ASEAN presence a prerequisite in any future Asia Pacific community

Lilian Budianto, The Jakarta Post | Sat, 05/01/2010 10:45 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Jakarta has recently welcomed Russia and the US to join in the East Asia Summit (EAS) after years of veering away from admitting new members into the 16-strong-grouping. The proposal is aimed at bringing together the two Cold War rivals with the 10 ASEAN member-states plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa talked to The Jakarta Post’s Lilian Budianto on the reasons behind this shift in foreign policy.

Question: What led to the decision to welcome Russia and the US into the EAS?


Answer: It is an undoubted fact that the geopolitical trend today and for the immediate future rests on the increasing prominence of Asia, East Asia, and Asia Pacific in general. Whatever we do in our region, in terms of its regional architecture, geopolitical underpinning and structure, will have not only regional but also global implications.

To put things in the global context, our national perspective is to ensure what we call dynamic equilibrium in the Asia Pacific region. Dynamic equilibrium marked by the absence of domination of any single power; dynamic equilibrium where countries can engage with one another in a mutually beneficial and peaceful way. Given this kind of background and geopolitical concerns, we have become recently aware of ideas such as the Asia Pacific Community and the East Asia Community as suggested by some countries. We are looking at where we are now and how we should proceed. Inaction is not an option.

We are aware that we have to think this through. In the first months of my tenure I am very much in the listening mode. I want to know what are the latest ideas and thoughts. Having listened to the Australian and Japanese ideas, we come to several conclusions. One, we must continue with the ASEAN community building track. We must not be diverted away from the ASEAN community track because any future Asia Pacific community must have as a constituent element the ASEAN community. It’s a prerequisite. So, first and foremost we must continue to integrate ourselves into ASEAN community building efforts by 2015.

However, you can walk and whistle at the same time. So, when I said we must concentrate and put emphasis on ASEAN community building, it does not mean that everything else must be put on hold.

Where there are gaps, where there is room for improvement, then we must have the courage to improve and to undertake that. This is where the East Asia Summit comes in, especially vis a vis how best to engage or find the right modalities for the deepening of US and Russia engagement in the region. This is still the ongoing discussion. We have yet to find the right modality, whether via the East Asia Summit or other.

Does ASEAN look to have both Russia and the US joining at one time or it can come in sequence?

Russia has been knocking on the door for some time. They are there and want to join the EAS. We have formally stated that we welcome Russia’s participation in the summit, which is an evolution in our position. At the same time we would also welcome, the US in the EAS, if they wish to join. But we have yet to hear formally from them. Now in terms of the sequence, as to which comes before, that is something we can think through further. Ideally, it would be nice to think that they can do things in tandem or in concert in terms of procedures.

Why not just do it in one go. But there is also the geopolitical context as well, that it would be ideal if both these relatively large countries proceeded in concert.

But these are all still possibilities. It is not Indonesia’s business to suggest anything to these countries because we are yet to fully ascertain what is the preferred modality.


Do all ASEAN member states already agree in principle to include Russia and the US?

This is still being discussed. The leaders in their summit in Hanoi have tasked foreign ministers to consider fully

the whole subject of regional architecture. I think, to be honest, this will be forever a work-in-progress. There won’t be one day when we can say that it is all done. This is something fluid and dynamic, constantly evolving. There won’t be a moment in time when we say we are not perfect right now and after the two countries join us, this is it. No, we are constantly evolving in a dynamic and fluid situation. Indonesia revels in this kind of dynamic. We are not worried.

We find this dynamic equilibrium is the type of diplomacy that will make progress. We need to be alert to the evolving situation.

Do you have any timeline to complete the discussion on the expansion?

I don’t want to reduce it to the whole issue of expansion per se. It is more than simply an expansion. The fact is we have the ministerial meeting in Hanoi this July and then we have the summit this October and so there will be at least those opportunities to see whether progress can be made.

Indonesia will be chairing ASEAN in 2011 and this is a good opportunity along the line for us to be part of the effort to help shape our regional architecture. For us, sooner is better than later. No need to postpone things that can be done. But at the same time, we are very much aware that this is about comfort levels, we must proceed as they said in ASEAN language: at the best comfortable rate for all

Defining Indonesia’s need for a grand strategy

Lie Nathanael Santoso, Washington | Fri, 08/19/2011 8:00 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

The United States has identified Indonesia as a “linchpin” for security in the Asia Pacific region. Indonesia should rightly be proud.

Why? It has the largest economy in Southeast Asia, is rich in natural resources and is the world’s third largest democracy. It occupies a strategic location for key international maritime activities — bridging the Pacific and Indian oceans. The country has huge potential to become one of Asia’s leading powers of the 21st century.

However, there is something Indonesia lacks — a grand strategy. It has not clearly defined what its geopolitical interests are and has not convincingly articulated what it wants to achieve with its foreign
relations over the long term.

It needs to explain how its foreign policy advances its overall national interests. Indonesia had outlined eight foreign policy priorities in 2009, including taking the leadership role in ASEAN and strengthening partnerships with other Asia-Pacific countries.

As chair of ASEAN this year, Indonesia has shown it can play a significant role in shaping the regional architecture of the Asia Pacific.

Indonesia is setting the agenda of all the ASEAN-related meetings this year — a testing time for Jakarta due to outstanding border disputes between neighbors Thailand and Cambodia and China’s claims in the South China Sea. These security concerns come at a time when US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton identifies ASEAN as the “fulcrum” of the evolving regional architecture.

By leading ASEAN to discuss these “sensitive” issues during the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meetings in Bali last month, Indonesia is taking a leadership role. Indeed, Indonesia should take heart that it was under its leadership when China agreed to the guidelines of a Code of Conduct (COC) with ASEAN.

But Indonesia’s leadership should not end there, or at the end of this year when its ASEAN chairmanship expires. The question that Indonesia needs to define clearly is — how do the successes of this year advance Indonesia’s national interests in the long run?

Indonesia’s leaders need to remind themselves that their country’s involvement in ASEAN or in other international forums is a means and not an end in itself. They should understand that the ultimate geopolitical goal for Indonesia is to become a significant economic and global power.

Being a global power gives Indonesia greater security, stability, prosperity, and access to markets and opportunities. It has the potential to achieve all of these.

But it has to consolidate its military capabilities, maintain high GDP growth and have a stable economy diversified away from natural resources. It should aim to be in the same league as China and India within the next two decades and it should take concrete, strategic measures to achieve that. Indonesia has to diversify its foreign policy and invest more time and resources engaging other powers that have strategic and economic influence in the Asia Pacific. Key pillars of a grand strategy for Indonesia could include:

Strengthening military relations with Australia, India, Japan and the United States. Indonesia’s diplomatic relationship with these countries has improved since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took office in 2004. Jakarta has to build on this improvement and make more efforts to militarily engage these countries.

They are strategically located across the Asia Pacific, have sustained relatively strong economies and have advanced military technologies that Indonesia could acquire.

Jakarta needs to diversify its foreign policy resources and find common ground with these countries, especially as they have recognized Indonesia as part of their main foreign policy formulations for the security of the Asia Pacific.

Continue taking a leadership role in regional economic architecture. Indonesia should continue to invest in ASEAN and help establish the ASEAN Economic Community by 2015.

It has to strengthen its trade relations with China, play a more active role in economic institutions such as APEC and the G20 and consider joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). A strategic economic policy is core to a proactive and globally compelling foreign policy.

This will take courage, because it means investing in Indonesia’s future competitiveness while exposing legacy businesses to new levels of competition. Trading long-term gains in technology, education, access to markets and innovation for short-term pain to large and inefficient national businesses is in Indonesia’s interest.

Clearly articulate Indonesia’s foreign policy principle of “active and independent” in the context of
21st-century globalism. The principle of “active and independent” has been used since it was formulated in 1948 by Indonesia’s first vice president Mohammad Hatta. This foreign policy was aimed to avoid Indonesia being pulled into the orbit of the big powers’ politics during the Cold War.

At present, though, Indonesia needs to look at this principle contextually and not literally. It has to define this ideology in the context of a complex, interdependent world of the 21st century. In short, Indonesia needs to strategically define what it wants to achieve in the long run.

It should not limit its foreign policy to Southeast Asia only. It has to continue strengthening ASEAN because Indonesia’s role as an influential global power is limited if ASEAN is weak. At the same time, it has to realize that it has enough clout to bilaterally engage with other big powers.

The writer is an Indonesia researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Southeast Asia Program in Washington, DC. He has a Master’s degree in International History and Asian Studies from Georgetown University.

Asia in a messy world

Simon Tay, Singapore | Thu, 08/18/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A | - Klipping the Jakarta Post

Problems in public finance in the US and Europe have spooked markets. The debt ceiling debacle in Washington DC shows how divided politics has become.

Riots first in Greece and now in the UK dramatically signal how governments struggle as downturns upend the expectations of citizens. Even as order is being restored, the outlook is for a potential recession in the West, and an accompanying political malaise.

Coming in the wake of uprisings in the Arab world, there are reasons to worry that for too much of the world, Spring is turning into a long and torrid Summer. What of Asia?

For most countries for much of the past year, the region has withstood contagion from revolutionary politics, and continued to grow rapidly. Some may trumpet this as another step in the decline of the West and the rise of Asia. These relatively favorable conditions are however subject to change.

Global interdependence continues and many exports from Asian factories still seek a final consumer in the West.

Countries like the Philippines and India bank considerable remittances from workers abroad. A prolonged slump in Europe and the US will impact exports, industries and jobs across Asia.

What has buoyed Asian economies has been the China factor but now signs from the Asian giant must be closely watched. Economic growth is slowing, even as inflation rises and wage demands spiral. Rapid growth has been a lubricant for social and political frictions in the country, so this is more than an economic question.

Protests by the Uighur minority in early August may be a special case. But recent anger over the tragic train crash in China shows a restive public sentiment.

Since the turning point of the Foxconn protests in mid 2010, labor costs and fewer jobs have also been a specter.

China’s intensely domestic issues matter more today than ever before. If Beijing cannot maintain economic growth and political stability, then bereft of the economic engines of the West, the impacts will be outsized across the region and for many multinationals.

Yet even if China is stable internally, its external influence is not always benevolent. Tensions have risen with others Asians over political and security issues like the South China Seas, Senkaku islands and Korean peninsula.

Thus even as some are concerned about an unstable Chinese economy, others fear an assertive Middle Kingdom attitude, especially if the USA is sidelined.

In a messy world, Asians are not inured.

Many hope the West is going through only temporary disruptions, and that their economies soon will recover, and polities heal. Few are prepared if the West is in sharp decline, for a global economic downturn and more political ruptures.

If governments cannot keep inflation down, problems can flare easily not only in the streets of Beijing, but in Jakarta or Kuala Lumpur. If they give in to populist gestures and do not discipline subsidies and stimulus spending, macroeconomic conditions can change quickly in a world of financial turmoil.

If protests break out in Asian cities, government use of force may be tougher than some think legitimate, as seen in the crackdown on the Bersih demonstration in Malaysia. Protests may be exploited by rival elite groups, in attempts to unsettle each other, as seen in Bangkok. Violence and casualties can therefore spiral, as easily as we have seen across the UK — if not worse.

Social cohesion and political compromise will be key factors to avoid such scenarios. For some countries, religion or nationalist institutions can provide such cohesion. Asia’s elites as well as ordinary citizens must be prepared to cooperate and indeed make sacrifices. Such elements are neither unknown nor alien to Asia.

In times of downturn, workers in Singapore and elsewhere were not summarily laid off but instead cooperated with companies by staying at home until economic conditions improved.

In the Asian financial crisis of 1997, many Thais followed the example set by monks to make donations of gold to the Bank of Thailand. Now again, many will look to Thailand under new Premier Yingluck Shinawatra to see if promises of a minimum wage and infrastructure spending can be paired with some political accommodation.

Where finances allow, Asians should construct policies to provide better wages, safety nets of basic welfare and healthcare. Regionally, economies should open up more to each other.

This is not only for the benefits of free trade and investment but can help Asians collectively deal better with global shocks than any one can do alone.

If the world will get messier, Asia cannot presume its continuing rise. There are things that can and should be done, now in these relatively good times, to prepare for potentially worse days ahead.

The writer is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and author of Asia Alone: The Dangerous Post Crisis Divide from America.

Regional Security in Southeast Asia - Beyond the ASEAN Way

1. Until the late 1990s, the ASEAN had been described as one of the most successful regional organizations in the world. Founded in 1967 in a region that was once characterized as conflict-ridden and akin to the “ Balkans of the East “, ASEAN’s efforts in maintaining peaceful relations among its members and with states beyond Southeast Asia has made ASEAN an important actor in the bigger int’l arena of the Asia-Pacific.
2. Moreover, at least until the Asian financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN was also one of the fastest developing economic regions in the world. This made ASEAN a pivotal actor in the much larger multilateral initiatives that emerged, which were geared towards closer political and security co-operation, as well as deeper economic co-operation.
3. These multilateral initiatives include the APEC in 1989, the ARF in 1994, ASEM in 1995 and ASEAN plus 3 in 1997.

Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia - ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order

1. ASEAN has enjoyed a mixed institutional experience since its advent in August 1967. The past three decades and more have seen the Association manage intra-mural tensions with some success and also act as a diplomatic community speaking with a single voice during the course of the Cambodian conflict.
2. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has assumed a diplomatic centrality within the ARF but has also faced evident difficulties in sustaining collective consensus as a result of the impact of regional economic crisis and an enlargement of membership to coincide with geographic Southeast Asia.
3. ASEAN has lived through a major shift in the regional strategic environment of Southeast Asia. In the 1960s, the outlook for regional security and stability in Southeast Asia was particularly grim. The region was portrayed variously as a “ region of revolt “, the “ Balkans of the East “, or a “ region of dominoes “.
4. The weak socio-political cohesion of the region’s new nation states, the legitimacy problem of several of the region’s postcolonial governments, interstate territorial disputes, intra-regional ideological polarisation and intervention by external powers, were marked features of the geopolitical landscape of Southeast Asia. These conflicts posed a threat not only to the survival of some of the region’s new states, but also to the prospects for regional order as a whole.

The Dragon Looks South - China and Southeast Asia in the New Century

1. It is important to understand China’s growing influence in Southeast Asia, because more than half a billion people live in the region, because that region is fifth largest trading partner of both the US and China, and because Southeast Asia sit astride China and the rest of East Asia’s energy windpipe. The most consistent and predictable component of the complicated relationship between China and Southeast Asia has been Beijing’s comprehensive strategy for that region over the past decade.
2. A central argument is that China’s success is inexplicable without exploring the politics, economics, cultures, and foreign policies of the states od Southeast Asia. This region is among the world’s most ethnically, politically and economically diverse and is divided into eleven independent states. Any attempt to treat this region as one state or economy in relation to China distorts reality. It also fails to explain why China has been more successful in one state or part of the region than in another.
3. China’s approach and its appeal to the region has remained remarkably consistent over the past decade. The most significant change has been a decision by Beijing, in early 2001, to avoid direct criticism of or opposition to American policies in Southeast Asia. To achieve its goal China needs non-confrontational relations with the US.

Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia - Politics, Security & Economic Development

1. East Asia – a region that looks likely to exert a profound influence on the course of global history in the twenty-first century. The sources of this influence are to be found in the region’s remarkable economic development and increasing strategic significance. One of the most striking things about East Asia and the countries that compose it is its internal heterogeneity and its distinctiveness from other regions. Indeed, if there is one observation thai is always made about East Asia it is about its diversity. Whether this diversity is measured in terms of living standards, political systems, or religious beliefs, there is much that distinguishes one East Asian country from another.
2. Yet, despite all this diversity and uncertainty, there is increasing interest in attempting to give political and institutional expression to a distinct East Asian region, even if its precise borders remain contested and uncertain. If a more self-consciously realized, increasingly coherent, regional development process does continue, however, it will be one of the most important regional and global political development since the Second World War for, despite the East Asian crisis that erupted so unexpectedly in 1997, and despite the moribund performance of the Japanese economy throughout the 1990. East Asia remains a crucial and increasingly important part of the global economy.