The future of Asia may be determined by the interactions between the United States and China, but it is debatable whether the two largest powers in the region should have the field all to themselves. Medium powers, including Indonesia, will be playing their part to ensure that the Asian Century delivers peace and prosperity for all people in the region.
In his latest book The China Choice — Why America Should Share Power, Australia’s foremost strategic thinker Hugh White argues that the intensifying rivalry between the two biggest powers means that how Asia evolves will depend very much on the decisions made in Washington and Beijing. While they face an array of choices, White says the wrong decisions raise the specter of a catastrophic nuclear war.
Leaving aside for now his contentious point about the inevitability of bipolarizing Asia, The China Choice arguably is one of the best books written to date about Asia’s rapidly changing geopolitical landscape. The structure and clarity of his arguments and the conversational style are accessible for non-specialist readers, along the lines of a “for dummies” book on how to think strategically, but there is no doubt about the seriousness of the analysis, the tone or the conclusions and recommendation that White puts forward.
It is timely too. For years, the world has been awed and impressed by China’s rapid economic growth, but recent events suggest that its rise will not be as peaceful as most had assumed. As it dramatically transforms the geopolitical landscape, it is also upsetting the balance of power that had been in place for the last four decades that provided Asia a period of relative peace and in turn allowed countries in the region, including China, to develop and prosper.
Underpinning this peace, White argues, is the uncontested but not widely-discussed American primacy in Asia. Now, as China is about to replace the United States as the largest economy in the world, which many predict would happen before this decade ends, there has to be a new arrangement in the way the region is managed. The new Asian order will have to take into account China’s hegemonic ambitions, something that it is flaunting more openly now, and America’s objective to maintain its long-held primacy. Unless managed properly, these two objectives could put Asia’s two powers on a collision course.
The ball is in Washington’s court. White charts three possible courses of action for America: Defend its primacy at all costs by using its military superiority to tame China; abandon Asia and let China have its way; or recognize China as an equal, at least in Asia, and share power. The author says there is only one right choice for America: The third option. The other two would be catastrophic, not only for the rest of Asia but also for America whose future, and hence interests, lie with this part of the world.
Where we take issue with White is in his proposal for the establishment of a “Concert of Asia”, modeled on the 1815 Concert of Vienna, which provided the peace and stability that allowed Europe to grow and prosper in the 19th century before it collapsed into World War I in 1914. After recognizing the presence of great and middle powers in Asia, from India, Russia and Japan, to South Korea, Southeast Asia and Taiwan in this emerging political landscape, he quickly discountes their role, arguing that ultimately the choices will be made by the two Asian superpowers, China and America.
If we take a snapshot of the current political landscape and focus only on the two biggest powers, inevitably we would come to the same conclusion of a bipolarized Asia and all that this entails. The real world, however, is no laboratory where we can hold everything constant and look at the interaction between the two main variables. And Asia, as proponents of Indonesia’s foreign policy ethos of “dynamic equilibrium” would argue, is a very dynamic region.
Even White admits as much, in that most Asian countries, including long-time allies like Japan and Korea, would not automatically join America in the event of a war with China. If a new Cold War was in the making, Asian countries would not immediately align themselves with either power the way many countries did in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yes, in the emerging Cold War between China and America, Clinton’s “it’s the economy stupid” argument applies. For all countries in Asia, and, in fact, many in the world, including the United States, China has now become their biggest trading partner.
Would they risk their economic interests for a war that no one will win and almost surely, in the event of a nuclear war, everybody will suffer? That is one area on which The China Choice could have elaborated more. White made the point that the rivalry between America and China is unique in that the two powers have become economically dependent on one another. But surely Washington and Beijing will also be looking at the implications on their economies as they view their options in this confrontation. China today holds the largest amount of US Treasury Bills, such that it virtually underwrites the dollar exchange rate. In the wake of a conflict, Beijing would unload its holdings, which would have a devastating impact on the American economy. Never mind a nuclear holocaust — what about an economic holocaust? Beijing also knows that its own economic prosperity, from export markets to jobs, is tied to the fortunes of America.
The contest for primacy in Asia is turning into a high-stakes poker game, but one in which several different styles are at play. While China keeps all five cards close to its chest, America is playing a variety of seven-card Texas Hold ‘Em poker, where it keeps only two cards hidden, leaving China to guess about the various options of its rival. Other countries in Asia are also at the table, but it is unclear whether they are engaged in a multiplayer strategic game of chess based on the actions of Washington and Beijing, or whether they have been dealt into the card game, each with their own chips at risk. Either way, the two big powers cannot ignore the presence of the other players on the table.
Take Indonesia, for example. Straddling the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indonesia controls vital sea lanes of communication. And for all its faults, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), with Indonesia’s leadership, has helped shape the wider East Asia region through its active diplomacy over the last two decades. Doesn’t it deserve a place in the table or a part in this Concert of Asia?
Any analysis on the future of Asia must also consider the development in the Indian Ocean, something which White neglects as he focuses on the West Pacific side of Asia. For big countries like China, the United States and India, the Indian Ocean also has high strategic values. Indonesia, with a large coast lining the Indian Ocean, will certainly include this as one of its bargaining chips in the creation of a new Asia order.
White has little faith in some of the ongoing diplomatic work in the region aimed at building a new order based on the emerging geopolitical landscape. Some call it “containment”, others prefer the less offensive term “balancing”, but regardless of the nomenclature, current discussions to establish an Asia Pacific community — on which the Australian government has taken some initiatives — are held obviously with the idea of giving China its due and a respectable but not antagonistic place in the region.
White completely dismisses these inclusive multilateral diplomatic forums where everybody has equal say, describing them as reflecting “the older order in Asia rather than contributing to building a new one.” He writes: “New orders are not built this way. They are shaped in negotiations among the most powerful states — the great powers. Those negotiations do not happen in front of others, as they involve painful and reluctant compromises on key interests and questions of status.”
We argue the opposite and that the multilateral forum should be given the chance to work first. The future of Asia is too big and too precious to be determined only by two giant powers.
The writers are senior editors of The Jakarta Post and former editors-in-chief of the newspaper. They are Class 1979 and Class 2004 of the Nieman Fellowship program for journalism at Harvard University. Siagian was formerly Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia.
Concert of Asia needs more than two big players (Part 2 of 2)
Sabam Siagian and Endy Bayuni, Jakarta | Opinion | Thu, August 30 2012, 9:06 AM
Paper Edition | Page: 7
The East Asia Summit (EAS), an ASEAN initiative, is still in its infancy, but the admission of the United States and Russia last year raises hopes that countries in the region are seriously looking into all the issues, including peace and security, which challenge the region.
A more relevant point of reference or model for the EAS to emulate is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), rather than the Concert of Vienna or the bilateral talks that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
Granted, East Asia has many security challenges, some of which are only coming to the surface now as China begins to flex its muscles, but this is no reason to throw in the towel and let the big boys take care of the problems.
The solid foundation of ASEAN’s centrality is the unity of its 10 members. Since ASEAN’s durable cohesion is the essence to maintaining a secure geopolitical environment for the archipelagic Republic of Indonesia, it is Jakarta’s task to cajole and push fellow ASEAN members to solve or manage their bilateral problems amicably, including the remaining problems of overlapping territorial claims.
Jakarta should keep hammering the message to other members that their national interests will be better served by upholding ASEAN loyalty and adhering to the accepted ASEAN way of solving problems amicably.
ASEAN should not to be swayed by the promised assistance of outside powers.
The recent tension in the South China Sea, where China and a number of Southeast Asian countries have overlapping territorial claims, is an Achilles Heel for ASEAN, with Cambodia allying itself with China, while the Philippines and Vietnam are turning to the United States.
Having read White’s book and analysis, it is all the more important for the EAS, in which ASEAN centrality has been widely accepted, to succeed and to keep Asia from becoming polarized into two contesting camps for the good of the region and its people and keep the Asian Century on the right track.
Ways must be found — and Indonesia should play a leading role in this effort — to enhance the efficacy of the EAS. When the two great powers, each from opposite sides of the Pacific and with their contrasting historical experiences, engage in the painful give-and-take process toward a fine-tuned power-sharing agreement that unavoidably involves the need for face saving, an effective EAS could provide the ideal setting to manage egos, perceived losses of prestige and the resulting domestic backlash.
It would be asking too much of the two great powers’ rationality to expect that they would come up with an agreed formula for power sharing. After all, China’s determination to overcome and erase the lingering traces of a “century of national humiliation” and America’s faithful adherence to its concept of “Manifest Destiny” could entice them into a collision course.
The EAS provides the ideal setting for the two great powers to hammer out a power-sharing deal, while the rest of the nations in attendance can act as more than mere onlookers.
A unified ASEAN, with a combined GDP of US$2 trillion and the strategic sea lanes of communication, poses a potentially large source of nuisance and will not automatically submit itself to any agreed-upon power-sharing formula that does not take into account its interests.
White describes Taiwan as a major potential flashpoint, arguing that how China and America deal with this issue and how each sees the “status of China” will be a critical index of their respective places in Asia’s power structure.
Pointing out that the US will bear the high cost of waging war with China to preserve Taiwan, he also argues that America can no longer prevent China from seizing Taiwan by force.
He portends that “Taiwan has for a long time seemed to pose the greatest risk, and it remains quite possible that developments in the cross strait relationship could induce a crisis with very serious consequences.”
White’s alarming projection overlooks the dramatic improvements currently taking place in the cross strait relationship. We think that China is no longer willing to pay the high cost of seizing Taiwan by force where non-force approaches have started bearing fruit.
The historic Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed by Beijing and Taipei in 2010 covers an array of activities, such as direct flight and shipping connections, people’s movements, customs and quarantine procedures, and joint police operations to prevent smuggling. The ECFA is constantly being updated with new attachments to the original 16 agreements, such as the recent deal on investment protection.
The number of people crossing the straits by sea between China’s Fujian province and Taiwan has tripled to more than 90,000 in the first seven months of 2012 since the launching of new express passenger liner at the start of the year, according to a recent report in the China Daily.
When an Indonesian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) delegation visited Taipei in June, they were informed by the Strait Exchange Foundation that 1.8 million people from the mainland had visited Taiwan in 2011.
The chairman of this semi-official agency, Pin Kung-Chiang, a distinguished elderly gentleman who enjoys de facto cabinet member status, indirectly told the delegation that he was in regular contact with important members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee in Beijing.
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou is upbeat about the prospects of stronger ties. In his inaugural speech in May at the start of his second, and last, four-year term, he said the ECFA had made cross strait rapprochement a reality by improving relations, reducing tensions and bringing peace and prosperity. He added: “In the next four years, the two sides of the straits have to open up new areas of cooperation and continue working to consolidate peace, expand prosperity and deepen mutual trust.”
If the Taiwan problem is losing its sexiness as a flashpoint, the recent confrontations between Japan’s naval patrol boats and Chinese armed fishery vessels in Northeast Asia over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and between Chinese and the Philippines government ships in the South China Sea over the Scarborough/Huayang shoal have produced two new emerging flashpoints.
These two new flashpoints are potentially quite dangerous. Japan and the Philippines are formal allies of the United States, which could be sucked into a contentious crisis with China.
Although an important read for Asian policymakers, White wrote The China Choice with American readers very much in mind. The book’s conclusion and recommendations are all directed at Washington.
White even wrote the last chapter of the book as a draft speech for the American president to deliver to his fellow Americans, in recognizing and accommodating China’s hegemonic ambitions, but without completely giving up America’s primacy in Asia.
Of course, come the US presidential election in November, things may change completely. In the event of a Republican victory for challenger Mitt Romney, the new administration is unlikely to go for White’s carefully crafted third option of accommodating China.
In a recent New York Times opinion article, globalist Roger Cohen quoted Romney as saying about his foreign policy: “I do not view America as just one more point on the strategic map, one more power to be balanced. I believe our country is the greatest force for good the world has ever known.”
One may be tempted to ask in which century is Romney living — it certainly isn’t the Asian Century. If Romney does win in November, White will have to write another book, as the China Choice will have been made for him with America choosing to maintain its primacy at all costs.
The writers are senior editors of The Jakarta Post and former editors-in-chief of the newspaper. They are Class 1979 and Class 2004 of the Nieman Fellowship program for journalists at Harvard University. Siagian was formerly Indonesia’s ambassador to Australia.
