Reviving the spirit of ‘diplomasi perjuangan’

Yayan G.H. Mulyana, Jakarta | Mon, 08/22/2011 7:00 AM A | A | A |- Klipping the Jakarta Post.

On August 17, Indonesia celebrated the 66th anniversary of its independence. Indonesians have always been proud of the fact that their independence was gained and defended by tears and blood, where the use of bambu runcing (sharpened bamboo) was renowned. The physical struggle has been remembered many years after the declaration of independence.

But history records that Indonesian independence has also been guarded by diplomacy.

On August 19, 1945, two days after the declaration of independence, President Sukarno appointed Mr. Achmad Soebardjo to lead a small-sized Indonesian Foreign Ministry. Its initial responsibility was to deal with the remaining Japanese civilian and military administration and the arrival of the British-led Allied forces in Indonesia to disarm the defeated Japanese troops.

Although a foreign policy doctrine was yet to be envisioned during this formative period, diplomacy turned out to be a critical instrument of Indonesia’s foreign policy then.

The newly established Foreign Ministry was anticipating a more demanding role in supporting the government in the later months.

The British-led Allied forces, which docked at Tanjung Priok in Jakarta on September 15, 1945 carried with them the Dutch military personnel and the workforce of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). While serving as part of the Allied forces to disarm the Japanese forces, the Dutch also had a goal to reclaim their colonial power over Indonesia.

The Indonesian government knew more and more that the Dutch were using the American military equipment in their actions. Protesting the use of the American equipment by the NICA, President Sukarno sent a cable to President Harry S. Truman on October 20, 1945.

Diplomacy was increasingly important when the Dutch became more assertive in realizing their reoccupation policy. One important step was the Hoge Voluwe negotiation that took place from April 14 to 24, 1946.

It concluded with no concrete results. Following the unsuccessful Hoge Voluwe negotiation, from November 11 to 13, 1946, Indonesia and met with Dutch representatives at Linggarjati, and both accepted the Linggarjati Agreement.

The Linggarjati Agreement was short-lived. On July 21, 1947, the Dutch carried out their first military action in major cities of Indonesia. This move was aimed to secure factories and plantations vital to their economic interests. It was in breach of the Linggarjati Agreement.

The UN Security Council responded to the situation. The council endorsed the US proposal of the establishment of the Three States Commission. Under the Commission’s facilitation, Indonesia and the Netherlands signed the Renville Agreement on Jan. 17, 1948. The Agreement comprised two documents; on a ceasefire and on the establishment of foundations for achieving political accord.

The year was a difficult time for Indonesian diplomacy. In the international arena, the Cold War was steadily evolving. This had several repercussions in the domestic politics of the newly independent country. Muso and his Front Demokrasi Rakjat staged a revolt in Madiun in September 1948, and the Soviet flag was fluttering in the city. A debate among nationalists on whether the republic should align with the Soviet Union-led bloc or with the United States-led bloc had been pressing the government. In response, in his bold and visionary speech before parliament on September 2, 1948, Vice President Hatta outlined the bebas (independent) and aktif (active) doctrine of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

A few months after the pronouncement of the doctrine, on December 19, 1948, the Netherlands executed its second police action. Yogyakarta was captured, and Sukarno and Hatta were placed in exile. President Sukarno ordered the establishment of an emergency government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra, with Syafruddin Prawiranegara as president. He also tasked Dr. Sudarsono, L.N. Palar and A.A. Maramis who were then in India to found a government in exile if the plan to establish an emergency government in Sumatra did not succeed.

And once again, the UN Security Council responded to this aggression. After a long session, from March 10 to 23, 1949, the Council endorsed that a Round Table Conference was to be convened in The Hague from August 23 to November 2, 1949. A prelude to the Round Table Conference was the Roem-Roijen Agreement of May 1949. And the Round Table Conference turned out to be the last major effort of diplomasi perjuangan (diplomacy of struggle) during the formative period of Indonesia’s foreign policy.

But diplomasi perjuangan did not stop there. It continued to work in the following years. It worked in the Indonesia’s struggle for its sovereignty over West Irian, or Papua. It helped revive the Indonesian economy and its international stature in the era of President Soeharto. It was an important part of Indonesia’s struggle in securing the support of the international community for its sovereignty and territorial integrity during the rule of presidents Habibie, Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid.

And today, diplomasi perjuangan is as relevant as ever before. Under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the spirit of diplomasi perjuangan has been reflected, among other areas, in Indonesia’s efforts to realize an ASEAN Community, to build a regional architecture that generates peace, prosperity and stability, to build a just, balanced and sustainable global financial architecture, to address a gamut of non-traditional security challenges such as food and energy, and to eradicate poverty and elevate the people’s living conditions through the attainment of the MDGs.

As in the past, diplomasi perjuangan could be multi-pronged. In the formative period, it helped the government to tackle foreign aggression, and at the same time to respond to the bipolar pressure of the Cold War. One of the important factors of diplomasi perjuangan is unity in policy and national support. Domestic dissension will only corrode its effectiveness.

In future, diplomasi perjuangan will remain an essential instrument of Indonesia’s foreign policy. It is a foreign policy instrument with Indonesia’s character. And bebas aktif will continue to serve as its doctrinal vigor.

The writer is an assistant to the special staff to the President for International Relations. The opinions expressed are his own.