Rizal Sukma, Jakarta | Tue, 11/01/2011 11:59 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
Fifteen years ago, Prof. Juwono Sudarsono warned that “barring the possibility that China can gain access to resources other than the South China Sea area, then ASEAN countries will have to face the possibility of an imminent military confrontation with China”. (The Jakarta Post, Aug. 7, 1996). Dewi Fortuna Anwar agreed, and was even bolder when she stated that “China respects strength. If they see you as being weak, they will eat you alive.” (International Herald Tribune, Aug. 16, 1996).
By early in the 21st century, however, such perceptions of China had changed significantly. Aware of how it was perceived in Southeast Asia, China began to embark on charm diplomacy. It participated in ASEAN-driven multilateral processes. By 2002, it signed the Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) with ASEAN countries, laying the foundation for peaceful management of the dispute among the claimants.
As China’s economic rise increasingly benefited ASEAN countries, the relationship between the two sides also improved significantly. Within a decade, China had won recognition from regional countries as a positive force for peace and development. Most Southeast Asian leaders, scholars and politicians began to see China more as a partner rather than a threat.
Now, in 2011, it is indeed unfortunate that many in Southeast Asia have begun to wonder whether all the good things that come with China’s rise might not be long-lasting. Many begin to worry whether all the positive features in China’s policy towards the region are about to change. Voices coming out of China of late, and particularly China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, have become more and more puzzling for many regional countries.
After listening to statements made by some military officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and reading a series of articles and op-eds published in the Global Times, a popular newspaper published by China’s Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, one would think that Prof. Sudarsono’s forecast might no longer be a far-fetched prediction.
Let me just highlight two recent examples. On Sept. 29, 2011, the Times ran an opinion article titled “Time to teach those around South China Sea a lesson” calls for “a punishment” to be mounted against Vietnam and the Philippines, and that China “should make good preparations for a small-scale battle while giving the other side the option of war or peace.” On Oct. 25, an editorial even warned that “if these countries don’t want to change their ways with China, they will need to prepare for the sound of cannon. We need to be ready for that, as it may be the only way for the disputes in the sea to be resolved.” These are strong words indeed.
The response from China’s government has been curious as well. When asked about the newspapers remarks, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said that “China’s media have the right to freely say what they like...” (the Post, Oct. 26, 2011). While that surely is the case in a democracy, it is hard to believe that is also the case in China. Therefore, the “alternative” view of the “free” media different from the more official position of China’s government still raises a lot of questions.
Do such hard-line voices receive tacit support and blessing from the government? Or, do they reflect the ongoing internal struggle between hard-line conservative nationalists and the more pragmatic internationalists within China? Or, does it simply reflect the growing dominant voices of nationalism and assertiveness of those within the PLA in China’s foreign and security policy-making?
Clarity of understanding of the nature of China’s politics is absolutely necessary if we are to fully understand the real meaning of those calls for war coming out of the state-controlled media such as the Global Times. Such a clarity is, however, hard to come by. To the outside world, China is represented by multiple actors and projects multiple identities. In terms of foreign policy, the Communist Party, the Foreign Ministry, and the PLA are all significant actors. In terms of its identity, we are presented with both benign and aggressive China. The problem is, we do not really know which actor and which identity represents the real China.
All parties to the dispute should understand that tough talk is not helpful, if not counter-productive. Before things get out of control, ASEAN and China need to sit down, engage in productive dialogue and start discussing how to prevent tension and conflict over the South China Sea. That should start with a process of negotiating the Code of Conduct (CoC) in the South China Sea, sooner rather than later.
The writer is the executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta.
Monday, October 31, 2011
A hard choice for Southeast Asia
Vikram Nehru, Washington, DC | Tue, 11/01/2011 8:56 PM A | A | A | - K;lipping the Jakarta Post
President Barack Obama’s November itinerary includes three idyllic seaside locations — Cannes, Honolulu and Bali. But he will have little time to enjoy the scenery. The trip across the Atlantic to Cannes for the G20 meeting will no doubt focus on the vicissitudes of a hobbled eurozone and the need for global coordination to avoid a double dip recession.
In sharp contrast, his trip across the Pacific will be to engage with a robust and resurgent East Asia and his meetings there will probably prove more important for the long-term economic and security concerns of the United States. They will be an important milestone in the Obama Administration’s steady and determined effort to reestablish a diplomatic presence and develop closer ties with a region that is driving the world economy and unsettling the established global balance of power.
The first stop on the president’s Pacific itinerary will be Honolulu for the APEC Economic Leader’s Meeting at which the United States will chair discussions on trade, regulatory convergence, and green growth. At the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali the agenda is likely to include maritime security, a broad enough rubric permitting discussion of simmering tensions in the South China Sea.
Both meetings have taken on added significance for two reasons — first, Obama’s personal involvement signals America’s seriousness in strengthening its Asian presence, challenging China’s preeminent role in the region, and providing an alternative point of reference to ASEAN countries; and second, this will be the first time that the United States (and Russia) have been included as members of the EAS, a development resisted by China but encouraged by key ASEAN members seeking to counterbalance China’s growing role in the region and its recent muscular projection of power, particularly in the South China Sea.
From ASEAN’s perspective, there are several reasons why it welcomes the reengagement of the United States in the region.
First, the United States continues to project an important military presence in the region, offering some measure of comfort against China’s growing regional clout.
Second, the United States may be suffering its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, but it remains the world’s largest market, an important final destination for much of the region’s exports, and a key source of foreign direct investment.
Third, the recent ratification of the US-Korea free trade agreement potentially opens the door for either a similar free trade agreement with ASEAN or a broader APEC-wide free trade area for Asia and the Pacific — an arrangement that would serve the interests of the region as well as the United States.
And fourth, the presence of the US in regional forums such as APEC and EAS could potentially transform them into decision-making bodies rather than just “talking shops”.
But recent developments also give ASEAN reason to doubt US commitment toward the region. The US Senate’s recent passage of the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act is designed to punish China for alleged currency manipulation but if it becomes law, it will hurt Southeast Asian economies that are part of the East Asian production chain in which China is the final link.
Second, America’s crippling fiscal problems, the seeming inability of Washington to take decisive action, and a politically weakened President Obama, stand in stark contrast to the strength of the Chinese economy, the relatively smooth manner in which China’s leadership transition in 2012 is being engineered, and the government’s impressive ability to take collective action when necessary.
While President Obama will be welcomed in Bali, the staying power of the US in the region is being questioned, especially when juxtaposed with China’s seemingly unstoppable ascendancy. Will the US have the fiscal strength to increase its presence in the Pacific to match China?
These concerns leave ASEAN countries in a difficult situation. Their economic future is inextricably linked to China. ASEAN’s ambition to develop a free trade area by 2015 and build an infrastructure network to facilitate intra-regional trade is supportive of a broader East Asian regionalism in which China is an integral part.
At the same time, several ASEAN countries are uncomfortable with China’s rise as a military power and the dispute over the Spratly Islands is only one of several security issues that cloud the future — and where the security presence of the US brings some comfort.
The region is transitioning to a new balance of power in which equilibrium is yet to be established. Searching for that equilibrium will require constructive engagement from all sides — especially that of China and the US. The November APEC and EAS meetings are significant milestones in that long road ahead.
The writer is a senior associate for the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
President Barack Obama’s November itinerary includes three idyllic seaside locations — Cannes, Honolulu and Bali. But he will have little time to enjoy the scenery. The trip across the Atlantic to Cannes for the G20 meeting will no doubt focus on the vicissitudes of a hobbled eurozone and the need for global coordination to avoid a double dip recession.
In sharp contrast, his trip across the Pacific will be to engage with a robust and resurgent East Asia and his meetings there will probably prove more important for the long-term economic and security concerns of the United States. They will be an important milestone in the Obama Administration’s steady and determined effort to reestablish a diplomatic presence and develop closer ties with a region that is driving the world economy and unsettling the established global balance of power.
The first stop on the president’s Pacific itinerary will be Honolulu for the APEC Economic Leader’s Meeting at which the United States will chair discussions on trade, regulatory convergence, and green growth. At the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Bali the agenda is likely to include maritime security, a broad enough rubric permitting discussion of simmering tensions in the South China Sea.
Both meetings have taken on added significance for two reasons — first, Obama’s personal involvement signals America’s seriousness in strengthening its Asian presence, challenging China’s preeminent role in the region, and providing an alternative point of reference to ASEAN countries; and second, this will be the first time that the United States (and Russia) have been included as members of the EAS, a development resisted by China but encouraged by key ASEAN members seeking to counterbalance China’s growing role in the region and its recent muscular projection of power, particularly in the South China Sea.
From ASEAN’s perspective, there are several reasons why it welcomes the reengagement of the United States in the region.
First, the United States continues to project an important military presence in the region, offering some measure of comfort against China’s growing regional clout.
Second, the United States may be suffering its worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, but it remains the world’s largest market, an important final destination for much of the region’s exports, and a key source of foreign direct investment.
Third, the recent ratification of the US-Korea free trade agreement potentially opens the door for either a similar free trade agreement with ASEAN or a broader APEC-wide free trade area for Asia and the Pacific — an arrangement that would serve the interests of the region as well as the United States.
And fourth, the presence of the US in regional forums such as APEC and EAS could potentially transform them into decision-making bodies rather than just “talking shops”.
But recent developments also give ASEAN reason to doubt US commitment toward the region. The US Senate’s recent passage of the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act is designed to punish China for alleged currency manipulation but if it becomes law, it will hurt Southeast Asian economies that are part of the East Asian production chain in which China is the final link.
Second, America’s crippling fiscal problems, the seeming inability of Washington to take decisive action, and a politically weakened President Obama, stand in stark contrast to the strength of the Chinese economy, the relatively smooth manner in which China’s leadership transition in 2012 is being engineered, and the government’s impressive ability to take collective action when necessary.
While President Obama will be welcomed in Bali, the staying power of the US in the region is being questioned, especially when juxtaposed with China’s seemingly unstoppable ascendancy. Will the US have the fiscal strength to increase its presence in the Pacific to match China?
These concerns leave ASEAN countries in a difficult situation. Their economic future is inextricably linked to China. ASEAN’s ambition to develop a free trade area by 2015 and build an infrastructure network to facilitate intra-regional trade is supportive of a broader East Asian regionalism in which China is an integral part.
At the same time, several ASEAN countries are uncomfortable with China’s rise as a military power and the dispute over the Spratly Islands is only one of several security issues that cloud the future — and where the security presence of the US brings some comfort.
The region is transitioning to a new balance of power in which equilibrium is yet to be established. Searching for that equilibrium will require constructive engagement from all sides — especially that of China and the US. The November APEC and EAS meetings are significant milestones in that long road ahead.
The writer is a senior associate for the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Sunday, October 30, 2011
Democratic Peace Hypothesis
"Democracies are less aggresive than non-democracies or at least, less likely to go to war with other democracies, as democracies have developed mechanism of peaceful disputes settlement and compromise" - Rule-based behavior !
ASEAN, preventive diplomacy and bilateral conflict
P.L.E. Priatna, Jakarta | Sat, 10/29/2011 12:37 PM A | A | A |-Klipping The Jakarta Post
“We have shown the world that ASEAN can proactively facilitate and engage itself appropriately in creating conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes among its family members.”
(Marty Natalegawa, Foreign Minister, Jakarta, Aug. 5, 2011).
The ASEAN-EU High-Level Expert Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and International Peace Mediation was held in Bali at the Nusa Dua Convention Center on Oct. 11, 2011.
This interesting ASEAN-EU workshop was intended to explore the new facts of ASEAN life, thus it was dubbed the “Regional Organizations as Vectors of Peace: Building ASEAN’s Capacities in Preventive Diplomacy and International Peace Mediation”. It is not only how the EU sees ASEAN as its internal mediation support, but also the EU’s engagement with ASEAN to play a bigger role in the region.
This workshop seems relevant to ASEAN as well, as recently the issue of border disputes between member states — for example, Indonesia and Malaysia — have been rolling around amid the ASEAN community-building effort. Although ASEAN has its own unique bilateral and historical problems, ASEAN has been recognized as a successful model of regional organization, as it provides nations the ability to minimize conflicts and solve long-standing and unexpected disagreements through sustainable peace in the region.
A culture of peace is urgently needed when, for example, we are faced with interlinked existing border issues among almost all the member states. If ASEAN wants be relevant, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, in turn, have the opportunity and basis for getting involved with designing mechanisms of public communication to avoid the negative public response to the bilateral and legal disputes between member states.
In the context of ASEAN’s community building, all of the actors and the stakeholders have their own respective roles to keep ASEAN credible, trusted and supported.
Negative and uncontrolled public responses to bilateral disputes will only create negative support for the ASEAN community-building process. ASEAN’s member states each must avoid unexpected misunderstandings between people or even hostility, social hatred and frontal disengagements.
On a regional scope, ASEAN has the potential to establish its mediation capacity to solve existing conflicts, but ASEAN still has its own limits as well, said Agus Wandi, Deputy Transition Coordinator of the UN Development Program. There are at least two contributing factors to the limits.
First, there is no mechanism to identify actors or internal institutions that are responsible for initiating and implementing preventive action or forestalling conflict. Second is ASEAN’s non-interference principle, according to Agus.
ASEAN’s people-centered orientation, in the end, has brought the bloc face to face with the new challenge of redefining approaches to the meaning of its non-interference principle, especially in gaining public support.
It would be much better to have a common platform to find the new operational meaning of it, particularly as part of entering the ASEAN Community 2015.
Indonesia’s peace-making role in the case of the Thai-Cambodia border conflict, factually, is a new ASEAN understanding to have new substantial meaning of a truly flexible mediation process and support mechanism.
It will build momentum, in turn, for ASEAN’s stakeholders to formulate a new and stronger and more workable framework for regional preventive diplomacy. Entering the ASEAN Community 2015, in terms of public diplomacy, it is a big
challenge to gain public justification, even in just simplifying the split between “bilateral and regional issues”.
The Joint Border Commission, for example, as a bilateral instrument to solve “legal-based border issues”, has nothing to do with ASEAN community-building. It will not satisfy domestic constituents or give people on the street the feeling that they are truly living in ASEAN solidarity, in the big house of the ASEAN Community.
The ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation will hopefully not only contribute to building a new formula to face that challenge, but also become a credible institution to find various workable solutions to the modern ASEAN as it faces member state’s bilateral disputes.
ASEAN member states should be aware — in the era of outspoken and active public participation — that the ability to wield an elegant preventive form of diplomacy in bilateral (legal) border disputes, for example, will have a strong correlation to the public’s support of ASEAN community building.
These bilateral, legal-based disputes should be well communicated to the public by both conflicting parties. Domestic “hypernationalistic elements”, with incomplete and misleading information, will unnecessary derail the spirit of ASEAN community building.
Social capital is essential to gaining public support. ASEAN should invest heavily to build public trust, as the strongest social capital that ASEAN has is the workable regional mechanism to make better lives for the people in the region. ASEAN, with its unique capabilities, can reduce political tensions which are caused by legal-based, bilateral boundary disputes.
That is why it is now urgently needed for, let say, the ASEAN Secretariat to work with the respective member states to provide communication strategies to the media in the case of bilateral, legal-based disputes. The ASEAN Secretariat joined with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to formulate a mechanism of public communications with the media so that ASEAN still has its public trust and support to bridge those public misunderstandings.
While ASEAN is being recognized internationally of having all the mediation capabilities to create workable preventive diplomacy and credible mediation instruments, regarding bilateral relations, member states fail to provide joint strategic management of public perception.
Bilateral elements of ASEAN’s member states are still being pictured as deeply dividing the society, in which people live together as strangers full of hatred and fearing that the other people pose a danger. This is not the ASEAN Community that we, the people of ASEAN, actually expect.
ASEAN’s preventive diplomacy should include not only a formula to find a workable solution to stop “people-to-people misunderstandings”, but, more than that, it should create the strongest social capital possible. Now is the time for ASEAN to engineer a creative strategic public communication management in the case of negative public response to the bilateral, legal-based disputes among member states.
The writer is a diplomat and a political scientist with degrees from the University of Indonesia and Monash University, Australia. The opinions expressed are his own.
“We have shown the world that ASEAN can proactively facilitate and engage itself appropriately in creating conditions conducive to the peaceful settlement of disputes among its family members.”
(Marty Natalegawa, Foreign Minister, Jakarta, Aug. 5, 2011).
The ASEAN-EU High-Level Expert Workshop on Preventive Diplomacy and International Peace Mediation was held in Bali at the Nusa Dua Convention Center on Oct. 11, 2011.
This interesting ASEAN-EU workshop was intended to explore the new facts of ASEAN life, thus it was dubbed the “Regional Organizations as Vectors of Peace: Building ASEAN’s Capacities in Preventive Diplomacy and International Peace Mediation”. It is not only how the EU sees ASEAN as its internal mediation support, but also the EU’s engagement with ASEAN to play a bigger role in the region.
This workshop seems relevant to ASEAN as well, as recently the issue of border disputes between member states — for example, Indonesia and Malaysia — have been rolling around amid the ASEAN community-building effort. Although ASEAN has its own unique bilateral and historical problems, ASEAN has been recognized as a successful model of regional organization, as it provides nations the ability to minimize conflicts and solve long-standing and unexpected disagreements through sustainable peace in the region.
A culture of peace is urgently needed when, for example, we are faced with interlinked existing border issues among almost all the member states. If ASEAN wants be relevant, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Committee of Permanent Representatives, in turn, have the opportunity and basis for getting involved with designing mechanisms of public communication to avoid the negative public response to the bilateral and legal disputes between member states.
In the context of ASEAN’s community building, all of the actors and the stakeholders have their own respective roles to keep ASEAN credible, trusted and supported.
Negative and uncontrolled public responses to bilateral disputes will only create negative support for the ASEAN community-building process. ASEAN’s member states each must avoid unexpected misunderstandings between people or even hostility, social hatred and frontal disengagements.
On a regional scope, ASEAN has the potential to establish its mediation capacity to solve existing conflicts, but ASEAN still has its own limits as well, said Agus Wandi, Deputy Transition Coordinator of the UN Development Program. There are at least two contributing factors to the limits.
First, there is no mechanism to identify actors or internal institutions that are responsible for initiating and implementing preventive action or forestalling conflict. Second is ASEAN’s non-interference principle, according to Agus.
ASEAN’s people-centered orientation, in the end, has brought the bloc face to face with the new challenge of redefining approaches to the meaning of its non-interference principle, especially in gaining public support.
It would be much better to have a common platform to find the new operational meaning of it, particularly as part of entering the ASEAN Community 2015.
Indonesia’s peace-making role in the case of the Thai-Cambodia border conflict, factually, is a new ASEAN understanding to have new substantial meaning of a truly flexible mediation process and support mechanism.
It will build momentum, in turn, for ASEAN’s stakeholders to formulate a new and stronger and more workable framework for regional preventive diplomacy. Entering the ASEAN Community 2015, in terms of public diplomacy, it is a big
challenge to gain public justification, even in just simplifying the split between “bilateral and regional issues”.
The Joint Border Commission, for example, as a bilateral instrument to solve “legal-based border issues”, has nothing to do with ASEAN community-building. It will not satisfy domestic constituents or give people on the street the feeling that they are truly living in ASEAN solidarity, in the big house of the ASEAN Community.
The ASEAN Institute of Peace and Reconciliation will hopefully not only contribute to building a new formula to face that challenge, but also become a credible institution to find various workable solutions to the modern ASEAN as it faces member state’s bilateral disputes.
ASEAN member states should be aware — in the era of outspoken and active public participation — that the ability to wield an elegant preventive form of diplomacy in bilateral (legal) border disputes, for example, will have a strong correlation to the public’s support of ASEAN community building.
These bilateral, legal-based disputes should be well communicated to the public by both conflicting parties. Domestic “hypernationalistic elements”, with incomplete and misleading information, will unnecessary derail the spirit of ASEAN community building.
Social capital is essential to gaining public support. ASEAN should invest heavily to build public trust, as the strongest social capital that ASEAN has is the workable regional mechanism to make better lives for the people in the region. ASEAN, with its unique capabilities, can reduce political tensions which are caused by legal-based, bilateral boundary disputes.
That is why it is now urgently needed for, let say, the ASEAN Secretariat to work with the respective member states to provide communication strategies to the media in the case of bilateral, legal-based disputes. The ASEAN Secretariat joined with the Committee of Permanent Representatives to formulate a mechanism of public communications with the media so that ASEAN still has its public trust and support to bridge those public misunderstandings.
While ASEAN is being recognized internationally of having all the mediation capabilities to create workable preventive diplomacy and credible mediation instruments, regarding bilateral relations, member states fail to provide joint strategic management of public perception.
Bilateral elements of ASEAN’s member states are still being pictured as deeply dividing the society, in which people live together as strangers full of hatred and fearing that the other people pose a danger. This is not the ASEAN Community that we, the people of ASEAN, actually expect.
ASEAN’s preventive diplomacy should include not only a formula to find a workable solution to stop “people-to-people misunderstandings”, but, more than that, it should create the strongest social capital possible. Now is the time for ASEAN to engineer a creative strategic public communication management in the case of negative public response to the bilateral, legal-based disputes among member states.
The writer is a diplomat and a political scientist with degrees from the University of Indonesia and Monash University, Australia. The opinions expressed are his own.
Monday, October 17, 2011
Asian maritime geopolitics and Indonesian security
Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, Singapore | Mon, 10/17/2011 8:12 PM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post
On Sept. 1, 2011, an Indian naval vessel reported that it had received a warning by someone claiming to be a Chinese Navy official in the South China Sea. Although India and China have played down the report, such a scenario is utterly possible.
India and China have been investing immense resources for naval modernization in recent years to secure “blue-water” capabilities that would enable them to operate at long distances from territorial waters. Unlike the past colonialists, Indian and Chinese fleets of the 21st century are craving control over the oceans.
The Indian and Chinese navies are being designed to operate beyond their main areas of operation, namely the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, respectively. India’s “Look East” policy is designed to forge closer relationships with East Asian countries and the Indian Navy (IN) is one of its key instruments. India’s main concern is the security of its maritime communications via regional choke points, particularly the Malacca Strait.
With more than 50 percent of India’s foreign trade passing through the strait, the latter is the throat of India’s booming economy. The IN has beefed up its eastern naval command based in Andhra Pradesh and established a tri-service command center in 2001 at Port Blair in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, both of which are positioned close to the strait.
In April and March this year, the IN also conducted naval exercises and patrols jointly, or in cooperation, with Pacific Rim countries, such as Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, and such activities are likely to increase. Although these engagements are hardly intended to balance China, New Delhi has already sent a loud and clear message to the world that the Pacific will be another playground for its navy.
Consequently, the IN is revamping its force projection assets. The former Soviet-era Gorshkov aircraft carrier is due for delivery next year, after costing the Indian government an almost fourfold increase in refurbishment costs. Two indigenous aircraft carriers (IACs) are said to be undergoing development, in addition to a major purchase of fourth generation Russian fighter jets to bolster the IN’s air arm.
New Delhi’s activities are being echoed in Beijing. Currently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is crafted for force projection under the Offshore Defense doctrine. Operationally, the doctrine stipulates that PLAN deploys assets far from China’s littorals to Guam Island in the east, and the Natuna and Philippine seas to the south within the two island chains. But, conceptually, it could mean endeavors to promote and protect China’s national interests abroad.
As 80 percent of Beijing’s energy imports come from the Middle East and Africa, the Indian Ocean and approaches to the western Pacific are strategically vital for its energy security. This means that over the coming decades, the South China Sea, the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits, as well as the Andaman Sea, will be the major arteries for PLAN warships sailing to and from the Indian Ocean. Already, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Sittwe in Myanmar, China has constructed the “strings of pearls”, or ports for its tankers, and perhaps soon, bases for its warships – all located on India’s
peripheries.
True, one must not exaggerate PLAN’s successful aircraft carrier test to mean China’s success at global power projection. Even if Beijing possesses the resources to operate three carriers, they are no substitute for knowledge and experience of carrier naval battles. But one must bear in mind that China’s seaward die is already cast. Only major domestic unrest or troubles within its land borders of a catastrophic scale could gradually grind to a halt Beijing’s naval modernization.
As such, the dawn of the Asian “naval century” might be something like Chinese Navy vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean, and Indian warships in the western Pacific. This development could deliver detrimental effects for regional maritime security.
Like enlarging bubbles, India’s and China’s naval expansions may eventually collide and, perhaps, explode in Southeast Asian waters. The recent incident in the South China Sea hints at this trend, a trend that will probably increase in the future. This is something all Southeast Asian maritime states must anticipate. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have medium or “green-water” navies, whose missions (and ambitions) are generally confined to a regional scale. They are, nonetheless, responsible for securing the world’s busiest shipping lanes with global trade at stake.
If in the 20th century US warships were the ones mainly transiting these sea lanes, in the 21st there will be Indian and Chinese as well. Incidents in these waters have the potential for adverse global consequences, which would require other stakeholders to intervene. The US Navy has been given de facto consent to patrol the world’s major shipping routes; but China and, to some extent, India have yet to give their fiat. Moreover, the direct presence of US warships could add fuel to regional tensions, including the South China Sea disputes. Hence, the best solution remains to accommodate and increase the participation and capacities of regional navies.
Being the largest Southeast Asian state and a geographically maritime country, Indonesia can spearhead such efforts.
First, regional confidence-building measures (CBMs) must be unswervingly and consistently pursued. Strategic-level CBMs, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum, or the Singapore Shangri-La Dialogue, must be complemented with operational-level navy-to-navy talks, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Such measures could also include naval exercises involving members of ASEAN and the ARF aimed to promote friendship among navies. Indonesia can actively participate in all these measures.
Second, maritime domain awareness must be enhanced. Maritime surveillance radars, satellites and sonar should come as part and parcel of Indonesia’s naval modernization. Indonesia must also welcome foreign direct assistance in providing maritime surveillance facilities and infrastructure. US assistance of integrated maritime surveillance systems in the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea constitutes such a measure. But, without continuing and complete provisions of maintenance and support, this will just be a drop in the ocean.
Third, the principle of “armed neutrality” must guide Indonesia’s geostrategy. Indonesia must always strive to maintain regional peace and stability, actively promote good order at sea and friendship among nations, but doing so must not be at the cost of national sovereignty and the right to self-defense. The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) must be provided with the capabilities for forward presence in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific to notify and escort other warships transiting through Indonesian waters.
Such capabilities lie not in light naval platforms — like fast attack craft — but large and versatile ones, such as corvettes, frigates and destroyers. Therefore, the proposal to build at least 10 light frigates must be viewed as a necessary survival kit for Indonesia to remain afloat in the increasingly crowded waters of Asia.
The writer is a research analyst with the Maritime Security Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
On Sept. 1, 2011, an Indian naval vessel reported that it had received a warning by someone claiming to be a Chinese Navy official in the South China Sea. Although India and China have played down the report, such a scenario is utterly possible.
India and China have been investing immense resources for naval modernization in recent years to secure “blue-water” capabilities that would enable them to operate at long distances from territorial waters. Unlike the past colonialists, Indian and Chinese fleets of the 21st century are craving control over the oceans.
The Indian and Chinese navies are being designed to operate beyond their main areas of operation, namely the Indian Ocean and western Pacific, respectively. India’s “Look East” policy is designed to forge closer relationships with East Asian countries and the Indian Navy (IN) is one of its key instruments. India’s main concern is the security of its maritime communications via regional choke points, particularly the Malacca Strait.
With more than 50 percent of India’s foreign trade passing through the strait, the latter is the throat of India’s booming economy. The IN has beefed up its eastern naval command based in Andhra Pradesh and established a tri-service command center in 2001 at Port Blair in Andaman and Nicobar Islands, both of which are positioned close to the strait.
In April and March this year, the IN also conducted naval exercises and patrols jointly, or in cooperation, with Pacific Rim countries, such as Japan, Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, and such activities are likely to increase. Although these engagements are hardly intended to balance China, New Delhi has already sent a loud and clear message to the world that the Pacific will be another playground for its navy.
Consequently, the IN is revamping its force projection assets. The former Soviet-era Gorshkov aircraft carrier is due for delivery next year, after costing the Indian government an almost fourfold increase in refurbishment costs. Two indigenous aircraft carriers (IACs) are said to be undergoing development, in addition to a major purchase of fourth generation Russian fighter jets to bolster the IN’s air arm.
New Delhi’s activities are being echoed in Beijing. Currently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is crafted for force projection under the Offshore Defense doctrine. Operationally, the doctrine stipulates that PLAN deploys assets far from China’s littorals to Guam Island in the east, and the Natuna and Philippine seas to the south within the two island chains. But, conceptually, it could mean endeavors to promote and protect China’s national interests abroad.
As 80 percent of Beijing’s energy imports come from the Middle East and Africa, the Indian Ocean and approaches to the western Pacific are strategically vital for its energy security. This means that over the coming decades, the South China Sea, the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits, as well as the Andaman Sea, will be the major arteries for PLAN warships sailing to and from the Indian Ocean. Already, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Sittwe in Myanmar, China has constructed the “strings of pearls”, or ports for its tankers, and perhaps soon, bases for its warships – all located on India’s
peripheries.
True, one must not exaggerate PLAN’s successful aircraft carrier test to mean China’s success at global power projection. Even if Beijing possesses the resources to operate three carriers, they are no substitute for knowledge and experience of carrier naval battles. But one must bear in mind that China’s seaward die is already cast. Only major domestic unrest or troubles within its land borders of a catastrophic scale could gradually grind to a halt Beijing’s naval modernization.
As such, the dawn of the Asian “naval century” might be something like Chinese Navy vessels sailing in the Indian Ocean, and Indian warships in the western Pacific. This development could deliver detrimental effects for regional maritime security.
Like enlarging bubbles, India’s and China’s naval expansions may eventually collide and, perhaps, explode in Southeast Asian waters. The recent incident in the South China Sea hints at this trend, a trend that will probably increase in the future. This is something all Southeast Asian maritime states must anticipate. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have medium or “green-water” navies, whose missions (and ambitions) are generally confined to a regional scale. They are, nonetheless, responsible for securing the world’s busiest shipping lanes with global trade at stake.
If in the 20th century US warships were the ones mainly transiting these sea lanes, in the 21st there will be Indian and Chinese as well. Incidents in these waters have the potential for adverse global consequences, which would require other stakeholders to intervene. The US Navy has been given de facto consent to patrol the world’s major shipping routes; but China and, to some extent, India have yet to give their fiat. Moreover, the direct presence of US warships could add fuel to regional tensions, including the South China Sea disputes. Hence, the best solution remains to accommodate and increase the participation and capacities of regional navies.
Being the largest Southeast Asian state and a geographically maritime country, Indonesia can spearhead such efforts.
First, regional confidence-building measures (CBMs) must be unswervingly and consistently pursued. Strategic-level CBMs, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Maritime Forum, or the Singapore Shangri-La Dialogue, must be complemented with operational-level navy-to-navy talks, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Such measures could also include naval exercises involving members of ASEAN and the ARF aimed to promote friendship among navies. Indonesia can actively participate in all these measures.
Second, maritime domain awareness must be enhanced. Maritime surveillance radars, satellites and sonar should come as part and parcel of Indonesia’s naval modernization. Indonesia must also welcome foreign direct assistance in providing maritime surveillance facilities and infrastructure. US assistance of integrated maritime surveillance systems in the Malacca Strait and Sulawesi Sea constitutes such a measure. But, without continuing and complete provisions of maintenance and support, this will just be a drop in the ocean.
Third, the principle of “armed neutrality” must guide Indonesia’s geostrategy. Indonesia must always strive to maintain regional peace and stability, actively promote good order at sea and friendship among nations, but doing so must not be at the cost of national sovereignty and the right to self-defense. The Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) must be provided with the capabilities for forward presence in the Indian Ocean and western Pacific to notify and escort other warships transiting through Indonesian waters.
Such capabilities lie not in light naval platforms — like fast attack craft — but large and versatile ones, such as corvettes, frigates and destroyers. Therefore, the proposal to build at least 10 light frigates must be viewed as a necessary survival kit for Indonesia to remain afloat in the increasingly crowded waters of Asia.
The writer is a research analyst with the Maritime Security Program, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore
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