korea have various plans for dealing with the humanitarian consequences of a North Korean collapse. So why not share them with the Chinese? Needless to say, such talks would be sensitive, but so would a North Korean collapse that was not preceded by a serious exchange of views on the subject.
Sooner or later, such a quiet but deeper dialogue needs to start. Given the uncertain future that it portends, Kim Jong-il’s passing might be the perfect moment.
The writer, former US assistant secretary of State for East Asia, was US ambassador to Iraq, South Korea, Macedonia and Poland, US special envoy for Kosovo, a negotiator of the Dayton Peace Accords, and chief US negotiator with North Korea from 2005-2009. He is now dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.
Sunday, December 18, 2011
Mixed results from Durban climate talks for Indonesia
Fitrian Ardiansyah, Canberra | Fri, 12/16/2011 9:57 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
Agreements achieved in the early morning of Dec. 11 in Durban, South Africa, not only appeared to salvage the UN climate talks but have also raised further questions about the commitments and capabilities of countries around the world in urgently tackling climate change.
After two weeks and more than a day extension of difficult negotiations, governments involved in the 17th session of the Conference of Parties (COP-17) agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol and to negotiate a binding agreement for all countries to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
These agreements, known as the “Durban Platform”, also include the implementation of the Green Climate Fund, establishment of the Adaptation Committee, and further development of REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation).
The results of Durban climate negotiations need to be cautiously analyzed since they have potentially different implications for the planet and developing countries like Indonesia.
For Indonesia, it is crucial if negotiations in Durban resulted in decisions which clearly translate into or present strong signals leading to global actions to cut GHG emissions and to financially and technologically support actions on mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
Developing countries in Durban, for instance, managed to get developed countries to agree to the inclusion of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which will commence in January 2013, in the “Durban Platform”.
This result will definitely avoid a gap at the end of the first commitment period of the Protocol, ending in 2012.
The Protocol, having set binding targets for 37 developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to 5 percent below the 1990 levels by 2012, however, may lose its significance in the second period since some countries such as Canada, Japan and Russia were reportedly unwilling to take part.
With the US still opting out of the Protocol, it is likely that the Protocol will only achieve small reductions of GHG emissions.
This situation apparently justifies the importance of another agreed decision, as included in the “Durban Platform”, which is to have a roadmap to negotiate a new global treaty covering all countries to reduce GHG emissions.
The negotiations for this treaty are expected to be concluded by 2015 and the treaty will come into force from 2020.
Many climate analysts, nevertheless, are not convinced with the possible directions of this particular agreement.
Although covering both developed and developing countries, including Indonesia, the projected emissions resulting from this possible treaty — calculated based on the current pledges made by these countries since Copenhagen COP-15 in 2009 — may likely lead to a global average temperature rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius.
This means that the future of people living on this planet, particularly in vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is at stake. The economy and many aspects of human civilization are threatened.
Therefore, there is a need for serious new commitments and actions to address the “emissions gap” so that the planned treaty can effectively tackle climate change.
As of Durban, there were no new pledges for stronger emissions reductions.
In addition, waiting until 2020 for the treaty to take effect may also be too late. There is a huge risk that by that time, the limit of emissions in the atmosphere has been reached so that actions to stabilize the climate are next to impossible and too expensive.
Another perceived crucial agreement incorporated in the “Durban Platform” is a formal structure of the Green Climate Fund and a work plan to operate it by mobilizing funds from both private and public sources.
A number of countries signaled their readiness to contribute to the Fund but realizing the promise may prove to be a daunting task.
The global financial crisis was often cited as the reason behind the difficult negotiations and realization on finance.
This situation, hence, has left many unanswered questions for developing countries to fight climate change since the Fund is supposed to be used to support policies and actions in these countries.
Also, the negotiations on finance, specifically on the Green Climate Fund, have not resulted in the establishment of a specific window for REDD+. A special window funds for REDD+ at the global level, if agreed, is expected to provide significant support for tropical forest nations, including Indonesia, to advance their REDD+ development at national and local levels.
A decision coming out in Durban which can lead to financial support for REDD+ is the agreement on a variety of sources for financing ranging from public and private finance, as well as market mechanisms.
This decision will not only open the door for new and long-term investments in REDD+ but also at least help ensuring the future of investments already put in place in supporting REDD+ readiness and early actions. Other aspects of REDD+ were also agreed, among others, covering the reference levels and safeguards.
The progress made on the reference levels is necessary since establishing these levels is important not only for determining emission reductions but also as a basis for REDD+ funding mechanisms.
However, the aspect of rules on safeguards in REDD+ decision appears to be weak, especially when it comes to rules on protecting indigenous communities and biodiversity. This may undermine the credibility of REDD+ and make it unattractive in the eyes of investors.
Another positive decision reached in Durban, especially for vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is the establishment of the Adaptation Committee.
This Committee will coordinate adaptation activities on a global scale. The establishment of this Committee has put one of important the components to help developing countries confronting the increasingly dangerous impacts of climate change.
In general, the Durban climate talks have provided mixed results for developing countries like Indonesia. There was some marginal progress made but huge unanswered questions remain.
Political promises and weak agreements will hardly reduce GHG emissions. Only strong decisions and real actions can demonstrate the level of seriousness in addressing climate change.
It is therefore imperative for Indonesia, unilaterally and with other countries, to continue to work hard and show real actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Without these actions, the survival of the nation and the fate of the planet will look uncertain and grim.
The writer is a doctoral candidate at the Australian National University, and the recipient of the Australian Leadership Award and Allison Sudradjat Award.
Agreements achieved in the early morning of Dec. 11 in Durban, South Africa, not only appeared to salvage the UN climate talks but have also raised further questions about the commitments and capabilities of countries around the world in urgently tackling climate change.
After two weeks and more than a day extension of difficult negotiations, governments involved in the 17th session of the Conference of Parties (COP-17) agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol and to negotiate a binding agreement for all countries to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
These agreements, known as the “Durban Platform”, also include the implementation of the Green Climate Fund, establishment of the Adaptation Committee, and further development of REDD+ (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation).
The results of Durban climate negotiations need to be cautiously analyzed since they have potentially different implications for the planet and developing countries like Indonesia.
For Indonesia, it is crucial if negotiations in Durban resulted in decisions which clearly translate into or present strong signals leading to global actions to cut GHG emissions and to financially and technologically support actions on mitigation and adaptation in developing countries.
Developing countries in Durban, for instance, managed to get developed countries to agree to the inclusion of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which will commence in January 2013, in the “Durban Platform”.
This result will definitely avoid a gap at the end of the first commitment period of the Protocol, ending in 2012.
The Protocol, having set binding targets for 37 developed countries to reduce GHG emissions to 5 percent below the 1990 levels by 2012, however, may lose its significance in the second period since some countries such as Canada, Japan and Russia were reportedly unwilling to take part.
With the US still opting out of the Protocol, it is likely that the Protocol will only achieve small reductions of GHG emissions.
This situation apparently justifies the importance of another agreed decision, as included in the “Durban Platform”, which is to have a roadmap to negotiate a new global treaty covering all countries to reduce GHG emissions.
The negotiations for this treaty are expected to be concluded by 2015 and the treaty will come into force from 2020.
Many climate analysts, nevertheless, are not convinced with the possible directions of this particular agreement.
Although covering both developed and developing countries, including Indonesia, the projected emissions resulting from this possible treaty — calculated based on the current pledges made by these countries since Copenhagen COP-15 in 2009 — may likely lead to a global average temperature rise of more than 3.5 degrees Celsius.
This means that the future of people living on this planet, particularly in vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is at stake. The economy and many aspects of human civilization are threatened.
Therefore, there is a need for serious new commitments and actions to address the “emissions gap” so that the planned treaty can effectively tackle climate change.
As of Durban, there were no new pledges for stronger emissions reductions.
In addition, waiting until 2020 for the treaty to take effect may also be too late. There is a huge risk that by that time, the limit of emissions in the atmosphere has been reached so that actions to stabilize the climate are next to impossible and too expensive.
Another perceived crucial agreement incorporated in the “Durban Platform” is a formal structure of the Green Climate Fund and a work plan to operate it by mobilizing funds from both private and public sources.
A number of countries signaled their readiness to contribute to the Fund but realizing the promise may prove to be a daunting task.
The global financial crisis was often cited as the reason behind the difficult negotiations and realization on finance.
This situation, hence, has left many unanswered questions for developing countries to fight climate change since the Fund is supposed to be used to support policies and actions in these countries.
Also, the negotiations on finance, specifically on the Green Climate Fund, have not resulted in the establishment of a specific window for REDD+. A special window funds for REDD+ at the global level, if agreed, is expected to provide significant support for tropical forest nations, including Indonesia, to advance their REDD+ development at national and local levels.
A decision coming out in Durban which can lead to financial support for REDD+ is the agreement on a variety of sources for financing ranging from public and private finance, as well as market mechanisms.
This decision will not only open the door for new and long-term investments in REDD+ but also at least help ensuring the future of investments already put in place in supporting REDD+ readiness and early actions. Other aspects of REDD+ were also agreed, among others, covering the reference levels and safeguards.
The progress made on the reference levels is necessary since establishing these levels is important not only for determining emission reductions but also as a basis for REDD+ funding mechanisms.
However, the aspect of rules on safeguards in REDD+ decision appears to be weak, especially when it comes to rules on protecting indigenous communities and biodiversity. This may undermine the credibility of REDD+ and make it unattractive in the eyes of investors.
Another positive decision reached in Durban, especially for vulnerable countries like Indonesia, is the establishment of the Adaptation Committee.
This Committee will coordinate adaptation activities on a global scale. The establishment of this Committee has put one of important the components to help developing countries confronting the increasingly dangerous impacts of climate change.
In general, the Durban climate talks have provided mixed results for developing countries like Indonesia. There was some marginal progress made but huge unanswered questions remain.
Political promises and weak agreements will hardly reduce GHG emissions. Only strong decisions and real actions can demonstrate the level of seriousness in addressing climate change.
It is therefore imperative for Indonesia, unilaterally and with other countries, to continue to work hard and show real actions on climate change mitigation and adaptation. Without these actions, the survival of the nation and the fate of the planet will look uncertain and grim.
The writer is a doctoral candidate at the Australian National University, and the recipient of the Australian Leadership Award and Allison Sudradjat Award.
Thursday, December 15, 2011
US troops in Australia: What should Indonesia do?
Untung Suropati, Jakarta | Thu, 12/15/2011 7:56 AM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the deployment of 2,500 US troops to Darwin, Australia, only a few days before attending the East Asia Summit in Indonesia has made some countries uncomfortable.
China — although briefed by Australia beforehand — immediately reacted by questioning the appropriateness of having US marines in Australia. That China would react came as no surprise. Many saw this arrangement as part of a US plan to balance China’s rise as well as strengthen its role in the region.
Indonesia was not very excited, either. Right after the announcement in Canberra, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told the press that the arrangement would generate a “vicious circle of tension and mistrust’’.
One of Indonesia’s top newspapers wrote in an editorial that the US presence was “first and foremost” intended to show China that it still had the wherewithal to face a rising power, and that the US would prevent any possible military conflict along sea-borne trade routes, especially in the South China Sea.
The Indonesian Military (TNI) also displayed its concern. Adm. Agus Suhartono, the TNI chief, worried about the possible presence of fleets of both the US Navy and Royal Australian Navy in Indonesian waters for joint exercises in the future. The TNI is currently conducting an analysis on the possible impact of such arrangement.
Although Obama personally assured China and Indonesia during the East Asian Summit that the aim of the arrangement was to ensure regional security and support humanitarian operations, some analysts have expressed concern that this might “promote” a naval arms race. China might react by strengthening its naval forces, which in turn would force neighboring countries to follow in its footsteps.
There is little wonder why the US is so keen to take back its dominant role in the Asia Pacific region after focusing most of its military power and money in Afghanistan and Iraq for some time. Around US$5 trillion worth of commerce flows though the western Pacific; $1.2 trillion of it belongs to the US.
Trade is not the only US interest in the region. In its report in 2008, the US Energy Information Agency estimated that the South China Sea might hold around 230 billion barrels of oil deposits. On the other hand, China — with its remarkable and yet at times frightening economic development — will require an abundant supply of energy and the South China Sea is just right around the corner.
Another dominant reason is China’s rise in economic and military power. There have been various reactions from countries in the Asia Pacific region, most of whom are cautious or wary, including those with maritime boundary disputes with China.
The US has never been shy in expressing its concern over China’s military buildup and its “unknown” military budget. With heightened tension in the South China Sea between China and other disputing countries, most of whom are members of ASEAN, the world is watching how China will react after around 2,500 US Marines are deployed to Darwin in mid-2012.
China is acting calm in commenting on this arrangement. At the same time, China and ASEAN have agreed on discussions on the South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC). This is positive breakthrough in the settlement of the South China Sea dispute. However, we should continue to monitor China’s actions related to US presence, not only in the short term, but also long term.
Although the US has made it clear that its presence is not intended to interfere with the South China Sea dispute settlement, it is vital not to underestimate the importance of US interests in the region. Further, one of the claimant states is also an important US partner in the Southeast Asia region. The US may not interfere in a direct way but still its influence could be felt through allied or friendly countries.
What should we do then? Indonesia is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute however we are in the middle of two key
players in the region: China and the US. With the possibility of foreign naval fleets moving in our waters, Indonesia should first carefully calculate how it should move between these giants.
First, a thorough analysis on possible impacts on a number of areas, including the economy and security should be done among related government agencies. Second, Indonesia should play a key role in promoting the advancement of the CoC discussion to ensure stability in the South China Sea. Third, there is a need to increase the security of our waters through the Indonesian Navy.
The Navy should also enhance current cooperation with Australia, China and the US. As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia could also use the association’s leverage with China, Australia and the US. The signing of Bali Concord III would be one of our fundamental principals in this issue.
There are two important keywords: maritime security and cooperation. Maritime security is one of the main pillars of globalization, international trade and energy security. It cannot be achieved by one country without cooperation from neighboring countries or countries in the region.
The South China Sea dispute might disrupt regional maritime security if claimant states do not play by the agreed rules. One of the reasons the US is present in the region is also maritime security. The current cooperation mechanisms —
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral —should be the basis of how we cope with this issue. Further analysis and discussion is needed, not only with other countries, but also within our mechanisms.
Inability to move among these giants will be a loss for Indonesia. The nation’s strategic geographical position requires us to comprehend our surroundings. The US will never let China play a bigger role in the Asia Pacific. China will continue to rise, playing a bigger role in the region every single day. It is up to Indonesia to determine how it would stand in the region.
How we react to the Darwin arrangement would be crucial to how we position our country in the region.
The author is a graduate of the US Naval War College, Naval Command and College Class of 2009.
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| | | | | | | | Post Comments | Comments (9)
Goldfinger | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 09:12am
"...What should Indonesia do? You should supply the prostitutes and Marijuana to the American GIs."
Are you saying that that's all Indonesia is good for?
Report Abuse
Gurkha | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 07:12am
What should TNI do? As usual, when confronted with a prpfessional fighting force, go and hide.
Report Abuse
Lanun | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 05:12am
Indonesia should play neutral and let Chinese open up base in east Timor, that would be good and at the same time let Russia have a base in PApua and we can train jointly with all. That's the spirit of East Asia , if Australia objects, kick them out of ASEAN security meeting.
Report Abuse
BlondeDownUnder | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 03:12am
What should Indonesia do? Nothing, just sit back and enjoy. USA has training troups in many countries, even countries with no wars, so this is nothing new for the USA.
Report Abuse
scottieaussie | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 03:12am
Join-in. Interoperability is good for all.
Report Abuse
Jamals-8 US troops, Indos should supply girls | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 18:12pm
You reported: "US troops in Australia: What should Indonesia do?"
.
You should supply the prostitutes and Marijuana to the American GIs. Sooner of later the American Base would become a brothel.
Report Abuse
Goldfinger | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 16:12pm
What should Indonesia do? Indonesia should wake up and realize that the biggest threat to its stability and security comes, not from China, the US or Australia, but rather from its own government, its own military and its own people.
Report Abuse
US President Barack Obama’s announcement of the deployment of 2,500 US troops to Darwin, Australia, only a few days before attending the East Asia Summit in Indonesia has made some countries uncomfortable.
China — although briefed by Australia beforehand — immediately reacted by questioning the appropriateness of having US marines in Australia. That China would react came as no surprise. Many saw this arrangement as part of a US plan to balance China’s rise as well as strengthen its role in the region.
Indonesia was not very excited, either. Right after the announcement in Canberra, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa told the press that the arrangement would generate a “vicious circle of tension and mistrust’’.
One of Indonesia’s top newspapers wrote in an editorial that the US presence was “first and foremost” intended to show China that it still had the wherewithal to face a rising power, and that the US would prevent any possible military conflict along sea-borne trade routes, especially in the South China Sea.
The Indonesian Military (TNI) also displayed its concern. Adm. Agus Suhartono, the TNI chief, worried about the possible presence of fleets of both the US Navy and Royal Australian Navy in Indonesian waters for joint exercises in the future. The TNI is currently conducting an analysis on the possible impact of such arrangement.
Although Obama personally assured China and Indonesia during the East Asian Summit that the aim of the arrangement was to ensure regional security and support humanitarian operations, some analysts have expressed concern that this might “promote” a naval arms race. China might react by strengthening its naval forces, which in turn would force neighboring countries to follow in its footsteps.
There is little wonder why the US is so keen to take back its dominant role in the Asia Pacific region after focusing most of its military power and money in Afghanistan and Iraq for some time. Around US$5 trillion worth of commerce flows though the western Pacific; $1.2 trillion of it belongs to the US.
Trade is not the only US interest in the region. In its report in 2008, the US Energy Information Agency estimated that the South China Sea might hold around 230 billion barrels of oil deposits. On the other hand, China — with its remarkable and yet at times frightening economic development — will require an abundant supply of energy and the South China Sea is just right around the corner.
Another dominant reason is China’s rise in economic and military power. There have been various reactions from countries in the Asia Pacific region, most of whom are cautious or wary, including those with maritime boundary disputes with China.
The US has never been shy in expressing its concern over China’s military buildup and its “unknown” military budget. With heightened tension in the South China Sea between China and other disputing countries, most of whom are members of ASEAN, the world is watching how China will react after around 2,500 US Marines are deployed to Darwin in mid-2012.
China is acting calm in commenting on this arrangement. At the same time, China and ASEAN have agreed on discussions on the South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC). This is positive breakthrough in the settlement of the South China Sea dispute. However, we should continue to monitor China’s actions related to US presence, not only in the short term, but also long term.
Although the US has made it clear that its presence is not intended to interfere with the South China Sea dispute settlement, it is vital not to underestimate the importance of US interests in the region. Further, one of the claimant states is also an important US partner in the Southeast Asia region. The US may not interfere in a direct way but still its influence could be felt through allied or friendly countries.
What should we do then? Indonesia is a non-claimant state in the South China Sea dispute however we are in the middle of two key
players in the region: China and the US. With the possibility of foreign naval fleets moving in our waters, Indonesia should first carefully calculate how it should move between these giants.
First, a thorough analysis on possible impacts on a number of areas, including the economy and security should be done among related government agencies. Second, Indonesia should play a key role in promoting the advancement of the CoC discussion to ensure stability in the South China Sea. Third, there is a need to increase the security of our waters through the Indonesian Navy.
The Navy should also enhance current cooperation with Australia, China and the US. As a member of ASEAN, Indonesia could also use the association’s leverage with China, Australia and the US. The signing of Bali Concord III would be one of our fundamental principals in this issue.
There are two important keywords: maritime security and cooperation. Maritime security is one of the main pillars of globalization, international trade and energy security. It cannot be achieved by one country without cooperation from neighboring countries or countries in the region.
The South China Sea dispute might disrupt regional maritime security if claimant states do not play by the agreed rules. One of the reasons the US is present in the region is also maritime security. The current cooperation mechanisms —
bilateral, trilateral and multilateral —should be the basis of how we cope with this issue. Further analysis and discussion is needed, not only with other countries, but also within our mechanisms.
Inability to move among these giants will be a loss for Indonesia. The nation’s strategic geographical position requires us to comprehend our surroundings. The US will never let China play a bigger role in the Asia Pacific. China will continue to rise, playing a bigger role in the region every single day. It is up to Indonesia to determine how it would stand in the region.
How we react to the Darwin arrangement would be crucial to how we position our country in the region.
The author is a graduate of the US Naval War College, Naval Command and College Class of 2009.
Follow our twitter @jakpost
& our public blog @blogIMO
| | | | | | | | Post Comments | Comments (9)
Goldfinger | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 09:12am
"...What should Indonesia do? You should supply the prostitutes and Marijuana to the American GIs."
Are you saying that that's all Indonesia is good for?
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Gurkha | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 07:12am
What should TNI do? As usual, when confronted with a prpfessional fighting force, go and hide.
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Lanun | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 05:12am
Indonesia should play neutral and let Chinese open up base in east Timor, that would be good and at the same time let Russia have a base in PApua and we can train jointly with all. That's the spirit of East Asia , if Australia objects, kick them out of ASEAN security meeting.
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BlondeDownUnder | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 03:12am
What should Indonesia do? Nothing, just sit back and enjoy. USA has training troups in many countries, even countries with no wars, so this is nothing new for the USA.
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scottieaussie | Fri, 16/12/2011 - 03:12am
Join-in. Interoperability is good for all.
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Jamals-8 US troops, Indos should supply girls | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 18:12pm
You reported: "US troops in Australia: What should Indonesia do?"
.
You should supply the prostitutes and Marijuana to the American GIs. Sooner of later the American Base would become a brothel.
Report Abuse
Goldfinger | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 16:12pm
What should Indonesia do? Indonesia should wake up and realize that the biggest threat to its stability and security comes, not from China, the US or Australia, but rather from its own government, its own military and its own people.
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Wednesday, December 14, 2011
Domino effect of Indonesia’s CTBT ratification
Kemal Azis Stamboel, Jakarta | Mon, 12/12/2011 8:34 PM A | A | A | - Klipping The Jakarta Post
Finally, the House of Representatives has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) more than a decade after the government signed the anti-nuclear accord.
The CTBT is an international treaty that regulates the prohibi-tion of all forms of nuclear testing for both military and civilian purposes.
Since the discovery of nuclear technology, at least 2,000 nuclear bombs have been detonated in various parts of the world either in the form of underground bombs, air bombs or underwater bombs.
As of 2010, more than 182 countries had signed the CTBT, with 151 of them having ratified it. However, the CTBT will not be acknowledged as a binding international law if all the 44 countries listed in the Annex 2 (states with nuclear potential) do not ratify the treaty.
Since Indonesia ratified the CTBT on Dec. 6, 2011, five Annex 2 states — China, Egypt, the United States, Israel and Iran — remain non-parties to the treaty.
Indonesia’s decision to join the club of parties to the CTBT demonstrates the nature of its foreign policy that is dedicated to world peace.
The ratification is not just a matter of Indonesia’s responsibility in advancing world peace, however, as there are some short-term strategic goals Indonesia can expect to reach.
First, by signing the treaty Indonesia can develop technology related to the verification of nuclear testing by utilizing technical assistance within the framework of the CTBT verification provided for countries that ratify the CTBT.
Furthermore, Indonesia can improve its human resources expertise through technology transfers in the fields of geophysics and verification of nuclear tests as well as increase opportunities to hold important
positions within the CTBT organization.
Second, Indonesia can play a strategic role as a prime mover of global efforts to push the US and other world powers to ratify the CTBT. Since the inception of the treaty, Indonesia had always opted to wait and see the US response to the treaty.
With the administration of President Barack Obama tending to urge the Congress to ratify the treaty, Indonesia’s ratification of the accord might encourage the US Congress to follow suit.
Debates have been rife within the US Congress whether the ratification would harm the country’s national interests. But Indonesia’s ratification might convince the Congress the treaty will do more good than harm.
China, India and Pakistan may soon ratify the CTBT. As suggested by Yukio Hatoyama, a former Japan prime minister, all this time, China is reluctant to ratify the CTBT as the US has not yet ratified it.
If only the US and China ratified the CTBT circumstances would certainly change. Furthermore, as suggested by Hans Blix, former UN Chief Weapons Inspector, “The reality is that if the US were to ratify (the CTBT), then China would. If China did, India would.
If India did, Pakistan would. If Pakistan did, then Iran would”. Ratification by other countries listed as Annex 2 countries is only a matter of time. Indonesia’s ratification of the CTBT might generate the requisite domino effect worldwide.
However, there are some challenges we must carefully consider relating to Indonesia’s ratification of the CTBT. First, by signing the treaty, it does not mean that other countries cannot develop nuclear technology.
The CTBT is aimed at creating nuclear weapons-free zones, but not zero nuclear technology. Hence ratification does not prevent Indonesia from developing nuclear technology.
Second, there must be assurances from nuclear-weapon countries that they will not use their weapons of mass destruction against non-nuclear armed countries under any circumstances.
Third, there must be a real effort to declare the Middle East as a nuclear free zone. In this process, there should be no double standards applied to Israel, which is suspected to have developed nuclear weapons without sanctions from the US and its allies.
These efforts will never succeed as long as there is no clarity regarding Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Israel has not joined the NPT and until today does not intend to ratify the CTBT.
Countries in possession of nuclear power and especially the US must be able to put pressure on Israel over its nuclear-weapons possession. As long as Israel has nuclear weapons, the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will continue to haunt world peace.
Finally, for Indonesia, the ratification of the CTBT is an appropriate diplomatic strategy. This is in line with the principle of the government’s foreign policy of “A Million Friends and Zero Enemies”. This ratification once again will add to Indonesia’s high profile in the international arena.
The writer is chairman of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense and a lawmaker from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Finally, the House of Representatives has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) more than a decade after the government signed the anti-nuclear accord.
The CTBT is an international treaty that regulates the prohibi-tion of all forms of nuclear testing for both military and civilian purposes.
Since the discovery of nuclear technology, at least 2,000 nuclear bombs have been detonated in various parts of the world either in the form of underground bombs, air bombs or underwater bombs.
As of 2010, more than 182 countries had signed the CTBT, with 151 of them having ratified it. However, the CTBT will not be acknowledged as a binding international law if all the 44 countries listed in the Annex 2 (states with nuclear potential) do not ratify the treaty.
Since Indonesia ratified the CTBT on Dec. 6, 2011, five Annex 2 states — China, Egypt, the United States, Israel and Iran — remain non-parties to the treaty.
Indonesia’s decision to join the club of parties to the CTBT demonstrates the nature of its foreign policy that is dedicated to world peace.
The ratification is not just a matter of Indonesia’s responsibility in advancing world peace, however, as there are some short-term strategic goals Indonesia can expect to reach.
First, by signing the treaty Indonesia can develop technology related to the verification of nuclear testing by utilizing technical assistance within the framework of the CTBT verification provided for countries that ratify the CTBT.
Furthermore, Indonesia can improve its human resources expertise through technology transfers in the fields of geophysics and verification of nuclear tests as well as increase opportunities to hold important
positions within the CTBT organization.
Second, Indonesia can play a strategic role as a prime mover of global efforts to push the US and other world powers to ratify the CTBT. Since the inception of the treaty, Indonesia had always opted to wait and see the US response to the treaty.
With the administration of President Barack Obama tending to urge the Congress to ratify the treaty, Indonesia’s ratification of the accord might encourage the US Congress to follow suit.
Debates have been rife within the US Congress whether the ratification would harm the country’s national interests. But Indonesia’s ratification might convince the Congress the treaty will do more good than harm.
China, India and Pakistan may soon ratify the CTBT. As suggested by Yukio Hatoyama, a former Japan prime minister, all this time, China is reluctant to ratify the CTBT as the US has not yet ratified it.
If only the US and China ratified the CTBT circumstances would certainly change. Furthermore, as suggested by Hans Blix, former UN Chief Weapons Inspector, “The reality is that if the US were to ratify (the CTBT), then China would. If China did, India would.
If India did, Pakistan would. If Pakistan did, then Iran would”. Ratification by other countries listed as Annex 2 countries is only a matter of time. Indonesia’s ratification of the CTBT might generate the requisite domino effect worldwide.
However, there are some challenges we must carefully consider relating to Indonesia’s ratification of the CTBT. First, by signing the treaty, it does not mean that other countries cannot develop nuclear technology.
The CTBT is aimed at creating nuclear weapons-free zones, but not zero nuclear technology. Hence ratification does not prevent Indonesia from developing nuclear technology.
Second, there must be assurances from nuclear-weapon countries that they will not use their weapons of mass destruction against non-nuclear armed countries under any circumstances.
Third, there must be a real effort to declare the Middle East as a nuclear free zone. In this process, there should be no double standards applied to Israel, which is suspected to have developed nuclear weapons without sanctions from the US and its allies.
These efforts will never succeed as long as there is no clarity regarding Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Israel has not joined the NPT and until today does not intend to ratify the CTBT.
Countries in possession of nuclear power and especially the US must be able to put pressure on Israel over its nuclear-weapons possession. As long as Israel has nuclear weapons, the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will continue to haunt world peace.
Finally, for Indonesia, the ratification of the CTBT is an appropriate diplomatic strategy. This is in line with the principle of the government’s foreign policy of “A Million Friends and Zero Enemies”. This ratification once again will add to Indonesia’s high profile in the international arena.
The writer is chairman of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense and a lawmaker from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)
Hello ASEAN+3, good-bye Europe
Fithra Faisal Hastiadi, Tokyo | Tue, 12/13/2011 9:28 PM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
A Distinguished Speakers Seminar (DSS) held by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo in November came to the powerful conclusion that the European mess was getting messier.
As stated by Wyplosz (2011), since late 2009 the European debt crisis has not shown any sign of recovery.
For several reasons, apparently, the policy responses have been wrong. Wyplosz argues that the mother of all mistakes may lie in the policy options to provide ¤110 billion to save Greece through its tough austerity program.
There were two major flaws in this policy. First, it violates the no-bailout clause in the European Central Bank (ECB) system; and second, austerity in the midst of recession cannot act as a remedy.
These factors eventually led to a liquidity crisis that has overwhelmed the European banking system (Collignon, 2011).
Colloquially speaking, the liquidity shock caused a sudden deterioration in specific classes of assets that has spilled over into banks, which are in dire need of liquidity.
The liquidity shortage then put banks in distress as the deteriorating asset prices affected their balance sheets and thus reduced bank capital. These difficulties then spilled over into the real economy in the form of a recession. This recession will most likely see Europe sinking into irrelevance.
Meanwhile, ASEAN is fueled by a youthful spirit that could bring new hope during the current global imbalances. ASEAN members are becoming increasingly connected. The ASEAN region has experienced sustainable growth of intra-regional trade share. In 1990, the intra-regional trade share was only 17 percent but in 2010 the figure swelled to 25.2 percent.
If we expand the coverage to include ASEAN’s plus three countries (China, Japan and Korea), the intra-regional trade figure is becoming more robust.
In 1990, it already reached 47.2 percent and developed over a decade as it leapt to 58.4 percent.
The FTAs and EPAs that have been emerging since mid-2000 have had made a significant contribution to warming of relations among ASEAN+3 countries.
An important factor explaining the success of the ASEAN+3 economies has been their participation in a dynamic, regionally integrated economic structure beyond just ASEAN+3. Strong and dynamic production networks have progressively linked East Asian and ASEAN+3 countries.
The fragmentation of manufacturing production and “fragmented trade” linked to rising intra-industry trade has enabled ASEAN+3 countries to maintain their competitiveness and successfully pursue an export-led development strategy. ASEAN+3 countries have also developed robust, flexible and vibrant small and medium size enterprise (SME) sectors.
While this region has experienced two periods of economic crisis (late 1997 and late 2008), it did well in bouncing back afterward.
During the first crisis, the total ASEAN+3 intra-regional exports fell from US$179,732.1 million in 1997 to $146,166.3 million in 1998. Imports also declined from $186,630.5 million in 1997 to $141,979.3 million in 1998. This number contributed to an almost 3 percent decline of ASEAN+3’s intra-regional trade from 49.9 percent in 1997 to 47.2 percent in 1998. But in 1999 this bounced back well to 49 percent, followed by 51.4 percent in 2000. This figure gave a big boost to East Asian countries at that time to recover from the crisis.
The second crisis in late 2008 also caused regional trade imbalances in ASEAN+3 countries as the total exports and imports fell from $547,427.5 million and $518,966.8 million in 2008 to $450,665.6 million and $411,663.3 million in 2009.
But, again, the regional economy bounced back in 2010 to $630,089.6 million for exports and $609,465.3 million for imports. This bounce was also seen in the intra-regional trade share figure that experienced a hike from 55.8 percent in 2008 to 58.4 percent in 2010.
Comparing these two crisis periods, we can draw the general conclusion that East Asia has learned well in coping with crises. This is reflected by the speed of recovery in 2010 which was better than that of 1999. Also, the closer integration among the countries has created a vaccine-like treatment in the region.
Looking into the future, based on ADB projections, in 2030, per capita GDP in 2007 constant US dollars, will reach 9,012 for ASEAN, 12,361 for China, 40,415 for Japan and 41,674 for Korea.
These figures surely indicate a very optimistic path for the region in taking a powerful role globally, but in order to play that role the region, especially the ASEAN countries, must pay more attention to several crucial factors.
The first of these is infrastructure. The simulation result confirms the importance of infrastructure to create greater room for the region to evolve. The second is industrialization. A one point rise in the industrial index will most likely increase the tendency of economic growth by 0.04 percent. The third is population.
Population is regarded as the most important variable that serves as a foundation for strong growth. A 1 percent increase in the total population will increase the likelihood of regional growth by 0.86 percent.
The sheer size of the East Asian population creates not only the potential demand for the goods traded in the region but also the supply of labor and low absolute level of wages.
This trend is very important since homogeneity in industrialization among countries in the region will assist the progress of economic integration, and thus economic growth.
To wrap up, ASEAN+3 countries should ensure countries within this region that are lagging behind to eventually catch up with the rest.
Sound policy measures that incorporate the expansion of production networks should be set as a common goal for the future of this region. Whether ASEAN+3 moves forward or ends the story like the Europeans is a matter of political will.
The writer is research associate at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo. The opinions expressed are his own.
Follow our twitter @jakpost
& our public blog @blogIMO
| | | | | | | | Post Comments | Comments (1)
Risti Permani | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 06:12am
It's good to be an optimist, but the statistics do not seem to support the decoupling thesis ie. ASEAN or at a larger scope East Asian will be able to grow without the support of the rest of the world (ROW) including EU. In the 1998-2008 period (see Figure 2 on page 51: http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp2009/wp_econ_2009_09.pdf) intra-regional trade in East Asian region accounted for less than 40% of total trade, whilst parts and components accounted for more than 60%. This implies that the region still needs ROW to sell their final products to.
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A Distinguished Speakers Seminar (DSS) held by the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) in Tokyo in November came to the powerful conclusion that the European mess was getting messier.
As stated by Wyplosz (2011), since late 2009 the European debt crisis has not shown any sign of recovery.
For several reasons, apparently, the policy responses have been wrong. Wyplosz argues that the mother of all mistakes may lie in the policy options to provide ¤110 billion to save Greece through its tough austerity program.
There were two major flaws in this policy. First, it violates the no-bailout clause in the European Central Bank (ECB) system; and second, austerity in the midst of recession cannot act as a remedy.
These factors eventually led to a liquidity crisis that has overwhelmed the European banking system (Collignon, 2011).
Colloquially speaking, the liquidity shock caused a sudden deterioration in specific classes of assets that has spilled over into banks, which are in dire need of liquidity.
The liquidity shortage then put banks in distress as the deteriorating asset prices affected their balance sheets and thus reduced bank capital. These difficulties then spilled over into the real economy in the form of a recession. This recession will most likely see Europe sinking into irrelevance.
Meanwhile, ASEAN is fueled by a youthful spirit that could bring new hope during the current global imbalances. ASEAN members are becoming increasingly connected. The ASEAN region has experienced sustainable growth of intra-regional trade share. In 1990, the intra-regional trade share was only 17 percent but in 2010 the figure swelled to 25.2 percent.
If we expand the coverage to include ASEAN’s plus three countries (China, Japan and Korea), the intra-regional trade figure is becoming more robust.
In 1990, it already reached 47.2 percent and developed over a decade as it leapt to 58.4 percent.
The FTAs and EPAs that have been emerging since mid-2000 have had made a significant contribution to warming of relations among ASEAN+3 countries.
An important factor explaining the success of the ASEAN+3 economies has been their participation in a dynamic, regionally integrated economic structure beyond just ASEAN+3. Strong and dynamic production networks have progressively linked East Asian and ASEAN+3 countries.
The fragmentation of manufacturing production and “fragmented trade” linked to rising intra-industry trade has enabled ASEAN+3 countries to maintain their competitiveness and successfully pursue an export-led development strategy. ASEAN+3 countries have also developed robust, flexible and vibrant small and medium size enterprise (SME) sectors.
While this region has experienced two periods of economic crisis (late 1997 and late 2008), it did well in bouncing back afterward.
During the first crisis, the total ASEAN+3 intra-regional exports fell from US$179,732.1 million in 1997 to $146,166.3 million in 1998. Imports also declined from $186,630.5 million in 1997 to $141,979.3 million in 1998. This number contributed to an almost 3 percent decline of ASEAN+3’s intra-regional trade from 49.9 percent in 1997 to 47.2 percent in 1998. But in 1999 this bounced back well to 49 percent, followed by 51.4 percent in 2000. This figure gave a big boost to East Asian countries at that time to recover from the crisis.
The second crisis in late 2008 also caused regional trade imbalances in ASEAN+3 countries as the total exports and imports fell from $547,427.5 million and $518,966.8 million in 2008 to $450,665.6 million and $411,663.3 million in 2009.
But, again, the regional economy bounced back in 2010 to $630,089.6 million for exports and $609,465.3 million for imports. This bounce was also seen in the intra-regional trade share figure that experienced a hike from 55.8 percent in 2008 to 58.4 percent in 2010.
Comparing these two crisis periods, we can draw the general conclusion that East Asia has learned well in coping with crises. This is reflected by the speed of recovery in 2010 which was better than that of 1999. Also, the closer integration among the countries has created a vaccine-like treatment in the region.
Looking into the future, based on ADB projections, in 2030, per capita GDP in 2007 constant US dollars, will reach 9,012 for ASEAN, 12,361 for China, 40,415 for Japan and 41,674 for Korea.
These figures surely indicate a very optimistic path for the region in taking a powerful role globally, but in order to play that role the region, especially the ASEAN countries, must pay more attention to several crucial factors.
The first of these is infrastructure. The simulation result confirms the importance of infrastructure to create greater room for the region to evolve. The second is industrialization. A one point rise in the industrial index will most likely increase the tendency of economic growth by 0.04 percent. The third is population.
Population is regarded as the most important variable that serves as a foundation for strong growth. A 1 percent increase in the total population will increase the likelihood of regional growth by 0.86 percent.
The sheer size of the East Asian population creates not only the potential demand for the goods traded in the region but also the supply of labor and low absolute level of wages.
This trend is very important since homogeneity in industrialization among countries in the region will assist the progress of economic integration, and thus economic growth.
To wrap up, ASEAN+3 countries should ensure countries within this region that are lagging behind to eventually catch up with the rest.
Sound policy measures that incorporate the expansion of production networks should be set as a common goal for the future of this region. Whether ASEAN+3 moves forward or ends the story like the Europeans is a matter of political will.
The writer is research associate at the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo. The opinions expressed are his own.
Follow our twitter @jakpost
& our public blog @blogIMO
| | | | | | | | Post Comments | Comments (1)
Risti Permani | Thu, 15/12/2011 - 06:12am
It's good to be an optimist, but the statistics do not seem to support the decoupling thesis ie. ASEAN or at a larger scope East Asian will be able to grow without the support of the rest of the world (ROW) including EU. In the 1998-2008 period (see Figure 2 on page 51: http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/acde/publications/publish/papers/wp2009/wp_econ_2009_09.pdf) intra-regional trade in East Asian region accounted for less than 40% of total trade, whilst parts and components accounted for more than 60%. This implies that the region still needs ROW to sell their final products to.
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RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoeanda Declaration
I Made Andi Arsana, Yogyakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:43 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
RI toward a naval power? 54 years of Djoeanda Declaration
I Made Andi Arsana, Yogyakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:43 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
On the day Indonesia gained its independence from the Netherlands, its territory and jurisdiction were less than what we see today, especially for the maritime area. The maritime area between Kalimantan and Java, for example, was considered as high seas (free seas) where foreign vessels could sail freely.
At that time, Indonesia inherited law regarding maritime area from the colonial power, the Netherlands. It was the 1939 Ordinance concerning Territorial Sea and Marine Environment under which Indonesia is entitled to only 3 nautical miles (around 5.6 kilometers) of territorial sea measured from the baselines (usually coastline) of each island. Consequently, the Indonesian archipelago was divided into several groups of territories separated by one another.
This was disadvantageous because it “could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket” (Djalal, 1990).
To deal with this situation, prime minister Djoeanda Kartawidjaja declared new Indonesian maritime claims through the Djoeanda Declaration on Dec. 13, 1957. It asserts that the entire archipelago was enclosed by a belt of baselines (islands and waters between islands) that must be regarded as one integral unit and integral parts of Indonesia. By doing so, Indonesia was claiming the status of an “archipelagic state”.
Indonesia’s unilateral claim of an “archipelagic state” status, however, was not easily accepted by the international community. Indonesia did not give up and diligently sought for support from other countries.
The fight was finally fruitful as the concept of an “archipelagic state” was adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. The Convention is the latest and is considered as the most comprehensive ocean-related international convention, which often referred to as the “constitution of the ocean”.
Indonesia, through its prominent diplomats, such as Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,
has proven its invaluable contribution to the establishment of the convention.
Indonesia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1985 through Law No. 17/1985. In addition to other ocean affairs, the convention also governs maritime zones of jurisdictions. A coastal state is entitled to, i.e. 12 nautical miles of territorial sea, a contiguous zone out to 24 nautical miles, an exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles and a continental shelf out to 350 nautical miles or more.
Pursuant to the convention, Indonesia is entitled to much larger maritime areas compared to what it possessed at the time of independence. It is fair to say that this is the most peaceful possession of territory and jurisdiction with no single bullet being shot.
The convention also deals with maritime delimitation/division between States on the occurrence of overlapping entitlement. In this regards, Indonesia considers itself to have at least 10 neighbors with which maritime boundaries need to be settled.
Indonesia is reasonably productive in establishing maritime boundary agreements. It has agreed upon various maritime boundaries with seven neighbors such as Malaysia (1969, 1970), Thailand (1971, 1975), Australia (1971, 1972, 1997), Singapore (1973, 2009), Papua New Guinea (1973, 1980), India (1974, 1977) and Vietnam (2003).
Unilaterally, Indonesia has also made a submission to the United Nations on the outer limits of its continental shelf (seabed) beyond 200 nautical miles from baselines for the area to the southwest of Aceh. Through this submission Indonesia has confirmed an “additional” seabed area the size of which equals Madura Island (around 4,000 square kilometers).
While Indonesia has been quite productive in defining its boundaries, various segments are left to settle. As per December 2011, Indonesia has yet to settle more than 20 maritime boundary segments in around 15 locations. Pending maritime boundaries have been evident to cause maritime disputes and incidents.
The case of the Ambalat Block (2005, 2009), Tanjung Berakit incident (2010) and the Malacca Strait incident (2011) are three incidents involving Indonesia and Malaysia due to pending maritime boundaries between the two. In the Timor Sea, where maritime boundaries have been settled between Indonesia and Australia, maritime incidents are not absent either.
Lack of information causing border crossing and illegal fishing activities seem to be the reason of Indonesian fisherman seizure in the area.
After defining maritime limits and boundaries, boundary administration (management) becomes critical. Well-established “fences” at sea are not the end of the story. The fences need to be guarded to prevent border crossings and other illegal activities, especially those related to resource utilization. For these purposes the Indonesian Navy, water police, ministry of marine affairs and fisheries patrolling force, should be equipped with sophisticated operational facilities.
However, the current situation is still far from ideal. It is widely known that Indonesia has yet to add a number of vessels to guard its large maritime area.
While it is true that illegal fishing offenders should be prosecuted for deterrence purposes, it is Indonesia’s responsibility to guard its maritime area from such activities. Analogically, the law may prohibit anyone from stealing anything from somebody’s premises but it is the owner’s responsibility to lock its door for security reason.
Another important agenda is to enhance the expertise concerning ocean affairs and the law of the sea in general. This expertise should cover technical and non-technical issues. For example, Indonesia requires more geoscientists (geodesists, geophysicists, geographers, geologists) with interest in the law of the sea.
Ocean affair is, eventually, not only about legal aspect but also technical consideration. Indonesia’s journey toward a naval power is not only about modernizing main weaponry system (Alutsista) but also preparing future generation with adequate expertise.
What Indonesia has managed to secure in terms of territory and jurisdiction cannot be ignored and abandoned. Large maritime area does promise a lot of opportunities but it also comes with great responsibility. On the 54th celebration of Djoeanda Declaration, it is worth recalling an old song.
Nenek moyangku orang pelaut // Our ancestors were sailors;Gemar mengarung luas samudera // They sailed across the oceans;Menerjang ombak tiada takut // Challenged waves fearlessly;
Menempuh badai sudah biasa ... // Were used to weathering storms …
The writer is a lecturer at the Department of Geodetic Engineering, Gadjah Mada University.
Local governments and Indonesian foreign policy
Yayan GH Mulyana, Jakarta | Wed, 12/14/2011 8:52 AM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a directive in a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 2, asking, among other things, for governors to fully understand Indonesia’s standpoint regarding various international issues. This directive is very timely considering the increase in local government interest in conducting relations with foreign entities or governments.
While the authority for the formulation, making and implementation of foreign policy rests with the central government, local governments share some authority with the national government in conducting foreign relations, especially for economic and development purposes. Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which replaced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government, explicitly mentions the authority of a region to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation with institutions or agencies abroad relating to areas
under its authority (Article 88).
Article 41 of Law No. 32 /2004 stipulates that with the approval of the regional legislative council, a local government can propose and implement an international cooperation plan. In explanation of this article, “international cooperation” refers to regional cooperation with foreign parties, including twin or sister city cooperation, technical cooperation including humanitarian aid, cooperation on forwarding loans or grants, equity participation and joint cooperation in accordance with statutory regulations.
It is further stated that regional governments can accept foreign grants and can borrow foreign loans through the Ministry of Finance (Article 170).
In terms of foreign affairs relating to the authority of autonomous regions — as a solution to a conflict such as the Åland Islands in Finland, as recognition of special privileges to ethnic minorities such as in the Chinese provinces of Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Xizang, or as a result of a political process such as in Indonesia — economic and development cooperation is the most common dimension of such authority.
Based on existing practices, there are at least four patterns of interaction between local governments and their national governments in the conduct of foreign affairs.
First is a complementary pattern. In this pattern, the implementation of the local government’s authority in foreign affairs is in harmony with the central government’s foreign policy.
For example, in 1998, when the US imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar, the City Council of Los Angeles, California, issued an ordinance prohibiting the local government of Los Angeles executing contracts with companies that had investments or foreign relations activities with Myanmar.
Second is a complicating pattern. There have been cases where local governments in the US took legal and administrative measures that complicated US foreign policy. For example, in 2000, the state of California issued the Angelides’ guidelines that prohibited financial institutions in California investing in countries like Turkey and Egypt, which were US allies, as well as with China despite its special ties with the US. The guidelines placed the US in a difficult position in relation to its allies.
Third is a dissociating pattern. The central government will dissociate itself from the policy taken by autonomous local governments. For example, the Finnish government was not able to do anything when the European Commission demanded through the European Court that Finland abolish the “Snus Law” (law on chewing tobacco), which was applicable in the Autonomous Region of the Åland Islands.
The Finnish Government argued that health problems (including tobacco use) were within the full authority of the Autonomous Region of Åland Islands and chewing tobacco was an important commodity for the economy of the Åland Islands.
Fourth, there is a conflicting pattern. This pattern is visible when measures or policies taken by local governments conflict with the policies of national governments. In Indonesia, for example, it was once noticed that many local governments had expressed strong interest in advancing cooperation with Taiwan, which ran counter to Indonesia’s One China policy. Some had even proposed the foundation of a trade office in Taiwan.
Regional autonomy in Indonesia emerged from historical necessities and it is something that should not be undone. Yet, it is essential to ensure that local governments’ activism in foreign relations is pursued in the corridor of their limited authority and, in particular, on Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. It is important that local governments know their limits and respect and follow the policies set by the national government.
As local governments do not always have resources to support their foreign affairs activities, the central government could help equip local governments with such capacity, including information on various regulations and cooperation opportunities.
Local governments’ limited authority in foreign relations could also be empowered through institutional measures. The government of the state of California, for instance, formed the International Business Relations Program (IBRP) to support its foreign trade relations.
Local governments could also promote innovation. The Xinjiang Local Government, for example, annually holds the Xinjiang Urumqi Foreign Economic Relations & Trade Fair (Urumqi Fair), which has become the largest opportunity for trade transactions with Central Asia, Russia and Western China as target markets. Networking for local governments is important for exchanging best practices, for example through the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the Asia-Pacific Cities Summit.
The writer is an assistant to special staff to the President for international relations. The opinions expressed are his own.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a directive in a Cabinet meeting on Dec. 2, asking, among other things, for governors to fully understand Indonesia’s standpoint regarding various international issues. This directive is very timely considering the increase in local government interest in conducting relations with foreign entities or governments.
While the authority for the formulation, making and implementation of foreign policy rests with the central government, local governments share some authority with the national government in conducting foreign relations, especially for economic and development purposes. Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government, which replaced Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Government, explicitly mentions the authority of a region to conduct mutually beneficial cooperation with institutions or agencies abroad relating to areas
under its authority (Article 88).
Article 41 of Law No. 32 /2004 stipulates that with the approval of the regional legislative council, a local government can propose and implement an international cooperation plan. In explanation of this article, “international cooperation” refers to regional cooperation with foreign parties, including twin or sister city cooperation, technical cooperation including humanitarian aid, cooperation on forwarding loans or grants, equity participation and joint cooperation in accordance with statutory regulations.
It is further stated that regional governments can accept foreign grants and can borrow foreign loans through the Ministry of Finance (Article 170).
In terms of foreign affairs relating to the authority of autonomous regions — as a solution to a conflict such as the Åland Islands in Finland, as recognition of special privileges to ethnic minorities such as in the Chinese provinces of Guangxi, Nei Mongol, Ningxia, Xinjiang and Xizang, or as a result of a political process such as in Indonesia — economic and development cooperation is the most common dimension of such authority.
Based on existing practices, there are at least four patterns of interaction between local governments and their national governments in the conduct of foreign affairs.
First is a complementary pattern. In this pattern, the implementation of the local government’s authority in foreign affairs is in harmony with the central government’s foreign policy.
For example, in 1998, when the US imposed economic sanctions against Myanmar, the City Council of Los Angeles, California, issued an ordinance prohibiting the local government of Los Angeles executing contracts with companies that had investments or foreign relations activities with Myanmar.
Second is a complicating pattern. There have been cases where local governments in the US took legal and administrative measures that complicated US foreign policy. For example, in 2000, the state of California issued the Angelides’ guidelines that prohibited financial institutions in California investing in countries like Turkey and Egypt, which were US allies, as well as with China despite its special ties with the US. The guidelines placed the US in a difficult position in relation to its allies.
Third is a dissociating pattern. The central government will dissociate itself from the policy taken by autonomous local governments. For example, the Finnish government was not able to do anything when the European Commission demanded through the European Court that Finland abolish the “Snus Law” (law on chewing tobacco), which was applicable in the Autonomous Region of the Åland Islands.
The Finnish Government argued that health problems (including tobacco use) were within the full authority of the Autonomous Region of Åland Islands and chewing tobacco was an important commodity for the economy of the Åland Islands.
Fourth, there is a conflicting pattern. This pattern is visible when measures or policies taken by local governments conflict with the policies of national governments. In Indonesia, for example, it was once noticed that many local governments had expressed strong interest in advancing cooperation with Taiwan, which ran counter to Indonesia’s One China policy. Some had even proposed the foundation of a trade office in Taiwan.
Regional autonomy in Indonesia emerged from historical necessities and it is something that should not be undone. Yet, it is essential to ensure that local governments’ activism in foreign relations is pursued in the corridor of their limited authority and, in particular, on Law No. 37/1999 on Foreign Relations. It is important that local governments know their limits and respect and follow the policies set by the national government.
As local governments do not always have resources to support their foreign affairs activities, the central government could help equip local governments with such capacity, including information on various regulations and cooperation opportunities.
Local governments’ limited authority in foreign relations could also be empowered through institutional measures. The government of the state of California, for instance, formed the International Business Relations Program (IBRP) to support its foreign trade relations.
Local governments could also promote innovation. The Xinjiang Local Government, for example, annually holds the Xinjiang Urumqi Foreign Economic Relations & Trade Fair (Urumqi Fair), which has become the largest opportunity for trade transactions with Central Asia, Russia and Western China as target markets. Networking for local governments is important for exchanging best practices, for example through the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA) and the Asia-Pacific Cities Summit.
The writer is an assistant to special staff to the President for international relations. The opinions expressed are his own.
Thursday, December 8, 2011
Future peace institute won’t violate non-interference principle: Marty
Dina Indrasafitri, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Fri, 05/06/2011 10:08 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that the plan for the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation was unlikely to breach the organization’s principle of non-interference.
“We don’t think the institution would contradict the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference because the institution’s concepts have been anticipated in ASEAN’s politics and security pillars,” he said Friday in Jakarta.
He was refereeing to the pillars stated in a 2003 ASEAN meeting in Bali, when member nations saw a declaration of an ASEAN community to be set upon three pillars: political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation
Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, is scheduled to host the 18th ASEAN summit. Preceding the summit, slated to begin on Saturday, are a number of meetings, including the ASEAN Politics and Security Community meeting and the Foreign Minister’s meeting.
One of Indonesia’s inputs for ASEAN has been the establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.
Marty said that the planned institute was a non-governmental initiative.
“This is part of the effort by the Indonesian government and by ASEAN to complement various instruments to prevent and settle conflicts, should they occur. In other words, not all [efforts] should be in the intergovernmental form. We can benefit from the institute to be established.” he said.
Two ASEAN members – Cambodia and Thailand – are currently engaged in an unsettling series of violent territorial clashes with each other, with the latest incident occurring last month.
Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa said that the plan for the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation was unlikely to breach the organization’s principle of non-interference.
“We don’t think the institution would contradict the concepts of sovereignty and non-interference because the institution’s concepts have been anticipated in ASEAN’s politics and security pillars,” he said Friday in Jakarta.
He was refereeing to the pillars stated in a 2003 ASEAN meeting in Bali, when member nations saw a declaration of an ASEAN community to be set upon three pillars: political and security cooperation, economic cooperation and socio-cultural cooperation
Indonesia, the current ASEAN chair, is scheduled to host the 18th ASEAN summit. Preceding the summit, slated to begin on Saturday, are a number of meetings, including the ASEAN Politics and Security Community meeting and the Foreign Minister’s meeting.
One of Indonesia’s inputs for ASEAN has been the establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation.
Marty said that the planned institute was a non-governmental initiative.
“This is part of the effort by the Indonesian government and by ASEAN to complement various instruments to prevent and settle conflicts, should they occur. In other words, not all [efforts] should be in the intergovernmental form. We can benefit from the institute to be established.” he said.
Two ASEAN members – Cambodia and Thailand – are currently engaged in an unsettling series of violent territorial clashes with each other, with the latest incident occurring last month.
RI has created a ‘sound climate’ for resolving disputes
Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, The Jakarta Post | Fri, 07/22/2011 10:18 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
The South China Sea issues have prompted several ASEAN claimants to brandish their might in the face of Asian giant China, with the Philippines and Vietnam collecting support from the United States. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, as well as other Indonesian journalists after ASEAN and China agreed on guidelines for cooperation in the South China Sea. Below are excerpts from the interview.
Question: What progress has been made in the discussions on the South China Sea issues between ASEAN and China?
Answer: It has been six years of negotiations. I got the actual Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in Lombok, and I read all of it. This is it, the document that for five years has held back progress, the so-called guidelines.
I told my counterparts enough is enough, there comes a time when you must get things done. More delay does not mean everything stands still, but rather gets worse. That’s why I really pushed it to make sure we make real and concrete progress. If it is important to have guidelines, let’s do it, so we can move on to the Code of Conduct.
We have to work on the draft, but we have to make a climate conducive to an agreement to be achieved. That’s why I talked with my ASEAN colleagues, ASEAN claimant states, to China, to other parties, basically to create positive energy, competition in a positive way.
The guidelines have to be self-fulfilling. It’s not the content, but the idea behind this that ASEAN and China can sit together and should discuss this. Indonesia is keen to get this done.
There is competition going on over oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, with China’s assertiveness, and the fact that Indonesia has only several months left as chair of ASEAN, how do you deal with this?
This is a process. We have to remember to always differentiate chairmanship from leadership. Indonesia indeed is the chairman of ASEAN this year. But from the start, we wanted to show that we wanted not only to chair ASEAN, but also to show our leadership.
We told the Chinese that if we did not have an ASEAN-China script on [the South China Sea issues], the issues would always be a wild ball.
We will meet several times this week, ASEAN plus three, plus one, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the EAS [at the ministerial level]. If we do have a way-out, we can tell the world, “thank you for your attention”. But if we don’t have a script, it will become a wild ball. We are not underestimating the challenges.
Are ASEAN’s member states split over the South China Sea issues, with the Philippines and Vietnam leaning toward the United States?
With or without the participation of Russia and the US, they will play a role one way or another. They are too big for us to close the door to.
It also doesn’t have to be described as a black-and-white option because it’s a fact that some of us have special relations with other countries from outside the region. That’s a fact of life. It depends on how we make sure that this fact can be in harmony with what we are aiming for.
Don’t let it … create a new gap in our region and bring in a new Cold War.
Do the guidelines say anything about political and security activities that can make sure that there will be no escalation of tensions in the South China Sea in the future?
The guidelines is a by-product, a sub-element of the declaration, it doesn’t stand on its own. So the guideline is essentially on how to implement the declaration of conduct, most especially not on the code of behavior itself but on the projects.
That’s my main understanding, because if you look at the DOC, it makes references to certain projects in certain areas — marine environment, SARS, transnational crimes, the safety of navigation, biodiversity.
Those are four areas on which we can collaborate, we are supposed to collaborate.
What about joint activities in oil and gas exploration?
No. Oil and gas exploration is not specifically regulated in the DOC.
The South China Sea issues have prompted several ASEAN claimants to brandish their might in the face of Asian giant China, with the Philippines and Vietnam collecting support from the United States. Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Kornelius Purba and Mustaqim Adamrah, as well as other Indonesian journalists after ASEAN and China agreed on guidelines for cooperation in the South China Sea. Below are excerpts from the interview.
Question: What progress has been made in the discussions on the South China Sea issues between ASEAN and China?
Answer: It has been six years of negotiations. I got the actual Declaration of Conduct (DOC) in Lombok, and I read all of it. This is it, the document that for five years has held back progress, the so-called guidelines.
I told my counterparts enough is enough, there comes a time when you must get things done. More delay does not mean everything stands still, but rather gets worse. That’s why I really pushed it to make sure we make real and concrete progress. If it is important to have guidelines, let’s do it, so we can move on to the Code of Conduct.
We have to work on the draft, but we have to make a climate conducive to an agreement to be achieved. That’s why I talked with my ASEAN colleagues, ASEAN claimant states, to China, to other parties, basically to create positive energy, competition in a positive way.
The guidelines have to be self-fulfilling. It’s not the content, but the idea behind this that ASEAN and China can sit together and should discuss this. Indonesia is keen to get this done.
There is competition going on over oil and gas resources in the South China Sea, with China’s assertiveness, and the fact that Indonesia has only several months left as chair of ASEAN, how do you deal with this?
This is a process. We have to remember to always differentiate chairmanship from leadership. Indonesia indeed is the chairman of ASEAN this year. But from the start, we wanted to show that we wanted not only to chair ASEAN, but also to show our leadership.
We told the Chinese that if we did not have an ASEAN-China script on [the South China Sea issues], the issues would always be a wild ball.
We will meet several times this week, ASEAN plus three, plus one, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the EAS [at the ministerial level]. If we do have a way-out, we can tell the world, “thank you for your attention”. But if we don’t have a script, it will become a wild ball. We are not underestimating the challenges.
Are ASEAN’s member states split over the South China Sea issues, with the Philippines and Vietnam leaning toward the United States?
With or without the participation of Russia and the US, they will play a role one way or another. They are too big for us to close the door to.
It also doesn’t have to be described as a black-and-white option because it’s a fact that some of us have special relations with other countries from outside the region. That’s a fact of life. It depends on how we make sure that this fact can be in harmony with what we are aiming for.
Don’t let it … create a new gap in our region and bring in a new Cold War.
Do the guidelines say anything about political and security activities that can make sure that there will be no escalation of tensions in the South China Sea in the future?
The guidelines is a by-product, a sub-element of the declaration, it doesn’t stand on its own. So the guideline is essentially on how to implement the declaration of conduct, most especially not on the code of behavior itself but on the projects.
That’s my main understanding, because if you look at the DOC, it makes references to certain projects in certain areas — marine environment, SARS, transnational crimes, the safety of navigation, biodiversity.
Those are four areas on which we can collaborate, we are supposed to collaborate.
What about joint activities in oil and gas exploration?
No. Oil and gas exploration is not specifically regulated in the DOC.
More than just ratifying CTBT
Muhamad Najib, Jakarta | Mon, 01/24/2011 9:35 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
At the end of the recent House of Representatives’ sitting session, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa submitted a bill on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In the current session, the House’s Commission I on foreign affairs and defense is opening opportunities to all stakeholders, including scholars, NGO activists and public figures, to provide input.
Input recently came from the National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan) and Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (Bapeten ). For the majority of the Commission I, it is not an issue of whether or not to ratify this international treaty but more about when and how to go about doing it in the best manner possible.
As Indonesia does not have any ambition of manufacturing nuclear weapons of its own, this is not a difficult decision to make.
The challenge, rather, is how Indonesia’s eagerness to ratify the CTBT can contribute to the treaty’s implementation, without any particular nation receiving special privileges in the process, regardless of the argument put forward to avoid due compliance.
We can take a lesson from the experience of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was aimed at preventing competition among nations in the development of superior stockpiles of nuclear weapons, disarming nations that already possessed such devices, as well as directing the use of nuclear technology exclusively toward peaceful objectives.
“
The very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase
its international
reputation.
”
In reality, the NPT, which was first opened for signature in 1968, failed to achieve its declared objective.
First, it had its flaws from the outset. The five nations that already had nuclear weapons were given the right to remain in possession of the weapons of mass destruction.
Second, in the matter of disarmament, there was no clear deadline and no penalties for those that did not comply. As a result, the treaty has effectively been running in place up to the present day.
Third, nations that later went on to build nuclear weapons have never been penalized. Even if a particular nation was penalized, this was more due to preferential treatment. Meanwhile, the countries that had actually ratified the treaty were placed under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and were always in danger of being penalized.
Practically speaking, the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons from Earth has not made any tangible progress.
The text of the CTBT, which includes a ban on all test detonations of nuclear weapons and all other types of nuclear detonations, with the ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament, was finally completed in 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and was adopted by a UN General Assembly in the same year.
At present, 182 nations have signed this agreement. There are 44 nations with nuclear reactors that are listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, including Indonesia.
To date, only 35 nations have ratified the treaty. This means nine countries have not yet ratified it, including Indonesia.
Looking at these facts, Indonesia should view this as an opportunity. If the Indonesian Foreign Ministry would undertake some effort to lobby the other eight nations, in order for all of them to ratify it at the same time, Indonesia would certainly become highly respected, apart from demonstrating its seriousness in carrying out exceedingly noble humanitarian work.
The decision to do so does not have much chance of succeeding, based on the fact that most of the nations that have not ratified the treaty are large and powerful, and they secretly want to hold on to and exploit their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against competing nations
However, the very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase its international reputation. This is because it would be a tremendous achievement if the effort is successful. So why not go ahead and try it?
The writer is a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense.
At the end of the recent House of Representatives’ sitting session, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa submitted a bill on the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
In the current session, the House’s Commission I on foreign affairs and defense is opening opportunities to all stakeholders, including scholars, NGO activists and public figures, to provide input.
Input recently came from the National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan) and Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency (Bapeten ). For the majority of the Commission I, it is not an issue of whether or not to ratify this international treaty but more about when and how to go about doing it in the best manner possible.
As Indonesia does not have any ambition of manufacturing nuclear weapons of its own, this is not a difficult decision to make.
The challenge, rather, is how Indonesia’s eagerness to ratify the CTBT can contribute to the treaty’s implementation, without any particular nation receiving special privileges in the process, regardless of the argument put forward to avoid due compliance.
We can take a lesson from the experience of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was aimed at preventing competition among nations in the development of superior stockpiles of nuclear weapons, disarming nations that already possessed such devices, as well as directing the use of nuclear technology exclusively toward peaceful objectives.
“
The very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase
its international
reputation.
”
In reality, the NPT, which was first opened for signature in 1968, failed to achieve its declared objective.
First, it had its flaws from the outset. The five nations that already had nuclear weapons were given the right to remain in possession of the weapons of mass destruction.
Second, in the matter of disarmament, there was no clear deadline and no penalties for those that did not comply. As a result, the treaty has effectively been running in place up to the present day.
Third, nations that later went on to build nuclear weapons have never been penalized. Even if a particular nation was penalized, this was more due to preferential treatment. Meanwhile, the countries that had actually ratified the treaty were placed under the strict supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and were always in danger of being penalized.
Practically speaking, the plan to gradually eliminate nuclear weapons from Earth has not made any tangible progress.
The text of the CTBT, which includes a ban on all test detonations of nuclear weapons and all other types of nuclear detonations, with the ultimate objective of total nuclear disarmament, was finally completed in 1996 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and was adopted by a UN General Assembly in the same year.
At present, 182 nations have signed this agreement. There are 44 nations with nuclear reactors that are listed in Annex 2 of the CTBT, including Indonesia.
To date, only 35 nations have ratified the treaty. This means nine countries have not yet ratified it, including Indonesia.
Looking at these facts, Indonesia should view this as an opportunity. If the Indonesian Foreign Ministry would undertake some effort to lobby the other eight nations, in order for all of them to ratify it at the same time, Indonesia would certainly become highly respected, apart from demonstrating its seriousness in carrying out exceedingly noble humanitarian work.
The decision to do so does not have much chance of succeeding, based on the fact that most of the nations that have not ratified the treaty are large and powerful, and they secretly want to hold on to and exploit their nuclear weapons as a deterrent against competing nations
However, the very act of Indonesia coming out in favor of ratification would increase its international reputation. This is because it would be a tremendous achievement if the effort is successful. So why not go ahead and try it?
The writer is a member of the House of Representatives’ Commission I on foreign affairs and defense.
Test Ban Treaty defeat a step toward nuclear war
The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Mon, 10/18/1999 7:39 AM A | A | A |-Klipping the Jakarta Post
LONDON (JP): President Bill Clinton's inability to win enough Senate votes to win ratification of the American-sponsored Test Ban Treaty is one more milestone on the way to inevitable nuclear conflict. The fact that thedecision to concede defeat was taken with the knowledge, following the coupin Pakistan, that a military regime, answerable to no civilian authority, is now in direct control of one country's nuclear weapons is but one more indication that U.S. congressional opinion is dangerously out of touch withthe pace of world events. It sends a clear signal to the world at large that the U.S. is not committed to nuclear arms control, even when it works in its favor. America, we all know, is capable of reacting after a disaster, but it appears dangerously bereft of an instinctive, prescient wisdom that might preclude it.
The use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely between the United States andRussia, but today the chance of them being used in a war between Pakistan and India is even higher than it was earlier in the year when, during theirfighting over Kashmir, it seemed to some observers they were playing with nuclear matches. There also remains the possibility of the use of a nuclearweapons in the Middle East or by mafia elements who may get their hands onmaterial and knowledge from Russia's disintegrating nuclear weapons' laboratories.
Nuclear proliferation has now gone so far, and the window of opportunity that presented itself at the Cold War's end to take radical steps to wind back the nuclear clock has now all but closed, that it is difficult to argue with conviction that time is any longer on our side. What should havebeen done, as Gen. George Lee Butler, formerly commander of U.S. Strategic (Nuclear) Forces, has argued, was for the United States to have seized, from its position of strength at Cold War's end, the moral high ground and to have led a crusade, which necessarily would have had to have many unilateral, self-denying, ingredients, to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Today I find that I have enormous sympathy for those, mainly on the rightin America, who are pushing for the United States to build itself as quickly as possible a defensive shield that can stop an incoming missile from a rogue regime -- though not a massive nuclear superpower attack -- inits tracks.
The trouble, however, is not the instinctive desire for protection, it isthe ability to secure it. That quite simply is an impossible quest. A missile shield will not help against a suitcase bomb parked in Grand Central Station. And if the United States cannot stop countless small boatsand planes landing drugs on American soil, why does it think it can intercept the arrival of a nuclear bomb that could arrive just the same way?
It is, in fact, this awareness of the odds that persuaded Gen. Butler to ask if ""history will judge that the Cold war was a sort of Trojan Horse, whereby nuclear weapons were smuggled into the life of the world and made an acceptable part of the way it works?"" We have been led, he says, ""to think about the unthinkable, justify the unjustifiable and rationalize theirrational"".
Yet for every Gen. Butler who now sees the folly of the U.S. clinging to nuclear weapons, there is a Bill Clinton -- a politician in power or about to be in power -- who, while his brain says one thing does another. Nothingillustrates this more than Clinton's remark 15 months ago after Pakistan and India first tested their nuclear bombs, when he said, ""I cannot believethat we are about to start the 21st century by having the subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or national fulfillment"".
But what has Clinton done to reverse the American psyche that deeply believes for all the reasons he publicly scorned that it is absolutely necessary to hold on to its nuclear armory, even after the end of the Cold War?
The Test Ban Treaty, once the idealistic dream of President John Kennedy,was meant as a tool for stopping the nuclear arms race in its tracks. Fortyyears on, after labyrinth negotiations, it has become, in its post Cold Wartext, not much more than a subterfuge for making it difficult for the new nuclear powers -- India and Pakistan in particular -- to develop the sophistication of their still relatively basic nuclear stockpile. Testing is absolutely necessary at this stage for miniaturization and nose-cone development, whereas the United States and the other established powers can maintain their commanding lead over everyone else by computer simulation.
The fact that the Senate Republicans have scuppered the treaty is nothingmore than reflexive hostility to the Democratic Administration. In real terms it penalizes America by giving succor to those countries which want to go their own way.
Nuclear arms control and eventual disarmament, once the center-piece of American foreign policy under presidents as diverse as Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan, have become the interest of a dwindling minority. Neither Clinton nor his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, have ever given the impression of being remotely interested in staking out a seriousradical position and following it through with a sustained education of public opinion.
If it were not for the disintegration of the Russian nuclear armory through lack of maintenance and replenishment we would have to conclude that the disarmament situation is all but stalled. The Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1993 remains unratified by the Russian Duma, a hostage first to the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms who took all the momentum out of it, and to the Russian communist and nationalist parliamentarians who, for their own reasons, took a cue from him.
To break this impasse is a must. A year ago senior Pentagon officials letit be known that they were prepared to advocate unilateral cuts in the American armory, at least to match the de facto cuts in Russia. Again, because of pressure from Senator Helms and his colleagues the White House has refused to give a lead on this.
In normal times one would expect the coup in Pakistan to wake up those who somehow think the nuclear status quo is liveable with. But such is the degree of partisan fervor in the United States, rational thinking comes second to dangerous schizophrenia. Nuclear weapons always were and now are more than ever the world's greatest threat. We missed nuclear war by a hair's breadth not once in the Cold War, but at least half a dozen times. Today the odds are even worst. And the American president and U.S. Senate, each in their own way oblivious to their responsibility, only think about impossible schemes for protecting America from Armageddon.
LONDON (JP): President Bill Clinton's inability to win enough Senate votes to win ratification of the American-sponsored Test Ban Treaty is one more milestone on the way to inevitable nuclear conflict. The fact that thedecision to concede defeat was taken with the knowledge, following the coupin Pakistan, that a military regime, answerable to no civilian authority, is now in direct control of one country's nuclear weapons is but one more indication that U.S. congressional opinion is dangerously out of touch withthe pace of world events. It sends a clear signal to the world at large that the U.S. is not committed to nuclear arms control, even when it works in its favor. America, we all know, is capable of reacting after a disaster, but it appears dangerously bereft of an instinctive, prescient wisdom that might preclude it.
The use of nuclear weapons remains unlikely between the United States andRussia, but today the chance of them being used in a war between Pakistan and India is even higher than it was earlier in the year when, during theirfighting over Kashmir, it seemed to some observers they were playing with nuclear matches. There also remains the possibility of the use of a nuclearweapons in the Middle East or by mafia elements who may get their hands onmaterial and knowledge from Russia's disintegrating nuclear weapons' laboratories.
Nuclear proliferation has now gone so far, and the window of opportunity that presented itself at the Cold War's end to take radical steps to wind back the nuclear clock has now all but closed, that it is difficult to argue with conviction that time is any longer on our side. What should havebeen done, as Gen. George Lee Butler, formerly commander of U.S. Strategic (Nuclear) Forces, has argued, was for the United States to have seized, from its position of strength at Cold War's end, the moral high ground and to have led a crusade, which necessarily would have had to have many unilateral, self-denying, ingredients, to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Today I find that I have enormous sympathy for those, mainly on the rightin America, who are pushing for the United States to build itself as quickly as possible a defensive shield that can stop an incoming missile from a rogue regime -- though not a massive nuclear superpower attack -- inits tracks.
The trouble, however, is not the instinctive desire for protection, it isthe ability to secure it. That quite simply is an impossible quest. A missile shield will not help against a suitcase bomb parked in Grand Central Station. And if the United States cannot stop countless small boatsand planes landing drugs on American soil, why does it think it can intercept the arrival of a nuclear bomb that could arrive just the same way?
It is, in fact, this awareness of the odds that persuaded Gen. Butler to ask if ""history will judge that the Cold war was a sort of Trojan Horse, whereby nuclear weapons were smuggled into the life of the world and made an acceptable part of the way it works?"" We have been led, he says, ""to think about the unthinkable, justify the unjustifiable and rationalize theirrational"".
Yet for every Gen. Butler who now sees the folly of the U.S. clinging to nuclear weapons, there is a Bill Clinton -- a politician in power or about to be in power -- who, while his brain says one thing does another. Nothingillustrates this more than Clinton's remark 15 months ago after Pakistan and India first tested their nuclear bombs, when he said, ""I cannot believethat we are about to start the 21st century by having the subcontinent repeat the worst mistakes of the 20th when we know it is not necessary to peace, to security, to prosperity, to national greatness or national fulfillment"".
But what has Clinton done to reverse the American psyche that deeply believes for all the reasons he publicly scorned that it is absolutely necessary to hold on to its nuclear armory, even after the end of the Cold War?
The Test Ban Treaty, once the idealistic dream of President John Kennedy,was meant as a tool for stopping the nuclear arms race in its tracks. Fortyyears on, after labyrinth negotiations, it has become, in its post Cold Wartext, not much more than a subterfuge for making it difficult for the new nuclear powers -- India and Pakistan in particular -- to develop the sophistication of their still relatively basic nuclear stockpile. Testing is absolutely necessary at this stage for miniaturization and nose-cone development, whereas the United States and the other established powers can maintain their commanding lead over everyone else by computer simulation.
The fact that the Senate Republicans have scuppered the treaty is nothingmore than reflexive hostility to the Democratic Administration. In real terms it penalizes America by giving succor to those countries which want to go their own way.
Nuclear arms control and eventual disarmament, once the center-piece of American foreign policy under presidents as diverse as Kennedy, Nixon, Carter and Reagan, have become the interest of a dwindling minority. Neither Clinton nor his Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, have ever given the impression of being remotely interested in staking out a seriousradical position and following it through with a sustained education of public opinion.
If it were not for the disintegration of the Russian nuclear armory through lack of maintenance and replenishment we would have to conclude that the disarmament situation is all but stalled. The Second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1993 remains unratified by the Russian Duma, a hostage first to the Republican Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms who took all the momentum out of it, and to the Russian communist and nationalist parliamentarians who, for their own reasons, took a cue from him.
To break this impasse is a must. A year ago senior Pentagon officials letit be known that they were prepared to advocate unilateral cuts in the American armory, at least to match the de facto cuts in Russia. Again, because of pressure from Senator Helms and his colleagues the White House has refused to give a lead on this.
In normal times one would expect the coup in Pakistan to wake up those who somehow think the nuclear status quo is liveable with. But such is the degree of partisan fervor in the United States, rational thinking comes second to dangerous schizophrenia. Nuclear weapons always were and now are more than ever the world's greatest threat. We missed nuclear war by a hair's breadth not once in the Cold War, but at least half a dozen times. Today the odds are even worst. And the American president and U.S. Senate, each in their own way oblivious to their responsibility, only think about impossible schemes for protecting America from Armageddon.
RI ratification of the CTBT to help end nuclear arms testing
Marty M. Natalegawa, Jakarta | Wed, 12/07/2011 9:28 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
Indonesia took a significant step toward global prohibition of nuclear-test explosions on Tuesday, by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
By doing so, Indonesia has increased the number of states that have ratified the Treaty to 156. Eight more from Annex II countries and the Treaty will come into force. Like Indonesia, these remaining eight are significant technology holders and thus their ratifications are mandatory for the Treaty to come into force — as was the case for Indonesia.
We have therefore made a strong declaration of commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. We have also made a timely contribution to the fortunes of the Treaty.
The timing of this move could not be more propitious. It came right after Indonesia, as Chair of ASEAN, successfully facilitated the conclusion of negotiations between ASEAN and Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) to enable the NWSs to accede to the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty.
This is no less than a double breakthrough for Indonesia and ASEAN. Aside from benefiting the entire Asian region, these two developments will create positive momentum that could push the remaining Annex II countries to start their ratification process and help promote the universalization of the Treaty.
Indeed, Indonesia’s support for the Treaty and the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons is not something new. Indonesia affixed its name to the Treaty on the very day it was opened for signature: Sept. 24, 1996.
From then on, we have given it consistent support, because we regard it as a crucial stepping stone to achieve nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
A number of principles lie behind our firm commitment to the Treaty. First, the national mandate laid down by the 1945 Constitution to help maintain peace and justice throughout the world. Second, because the Treaty is nondiscriminatory and inclusive, under its provisions, all states – whether they have nuclear arsenals or not –must play by the same rules.
And third, because it is indeed do-able: The technology is already in place to police nuclear explosions all around the world. This is made possible through an open-source International Monitoring System encompassing the entire planet, with its detectors dispersed from the poles to the tropics, whose data is owned by the 182 states that have so far signed the treaty.
Thus the Treaty represents the marriage of robust science to an inclusive and democratic international legal instrument.
We are also proud that our ratification crowned an initiative carried out in the context of our own vibrant and dynamic democracy, through which the government has partnered closely with the legislature, civil society and other stakeholders, including the media.
For only through a democratic approach, involving intensive deliberations, with the participation of all stakeholders, can a Treaty like this gain the strong sense of ownership at home.
It is true that in the past we deferred the process of its ratification. At that time, it was as a matter of principle. We reiterated that states that possessed nuclear weapons, after all, should first and foremost commit to the Treaty ahead of anyone else.
That position of principle had served its purpose. Our standing had contributed to the global effort to push for the NWSs to commit themselves to the Treaty.
Recent events show a glimmer of hope, a gleam of possibility that the cause of disarmament can move forward much more expeditiously. Thus, from today’s vantage point, we in Indonesia believe we can help brighten that possibility by ratifying the Treaty.
As I announced at the opening of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Indonesia had decided that it was not in our interest to wait any longer. Indeed, the time to act had come.
We heard familiar arguments against ratifying the treaty, but they became too narrow to prevail. By embracing the Treaty, states lose none of their powers, on the contrary they make a solid investment in global security insurance, a multilateral undertaking to rid planet Earth of nuclear weapons.
It must also be stressed that of about 337 monitors employing four different technologies that the Treaty will rely on for verification once it is in force, more than 250 are already in place. And they are already functioning as a result of an investment of more than a billion dollars by the Treaty’s signatories.
On Indonesia’s part, we are contributing six certified seismological stations to the system, whose scientific capabilities offer a broad range of additional benefits to human security, including early warnings on tsunamis, new revelations about the behavior of the earth’s crust and enhanced monitoring of volcanic eruptions.
But the core benefit from the Treaty is, of course, the advancement of the cause of global disarmament. For as long as nations continue to invest their security in nuclear arsenals, the high risk of their use remains.
This is not a new concern for Indonesia. We have been dedicated to ridding the planet of nuclear weapons since shortly after their first use 65 years ago. Indonesia, one of the founders in 1961 of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), has been serving as coordinator of the Movement’s disarmament working-group for almost two decades; as such we have been spearheading global multilateral disarmament efforts throughout the world.
Indonesia was among the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that in 1995 concluded the SEANWFZ, the most ambitious nuclear weapons free zone in terms of its zone of application.
Thus, by Indonesia ratifying the CTBT, we reiterate our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, to promoting this noble cause in the region and beyond and to ensuring that their goals are fulfilled. This is the first of many steps that we will take to work for the universalization and enforcement of the treaty.
Inevitably, the tide of history is turning in favor of nuclear disarmament. And as the international community moves closer to the enforcement of the CTBT, humankind also moves away from the perils of the age of nuclear weapons toward a future of more durable security and peace.
The writer is minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.
Indonesia took a significant step toward global prohibition of nuclear-test explosions on Tuesday, by ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
By doing so, Indonesia has increased the number of states that have ratified the Treaty to 156. Eight more from Annex II countries and the Treaty will come into force. Like Indonesia, these remaining eight are significant technology holders and thus their ratifications are mandatory for the Treaty to come into force — as was the case for Indonesia.
We have therefore made a strong declaration of commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. We have also made a timely contribution to the fortunes of the Treaty.
The timing of this move could not be more propitious. It came right after Indonesia, as Chair of ASEAN, successfully facilitated the conclusion of negotiations between ASEAN and Nuclear Weapon States (NWSs) to enable the NWSs to accede to the Protocol of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty.
This is no less than a double breakthrough for Indonesia and ASEAN. Aside from benefiting the entire Asian region, these two developments will create positive momentum that could push the remaining Annex II countries to start their ratification process and help promote the universalization of the Treaty.
Indeed, Indonesia’s support for the Treaty and the vision of a world free from nuclear weapons is not something new. Indonesia affixed its name to the Treaty on the very day it was opened for signature: Sept. 24, 1996.
From then on, we have given it consistent support, because we regard it as a crucial stepping stone to achieve nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.
A number of principles lie behind our firm commitment to the Treaty. First, the national mandate laid down by the 1945 Constitution to help maintain peace and justice throughout the world. Second, because the Treaty is nondiscriminatory and inclusive, under its provisions, all states – whether they have nuclear arsenals or not –must play by the same rules.
And third, because it is indeed do-able: The technology is already in place to police nuclear explosions all around the world. This is made possible through an open-source International Monitoring System encompassing the entire planet, with its detectors dispersed from the poles to the tropics, whose data is owned by the 182 states that have so far signed the treaty.
Thus the Treaty represents the marriage of robust science to an inclusive and democratic international legal instrument.
We are also proud that our ratification crowned an initiative carried out in the context of our own vibrant and dynamic democracy, through which the government has partnered closely with the legislature, civil society and other stakeholders, including the media.
For only through a democratic approach, involving intensive deliberations, with the participation of all stakeholders, can a Treaty like this gain the strong sense of ownership at home.
It is true that in the past we deferred the process of its ratification. At that time, it was as a matter of principle. We reiterated that states that possessed nuclear weapons, after all, should first and foremost commit to the Treaty ahead of anyone else.
That position of principle had served its purpose. Our standing had contributed to the global effort to push for the NWSs to commit themselves to the Treaty.
Recent events show a glimmer of hope, a gleam of possibility that the cause of disarmament can move forward much more expeditiously. Thus, from today’s vantage point, we in Indonesia believe we can help brighten that possibility by ratifying the Treaty.
As I announced at the opening of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, Indonesia had decided that it was not in our interest to wait any longer. Indeed, the time to act had come.
We heard familiar arguments against ratifying the treaty, but they became too narrow to prevail. By embracing the Treaty, states lose none of their powers, on the contrary they make a solid investment in global security insurance, a multilateral undertaking to rid planet Earth of nuclear weapons.
It must also be stressed that of about 337 monitors employing four different technologies that the Treaty will rely on for verification once it is in force, more than 250 are already in place. And they are already functioning as a result of an investment of more than a billion dollars by the Treaty’s signatories.
On Indonesia’s part, we are contributing six certified seismological stations to the system, whose scientific capabilities offer a broad range of additional benefits to human security, including early warnings on tsunamis, new revelations about the behavior of the earth’s crust and enhanced monitoring of volcanic eruptions.
But the core benefit from the Treaty is, of course, the advancement of the cause of global disarmament. For as long as nations continue to invest their security in nuclear arsenals, the high risk of their use remains.
This is not a new concern for Indonesia. We have been dedicated to ridding the planet of nuclear weapons since shortly after their first use 65 years ago. Indonesia, one of the founders in 1961 of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), has been serving as coordinator of the Movement’s disarmament working-group for almost two decades; as such we have been spearheading global multilateral disarmament efforts throughout the world.
Indonesia was among the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that in 1995 concluded the SEANWFZ, the most ambitious nuclear weapons free zone in terms of its zone of application.
Thus, by Indonesia ratifying the CTBT, we reiterate our commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, to promoting this noble cause in the region and beyond and to ensuring that their goals are fulfilled. This is the first of many steps that we will take to work for the universalization and enforcement of the treaty.
Inevitably, the tide of history is turning in favor of nuclear disarmament. And as the international community moves closer to the enforcement of the CTBT, humankind also moves away from the perils of the age of nuclear weapons toward a future of more durable security and peace.
The writer is minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia.
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