The Jakarta Post, Jakarta | Tue, 03/20/2007 4:13 PM A | A | A | Rizal Sukma, Jakarta
- Klipping The Jakarta Post
The latest move by Japan and Australia to forge closer defense and security ties is part of the strategic realignment of the major powers in East Asia over the last 10 years or so. Japan, in its search for a new ""normal"" international role, has begun to incorporate strategic considerations more seriously into its foreign relations. Australia, which has assumed a greater international role since the East Timor saga in 1999, is also keen to consolidate its place within an American-centered strategic structure in the region.
This latest strategic development, however, has raised a key question. Was the new pact initiated with China in mind? This question arises especially due to the growing difficulties in Sino-Japanese relations in recent years. Moreover, it is the first time for Japan to have such a security pact with another country other than the U.S. However, both Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Prime Minister John Howard categorically stated that the new pact was not meant to counter the rise of China.
The implications of the new security pact between the two countries for the evolving regional order cannot be more apparent. It will certainly consolidate the close strategic alignment between Japan, Australia and the U.S. The security pact itself has made it clear that it will strengthen three-way cooperation involving Australia, Japan and the U.S. In other words, the deal clearly registers a strong spirit of strategic hedging, due to the uncertainties generated by the shifting of power taking place in the region. And the rise of China is a key element in this power shift.
More importantly, regardless of the real motives behind the pact, Japan and Australia clearly maintain that they want to strengthen cooperation among democracies in the Asia Pacific. The joint declaration on the security pact, for example, maintains that the relationship between Japan and Australia is ""based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship"". In other words, the region is now characterized by the emerging strategic alliance between East Asian democracies, led by the U.S.
What is a suitable place for Indonesia in this changing strategic environment in East Asia? The country is not comfortable being within the orbit of a communist China. Similarly, it is not yet comfortable being placed within the emerging democratic alliance led by the U.S. The natural choice for Indonesia then is to continue its bebas-aktif (independent and active) foreign policy.
But this bebas-aktif position needs a more concrete operationalization. It is not enough to just say that we are neither with the Chinese nor with the Americans. Even if we say that we are only for ASEAN, that preference still requires further clarification. ASEAN member states are not united in responding to the changing strategic environment in East Asia. Some are more sympathetic with the Chinese, others are more comfortable with the U.S.
So, once again Indonesia's foreign policy is going to face a strategic dilemma, especially in light of the growing rivalry between Japan and China. On the one hand, Japan is still the most important partner for Indonesia, especially in economic terms. On the other hand, the strategic importance of China has continued to grow, and within the next 10-15 years, the Chinese influence will be felt in a much more concrete way.
In other words, Indonesia is faced with the dilemma of maintaining a good and friendly relationship with an existing close friend (Japan) on the one hand, and maintaining the opportunity to develop a good relationship with a possible close future friend (China), whose future relationship with Japan might continue to be competitive. Finding a balance in managing this dilemma will not be an easy task for Indonesia.
Indeed, Indonesia should be concerned about the possible regional uncertainties stemming from the rise of China. There is no guarantee that in the future a powerful China, both in economic and military terms, will continue to be a status quo power. There is also no guarantee China will not pursue a revisionist foreign policy agenda.
The concerns with China relate first and foremost to the question of how the country is going to use its new stature and influence in achieving its national interests and objectives in the region. However, it is important to note that China has pursued positive foreign policy measures in assuring Southeast Asian states that it has no hegemonic intentions in the region.
The key challenge for Indonesia now, together with ASEAN, is how to encourage both Japan and China to avoid an unnecessary strategic rivalry in the region. That would require convincing both major powers of the merits of greater efforts at institution-building and community-building in East Asia.
The East Asian community-building process, for example, constitutes one promising mechanism by which regional states -- including the major powers -- can manage differences and promote common interests within the new emerging regional order in East Asia. Institution does matter and can affect state behavior.
The writer is deputy executive director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
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